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Abstract 
 
 
Procopius of Caesarea wrote a classicizing history of the wars of Justinian, 
which focuses squarely on warfare in an age when his contemporaries were often 
directing their attention towards theological matters.  Battles make up a significant 
portion of this history and they are the focus of this thesis, with particular attention 
paid to their literary construction, as well as the values, norms, and assumptions 
which underscore them. 
Chapter one focuses on the life and social background of Procopius, 
addressing issues such as his literary career and education.  Chapter two looks at 
the wider context, including the three strands of thought concerning the composition 
of a work of history written in Greek, namely rhetoric, historiographical theory, and 
Greek military theory.  It looks, particularly, at the theorists’ respective discussions of 
battle; and, the practices adopted by Procopius’ contemporaries when approaching 
battle, whether writing an ecclesiastical history, chronicle, or classicizing history, or a 
military treatise. 
In the next four chapters I focus on the text itself.  Chapter three, on the 
Persian Wars, looks at issues such as narrative order and pace, the exhortation, and 
morale, discipline, and the use of stratagems.  Battles in the Vandal Wars is the 
subject of chapter four, and here I look at how Procopius engages with his audience 
through the use of literary devices such as narrator interventions and narrative 
markers, as well as how he characterizes the warfare itself.  In chapter five I explore 
the influence that Homer has had on Procopius’ descriptions of battle in the Gothic 
Wars, especially the siege of Rome.  The last chapter, six, skips the thematic 
 x 
approach used in the previous three chapters and instead evaluates his battles on a 
case-by-case basis.   
While Procopius’ conception of battle betrays many of the hallmarks of his 
classical predecessors, there are unmistakable signs of the influence of his 
contemporary context, such as the attribution of outcomes to God.  What is more, 
these battles, which are carefully constructed, and integrated into the wider text, 
showcase Procopius’ skill and ingenuity as a writer, and historian.  As a result, my 
thesis demonstrates that Procopius needs to be taken seriously as a literary, cultural, 
and historical source for the sixth century.
 1 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is a study of war and historiography in one period of late antiquity, 
namely the sixth century during the reign of Justinian.  The particular focus of the 
thesis is the descriptions of battle in the Wars of Procopius.  Although there have 
been a handful of studies on military matters and Procopius, and studies of warfare 
that have touched on Procopius, the issue of Procopius and battle remains, 
somewhat surprisingly, largely untouched.1  This is despite the fact that the number 
of works devoted to Procopius has started to increase, as has the number of works 
devoted to Justinian and his age.2  Indeed, one might conjecture that the study of 
late antiquity itself has come of age,3 especially now that in many western 
universities it is recognized as an important part of the study of the ancient world, if 
not as a period worthy of study in its own right.  Thanks to the utilization of new tools 
of analysis, such as the inclusion of theoretical frameworks from other disciplines, 
our knowledge and understanding of ancient historiography and warfare has made 
significant advances over the past two decades or so.  A selective survey of the 
modern literature concerned with historiography and warfare in late antiquity will bear 
this out, while also highlighting the gaps that still exist, including, notably, battle, and 
Procopius as a military historian. 
An increasing number of scholars are turning their attention to historiography 
in late antiquity; if we include the late antique historians under the broader category 
                                                
1 There are some exceptions, which I discuss below pp 8-12. 
2 Though the number of studies devoted to late antiquity is nothing like those pertaining to 
Classical Greece and Classical Rome, particularly Classical Athens and late Republican and 
early Imperial Rome, I have been forced to be selective.  My bibliography for this introduction 
contains only a sample of the requisite material. 
3 See the various contributions to volume 72 (1997) of Symbolae Osloenses, which examine 
the impact of Peter Brown’s (1971), the World of Late Antiquity, on the study of the late 
Roman world. 
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of Byzantine historians the list is even greater.4  There have been both general 
studies, and examinations of specific issues.  All manners of historical writing have 
been approached:  from the writers of ecclesiastical history, such as the works of 
Urbainczyk on Socrates,5 and Van Nuffeln on both Socrates and Sozomen;6 to the 
many works of Jeffreys, and her colleagues, on Malalas and the Greek chronicle,7 as 
well as those of Croke on Marcellinus and the Latin chronicle.8  There have also 
been studies of individuals.  As regards Ammianus Marcellinus, Matthews 
contributed an extensive study to the fourth century historian;9 Barnes wrote a 
monograph on his literary presentation of historical reality;10 Drijvers and Hunt edited 
a collection of papers on various aspects of Ammianus, which, in many respects, 
built on the earlier work of Matthews;11 Kagan studied Ammianus in tandem with 
Caesar in a broader look at battle narrative;12 and Kelly, the most recent contribution 
in this selective list, has looked at intertextuality in the Res Gestae.13  There have 
been studies of particular matters pertaining to the writing of history such as 
Marincola’s look at the way that ancient historians establish their authority in their 
texts, which includes Ammianus Marcellinus;14 Inglebert’s book on the transformation 
of ancient knowledge in a Christian empire, of which a substantial portion is devoted 
                                                
4 Ljubarskij (1993, 1998) has both edited and contributed papers on Byzantine historiography.  
One of the more prominent sections in a recent collection in honour of Roger Scott is devoted 
to historical narrative (Burke 2006).  The proceedings of a conference on Byzantine historical 
narrative were published in the same year as the Scott volume (Odorico, Agapitos, and 
Hinterberger 2006).  Similarly, the 2007 spring symposium of Byzantine Studies in Britain 
was devoted to historiography.  Indeed, historiography is generally considered one of, if not 
the, prime contribution of the Byzantines to world literature.   
5 Urbainczyk 1997. 
6 Van Nuffelen 2004. 
7 Jeffreys, Croke, and Scott 1990; Jeffreys 2000, 2003.. 
8 Croke 1990, 2001, 2003. 
9 Matthews 1989. 
10 Barnes 1998. 
11 Drijvers and Hunt 1999. 
12 Kagan 2006. 
13 Kelly 2008. 
14 Marincola 1997. 
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to historical writing;15 Clark’s insightful text on the writing of history and literary 
theory, which is in part devoted to historical texts;16 Brodka’s study of historical 
thought at the end of antiquity in the works of Procopius, Agathias, and Theophylact 
Simocatta;17 and Merrills’ examination of the transformation of historical and 
geographical thought in the works of Orosius, Jordanes, Isidore of Seville, and Bede 
at the dawn of the medieval world.18  There have also been broader studies of a 
particular aspect of late antiquity such as the reign of Justinian, or, historiography in 
general, that have included chapters on late antique historiography.  Some such 
examples include Heather’s chapter on late antique historiography, which is included 
in a volume on historical writing through the ages;19 Liebeschuetz’s study of the late 
antique city which includes some discussion of historiography in both the east and 
west;20 Mazal’s chapter on historical writing in his large study of Justinian and his 
age;21 Flusin’s chapter on literary culture, which has some bearing on the historical 
literature;22 Rapp’s chapter on Justinianic literary culture, which is much like Flusin’s, 
though with a greater focus on historiography;23 there are a handful of chapters 
which are specifically concerned with late antique issues in Marincola’s recent 
companion to Greek and Roman historiography.24  We have also seen the 
publication of a handful of books, and edited volumes, devoted to late antique 
                                                
15 Inglebert 2001:  289-391; 463-544.  
16 Clark 2004. 
17 Brodka 2004.  Despite my focus on battles in particular, my main focus in this thesis is how 
Procopius orders his narrative.  Brodka (2004:  62-108) has recently looked at some aspects 
of the Wars narrative structure. 
18 Merrills 2005. 
19 Heather 1997:  69-87. 
20 Liebeschuetz 2001:  223-248; 318-341. 
21 Mazal 2001:  486-501. 
22 Flusin 2004. 
23 Rapp 2005. 
24 Marincola 2007a.  See, especially, the contributions of Banchich, “The Epitomizing 
Tradition in Late Antiquity”; Croke, “Late Antique Historiography, 250-650 CE”; Kelly “To 
Forge their Tongues to Grander Styles: Ammianus' Epilogue”; and Rohrbacher “Ammianus' 
Roman Digressions and the Audience of the Res Gestae”. 
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historians such as the book edited by Cameron and Conrad on the late antique 
east;25 Rohrbacher’s book entitled the Historians of Late Antiquity, which deals 
primarily with fourth and fifth century historians;26 the collected volume edited by 
Marasco, which contains papers covering a wide range of late antique 
historiographical issues;27 and, Treadgold’s overview of early Byzantine historians, 
which includes those writing between the third and seventh centuries.28  Although 
many gaps still remain, the establishment of a number of standard texts as well as 
the publication of a host of translations has done much to open up the field; the work 
of Blockley is noteworthy in this regard.29  Indeed, as this overview suggests, late 
antique historiography has been well served of late, as with many other aspects of 
late antiquity. 
Late antique warfare has perhaps been even better served than 
historiography.  A number of major collaborations on late antiquity that have been 
published over the past twenty years or so have included a chapter or two on late 
antique warfare.  Volumes XII, XIII, and XIV of the Cambridge Ancient History all 
include chapters on warfare, with Campbell contributing a chapter on the army, and 
Wilkes on the provinces and frontiers in XII;30 Lee discussing the army, and Blockley 
war and diplomacy in XIII;31 and with Whitby contributing two chapters, one on the 
army, the other on the army and society, in XIV.32  In the two respective Cambridge 
late antique companions there are chapters on warfare with Elton contributing to the 
                                                
25 Cameron and Conrad 1992.  In this book Whitby’s (1992) paper on Greek historical writing 
is the most relevant.  Cf. Whitby 1988:  311-358. 
26 Rohrbacher 2002. 
27 Marasco 2003. 
28 Treadgold 2007. 
29 Blockley has published editions with translation and commentary of the fragmentary 
historians of late antiquity, including Malchus, Olympiodorus, and Priscus (1981, 1983), and 
Menander (1985). 
30 Campbell 2005; Wilkes 2005. 
31 Blockley 1998; Lee 1998. 
32 Whitby 2000a; Whitby 2000b. 
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Constantine volume,33 and Lee to the Justinian volume;34 Zuckerman supplies the 
chapter in Le Monde Byzantin I edited by Morrisson;35 and Whitby adds a chapter on 
emperor and army in Swain and Edward’s Approaching Late Antiquity.36  There have 
been monographs on broader themes that have included discussions on warfare in 
late antiquity, though the breadth of coverage has varied:  Cameron in her 
Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity,37 Mazal in his Justinian I und seine Zeit,38 
Halsall in his Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West,39 and Southern’s ‘Late 
Roman Army’ chapter in her the Roman Army:  a Social and Institutional History.40  
On the other hand, we have seen the publication of a number of collections devoted 
specifically to warfare in late antiquity, or to military matters in general that have 
included chapters on late antiquity.  Four collections concerned with late antique 
warfare are the Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East:  States, Resources and 
Armies, edited by Averil Cameron;41 the many varied contributions in Le Bohec and 
Wolff’s L’Armée Romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien I;42 the recently published 
collection on the Danube region in late antiquity edited by Poulter which is largely 
concerned with military matters;43 and the new volume edited by Lewin and Pellegrini 
                                                
33 Elton 2006. 
34 Lee 2005. 
35 Zuckerman 2004. 
36 Whitby 2004a. 
37 Cameron 1993:  49-56. 
38 Mazal 2001:  325-331. 
39 Halsall 2007:  101-110. 
40 Southern 2007:  245-265. 
41 Cameron 1995. See, especially, the papers by Carrié, “L’état à la recherche de nouveaux 
modes de financement des armées (Rome et Byzance, IVe-VIIIe siècles)”; Howard-Johnston, 
“the Two Great Powers in Late Antiquity:  a Comparison”; Isaac, “The Army in the Late 
Roman East:  the Persian Wars and the Defence of the Byzantine Provinces”; Rubin, “The 
Reforms of Khusro Anushirwan”; and Whitby, “Recruitment in Roman Armies from Justinian 
to Heraclius, ca. 565-615”.  
42 Le Bohec and Wolff 2004. 
43 The papers by Christie, “From the Danube ot the Po:  the Defence of Pannonia and Italy in 
the Fourth and Fifth Centuries”; Crow, “Amida and Tropaeum Traiani:  a Comparison of Late 
Antique Fortress Cities on the Lower Danube and Mesopotamia”; Dinchev, “The Fortresses 
of Thrace and Dacia in the Early Byzantine Period”; Heather, “Goths in the Roman Balkans, 
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entitled the Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab 
Conquest.44  The recent Companion to the Roman Army edited by Erdkamp45 
contains a section on late antiquity with chapters by Elton on battle,46 Liebeschuetz 
on warlords,47 Stickler on the foederati,48 and Whitby on war and society;49 the 
chapters by Caldwell, Levithan, and Whately in Bragg, Hau, and Macaulay-Lewis’ 
Beyond the Battlefields;50 and, notably, the chapters by Elton on the military forces,51 
Fear on war and society,52 Humphries on international relations,53 Lee on war and 
the state,54 Rance on battle,55 and Whitby on war itself56 in the late antique section of 
volume II of the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare.57  Finally, a 
number of monographs dealing with late antique military matters have also been 
published.  The period from Diocletian to the middle of the fifth century has been 
particularly well served, with books by Liebeschuetz concerned largely with the issue 
of barbarization at the end of fourth century into the fifth;58 by Elton on the fourth and 
fifth centuries, again concerned, at least in part, with barbarization, but also Rome 
                                                                                                                                      
c. 350-500”; Johnstone, “A Short Report on the Preliminary Results form the Study of the 
Mammal and Bird Bone Assemblages from Dichin”; Liebeschuetz, “The Lower Danube 
Region under Pressure:  from Valens to Heraclius”; Von Bülow, “The Fort of Iatrus in Moesia 
Secunda:  Observations on the Late Roman Defensive System on the Lower Danube 
(Fourth-Sixth centuries AD)” ; and Whitby, “The Late Roman Army and the Defence of the 
Balkans”, in Poulter (2007) are most relevant. 
44 Lewin and Pellegrini 2007. 
45 Erdkamp 2007. 
46 Elton 2007c. 
47 Liebeschuetz 2007. 
48 Stickler 2007. 
49 Whitby 2007c. 
50 Bragg, Hau, and Macaulay-Lewis 2008.  Caldwell’s paper is concerned with troop loyalty 
during the civil wars in the fourth century Balkans, Levithan’s looks at the intentional 
exposure of emperors and generals during sieges through Roman Imperial history, and my 
own paper looks at the connection between generalship and indiscipline in much of the sixth 
century literature concerned with military matters. 
51 Elton 2007a. 
52 Fear 2007. 
53 Humphries 2007. 
54 Lee 2007b. 
55 Rance 2007a. 
56 Whitby 2007b. 
57 Sabin, Van Wees and Whitby 2007b. 
58 Liebeschuetz 1990. 
 7 
and their western foes at war; 59 by Southern and Dixon, ostensibly concerned with 
the whole of late antiquity though focusing more heavily on the fourth century and 
quite dependent on earlier work;60 by Nicasie, which covers many of the same issues 
as Elton, only with more discussion of army organization;61 by Richardot, covering a 
range of issues from frontier surveillance to logistics with a handful of case studies of 
individual battles;62 and by Le Bohec, which, like the previous five, is concerned 
mostly with the west, and again covers many issues from the state of the army under 
specific emperors to military architecture.63  Doug Lee has published a wide-ranging 
book that looks at the effects of war on society in late antiquity, but which also 
includes a look at the military infrastructure;64 while Ravegnani has contributed two 
books on Justinianic military matters, the first focused on the soldiery and issues 
such as equipment and the conditions of service,65 the latter with war itself from 
imperial defence policy to battle itself.66  Greatrex contributed a detailed study of the 
first Persian war of the sixth century using a wide array of different sources, and, 
which also looked at things from the Iranian perspective; and Syvänne has written a 
very detailed book on tactics in the last century and a half of antiquity that also 
includes discussion of the armies of Rome’s opponents.67  This dizzying survey of 
much of the modern literature concerned with late antique warfare gives some 
indication of the breadth and variety of coverage over the past two decades; 
however, it should also have flagged some of the gaps.   
                                                
59 Elton 1996. 
60 Southern and Dixon 1996. 
61 Nicasie 1998. 
62 Richardot 2005. 
63 Le Bohec 2006. 
64 Lee 2007a. 
65 Ravegnani 1988. 
66 Ravegnani 2004. 
67 Syvänne 2004. 
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Scholars have looked at both historiographical and military issues in their 
works, but less so the historiography of war.  Indeed, for good reason, source 
criticism is a major part of most studies of warfare in late antiquity; much of this is 
concerned with not only the reliability of the historians used, but also their qualities 
as military historians.  Both Greatrex and Syvänne, for example, include substantial 
discussions of the major historians, as well as the various other sorts of evidence, in 
their works.68  Though dealing with a later period, Birkenmeier is illustrative in this 
regard, devoting as he does his first chapter of his study of the Komnenian army to 
the textual sources, particularly the many principal historians of the age.69  The first 
section of the collection on the fourth century Roman army edited by Le Bohec and 
Wolff is based on sources, and contains an interesting chapter by Sabbah, who 
discussed some of the literary qualities of Ammianus’ treatment of warfare in an 
earlier book.70  There are also studies of particular military matters centred on the 
evidence of a single historian, though they are fewer in number, and span the course 
of antiquity through to the Byzantine period.71  Kouroumali’s recent doctoral thesis 
examined Procopius’ presentation of the Gothic War in detail, and it is in part an 
extended source criticism and commentary on Procopius’ Wars V-VII.72  Whitby’s 
monograph on the emperor Maurice, with especial attention paid to the Balkan and 
Persian warfare that occupied much of the reign, is also a careful historiographical 
                                                
68 Greatrex 1998:  62-67, 73-76, 168,194-195; Syvänne 2004:  12-27. 
69 Birkenmeier 2002:  3-26.  Those historians are namely Anna Komnena, John Zonaras, 
Nikephoros Bryennios, Michael Psellos, John Kinnamos, and Niketas Choniates. 
70 Sabbah 2004.  See Sabbah 1978. 
71 J. W. I. Lee (2007) studies the classical Greek mercenary soldiers through a careful 
analysis of Xenophon’s Anabasis, and by employing material from sociology and modern war 
studies.  Though he is less concerned with the issues that I discuss, it is an important study 
nonetheless.  Xenophon is also the primary source for Hutchinson’s (2000) look at command 
in the late fifth and fourth centuries BC, pertinent because of the emphasis that Procopius 
places on generalship.  The same can be said for Ash (1999), who looks at Tacitus’ careful 
characterization of the rival armies, and their commanders, during the civil wars that led to 
the promotion of Vespasian to the purple in the Histories. 
72 I want to thank Maria for allowing me to read her thesis (Kouroumali 2005).  I discuss her 
work further below. 
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examination of Theophylact Simocatta.73  Dealing with a later period of Byzantine 
history, Holmes’ detailed study of the reign of Basil II and his foreign policy is in large 
measure an historiographical study of John Skylitzes.74  The precedent for an 
historiographically based study of warfare in late antiquity does exist.   
There have been a number of papers that have treated some aspect of 
Procopius’ treatment of military matters in the sixth century.75  Nearly a century ago 
Müller examined the Justinianic army as reported by Procopius and Agathias, 
focusing primarily on troop types from the so-called katalogoi to the private soldiers, 
though also looking, if briefly, at conditions.76  Hannestad wrote an influential article 
that, much like Müller’s, focused largely on the military forces as described by 
Procopius in the Gothic Wars, especially their numbers; he also discussed the 
change in presentation of Belisarius in the second half of this text. 77  The Buildings 
has attracted a lot of attention thanks to Procopius’ heavy emphasis on frontiers and 
strategy.  Brian Croke discussed the Anastasian Long Wall and argued against 
Procopius’ claims that Anastasius had built it.78  In another article, Croke, along with 
Crow, discuss Procopius’ presentation of the fortress of Dara using it as a case study 
to generalize about his account of other buildings on the eastern frontier; they 
ultimately conclude that he tends to over-exaggerate.79  These views have been 
challenged, however, on a number of occasions, by Michael Whitby.  Whitby treats 
Procopius’ presentation of a number of eastern frontier sites in detail.  He 
acknowledges, for example, that the description of Martyropolis needs to be treated 
                                                
73 Whitby 1988. 
74 Holmes 2005. 
75 This survey includes the majority of those papers that deal specifically with Procopius and 
military matters.  As such, I have left out those other studies which, at some point or other, 
discuss military matters, if briefly, such as the monographs of Cameron, Kaldellis, and Börm. 
76 Müller 1912. 
77 Hannestad 1960. 
78 Croke 1982. 
79 Croke and Crow 1983. 
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with caution, but argues that it is not mere fabrication.80  Whitby’s sanguine view of 
Procopius, particularly his recognition of his value for late antique frontier and military 
history, is forcefully advocated in a handful of other papers, one on the defences of 
Upper Mesopotamia,81 one on his presentation of Dara, which is a successful 
refutation of the arguments of Croke and Crow,82 and another that looks at a number 
of different sites, including Edessa, Sergiopolis, and the churches of Saints Peter 
and Paul at Constantinople.83  Many of the papers in the Antiquité Tardive collection 
devoted to the Buildings have some bearing on military matters.84  Despite this 
attention on the Buildings, the Wars has not entirely been overlooked.  Adshead 
contributed a thoughtful paper that compared Procopius’ description of the siege of 
Rome with Thucydides’ siege of Syracuse, while also discussing some aspects of his 
presentation of strategy, particularly as regards the Slavs.85 The same year as 
Adshead’s paper Walter Kaegi published an overview of Procopius’ qualities as a 
military historian.86  In Kaegi’s eyes Procopius is the best Byzantine military historian, 
and over the course of his paper he looks at issues such as his attention to detail, his 
knowledge of earlier military history, logistics, heroism, while also remarking that 
“Procopius was an accomplished analyst of battles and missed opportunities”.87  
Liebeschuetz discusses the willingness of the Italians to participate in combat, 
largely on the basis of the evidence of Procopius.88  Pazdernik compares Procopius’ 
presentation of Belisarius and Thucydides’ of Brasidas in an intertextual analysis that 
                                                
80 Whitby 1984. 
81 Whitby 1986a. 
82 Whitby 1986b. 
83 Whitby 1987. 
84 Antiquité Tardive 8, 2000.  This special edition is entitled Le De Aedificiis de Procope:  Le 
Texte et les Réalités Documentaires. 
85 Adshead 1990. 
86 Kaegi 1990. 
87 Kaegi 1990:  67. 
88 Liebeschuetz 1996. 
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draws on his unpublished PhD dissertation.89  The paper focuses largely on the 
respective generals’ treatment of, and interaction with, the population of the cities 
they aim to capture, as well as their authority.  Philip Rance has recently discussed 
Procopius’ description of the battle of Busta Gallorum and his presentation of sixth 
century warfare.90  In this wide-ranging paper Rance is primarily concerned with 
reconstructing the battle, particularly as regards the tactics employed by both sides, 
which he endeavours to place in their sixth century context, though Procopius’ 
sources and methodology also attract considerable attention.  Maria Kouroumali has 
recently completed her Oxford thesis on Procopius and the Gothic Wars, which deals 
not only with stylistic and methodological issues regarding Procopius, particularly in 
comparison to Thucydides, but also with the war in Italy itself, and how Procopius’ 
reconstruction matches what little we know.91  Lastly, in a paper which returns to the 
issue of Dara, Chris Lillington-Martin reconstructs the topography of the site using a 
re-reading of Procopius’ description from the Wars, as well as his own first-hand 
knowledge of the site.92  In summation, there have been a number of important 
studies of various aspects of Procopius the military historian; however, major gaps 
still exist.  Despite the significant work on the Buildings, and Procopius’ discussion of 
eastern fortresses, much remains to be done regarding his construction, and 
understanding, of the Roman frontiers.93  Procopius has much to tell us about the 
conduct of war in the sixth century:  the supplying of goods while on campaign, a 
task with which he had some experience; imperial decision making, particularly 
                                                
89 The article was published in 2000 while the thesis dates to 1997.  More recently Pazdernik 
(2006) has written an article that compares aspects of Xenophon’s Hellenica with Procopius’ 
Wars, again an intertextual analysis. 
90 Rance 2005. 
91 Kouroumali 2005. 
92 Lillington-Martin 2007. 
93 The careful work of Börm (2007), Greatrex (1998; Greatrex and Lieu 2002), and Whitby 
(1984, 1986a, 1986b, and 1989) has gone a long way towards rectifying this for the east.  
The recent dissertations of Kouroumali (2005) and Sarantis (2005) have done the same for 
Italy and the Balkans, respectively.  
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apparent in the opening to the Vandal Wars when Justinian seeks advice on waging 
war in Africa, though also in the introductions to the Persian Wars and the Gothic 
Wars;  Roman conceptions of foreign policy, including how some members of the 
elite conceived of the frontiers, as well as what they perceived to be the causes of 
war; and, the communications between the emperor and his generals during war 
itself.  Yet, the most glaring omission might be Procopius’ descriptions of combat, 
whether open battle or siege.  Although the evidence from his works has been used 
to reconstruct ancient battles and warfare,94 there has been no detailed treatment of 
his narratives themselves.     
With so much still to be done regarding Procopius and warfare I need to 
clarify my focus on battle.  For one thing, the interest in ancient battles is sufficient to 
warrant such a study, and in many ways Procopius makes a better object of study 
than most other ancient historians.  In Procopius’ case it is important to note that he 
was both an eye-witness to some of the battles that he describes, as well as their 
only chronicler.  Furthermore, in the works referred to above, the issue of Procopius 
and battle has not been addressed at length.  This is in marked contrast to that other 
major late antique historian, Ammianus Marcellinus; his descriptions of battle have 
attracted considerable attention.95  There have been two studies devoted specifically 
to Ammianus’ qualities as a military historian, one by Austin,96 the other by Crump,97 
both of which treat battle.  Sabbah discusses Ammianus’ literary construction of 
                                                
94 Rubin (1957) does discuss all the major battles in his detailed treatment of Procopius, 
though his commentary is more concerned with geographical and historical matters than 
historiographical ones.  See, for example, his discussions of the battle of Dara (Rubin 1957:  
367-369) and Rome (Rubin 1957:  441-450). 
95 The three most important historians for studying warfare in late antiquity are Ammianus 
Marcellinus, Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, and Procopius.  While I may bemoan the lack of 
attention paid to Procopius, particularly when compared to Ammianus, he is much better 
served than the earlier Syriac historian Pseudo-Joshua, on whom little work has been done. 
96 Austin 1979.  See especially pp 140-161. 
97 Crump 1975.  See especially pp 69-113. 
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battles and sieges in his detailed monograph;98 the same is true for Matthews.99  
Three of the chapters in the collection the Late Roman World and Its Historian are 
concerned with battle and military matters, namely those by Den Hengst,100 Smith,101 
and Trombley.102  Barnes and Kelly are more sparing in their treatment of battle and 
military matters.103  The most detailed study, however, is Kagan’s recent monograph 
on the battle narratives of Ammianus and Caesar.104  This book carefully examines 
the narrative techniques employed by these two historians, and, puts them in relation 
to the points made by Keegan in his monumental Face of Battle, among other 
contemporary psychological and sociological theory, while also focusing on causality 
in these ancient descriptions.105  An important thing that Kagan’s book does is force 
us to think about the many ways that battle has been, and can be, studied, 
particularly in the context of interdisciplinary studies.  The question that arises then is 
how to approach battle in Procopius’ Wars.  There are a number of ways that this 
could be done.  First, I could adopt the approach of Syvänne and Rance and 
concentrate on how his battles elucidate sixth century Roman tactics; this would 
inevitably necessitate the use of other sources, notably Maurice, to fill the gaps that 
Procopius leaves.106  Plus, Procopius, as we shall see, frequently puts his emphasis 
on a variety of factors other than tactics, such as God and morale, when explaining a 
battle.  Second, I could attempt to recreate the course of the battles, employing 
various other materials, both ancient and modern.  Many of the battle summaries in 
                                                
98 Sabbah 1978:  572-588. 
99 Matthews 1989:  279-303. 
100 Den Hengst 1999. 
101 Smith 1999. 
102 Trombley 1999. 
103 Barnes 1998, Kelly 2008. 
104 Kagan 2006. 
105 Keegan 1976.  Kagan (2006:  7-22) offers a provocative critique of Keegan’s ‘face of 
battle’ narrative approach.  Cf. Wheeler 2001. 
106 The best overall discussion of late Roman battle is Rance’s (2007a) chapter in the 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. 
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Syvänne’s book, for example, are heavily dependant on Procopius.107  Battles are, 
however, notoriously complex and nonlinear events, and one observer, which – 
fortunately for many of the battles described – Procopius is, cannot expect to know 
all the central points.108  Whatley long ago recognized the problems this posed; since 
then scholars have attempted to supplement the ancient historians in a variety of 
ways, many of which are carefully set out by Whitby.109  Battlefield archaeology has 
been used with some success to recreate battles.  Though less helpful with open 
battles for reasons such as the nature of the natural environment, the reuse of 
weapons and equipment, the ambiguity which exists about the location of a site, and, 
at least in some locations such as Adrianople, the frequency with which a particular 
spot has been the site of combat, the study of sieges has, at least to some degree, 
benefitted.110  On the one hand Lillington-Martin’s work at Dara has pinpointed the 
precise location of the battle in 530, though it is not likely that any future study of the 
site will tell us any more; on the other hand James’ work at Dura has been of 
inestimable value for elucidating the siege of 256 which, otherwise, is little known.111  
More recently Sabin has applied a general model of combat, which draws on many 
of the techniques used in war-gaming, to a number of ancient battles.  His novel 
model does allow the examination of a number of different scenarios for each battle, 
and it does allow us to view the ancient descriptions from a different perspective, 
though it requires further study before its value can be fully understood.112  
Nevertheless, whether the literary accounts are supplemented by some combination 
of the material evidence and modern models, more work is needed before all the 
                                                
107 Haldon’s (2001) overview of Byzantine warfare is along similar lines. 
108 What constitutes a central point, however, is something that I discuss at length at various 
points in this thesis, and I shall return to this issue shortly. 
109 Whatley 1964; Whitby 2007a.  cf. Hanson 2007. 
110 Keegan 1993:  70-73. 
111 Lee 2007a:  130-131.   
112 Sabin 2007. 
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battles can be successfully reconstructed.  Third, I could use Procopius to describe 
sixth century battle from the much debated ‘face of battle’ approach to battle 
narrative, which takes its name from Keegan’s influential book.113  This has been 
attempted, with some success, by Hanson for Classical Greek warfare,114 and 
Goldsworthy115 and Sabin116 for Classical Roman warfare; such an approach has yet 
to be attempted for late antiquity, though some preliminary studies have been made.  
Syvänne discusses some aspects of the ‘face of battle’ approach as far as it applies 
to infantry battle,117 while Lenski looks at the experience of battle by focusing on two 
separate sieges of Amida.118  This takes me back to the aforementioned study by 
Kagan, in which she suggests that Ammianus pioneered the ‘face of battle’ approach 
which is particularly clear in his descriptions of siege of Amida and the battle of 
Strasbourg.119  Keegan’s approach, however, is not without its flaws, particularly as 
regards ancient combat, as a number of scholars, especially Wheeler, have pointed 
out.120  Fourth, and finally, there is the cultural approach to the study of battle, one 
which claims that battle description reflects culture;121 this is the one that I have 
adopted here in this thesis. 
While introducing the topic of his thought-provoking paper “The Rhetoric of 
Combat”, Ted Lendon makes the following salient points:   
                                                
113 Keegan 1976. 
114 Hanson 2000. 
115 Goldsworthy 1996.  cf. Lee 1996; Gilliver 1999. 
116 Sabin 2000. 
117 Syvänne 2004:  260-276. 
118 Lenski 2007.  Cf. Matthews 1989:  279-303; Lee 2007a:  123-146, esp. 123-133. 
119 Kagan 2006:  23-95.  As evidenced in her critique of Keegan’s approach (2006:  7-22), her 
monograph includes some quite technical discussion of military issues throughout, thanks to 
her professional engagement with contemporary matters.  See, for example, her concluding 
remarks (2006:  181-200).  
120 Wheeler 1998, 2001, 2004a, 2004b.  Cf. Wheeler 2007:  187 
121 Lendon 1999:  275.  A shorter essay, which adopts many of the points noted here by 
Lendon, is McGrath’s (1995) discussion of the rhetoric of battle regarding John Sklitzes and 
Leo the Deacon who both describe the battles of Dorostolon in 971. 
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What is described in a battle description depends on unconscious cultural 
and conscious intellectual decisions about what it is important to 
describe…the way ancient authors describe the details of battle can tell us 
about the mental rigging of the societies in which they lived…Understanding 
the mechanics of battle in ancient authors also offers a corrective to 
traditional methods of reconstructing ancient battles…ancient authors have 
their own conventions with which to accord:  not merely obvious large-scale 
stylistic models like the invented paired harangues with which some classical 
historians adorn their battles, but deep-seated inherited convictions about 
what factors were decisive in battle, what details ought to be related, and how 
the narrative of events should be structured…study of ancient conventions 
may…offer insight into ancient realities which the arrogant imposition of 
modern convention hides…122 
 
These comments are fundamental to the approach that I am going to take to 
Procopius’ descriptions.  As I noted earlier, there is no scholarly consensus 
regarding the quality of Procopius as an historian, and although many do hold him in 
high regard, including, most recently, Pazdernik,123 Kaldellis,124 and Börm125, others 
have reservations.126  This mixed appraisal is particularly apparent when the issue of 
Procopius’ classicism, or, rather, classicizing tendencies, is raised.  And, this is often 
extended to his knowledge of military matters; in particular, his descriptions of battle, 
which have been censured by scholars.  For example, Brent Shaw, in his wide-
ranging paper on war and violence in late antiquity, includes the following 
disparaging remarks:  “most of Procopius’ accounts of sieges and set battles [are] 
dependant on rhetorical devices and images adopted from earlier historians “.127  I 
want to suggest that views such as this betray a misunderstanding of the cultural 
framework that underscores Procopius’ descriptions of battle.  In order to properly 
evaluate Procopius’ abilities as a military historian we must be cognizant of how he 
                                                
122 Lendon 1999:  275. 
123 Pazdernik 2000, 2006. 
124 Kaldellis 2004. 
125 Börm 2007. 
126 Kouroumali (2005) is one such example. 
127 Shaw 1999:  133.  cf. Cameron (1985:  37-39), though she acknowledges the continuity of 
ancient warfare, hence alluding to the acceptability of seemingly older Classical language for 
combat. 
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understands battle as Lendon states, not whether his descriptions fit our 
understanding.  Thus, in this thesis I shall undertake a thorough examination of 
Procopius’ descriptions of battles, which will bear in mind the cultural approach 
advocated by Lendon.  By closely analysing all of Procopius’ battle narratives I can 
set out his grammar of battle.  Of course, it is not only a matter of looking at all of the 
battles on their own, but also in the context of the respective sections of the text in 
which they are found, whether it is the Persian Wars, Vandal Wars, Gothic Wars, or 
Book VIII, as well as in the context of the text as a whole.  The importance of looking 
at a smaller component, such as battle in a history, in the context of the rest of the 
text cannot be overestimated, a point well stated by Rood in his study of narrative in 
Thucydides.128  Scholars are now starting to appreciate the literary character of 
historiography,129 an issue which Averil Cameron first drew our attention to as 
regards Procopius nearly 25 years ago.130  Indeed, one of the points made by 
Lendon is that it is important to look at a battle description’s narrative structure.  
Although her starting point is Virgilian battle narrative, Rossi’s study, out of necessity, 
incorporated Greek and Latin epic narrative and historiography, as well as literary 
theory, particularly the textual relationship between the two genres; as such, her 
book makes fundamental reading for any historian tackling the literary character of 
ancient constructions of battle.131  As a result, narrative theory,132 both ancient and 
                                                
128 Rood 1998. The text’s unity must be borne in mind whenever evaluating an ancient text, 
whether fictional or factual, and in an historical text this means evaluating the body of the 
work in light of the objectives set out by the author in the introduction.   
129 Note, for example, the comments of Whitby (2007a:  57-60). 
130 Cameron (1985), of course, was not interested in Procopius and warfare. Cf. the work of 
Italian scholars such as Trisoglio (1977), Cesa (1982), and Cresci (1986). 
131 Rossi 2004. 
132 The literature on narrative theory is immense and so I am not going to provide an overview 
of some of the more important modern works here.  A number of works have been 
particularly useful.  Booth (1961), Genette (1983), and Bal (1997) are three standard works.  
Rimon-Kenan (2002) is a very readable introduction to the issue, while Schmitz (2007:  43-
62) provides a concise introduction to narrative theory and classical texts, as does Dewald 
(2005:  1-22), whose focus is primarily Thucydides.  The papers in the collection edited by De 
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modern, will play a part in my analysis, which will closely examine how Procopius 
orders his battles.133  Narrative theory is a very helpful tool, but it must always be 
borne in mind that no text was created in a vacuum.134  The Wars had an audience; 
indeed, it was fairly successful given Procopius’ later addition of book VIII.  As such, 
the values inherent in his reconstructions of sixth century battles must reflect not only 
those of Procopius, but also his audience, a significant segment of the east Roman 
elite.  Some of this thesis will thus involve a comparison of Procopius’ text with those 
of his contemporaries.  In the end, this cultural analysis of Procopius’ descriptions of 
battles in the Wars has the potential to tell us a lot more about both the historian and 
his world than it might have seemed possible.135  
My dissertation is broken down into six chapters.  The first provides an 
overview of Procopius’ life.  Some of the issues discussed include his possible social 
background; his probable education, which is, to all intents and purposes, an 
overview of late east Roman education practices; a look at his career, both military 
and literary; a discussion of his literary background, which includes some comments 
on his knowledge of languages other than Greek, as well as literature in general; and 
                                                                                                                                      
Jong, Nünlist, and Bowie (2004) are insightful and instructive.  For an overview of historical 
narrative through the ages see Munz (1997), and on a related note, to my mind the best 
study of an ancient author using the tools of modern narrative theory is Rood’s (1998) 
analysis of Thucydides.  For a good critique of narratology see Laird (1999:  46-63).   
133 Nearly ten years ago Jakov Ljubarskij (1998), in a special section of volume 73 of 
Symbolae Osloenses, pointed out the lack of applications of modern critical and literary 
theory to Byzantine texts, including histories.  What is more, this was despite the fact that 
Byzantine texts lent themselves to this sort of analysis, especially those derived from 
narrative theory.  One claim of some narrative theorists is that “the author is dead” 
(essentially the author is irrelevant to the text itself).  Ljubarskij felt that this notion was 
particularly applicable to Byzantine texts because in most cases, for all intents and purposes, 
the author was dead in that we know next to nothing about their background, life, and the 
specific context of when they were writing.  Although Ljubarskij excludes Procopius from 
Byzantine historiography, his comments in this paper apply to most late antique texts.  Cf. 
Haldon (1984) on the failure to utilize modern critical theory in Byzantine studies in general, 
and Haldon (1993) on his application of social theory to Byzantine economic matters. 
134 The principal problem with narrative theory is that it treats the text in isolation and 
considers the context irrelevant. 
135 Charles’ (2007) recent monograph on the dating of the Epitoma Rei Militaris – and he is in 
favour of a date sometime during the reign of Valentinian III – demonstrates that Vegetius’ 
work does much the same for the historical period in which he was writing. 
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a breezy mention of more contentious issues such as his religious background, and 
the dating of his works.  Having discussed Procopius’ personal background I delve 
into his intellectual and cultural background in chapter two.  The first broad subject of 
enquiry is ancient theories of history, especially the proper means of constructing an 
historical narrative with a heavy emphasis on battle narrative; this includes a 
discussion of the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Polybius, Cicero, Plutarch, 
and Lucian.  I shall also look briefly at rhetoric because of its close relationship with 
historiography, and more specifically, because the means of describing a battle is a 
topic that frequently appears in rhetorical handbooks.  The next subject is Greek 
military theory, for many of the works that Procopius would have read during his 
education, as well as many of the works that some of the officers, whom he would 
have served with on campaign, might have read, would have been influenced by 
Greek, and to a lesser degree, Roman military theory, and so had a marked 
influence on Procopius’ conception of battle.  The third subject is Procopius’ cultural 
background, and here I offer a select examination of the descriptions of battle found 
in the works of a number of Procopius’ contemporaries, and near-contemporaries, 
including those of writers such as Agathias, Evagrius, Jordanes, and Malalas.  In 
chapter three I turn to the text itself and I start with the Persian Wars.  Here I discuss 
a number of topics:  the programmatic-battle and –siege, in which I look at how the 
first battle and siege of the text shapes the way that the audience reads the battles 
and sieges that show up later; I look at such narrative features as the order of 
events, the rhetorical use of certain elements such as numbers, and the narrative 
pace; exhortations, which, while summarizing some earlier events, provide the 
criteria with which the reader is to evaluate the combat to follow; I look at how 
military theory underscores the text, particularly as regards both the importance of 
order in the battle-line, and psychology during combat itself; I look at some 
 20 
generalship issues that arise, including Procopius’ pairing of Belisarius and Khusro; 
and I look at the importance of the sixth century context, specifically the relationship 
with contemporary military thinking to the text at large.  In chapter four the Vandal 
Wars becomes my focus.  As the setting for this part of the Wars represents largely 
unchartered territory for Procopius and his audience I look at how the didactic 
purpose of the narrative shapes his descriptions here, with reference not only to the 
preface to the text as a whole, but also to the Vandal Wars; on a related note I delve 
further into the relationship between contemporary military thinking and Procopius’ 
battles.  More narrative features, such as narrator interventions, his use of names, 
and his use of numbers are discussed, as are some further ancient military theory 
issues such as morale and discipline.  In chapter five I move to the longest section of 
the Wars, namely, the Gothic Wars.  Many of the literary features of Procopius’ text, 
which are particularly evident here, are discussed including:  the epic quality of most 
of the narrative, particularly during the siege of Rome, and this includes issues such 
as the gory detail of the wounds described, and the single shot success that 
pervades this part of the engagement; the rhetorical use of numbers in the text, 
particularly as regards the use of large, myriad-range, figures; contextual and 
theoretical matters, particularly as regards the effectiveness of the horse-archers; 
and, the underlying discussion of generalship, particularly in regard to the dichotomy 
which Procopius presents between the Achilles ethos general and the Odysseus 
ethos general, as manifested by Totila and Belisarius respectively.  In keeping with 
the organization of the thesis to this point, the last chapter is concerned with Book 
VIII.  As this book marks in many ways the culmination of Procopius’ descriptions of 
battle, this chapter is organized differently from the rest with the key battles 
discussed on their own rather than in regard to various issues.  This allows me to 
probe another facet of Procopius’ narrative practice, particularly the order in which he 
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wrote the three main parts of the text, the Persian Wars, Vandal Wars, and Gothic 
Wars.  The principal question I am interested in is whether he describes the Persian 
theatre in the same manner he did for the Persian Wars, or if his presumed later 
practice, namely that employed in the Gothic Wars, colours all of the battles 
described in this book.  With the end of this chapter the thesis draws to a close.  
Although primarily concerned with one aspect of Procopius’ writing, the 
techniques that I elucidate regarding battles have wide application to the text as a 
whole.  This thesis is as much about Procopius’ practices as an historian as it is 
about understanding battle in late antiquity.  Scholars such as Cameron and Shaw 
are right to play up the rhetorical nature of Procopius’ descriptions of battle, for he is, 
of course, a rhetorical writer; however, that does not justify their dismissals of his 
accounts.136  The variety of the descriptions and the depth of the explanations reveal 
an historian very much in control of his subject, points made clear once he is 
evaluated by criteria appropriate to his age, an age for which history and rhetoric 
went hand in hand.  Indeed, my study makes a considerable contribution to our 
understanding of the narrative practices of Procopius, and builds on the work of 
scholars such as Anthony Kaldellis, who illuminated the various ways in which 
Procopius presents fortune in the Vandal Wars and Gothic Wars.137  Many late 
antique texts, especially the chronicles and histories, have not been subject to the 
sort of analysis that utilizes modern literary theory; this thesis makes an important 
step in that direction.138  Despite the emphasis on the significance of my thesis for 
Procopius and late antique historiography, this is not to downplay the importance of 
studying battle narrative to our understanding of military history in the sixth century, 
                                                
136 On the role of rhetoric in east Roman education as well as the writing of history see 
chapter one below pp 31-34, and chapter two below pp 59-67. 
137 Kaldellis 2004:  176-194. 
138 Although she is mostly concerned with hagiographical texts, much of what Clark (2004) 
advocates is appropriate to late antique historiography. 
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for this thesis also argues that literary texts, whether historical or poetic, can tell us 
much more about military matters than most scholars previously would have 
admitted.139  The cultural history of warfare is a subject that deserves greater 
attention, and the literary quality of Procopius’ descriptions of battle does not obviate 
their study; the same can be said both for other late antique authors such as 
Corippus and Agathias, as well as other media such as manuscript illustrations and 
silverware.140  A few years ago Geoffrey Greatrex noted:  “it is clear that a new phase 
in Procopian studies has opened up”.141  My thesis continues this trend by 
emphasizing further the need for sensitivity when reading the works of Procopius.
                                                
139 In a similar vein note Charles’ (2007:  14-15) comments about the value of Claudian for 
late fourth/early fifth century military history. 
140 Here I am thinking about works such as the two manuscripts from the Vatican library that 
illustrate battle in the Aeneid, as well as the David plate that depicts the battle between David 
and Goliath from the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. 
141 Greatrex 2003:  67. 
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Chapter 1:  the Life of Procopius 
 
Lifespan 
Despite close to one hundred and fifty years of Procopian scholarship,1 
Procopius the man remains an enigma.  He tells us very little about his life in his 
three works, the History of the Wars of Justinian, the Secret History, and the 
Buildings,2 which is not, however, unusual.  Procopius was a classicizing historian 
following in the footsteps of Herodotus and Thucydides, neither of whom provided 
much personal information in their own works.3  Even his later Byzantine successors, 
who interjected more willingly in their texts, 4 left some of their personal life hidden.5  
Nevertheless, there is some information that can be gleaned from perusing his 
works.   
Procopius was born around the turn of the sixth century, and hailed from 
Caesarea.6  The year of his death, however, is contentious, and depends to a large 
extent on the date accepted for the Buildings, and to a lesser extent, the 
identification of him with the prefect of Constantinople in 562.  A common claim is 
                                                
1 I do not discuss the history of Procopian scholarship in this thesis; for a concise overview, 
which includes those older works that I exclude such as those of Dahn, Haury, and Braun, 
see Kouroumali (2005:  2-4), and Börm (2007:  18-22). 
2 The History of the Wars of Justinian is in eight books.  The first two books are also known 
as the Persian Wars, the second two as the Vandal Wars, the next three as the Gothic Wars, 
while the last book covers all fronts.  Hereafter I shall refer to this work simply as the Wars, 
although on occasion for the sake of clarity, I shall refer to the individual wars while keeping 
the continuous sequence of books (books one and two of the Persian Wars are books one 
and two of the Wars, books one and two of the Vandal Wars are books three and four of the 
Wars, and books one to three of the Gothic Wars are books five to seven of the Wars, with 
book eight covering the events on all fronts). 
3 Greatrex 1996:  125; Howard-Johnston 2000:  19. 
4 Some students of Byzantine historiography (Roger Scott for example) have argued that one 
of its distinctive features, particularly in relation to its classical predecessors, was the 
personal interest in, and their relation to, the topics chosen by the historians themselves.  
Anna Komnene, for example, made her father the focus of her Alexiad.  See Scott (1981:  63-
64), Ljubarskij (1991), and Talbot and Sullivan (2005:  28-31). 
5 The background of Leo the Deacon, the tenth century historian, for example, comes entirely 
from what references he makes to his life in his History.  Cf. Talbot and Sullivan 2005:  9-10.  
6 Procop. SH. 11.24. 
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that much of his work does not seem to be fully polished, a factor which some argue 
points towards his premature death.  The primary possibilities, then, are that he 
passed away in around 554 or 560. 7  Book seven of the Wars ends before the 
cessation of hostilities; the same is true for the later addition, book eight, which ends 
at the close of the campaigning season of 552.  The Buildings has large lists, the 
presence of which may suggest that Procopius had not fully incorporated his 
research into his writing, the implication being that he stopped writing.8  Howard-
Johnston suggests that his health had been failing and that he left two comments 
that imply this - one at the beginning and the other at the end - in the Secret History.9  
However, instead of alluding to Procopius’ imminent death, these comments from the 
Secret History suggest that Procopius expected Justinian to pass away in the not-
too-distant future, as Greatrex argues.10  It could very well be that in the process of 
his work on the Secret History, and in particular, that last bit, Procopius learned 
something that suggested that Justinian’s death might be forthcoming, and so 
stopped work and added that sentence.11  There is another clue from the preface of 
the Secret History, where Procopius says, “thus so much of what happened to befall 
the Romans in the wars up to this time has been described in full by me”.12   
                                                
7 I provide a brief account of the dates of his works below.  Rubin (1957:  300-301) and 
Brodka (2004:  15) leave the question unanswered.  Those who suggest an earlier date 
include Cameron (1985:  12), Howard-Johnston (2000:  20-21), Kouroumali (2005:  21), the 
authors of the Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (Martindale 1992:  1065), and 
Treadgold (2007:  191); those who prefer a later date include Börm (2007:  50-52), Evans 
(1972:  44-45), Hunger (1978:  293), and Signes Codoñer (2000:  16-20; 2003:  53-58).   
8 Whitby 1988:  73-74. 
9 See Procop. SH. 1.5, “For the men of the present being the most knowledgeable witnesses 
of events will be trustworthy in conveying to the future their belief in my good faith in 
presenting what really happened”; 30.34, “Thus when Justinian either if he is a man and 
leaves this life, or as the Lord of the devils lays aside his life, all those who happen to survive 
to that time will know the truth.” 
10 Greatrex 2000:  218-219. 
11 Likewise, if anything, those two comments demonstrate Procopius’ fear of a harsh reprisal 
if the Secret History was ever discovered by the Roman emperor. 
12 Procop. SH. 1.1.  For the attractive hypothesis that Procopius had not originally planned 
two separate works, that is both the Wars and the Secret History, see Greatrex 2000 
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Procopius may very well have planned on completing his opus with the Secret 
History integrated into the first seven books of the Wars.  If this is the case, the 
alleged references to Procopius’ impending death seem rather spurious.   
What about the seeming incompleteness of his works?  The organization of 
the Buildings could be the result of a personal choice:  Procopius chose to describe 
certain things in greater details than others.  It could be that his health failed while he 
was composing it and thus decided to bring matters to some sort of conclusion.  
Finally, it could also be, particularly if Procopius lost his enthusiasm, that well into his 
work he decided to give up, and thus, somewhat hastily, finished the Buildings.  As 
regards the Wars, I argue over the course of this thesis that the work is an integrated 
composition, in which Procopius carefully constructs his narrative around the themes 
and contexts of his work.  The ends of books VII and VIII are suitable points to end 
the text, with events, conceivably, drawing to a close.  What of the association of 
Procopius the historian with Procopius the prefect of Constantinople in 562?  John of 
Nikiu, who was writing late in the seventh century, says that he was a patrician and 
prefect, whose work was well known.13  Malalas describes the arrest of Belisarius by 
the city prefect Procopius,14 while Theophanes describes that same prefect’s 
dismissal.15  The tenth century Suda says that our historian was illustris.16  Taken 
together, there does seem to be some basis for this association:  the authors of the 
Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire and Börm accept the possibility, before 
ultimately rejecting it, while Signes Codoñer is more positive about its plausibility.17  
Yet, John of Nikiu is quite removed in time and space, while the name Procopius was 
                                                                                                                                      
(passim).  The fact that the Secret History opens with ο ν suggests that Procopius is here 
continuing from an earlier narrative. 
13 Joh. Nik. 92.20. 
14 Malalas 18.141. 
15 Theoph. Chron. AM 6065. 
16 Suda π 2479.  cf. Martindale 1992:  1062; Treadgold 2007:  190n, n. 84. 
17 Martindale 1992:  1066; Börm 2007:  48-49, 51; Signes Codoñes 2000:  17-20. 
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fairly common.  Thus, it is best to leave this possibility in the realm of conjecture, 
though this does not disprove a date in 560 or later for Procopius’ death.  Since I 
prefer a later date for the Buildings, as well as the Secret History, I suggest that 
Procopius passed away some time after 560. 
 
Family and Social Background 
Like much else his family history is obscure.  His parents are unknown, and 
despite one vague reference to “the most intimate of my kinsmen”, he tells us 
nothing about the rest of his family members.18  One possibility is that Procopius’ 
father was a certain Procopius of Edessa, a governor of Palestine, who held this post 
around the time of Procopius of Caesarea’s birth.19  Another possibility is that he was 
a certain Stephanus, who lived in Caesarea, was governor of Palestina Prima, and 
who rose to the rank of spectabilis, before passing away around 555.20  The quantity 
of the evidence in both cases, however, is sparse.  There is no information that could 
allow us to speculate about the identity of Procopius’ mother, any siblings, or 
whether he had a family of his own with a wife and children. 
What was Procopius’ social class?21  The fact that Procopius had the 
wherewithal to compose three literary works that were written in Attic Greek means 
                                                
18 Procop. SH. 1.2.   
19 Evans 1972:  30; Procop. Build. 4.7.14. 
20 Greatrex 1996. 
21 Procopius sympathizes with many different groups.  Samaritans, Hellenes, astrologers, 
senators, teachers, physicians, soldiers, merchants, and rhetors are the groups that 
Procopius defends in his Secret History.  Thus we should be cautious about identifying his 
class on the basis of any sympathetic remarks.  Regardless of this seemingly widespread 
concern, I would not go so far as to call him “the conscience of his age (Kaldellis 2004:  92), 
and suggest that he was not “a Roman chauvinist (Kaldellis 2004:  92)”.  See Brubaker 
(2004, 2005) for an overview of women in the mid-sixth century, and some discussion of 
Procopius’ views of women. 
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that his parents had the means to give him a traditional classical education.22  We 
know that Procopius was a provincial, or at least had provincial origins; in fact, Rapp 
has suggested that most of the authors writing in the sixth century came from 
provincial families of some wealth.23  There are several passages from the Secret 
History that hint that he had both property and wealth.24  In chapter eleven, 
Procopius claims that Justinian plundered “a majority of the homes of prosperous 
men.”25  He makes several more similar pronouncements including complaints about 
the exaction of heavy taxes on landowners, and granted the attention that he gives 
to Justinian’s plundering of property, it seems that Procopius himself was affected.26  
Sarris has recently commented on those and other similar remarks, and stated, quite 
rightly, that he was a member of the land-owning elite, and possibly a senator.27  
Kaldellis provocatively claims that attempts to pin down his social class are 
problematic, and instead avoids doing as much; the most he is willing to concede is 
that he was a Platonist, and that “Procopius’ allegiances in this case were 
philosophical, not social”.28  Howard-Johnston has recently suggested that 
                                                
22 This education, which we shall return to below, stretched back to the Hellenistic period with 
only minimal changes.  See Marrou 1956 for an older, though still useful, overview of both 
Greek and Roman education. 
23 Rapp 2005:  381-382.  Cf. Cameron 1985:  6. 
24 And by proxy, so did his parents. 
25 Procop. SH. 11.3.   
26 Procop. SH. 11.40, “the wealth of those who seem to be prosperous in Byzantium and 
each city after the members of the senate, was seized and plundered”; 12.12, “but when this 
[Nika] happened…they began to confiscate all at once the estates of nearly all the members 
of the Senate”; 13.22, “for he even believed that to take away the property of his subjects by 
small thefts”; 19.12, in regard to members of the senate, “he had stolen the property of no 
small number of them”; 19.17, “in plundering the property of all men”; 23.19, “These 
assessments were paid by the owners of the lands”; 26.3, “he had taken away all the 
properties of the Senators and of the others who were considered prosperous”.  This is only a 
sampling and Greatrex (2000:  215-228) is certainly right to argue that Procopius was not a 
senator. 
27 Sarris 2006:  5-7, esp. 6.  Cf. Cameron 1985:  144-145, 227-228; Greatrex 2000:  227; 
Börm 2007:  45-46. 
28 Kaldellis 2004:  47. 
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Procopius’ family “belonged to the commercial stratum”.29  He based this possibility 
on Procopius’ visit to Syracuse in 533 where he ran into an old friend, who happened 
to be a merchant.  This theory may explain Procopius’ fascination with economic 
matters in the Secret History and elsewhere, something uncommon in ancient 
literature.30  Regardless, whether through membership of the political, or, perhaps 
more likely, commercial elite, there can be little doubt that Procopius was a 
landowner of considerable means.31    
 
Religious Views 
Procopius’, and many of his peers’, religious proclivities have come under 
scrutiny and what had seemed to have been firmly established, namely, his 
Christianity, has been challenged. 32   Anthony Kaldellis has disputed this 
                                                
29 Howard-Johnston 2000:  23.  If this view is right, then that would preclude the inclusion of 
Procopius’ family within the local political elite. 
30 See for example Procop. SH. 25.11-26, where he discusses small coinage and Justinian’s 
monopoly of several different types of merchandise, including silk; Procop. Wars 8.17.1-8, 
where he includes the curious anecdote about the introduction of silk production into the 
Roman empire; Procop. Wars 8.22.9-16, where he discusses the construction of Aeneas’ 
ship; and more generally, the proclivity for Procopius to be assigned, when on campaign, to 
the collection of supplies, that is logistics.  Michael Whitby (pers. comm.) has suggested that 
as a result of the thriving Gaza wine industry, landowners (such as Procopius) may have 
known local merchants, hence Procopius’ relation to the fellow in Italy.  Indeed, amphorae 
from Gaza wine has been found in the eastern and western Mediterranean; in the fifth and 
sixth centuries Gaza and its hinterland were quite prosperous (Ward-Perkins 2000:  374; Cf. 
McCormick 2001:  35-37; Gregory of Tours Hist. 7.29, 348.6-12).   
31 If Procopius came from the merchant class, this may explain the trouble that scholars have 
had in identifying his parents.  Using trade as a primary source of income was still frowned 
upon by the Late Roman elite.  Procopius’ ambitious parents may have sought to raise their 
son above their own social background by giving him a classical education.  His parents’ 
money, and his talents, then allowed him to become Belisarius’ assessor. 
Kaldellis (2004:  47) has said that although Procopius has complained about the measures 
taken against landowners, that need not make him a spokesman for that group.  Procopius 
does complain more about the problems of some groups than others (and another notable 
group is the soldiers), and those are likely the groups with which he was best acquainted.  
Peasants, women, small-scale landowners, the clergy, philosophers, some religious groups 
(Jews, other Christian sects), and barbarians among others are not given voice by Procopius.  
Thus, while Procopius might not have been the spokesman, per se, for the larger 
landowners, that need not mean that he was not a member of that group. 
32 This consensus was reached as a result of the publication of Cameron’s (1985) 
monumental study of Procopius.  Cf. Meier (2004), who suggests that the natural disasters of 
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assumption.33  Kaldellis believes that in general Procopius’ cultural views were 
rooted in the Classics, that he was a member of an educated subculture hostile to 
Justinian, and following from that, he was not a Christian.  What is more, Kaldellis 
also holds to the view that Procopius says nothing in the Wars about God that is 
explicitly Christian. 34  While Kaldellis should be commended for questioning many of 
the assumptions about Procopius, arguing that he was not a Christian is problematic.  
This is not the place to discuss Procopius’ religious views in depth though I will 
provide a brief overview.  As a work of classicizing history, the Wars was never going 
to abound in treatments of Christian matters.  On the other hand Procopius, as the 
product of an author writing in a Christian age, unsurprisingly, discusses some 
Christian issues at various points.35  For example, Procopius does seem to be well 
aware of Christian doctrine and practices, such as Easter, as demonstrated in the 
context of an assault by the Persian forces.36  He also knows full well who Christ 
was, and despite his attempts to write as an unbiased observer, he accepts the 
standard interpretation of the details and significance of Christ’s crucifixion.37  There 
are other places where he demonstrates his knowledge of Christianity; this is 
                                                                                                                                      
the period directed Procopius’ attention towards God, and Brodka (2004:  21-56), who 
accepts Procopius’ Christianity, and whose book was published the same year as Kaldellis’. 
33 Kaldellis 2004.  Kaldellis also believes that two of Procopius’ contemporaries, Agathias and 
John Lydus, were also non-Christians.  Although I am not convinced that Procopius was a 
non-Christian, I do think that a case can be made that John Lydus was not a Christian, as 
there seem to be fewer traces of Christianity in his work (Kaldellis 2003b).  Sarris (2006:  
221) is sympathetic to Kaldellis’ claims. 
34 Kaldellis 2004:  171. 
35 I do concede that Procopius does not seem to have been a typical Christian, and may in 
fact have been a sceptic.  For example, Procopius’ discussion of the incident with the door at 
the Temple of Janus in Rome is peculiar (Wars 5.25.18-25), and may suggest that he 
sympathized with non-Christians.  Moreover, his comments about doctrinal disputes also 
suggest some scepticism (Wars 5.3.5-9).  Yet, one could argue that in the latter case that this 
was simply because Procopius was here writing a work of classicizing history, and as such, 
that sort of discussion would fall outside of the long-standing parameters of the genre.  Still, 
the fact remains that he felt the need to at least mention the doctrinal disputes, which is 
interesting in itself.  For a detailed treatment of Procopius’ religiosity see Michael Whitby’s 
(2007d) forceful rebuttal of Kaldellis’ arguments.  
36 Procop. Wars 1.18.15-16. 
37 Procop. Wars 2.11.14. 
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particularly evident when he was in Italy, and more specifically Rome, during the 
Gothic wars.38  Perhaps the best example, however, comes from the Persian wars.  
While narrating the story of Abgar of Edessa and Augustus Procopius says the 
following:   
 
Around that time Jesus the son of God was in the body moving among the 
men in Palestine, showing quite clearly that since he never sinned at all, and 
that he even performed impossible deeds that he was the Son of God in very 
truth; for having called the dead he raised them up just as if they were 
sleeping and opened the eyes of men who had been born blind, and 
cleansed those whose whole bodies were suffering from leprosy and 
released those whose feet were maimed, and he cured all other diseases 
which are called by the physicians incurable.39   
 
That statement, and others like it, casts doubt on any argument that he was a non-
Christian; he seems to have included this episode as a point of reference for those 
Christian readers who may not have been familiar with the story of Abgar.  What is 
more, the fact that he felt it necessary to prove that Jesus was the son of God, even 
though it was irrelevant to Abgar’s request, suggests that he may have doubted the 
faith of some of his readers and so sought to include, what was for him, irrefutable 
proof.40  There are other examples that point towards Procopius’ Christianity, such as 
his explanations of the outcomes of certain battles.41  Though he may not explain all 
that he describes in terms of the actions of an omnipotent Christian deity, that need 
not raise questions about his faith.  As Whitby has stressed, we should avoid 
measuring Procopius – and any other late antique author for that matter – against 
any monolithic standard of Christianity, for there was certainly a great deal of 
                                                
38 Cf. Procop. Wars 5.19.4.  Admittedly, one need not be a Christian to know about 
Christianity. 
39 Procop. Wars 2.12.22.  My italics. 
40 It may also hint that some of his readers would not have been Christians, and perhaps that 
there were more of them than scholars have previously believed.  In this regard Kaldellis is 
certainly right to cast doubt on the existence of a monolithic Christian society. 
41 See my discussion of the siege of Antioch below pp 144-150. 
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variety.42  With this in mind I hold that Procopius was a Christian, though one with 
views that at times diverged from those of his peers. 
 
East Roman Education 
Though he was a sixth century Christian, Procopius’ education would have 
been broadly similar to that of generations of his ancestors.43  From the Hellenistic 
age through Late Antiquity, although there was considerable variety in the 
organization of the schools, there was relative uniformity in the content of the 
education available to those who had the means to afford it.44  The upper tier 
education had three fairly distinct levels:  primary generally under the 
grammatistes,45 secondary under the grammarian (grammatikos),46 and higher under 
the teacher of rhetoric.47  Primary education, which started at the age of six or seven, 
involved endless memorization and repetition of the alphabet, and included writing, 
                                                
42 Whitby 2007d. 
43 The central figure in ancient education was the teacher, and it is probably better to speak of 
a teacher rather than a school, for the two were often coterminous.  This is not to say that 
buildings that we would call a school did not exist, but rather that the location was more often 
dependent on the teacher himself.  It is better to divide the educational practice into stages 
rather than schools (primary, secondary, tertiary).  Cf. Cribiore 2001. 
44 East Roman education is fairly well-known and has been discussed by a number of 
authors, such as Marrou (1956), Mango (1980), Wilson (1983), Browning (1997, 2000), 
Cribiore (2001, esp 160-244), Kouroumali (2005:  79-106), Cameron (2006:  133-162), and 
Watts (2006:  1-23).  Scholars are in agreement about most points, and so this brief overview 
is based on that consensus.  Although other members of the elite would have had a similar 
education to Procopius’, those from other ranks, would have had a different education.  There 
seems to have been something of a two-tier education system.   
45 It should be noted that the term grammatistes is fairly vague, and that it was not used in 
Egypt (Cribiore 2001:  51). 
46 The second level was more uniform in its structure than the primary. 
47 Although the teachers of rhetoric generally kept to the tertiary level, grammarians could, 
and sometimes did, instruct pupils at the primary level.   
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counting, and some reading aloud.48  It was at this stage that a student acquired 
basic literacy in Greek. 49   
Secondary education began at the age of nine or ten, and this second stage 
is better attested than the first.  It was at this stage that the pupils really got exposed 
to the Greek texts.  There was a standard group of authors studied at this level, and 
while there was some variation among grammarians as to which other authors could 
be added to the basic reading list, secondary education retained its homogeneity 
across the empire.  Those four standard authors were Homer, and in particular the 
Iliad, Euripides, Menander, and Demosthenes.50  Poetry, and in particular Homer, 
dominated all of the rest, and it is he who is best represented among the Egyptian 
papyri.51  The other authors who may also have been studied – though how much is 
debatable - include Aeschylus, Callimachus, Hesiod, Isocrates, Pindar, Plato, 
Sophocles, and Thucydides.  There were four basic steps to the study of these 
authors:  diorthosis, which was correction, and here the student would make sure 
that his text matched his master’s; anagnorisis, which was reading aloud and 
involved proper intonation; exegesis, which was explanation, and here the text was 
explained geographically, historically, linguistically, and mythologically; and krisis, 
which was criticism, and here various moral lessons would be expounded.52   
                                                
48 The ages that I give should not be considered standard, for in many cases a student’s 
education was adapted to suit his (and sometimes her) abilities and needs.  Thus, primary 
education could start earlier than six or later than seven depending on the context.  The same 
applies to the other two educational stages.  
49 While slandering Justinian’s background Procopius says that “as for Greek however he had 
never gone to an elementary teacher [γραμματιστο ], nor was he able to speak Greek itself 
in conversation (Procop. SH. 20.17)”.  Cf. Procop. Wars 8.19.8:  “and they neither have any 
elementary teachers [γραμματιστήν] nor do the children among them toil over their letters 
[γράμματα] at all as they grow up”.   
50 Over time, however, Aristophanes came to replace Menander. 
51 Wilson 1983:  19. 
52 Mango 1980:  125. 
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Next we come to higher education, and in particular, the teaching of 
rhetoric.53  This stage would begin when the student reached the age of fourteen or 
fifteen.  The students would learn, by heart, a number of model texts covering a 
variety of different genres.  These genres would be explicated by their teacher.  
Following this the student would study some sort of rhetorical handbook, such as any 
one of the four treatises of Hermogenes of Tarsus.54  Finally, the student would be 
required to compose and deliver their own speeches based on general moral or 
political topics.55  This level was the most demanding of the lot, with those students 
who completed their rhetorical education taking anywhere from six to ten years to do 
so.56 
One of the fundamental features of this training was the dominance of Attic 
Greek.  This was not the Greek spoken on the streets of Constantinople, but rather 
the Greek perhaps spoken, and certainly written, during the classical period of 
ancient Athens in the fifth century BC.  The continued dominance of the literary form 
of the language was largely due to the writers of the second Sophistic, which took 
hold in the second century AD during the High Empire.  The practitioners of Atticism 
were interested in the style and language of the authors of classical Athens.57  In the 
words of Swain, “Atticizing Greek was about the repristination of linguistic features, 
phonological, morphological, or syntactical, that were becoming or had become 
obsolete.”58  By late antiquity, there were a large number of lexicographical guides 
                                                
53 There were other disciplines that were taught, like medicine, philosophy, and 
architecture/engineering (which I shall have more to say about below).  I discuss rhetoric in 
greater detail in chapter two below pp 59-67. 
54 Those four treatises of Pseudo-Hermogenes, who lived c. 160-225, were the Peri staseon, 
the Peri ideon, the Peri heureseos, and the Peri methodon deinotetos. 
55 Cf. the insightful discussion of Gibson 2004. 
56 Cribiore 2001:  56. 
57 For a detailed discussion of the origins and place of Atticism in the Second Sophistic see 
Swain (1996, esp. 17-64). 
58 Swain 1996:  34-35.  Cf. Marrou (1956:  201), who says that they were “less concerned to 
recreate the style and taste of the great Athenian writers than to get back to the vocabulary, 
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available to the aspiring writer.59  One such example was the anthology of John 
Stobaeus, who was probably writing in the fifth century, which included excerpts from 
various poets and prose-writers from Homer to Themistius listed under a variety of 
different headings.60  Such anthologies, however, have brought into question the 
degree to which early Byzantine writers really were familiar with their ancient 
predecessors, whom they often quote.  Some scholars have suggested – and it is an 
item of current debate – that in many instances the mimesis was superficial, though 
this was not uniformly the case.61  Whether or not that was the case with Procopius 
is an issue to which we shall now turn. 
 
The Breadth of Procopius’ Reading62 
In this section I turn to Procopius’ engagement with other Greek texts, from 
brief references to more complex intertextual interactions.  In all three works, 
Procopius refers to a number of different authors by name, and in some cases, refers 
to specific lines from a classical author’s work.  Before I begin I need to make a few 
points.  The naming of an author in a text is not proof that the writer had read the 
work of that author.  At the same time the reference to any historical person or event 
need not mean that the writer had read a work that described said person or event.  
Yet, Procopius wrote three works in a language that had not been spoken for close 
to 1000 years, and in a world where only those with the sufficient education, and 
                                                                                                                                      
morphology, and the syntax of the classical language as it had existed in a ‘pure’ state in the 
past”   
59 Wilson 1983:  5. 
60 Edwards and Browning 1996:  1445. 
61 See Marrou (1956:  201), Jenkins (1963), Mango (1975; 1980:  243, which is specifically 
about Procopius), and Wilson (1983:  5) for the alleged superficiality of many Byzantine 
authors. 
62 The following discussion is an overview, and is not meant to be comprehensive.  I will not 
be discussing his awareness of more recent texts, and in particular authors like Eustathius 
and Priscus.  For those authors and their relationship to the works of Procopius, see Haury 
(2001:  vii-ix), and Blockley (1981:  115-116).     
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ability, could afford to so.  As such, it is highly unlikely that his references to classical 
authors, persons, and events were drawn from some sort of compendium of 
knowledge, despite their existence and possible popularity.63  Thus, there is every 
reason to believe that Procopius had some knowledge of those authors and works 
that he refers to.   Poets and playwrights are two groups particularly well represented 
in Procopius’ works, and Homer, unsurprisingly, more so than anyone else.  Many of 
the Homeric references from the Wars are found in the Gothic Wars where they act 
as sign posts, alerting the reader to not only the grandeur of the events about to be 
described, but also the epic flavour that colours the siege of Rome.64  In the preface, 
Procopius makes his famous comparison between the Homeric bowmen and 
contemporary Byzantine bowmen.65  On four occasions he explicitly names Homer.66  
Belisarius crosses from Messana to Rhegium in the Gothic Wars and Procopius 
claims that the poets associate the strait with the home of Scylla and Charybdis.67  
There is a quote in the Secret History, “a twin bane of mortals (βροτολοιγ )”, that 
was taken from Homer.68  More than halfway through the Buildings, Procopius says 
that the poets call Mysia (Moesia) the land of hand-to-hand fighters, and here he is 
likely referring to Homer.69  Early in the Buildings there is a reference to the autumn 
star Sirius also found at the beginning of book five of Homer’s Iliad.70  There are 
                                                
63 One such writer of these sorts of works, and contemporary of Procopius, is Hesychius, and 
his Register of Famous Men in Scholarship.  Other works include that of John Stobaeus and 
the Suda.  On Hesychius see Kaldellis (2005) and Treadgold (2007:  270-278).  On the Suda 
see the recent discussion of Baldwin (2006). 
64 I discuss this in greater depth below in chapter five pp 255-268. 
65 Procop. Wars 1.1.6-17; Hom. Il. 11.38.5.  For a discussion of the passage’s significance 
see below pp 249-255. 
66 Procop. Wars 5.11.2, 5.11.4, 8.22.19; Procop. Build. 1.1.15; Hom. Od. 2.47, 15.152. 
67 Procop. Wars 5.8.1.  Procopius says something similar later in the Wars:  “whence the 
poets say Scylla came” (Wars 7.27.17).  The reference to Scylla and Charybdis suggests that 
Procopius is referring to Homer and the Odyssey. 
68 Procop. SH. 12.14; Hom. Il. 5.31,βροτολοιγέ.  Cf. Signes Codoñer (2000:  105-112) for a 
brief discussion of the Secret History and classical mimesis. 
69 Procop. Build. 4.7.3; Hom. Il. 13.5. 
70 Procop. Build. 1.2.10; Hom. Il. 5.5. 
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three more allusions:  one early in the Wars,71 another early in the Buildings,72 and 
the other in the Secret History.73  Homer is not the only poet referred to by 
Procopius; there are at least two quotes from Pindar.  In book eight of the Wars in 
the middle of a letter to Gubazes Mermeroz says, the admittedly general phrase, 
‘know thyself’.74  The second reference comes from the Buildings where it reads, 
“‘o’er a work’s beginnings’ as the old saying has it, ‘we needs must set a front that 
shines afar.’”75  On several occasions Procopius simply refers to “the poets” (ο  ποιητα ).  Procopius mentions poets in the context of the Persian army’s arrival in 
Lazica in the second book of the Persian Wars, and in regard to the identification of 
that country with the location of the adventures of Medea and Jason.76  In book eight 
in the midst of a discussion of Colchis and the fortress of Cotais, Procopius says that 
others claim that Aeetes was born there, and that as a result the poets call him a 
Coetaean.77  Finally, while describing the ship of Aeneas, Procopius says that the 
poets call the ribs of the ship oak-stays.78   
We now turn to the ancient playwrights.  There is one lone reference to 
Aeschylus, and more specifically, the Prometheus Unbound, in the Wars.79  On the 
other hand, Aristophanes is well represented.  The Clouds is referred to on several 
occasions.  Here is one example from the Wars:  “As a result his thoughts soared 
aloft and were carried towards more distant hopes as he sought after impossible 
                                                
71 Procop. Wars 1.12.21; Hom. Il. 24.348, Od.10.279. 
72 Procop. Build. 1.146; Hom. Il. 8.18-27. 
73 Procop. SH. 9.24; Hom. Il. 2.262, Od. 10.70.  Cf. Roques (2000a:  14, n. 26) where he 
draws attention to Procopius’ use of σφαιρα instead of σειρα. 
74 Procop. Wars 8.16.27; Pind. Ol. 6.4. 
75 Procop. Build. 1.1.19; Pind. Ol. 6.4. 
76 Procop. Wars 2.17.2. 
77 Procop. Wars 8.14.49. 
78 Procop. Wars 8.22.12. 
79 Procop. Wars 8.6.15, Προμηθεῖ τῷ Λυομένῳ.  Cf. Arr. Peripl. M. Eux. 19.2, where a 
fragment of Aeschylus’ play is preserved; and Procop. SH. 12.14, a possible allusion to 
Aeschylus’ Suppliants (664). 
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things.”80  Aristophanes’ Knights figures in the Secret History, from the name of 
Priscus the Blunderer,81 to the several references in Procopius’ tirade against 
Justinian.82  Aristophanes’ Peace is alluded to on three occasions.83  There are also 
some echoes of Aristophanes’ Frogs, Plutus, and Acharnians, in Procopius’ Secret 
History.84 
We now turn to the prose authors of antiquity, beginning with the briefer 
allusions.  There are two references to “the teachings of Plato” in regard to the 
Gothic king Theodohad.85  There is an allusion to Plato’s Thaetetus in the Secret 
History,86 and his Phaedrus in the Buildings.87  There is an allusion to Plato’s Phaedo 
in the Buildings.88  On the other hand, the Apology is referred to a few times in the 
                                                
80 Procop. Wars 8.7.11.  There was no particular reason why this example was chosen as the 
others say more or less the same thing.  Procop. Wars 2.3.43:  “But he is even looking about 
the heavens and is searching the retreats beyond the ocean”; Procop. SH. 13.11:  “For his 
flatters could persuade him with no difficulty that he was raised to the skies and ‘walking the 
air’”; Procop. SH 18.29:  “all because of his parsimony, and instead of devoting himself to 
such things, scanning the heavens and developing a curious interest concerning the nature of 
God”; Procop. SH. 20.22:  “Consequently Constantius amassed great sums of money in a 
short time, and he assumed a sort of superhuman pomposity, treading the air and 
contemplating men with contempt”.  Cf. Ar. Nub. 225, 228, and 350.  Yet another reference is 
found at Procop. SH. 14.11.  Cf. Ar. Nub. 889ff. 
81 Procop. SH. 16.7; Ar. Eq. passim, esp. 692. 
82 Rubin (1957:  307) alleges a reference to Ar. Eq. 41 at Procop. SH. 17.31, though it is 
somewhat dubious.; SH. 14.11, and Ar. Eq. 632; SH 9.50, and Ar. Eq. 692; Rubin (1957:  
307) suggested that Procop. SH. 9.50 referred to Ar. Eq. 1120, though I found no similarity 
between the two passages in question. 
83 Procop. SH. 1.13; Ar. Pax 620; Procop. SH 9.50, and Ar. Pax 320; Procop. SH 13.3, and 
Ar. Pax 620. 
84 The similarities between the Secret History and the Frogs rest on one word:  Procop. SH. 
17.37, “and when this remark was brought to Theodora, she commanded the servants to 
hoist the man aloft (ὀγκωθέντα),” Ar. Ran. 703 (and not 702 as Rubin claims), “if we puff 
ourselves up about (ογκωσομεσθα) this and are too proud to do it”.  The similarities between 
Aristophanes’ Plutus at Ar. Plu. 307 and Procopius’ Secret History at Procop. SH 17.4, are 
dubious, although the tone of the two passages is similar.  The echoes of Aristophanes’ 
Acharnians are at Ar. Ach. 711 and the Secret History at SH. 17.4, and Ar. Ach. 704 and 
Procop. SH. 18.21. 
85 Procop. Wars 5.3.1; 5.6.10.  At the same time, those passages referred to from 
Aristophanes’ Clouds that also refer to “walking on air”, are also found in Plato’s Apology.  Cf. 
Pl. Ap. 19C.    
86 Procop. SH. 13.10; Pl. Thaet. 175e. 
87 Procop. Build. 1.1.22; Pl. Phdr. 234e. 
88 Procop. Build. 5.8.4; Pl. Phd.. 81a. 
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Secret History.89  There is a lone reference to Strabo in the Wars in the context of a 
digression concerning the Amazons and the Caucasus.90  Procopius was familiar 
with Diodorus and Isocrates.91  Procopius also refers to Plutarch’s Alcibiades.92 
Procopius also seems to have been familiar with some of Arrian’s works, and he 
seems to be especially well acquainted with his Periplus of the Black Sea.  In book 
eight of the Wars while describing the territory of the Lazi he says, “Arrian examined 
these things in this way”.93  A little earlier in the same book Procopius acknowledges, 
“that these things have been written down by some of the men of earlier times 
also”.94  Shortly after that Procopius says that the ancients called the city Apsaros 
Apsyrtus, a possible allusion to the Periplus.95  He then goes on to say that those 
very writers claim that the Trapezuntines neighbour the Colchians, but disagrees.  At 
least two ancient writers, namely Xenophon and Arrian, make that claim.96  It is 
possible that there is one further allusion to Arrian at Wars 8.2.16, where Procopius 
says, “Indeed they say that at the time of the Roman emperor Trajan detachments of 
Roman soldiers were stationed as far as Lazi and Saginae.”  Similarly, in his Periplus 
of the Black Sea Arrian says that five cohorts were stationed at Apsaros, the city 
                                                
89 Procop. SH. 13.11 “walking the air”, and 20.22, “treading the air”.  Cf. Pl. Ap. 19C “treading 
the air”.  Cf. Pl. Ap. 19B, “Socrates sins and is a busybody, examining the things beneath the 
earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others 
these same things”.  I discuss the possible intertextual relationship with Plato below pp 52-54. 
90 Procop. Wars 8.3.6:  “although much has been written about them both by Strabo and by 
some others”.  Rubin (1957:  308) also postulated that Procopius might be referring to Strabo 
in the Buildings in his discussion of the territory and tribes around the Danube where he says, 
“whether those writing the most ancient of histories called these nations Sauromatae 
Hamaxobioi or Metanastae (Build. 4.1.5)”.   
91 Procop. Wars 1.24.37; Diod. Sic. 14.8.5, Isoc. Panath. 246 
92 Procop. Wars 7.24.29; Plut. Vit. Alc. 34. 
93 Procop. Wars 8.14.48.  It is important to note the information supplied by Procopius before 
he makes this comment is not found in any of the extant works of Arrian, as Dewing (1928:  
205, n. 2) and Pekkanen (1964:  43) note.  The information may have come from Arrians’ 
Historica Alanica, which we do not have. 
94 Procop. Wars 8.1.7.   
95 Arr. Peripl M. Eux. 6.3.  Cf. Procop. Wars 8.4.10, where Roques (2000a:  14) postulates an 
allusion to Arrian (Peripl. M. Eux. 19.1). 
96 See Xen. An. 4.8.22 and Arr. Peripl. M. Eux. 11.1 (Arrian actually refers to Xenophon). 
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which Procopius is referring to.97  An important point to note about Procopius’ 
knowledge of Arrian’s Periplus is that he tends to refer only to the first half of the 
work; Pekkanen has argued that he was not familiar with the second half.98 
I want to begin my discussion of the vexed issue of intertextuality by touching 
on Procopius’ use of exempla.99  Procopius may not be as liberal in his use of 
exempla as his predecessor Ammianus, or, to a certain degree, his successor 
Agathias, but he does find occasion to use them in his works.  With that said, he 
does make a number of references to historical and mythical figures in his texts, 
often in the form of a digression, especially in the Buildings and Book 8 of the 
Wars.100  I am going to focus on the historical exempla, in the words of Kelly, those 
“where the past is recollected and applied to the present”.101  Early in the Secret 
History Procopius likens Justinian to Domitian; though he is ostensibly concerned 
with his physical appearance, he is looking towards an ideal outcome to Justinian’s 
reign, namely the emperor’s death.102  Anchises is mentioned in the context of 
Procopius’ discussion of a Gothic expedition from the Wars.103  The Italian town of 
Beneventum leads to the discussion of a host of exempla; Procopius says that it was 
                                                
97 Arr. Peripl. M. Eux. 6.1.  A possible problem is that Arrian’s Periplus was written for 
Hadrian:  “Arrian, to the Emperor Caesar Trajan Hadrian Augustus, greetings (trans. Liddle).”   
Αὐτοκράτοι Καίσαρι Τραιανῷ Ἀδριανῷ Σεβαστῷ Ἀρριανὸς χαίρειν.  At the same time, it is only 
a problem if we assume that Procopius had a perfect knowledge of the nomenclature of 
Roman emperors from Augustus onwards, which is unlikely.  He mentions Trajan on two 
other occasions:  at Wars 4.9.2, and at Buildings 4.5.15.  The reference from the Wars 
suggests that Procopius’ knowledge of former Roman emperors was limited; moreover, 
Trajan was one of the best known emperors and upon reading the introduction to Arrian’s 
Periplus, he may have recognized the name Trajan and assumed that the title referred to 
him, and not Hadrian.     
98 Pekkanen 1964. 
99 For a definition of the exemplum, in reference to Ammianus, see Kelly (2008:  258-266).   
100 This excludes the introductions to the respective sections of the Wars, which contain a 
host of historical, and pseudo-historical, material. 
101 Kelly 2008:  260.   
102 Procop. SH. 8.13. 
103 Procop. Wars 8.22.31. 
 40 
originally called Maleventus by the ancient Romans;104 he then gives an extended 
discussion of the site’s Trojan pedigree, which helps set the stage for the heroic 
events to follow at Rome.105  Midway through the Persian Wars Procopius likens 
Justinian to other monarchs, particularly eastern ones,106 who have attempted to 
enlarge their territory including both Cyrus the Great and Alexander the Great.107  
Only a few lines into the Buildings he does much the same regarding Cyrus, as he 
does three books later.108  Themistocles is another leader to whom Justinian is 
compared in the Buildings.109  Procopius makes a reference to the battle of Cannae 
in book seven of the Wars, which he notes was a great disaster; it comes in the 
context of Belisarius’ disastrous return to Italy, which is not an insignificant point.110  
There is an extended discussion of Trojan War figures midway through Wars book 
VIII in the context of Totila’s dispatch of nearly 300 ships to Greece.111  Among those 
referred to are the Phaeacians, Calypso, Odysseus, Ithaca, Agamemnon, Iphigenia, 
Artemis, and Troy itself.  Although this case may seem to be little more than a 
mythological cum historical digression rather than an exemplum per se on the part of 
Procopius, I think we are meant to read this as a reference to the Homeric hero-like 
characteristics of Totila, who had been characterized as an Achilles like figure 
throughout the Gothic Wars.112  In the preface of the Secret History, Nero, 
                                                
104 Procop. Wars 5.15.4; cf. Pliny 3.11.16. 
105 Procop. Wars 5.15.8-10. 
106 Whether this association is meant to be a subtle criticism of Justinian is a question beyond 
the scope of this thesis; however, Cyrus is an interesting comparandum nonetheless.  Cf. 
Kaldellis 2004:  54-55. 
107 Procop. Wars 2.2.15. 
108 Procop. Build. 1.1.12-13.  In this first reference Procopius says that Cyrus is the best 
known king in regard to building achievements; he then briefly asks whether this Cyrus 
should be equated with the Cyrus whose education is described by Xenophon.  Procop. 
Build. 3.1.5.  This historical digression is full of historical anecdotes, particularly those 
involving the Persians, Parthians, and Armenians (Procop. Build. 3.1.4-15). 
109 Procop. Build. 1.1.7. 
110 Procop. Wars 7.18.19. 
111 Procop. Wars 8.22.17-32. 
112 See my discussion in chapter five below pp 296-301. 
 41 
Sardanapalus, and Semiramis serve as exempla for Justinian and Theodora.113  The 
majority of the exempla found in Procopius’ works are used in reference to primary 
leaders and characters, such as Belisarius and Justinian.  We are also not given the 
source of any of the respective exempla, and so as with intertextuality in general, it is 
a question of interpretation.114   
Having discussed brief allusions and exempla, I now want to turn my 
attention to some of the more complex textual relationships that suffuse Procopius’ 
works, especially the Wars.115  To this point I have yet to discuss the relationship 
between Procopius and his predecessors, including Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Xenophon, and Polybius.  The issue has attracted a lot of attention of late, with 
studies that have postulated relationships between the works of Procopius and 
Thucydides, Procopius and Plato, and Procopius and Xenophon having appeared 
over the past decade or so.  Surprisingly, there has been no recent treatment of the 
relationship between Herodotus and Procopius; there has been very little since the 
nineteenth century study of Braun.116  A number of scholars have commented on 
Procopius’ relationship to Herodotus, if only in passing.117  This is despite the fact 
that Procopius quotes Herodotus verbatim in book VIII of the Wars.118  He even goes 
                                                
113 Procop. SH. 1.9. cf. Procop. SH. 1.7. 
114 Some of these examples might be considered part of the common body of knowledge in 
antiquity and so need not ultimately refer back to any particular source.  That does not, 
however, make invalid the suggestion of an intertextual dimension.  Intertextuality is largely 
dependent on the actions of the reader himself. 
115 For a succinct overview of intertextuality and the classics see Schmitz (2007:  77-85).  
Kelly (2008 passim, esp. 161-221) and Hinds (1998) discuss the issue in greater depth, 
though they focus on Latin literature rather than Greek.  For an introduction to intertextuality 
see Still and Worton (1990:  1-44), with bibliography. 
116 Braun 1894.  Kislinger’s (1998) paper is primarily concerned with historical matters rather 
than historiographical ones, particularly the defence of Thermopylae in the age of Justinian, 
and so omits any discussion of textual relationships. 
117 Evans 1972:  36, 37; Cameron 1985:  38, n. 30; Whitby 1994:  243; 2000d:  18-22; Brodka 
2004:  48-50; Kaldellis 2004:  92; Börm 2007:  255ff.; Treadgold 2007:  192ff. 
118 Procop. Wars 8.6.14, “And it seems that it is the right time to insert into my narrative the 
very words of Herodotus which are as follows. ‘Nor am I able to conjecture for what reason it 
is that, though the earth is one, three names are applied to it which are women’s names.  And 
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so far as to give us the book number of the quote:  “Herodotus of Halicarnassus in 
the Fourth Book of his history”.119  Hunger has postulated a connection between 
Procopius’ description of the ditch made by the Hephthalites against the Persians 
early in the Persian Wars, and Herodotus’ description of a similar technique 
employed by the Phocians.120  There are also three references to Herodotus in the 
Buildings.121  The Persian Wars, beginning with the Wars’ preface, is the obvious 
place to look for Herodotean echoes, though book VIII should also be considered 
filled as it is with geographical digressions and mythical figures.122  The Thucydidean 
character of Procopius’ Wars has long been recognized,123 though the Athenian 
historian is never named.  Procopius does use a Thucydidean phrase on at least one 
occasion in the Secret History. 124  There are a number or similarities between events 
described by Thucydides and events described by Procopius.  Cameron, for 
instance, notes a number of similarities between Procopius’ and Thucydides’ 
descriptions of their respective plagues.125  On the other hand, Adshead has argued 
                                                                                                                                      
its borders have been established as the Egyptian Nile and the Colchian Phasis.  But others 
name the Tanais River, which empties into the Maeotic Lake and the Cimmerian Strait.’”.  
The two texts are indeed nearly identical (I compared the Teubner text of Procopius with the 
Oxford text of Herodotus).  The only differences are minor:  P -ἄπο for ἐπ (H); P - τοῦ for ὅτευ 
(H); P –κέαται for κεῖται (H);  P - ἐπωνυμίην for ἐπωνυμίας (H); P - ὁρίσματα for οὕρισματα 
(H); and P – λέγουσιν for λέγουσι (H)  These minor differences need not surprise given the 
differences that can occur in manuscript traditions.  The quote itself is found at Hdt. 4.45.  Cf. 
Reynolds and Wilson (1991) on Greek and Latin palaeography. 
119 Procop. Wars 8.6.12; Hdt. 4.42ff. 
120 Procop. Wars 1.4.1ff; Hdt. 8.28ff; Hunger 1969/1970:  27.  cf. Polyaenus 6.18.2. 
121 Procop. Build 4.1.5; Hdt. 4.21.  Procop. Build. 4.2.8; Hdt. 7.175-213.  Procop. Build. 5.3.8; 
Hdt. 7.56. 
122 See my comments in chapter six below. 
123 See, for example, the comments of Cameron (1985:  3), Brodka (2004:  15-16) and 
Treadgold (2007:  177). 
124 Procop. SH 13.12.  Cf. Thuc. 2.89. 
125 Cameron 1985:  40; Meier 1999.  Procopius was not the only historian who may have 
used Thucydides’ description of the plague as model, for there are similarities between his 
account, and that of the fourteenth-century Byzantine historian John Kantakouzenos.  
Though, Kantakouzenos may also be alluding to Procopius, who served as one of John 
Kinnamos’ models (Brand 1976:  7; Scott 1981:  66).  Cf. Hunger 1976, 1978:  45; Miller 
1976; Scott 1981:  72. 
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that Procopius’ sieges are greatly indebted to those found in Thucydides.126  The 
siege of Naples described by Procopius, and the siege of Plataea described by 
Thucydides have a number of parallels;127 however, they are, in her words, only “the 
curtain raisers for the pièces de résistance”, the siege of Rome and the siege of 
Syracuse.128  Charles Pazdernik has recently gone further, laying out a detailed set 
of correspondences between Thucydides and Procopius, in regard to Procopius’ 
casting of Belisarius in the mould of Thucydides’ Brasidas,129 and in the interplay 
between freedom and slavery in domestic and international political contexts in the 
works of both historians.130   Beyond the allusions to Plato that I noted above, 
Anthony Kaldellis has proposed a much stronger relationship between the Wars and 
Plato, a provocative claim that has garnered a lot of attention.131  In particular, 
Kaldellis has argued that Platonic mimesis underscores the structure of the Wars,132 
and to such an extent that it is in many ways Platonic philosophy in disguise.133    As 
we saw above, there are a number of references to Xenophon.  There is an allusion 
in the Buildings to Xenophon’s Cyropaedia;134 three books later Procopius refers to 
his Anabasis.135  Procopius also alludes to Xenophon’s Anabasis in the Wars.136 
                                                
126 Adshead 1990:  93-104 (part I of her paper). 
127 There also seem to be a number of parallels between Dexippus’ description of the siege of 
Philippolis and Thucydides’ of Plataea, as well as Priscus’ of Naissus and the Thucydides’ of 
Plataea.  The emphasis on this particular siege could be the result of the shared rhetorical 
education of the three historians (Dexippus, Priscus, and Procopius), for the siege of Plataea 
is singled out as an exemplary ekphrasis in progymnasmata, on which see below pp 64-66.  
Cf. Hunger 1969/1970:  26. 
128 Cf. Pazdernik (2000:  171-181) for a discussion of the siege of Naples and its 
Thucydidean flavour from a different perspective. 
129 Pazdernik 2000:  149-187. 
130 Pazdernik 1997.   
131 Kaldellis 2004:  94-117.  The Republic is a central text in this relationship. 
132 On mimesis in general see the important study of Auerbach (1953).  On mimesis in 
Byzantine literature see Hunger (1969/1970).  Cresci (1986) does take a brief look at 
Procopius’ use of mimesis. 
133 Kaldellis 2004:  117.  Kaldellis’ view has come under fire.  See the comments of Greatrex 
(2003:  62-67) and Whitby (2007d:  74-76). 
134 Procop. Build. 1.1.13.   
135 Procop. Build. 4.1.16; Xen. An. 3.1.42. 
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Pazdernik has uncovered a correspondence between Xenophon’s Hellenica and 
Procopius’ Wars through the persons of Pharnabazus and Belisarius.137  Finally, 
Procopius also seems to have been familiar with Polybius; the reference to the 
disaster at Cannae may be such an allusion.138  Evans for one, believed that 
Polybius was “the one with whom he begs comparison most.”139  When Procopius 
expounds the virtues of Belisarius after his departure, his discussion of the rewards 
implemented to bolster troop loyalty is reminiscent of Polybius’ discussion of the 
Roman practices of punishment and reward described at length in book 6.140  Much 
of the war in Italy against the Goths is reminiscent of comparable Republican wars, 
which might again point towards Polybius.141  Polybius is one of the last known 
Greek historians to have described a major war in Italy prior to Procopius, and 
perhaps this is no coincidence.142  Tyche features prominently in the Wars, as it does 
                                                                                                                                      
136 Procop. Wars 1.4.17; Xen. An. preface 3.  Procop. Wars 4.16.12-25; Xen. An. 7.9-10.  Cf. 
Kaldellis 2004:  256, n. 57. 
137 Pazdernik 2006. 
138 Procop. Wars 7.18.19.  With that said, Cassius Dio should not be ruled out. 
139 Evans 1972:  133. 
140 Polybius’ famous digression on the Roman military systems is found at 6.19.1-42.6 ( the 
end of chapter 42 is fragmentary).  As regards the system of punishments and rewards 
compare Polybius at 6.39.1ff. with Procopius at 7.1.8, which strikes me as a synopsis of 
Polybius.  Of course, this could be little more than a reflection of the continuity of one element 
of the Roman army:  its system of punishments and rewards.  There are Polybian echoes in 
other sections such as the preface, especially his comments on the importance of experience 
as well as the utility of history.  Polybius’ emphasis on tyche also springs to mind.  Cf. Evans 
1972:  119, 133; Walbank 1972:  58-65; Kaldellis 2004:  19-21, 174, 218. 
141 Whether this is because Procopius constructed his narrative with Polybius in mind, at least 
in part, or because the war had many characteristics that were similar to either the Punic 
Wars, or Republican history in general is hard to say.  Cf. Sarris (2006:  223), who suggests 
that the Gothic war was reminiscent of a social war, and in that regard one thinks of the 
famous one that ravaged the Italian peninsula early in the first century BC. 
142 The civil wars of the late second century do affect Italy though we do not have Dio’s 
version, and Herodian’s account starts after the events in question.  Dio’s account of the civil 
war of 69 is also fragmentary.  We have virtually nothing from the fragmentary historians of 
the fifth century, and Zosimus’ Nova Historia ‘breaks off’ just before the sack of Italy.  
Olympiodorus’ History, for example, is fragmentary; furthermore, it may not have been terribly 
detailed.  Thus, if Procopius sought an earlier historian for some direction in regard to the 
narration of a war in Italy he may have sought Polybius.  Thucydides too, of course, also 
describes war in Italy, though for him it is confined to Sicily, as per the historical reality of the 
events he describes.  Appian also describes events in Italy; the structure of Procopius’ Wars 
itself is somewhat reminiscent of Appian’s Roman History.   
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in Polybius’ Histories; while both ascribe a different role to Tyche, Polybius may have 
been the model for Procopius in this regard.143 
What can we conclude from this survey of Procopius’ reading of Greek 
literature?  Based on his education alone, there can be little doubt that Procopius 
was well read.144  Procopius’ penchant for alluding to authors such as Homer and 
Aristophanes is unsurprising given their prominence in Greek education.  The same 
holds for his relationship with Thucydides, long the benchmark for ancient 
historiography.  On the other hand, allusions, such as those to Pindar and 
Aeschylus, are a bit more unexpected.  When the quantity of Procopius’ allusions is 
compared to the quantity of some of his contemporaries, who would have attained a 
similar level of education, Procopius is far more sparing in his use of classical 
allusions.145  Another issue is how far to push these alleged allusions.  As I have 
                                                
143 The role of Tyche in Procopius has been a contentious subject for a while.  Cameron 
argues that it was little more than literary affectation; Kaldellis argues that it underscores 
Procopius’ paganism.  Tyche was a prominent part of classical historiography for centuries 
(and a popular goddess among many pagans), and this continued into late antiquity.  Even 
Christian historians like Socrates Scholasticus used tyche in their work.  In regard to 
Socrates, “as a result of his reading of the pagan classics, and his own personal contact with 
believing pagans, a good many pagan terms crept into Socrates’ writing.”  That quote comes 
from Chesnut’s (1977:  179) study of the earliest Christian historians.  In fact, Chesnut (1977:  
213) has demonstrated that even the most Christian of historians incorporated tyche in their 
work.  Chesnut suggests that the Christian and pagan worlds came together in Procopius.  
For, “the transition from the pagan concept of Fortune found in pre-Constantine secular 
history to the mixed pagan-Christian literary language of the sixth-century secular historian 
Procopius takes place through the intermediary of the non-secular, completely ecclesiastical 
historians of the fourth and early fifth centuries, who first combined Fortune motifs with 
Christian interpretations of history (Chesnut 1977:  181, n. 77).”  See now the discussion of 
Whitby (2007d:  83-87). 
144 I do not hold to the view that Procopius composed his three works with lexica, such as that 
of John Stobaeus, at hand to select what he felt was a suitable reference at will, with little 
regard for the context of his own work, or those to which he alluded.   
145 As regards John the Lydian Maas (1992:  6) notes that learned allusions to classical 
culture are ubiquitous in John the Lydian’s works.  Agathias, whose History was much shorter 
than Procopius’, makes quite a few allusions.  Scholars, however, have disagreed on his 
success at this endeavour:  Cameron (1964:  33-52; 1970:  60ff, 112) is critical, while others, 
such as Adshead (1983:  82-87), Whitby (1992:  37-38), and Kaldellis (1997, 1999a) are 
more positive.  John Malalas, who may not have been as well educated as John Lydus, 
Agathias, or Dioscorus, unsurprisingly, perhaps, seems to have been a little less liberal in his 
use of allusions than those three, though even he makes more explicit allusions than 
Procopius does.  Scott (1990:  79) claims that Malalas was hostile to classical culture, despite 
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noted, intertextuality is a subject of some debate.  One must be careful when tackling 
this issue:  not all texts from antiquity survive, and those that do are not necessarily 
extant.146  Dio is particularly troublesome in this regard.147  Thus, it can be difficult to 
determine where to draw the line between a direct relationship, such as that 
suggested by Adshead between Procopius and Thucydides in the siege of Rome;148 
a common intellectual debt, which was the product of, the long-standing and shared 
Hellenistic educational system; and the staying power – dare I say popularity? – of 
the genre of classical and classicizing historiography.  Yet, many of the examples 
that I have discussed above are complex, and whether deliberate or not, add 
meaning to the passages in question. 
 
Military Career 
We now turn to Procopius’ military career.  Procopius officially enters history 
in 527 when he was appointed assessor to the general Belisarius.149  Procopius 
stayed with Belisarius throughout his campaigns in the east from 527 to 531.  By 532 
Procopius had returned to Constantinople, and was present for the Nika revolt.150  In 
533 he accompanied Belisarius to Africa, via Syracuse in Sicily, in the expedition 
                                                                                                                                      
his educational background.  On the other hand Dioscorus “expresses the interrelationships 
of his world through a wealth of figures of speech drawn from the classics” (MacCoull 1988:  
57).  MacCoull makes a strong case for a more positive interpretation of Dioscorus’ abilities. 
146 This is a point frequently raised by Kelly (2008) in his penetrating new study of allusion 
and intertextuality in Ammianus. 
147 See Potter 1999:  70-78.  
148 Adshead 1990. 
149 Procop. Wars 1.12.24 “Then Procopius, who wrote this, was chosen as his adviser.”  On 
Procopius’ career as an assessor see Martindale (1992:  1060-1062).  Trombley (1999) 
explores Ammianus’ career as a protector and on the basis of his discussion, the two 
historians may have had similar roles, at least on occasion, in their military careers.  Cf. 
Rubin 1957:  296-297; Börm 2007:  47; Treadgold 2007:  179. 
150 Procop. Wars 1.24.1-58.  Since, as far as we know, Procopius was still Beliasarius’ 
assessor, and Belisarius himself helped put down the revolt, Procopius must have been 
present.  On the Nika revolt see Greatrex (1997).  Cf. Börm 2007:  47. 
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against the Vandals.151  Procopius probably returned to Constantinople with 
Belisarius, and so was present to observe his triumph.152  Belisarius was recalled to 
Constantinople in 534, before returning west for the war against the Goths in 535.  
With the exception of those occasions when Procopius was sent on special missions, 
he was with Belisarius throughout the early phases of the Gothic wars.153  He was in 
Rome during the siege of the years 537-538, he was in Auximum for the siege of the 
summer and autumn of 539, and was in Ravenna in May of 540 when the Roman 
army entered the city.154  Thereafter he returned to Constantinople, and was certainly 
in Constantinople in 542, as his description of the plague suggests.155  Procopius 
may have kept his position on Belisarius’ staff in the eastern campaigns of 541 and 
542, but following the general’s recall, he was probably dismissed from office.  
Presumably, any sojourns to Palestine aside, Procopius spent the rest of his days in 
the capital.156 
 
Procopius the Rhetor 
One contentious issue is Procopius’ possible career as a rhetor.157  Agathias, 
in his preface, says that he will not go into much detail about “most of the events of 
the age of Justinian since they have been precisely described by Procopius the 
                                                
151 Treadgold (2007:  181) suggests that Procopius was present at the war council in 
Constantinople that convened in regard to the possible invasion of Africa.     
152 Procop. Wars 4.8.3-14; Martindale 1992:  1061; Börm 2007:  47; Treadgold (2007):  181.  
153 Procop. Wars 5.11.3; 6.23.23-28; 6.29.32.  cf. Börm 2007:  48. 
154 Procop. Wars 6.4.14; Rubin 1957:  298; Martindale 1992:  1061-1062; Börm 2007:  48; 
Treadgold 2007:  182-183. 
155 Signes Codoñer 2000:  14; Kouroumali 2005:  10.  The similarity between the plague in 
Constantinople described by Procopius and the plagues in Athens described by Thucydides 
does not vitiate the accuracy of Procopius’ description. 
156 The possible exception is the years 547-548, when there seems to be more detail about 
the Gothic wars than there had been for the years immediately preceding and following 547-
548.  In the absence of more evidence, this must remain speculation. 
157 For a more complete discussion of the problems and an argument in favour of considering 
Procopius a lawyer see Greatrex (2001); for the opposite view see Howard-Johnston (2000:  
22). 
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rhetor from Caesarea”.158  In one of the surviving fragments from Menander we have 
the following:  “Menander says about the historian and advocate Procopius”.159  
Evagrius also calls Procopius a rhetor on three occasions, one of which is 
particularly interesting and relevant.  Towards the end of his history Evagrius says: 
…and events after them have been collected by Priscus the rhetor and 
others...Events from him as far as the times of Justinian have been covered 
by Procopius the rhetor.  The sequel to these has been recorded in 
succession by Agathias the rhetor…160 
 
Procopius is also called a “rhetor and sophist” in the Suda.161  By the middle of the 
sixth century, when Procopius was writing, a rhetor was an attorney.  There are at 
least two places in Procopius’ Secret History where he uses the term rhetor to refer 
to a lawyer.162  There is a third place, in which Procopius’ usage is ambiguous.163  
The bulk of the evidence, however, suggests that the term was used to refer to a 
trained lawyer:  such is clear from Agathias’ comments.164  Menander’s statement is 
even more explicit.  Taken together, all this evidence suggests that Procopius had 
legal training, and that it was relevant to, and exploited in, his writing.165  There is 
one last point that seems to point to Procopius’ legal training.  Procopius seems to 
have had a pretty good grasp of Latin; good enough in fact, to discuss some Latin 
                                                
158 Agathias Prooem. 22. 
159 Men. Prot. fr. 14.2.  trans. Blockley. 
160 Evagr. HE 5.24.  trans. Whitby.  The other two references are at 4.12, and 4.19.   
161 Suda Π 2479. 
162 Procop. SH. 26.2, 26.35. 
163 Procop. SH. 30.18.  The text reads:  “Among the rhetors of Caesarea there was a certain 
Evangelos no obscure man”.  Unfortunately, the context of Procopius’ discussion leaves the 
specifics of Evangelos’ profession open. 
164 Howard-Johnston (2000:  22), who argues that Procopius was not a trained lawyer, 
nevertheless says that Agathias, through his usage of the term rhetor, “implies thereby that 
he was a trained lawyer (such being the normal meaning of rhetor at the time, as it is in 
Procopius’ usage)”. 
165 Treadgold (2007:  177) accepts the notion that Procopius had legal training.  The last of 
the classicizing historians, Theophylact Simocatta, was also a trained lawyer (Whitby 1988:  
28ff.). 
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etymology.166  His verbatim quotes from the sibylline oracle suggest some 
knowledge of Latin.167  By the time Procopius was writing Latin was being used less 
and less in Constantinople and the East,168 though it had not fallen out of use 
entirely.  Knowledge of Latin, therefore, is not implausible.169  
 
Procopius’ Literary Career 
Though some of the dates of Procopius’ works are fairly clear, others are 
uncertain, and considerable debate surrounds them.  The first seven books of the 
Wars were likely published in 550/551.170  Book VIII is a bit more problematic, with 
dates of 553 or 554 preferred by most,171 and with Evans opting for 557.172  Though 
most scholars would assign a date of 550/551 for the Secret History, 173 Brian Croke 
has recently stepped into the fray and put forth an argument of 558/559.174  Whether 
one opts for an earlier or a later date for the work, the discussion ultimately rests on 
when to believe that Procopius thought Justinian’s reign truly began:  during that of 
his uncle Justin in 518, or his official coronation in April 527.  The argument has been 
                                                
166 See, for example, the following quote:  (Procop. Wars 8.5.13) “receiving the pay from the 
emperor just as the other soldiers did every single year and being called foederati; for so the 
Romans at that time called them in the Latin language, insinuating, I think, that the Goths had 
not been defeated by them in war, but had come into peaceful relations with them on the 
basis of some treaty; for the Latins call treaties in war ‘foedera’”.  Börm (2007:  47), on the 
other hand, is not convinced.  Treadgold (2007:  177), however, does believe that Procopius 
had some knowledge of Latin. 
167 Procop. Wars 5.7.7.  Though, some might have been written in Greek.  See Potter (1990). 
168 On the increasing use of Greek in the fifth century East see Millar (2006). 
169 John the Lydian’s (Mag. 2.12, 3.27) comments do point towards a drop in usage.  On the 
other hand, there was clearly still a place for Latin as the works of Marcellinus, Jordanes, and 
Corippus indicate.  The Digest of course, was also written in Latin, as were the commands in 
Maurice’s Strategikon. 
170 Rubin 1957:  354; Cameron 1985:  9; Evans 1996a:  301; Börm 2007:  50-52; Treadgold 
2007:  189. 
171 Rubin 1957:  354; Martindale 1992:  1064; Greatrex 2003:  55-56; Brodka 2004:  17; 
Treadgold 2007:  189-190.  Börm (2007:  51) sidesteps the issue.  Cf. Agathias Proem 32. 
172 Evans 1996:  312. 
173 Rubin 1957:  356 (following Haury); Cameron 1985:  8-9; Martindale 1992:  1063; Signes 
Codoñer 2000:  53, 2003:  53; Brodka 2004:  17; Treadgold 2007:  187.  
174 Croke 2005b.  Croke is not the first to argue for a later date.  Cf. Scott 1987; Kislinger 
1998; Cataudella 2003:  401. 
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that Procopius does not tell us when he conceives of Justinian’s reign as starting.175  
Croke, however, has argued against this, along the way pointing out an unnecessary 
textual emendation on Haury’s part.176  He also discounts the supposition that the 
work cannot post-date the Buildings by again challenging a pair of questionable 
emendations of Haury’s, which Whitby had discussed earlier.177  Although not 
definitive, Croke’s arguments are convincing, and on balance, then, it is better to 
date the work to 558/559.   
Despite the problems surrounding the dating of the Secret History, it is the 
Buildings that has attracted most of the attention.  Yet again, the choice is between 
an earlier date and a later date, here 554 or 560.178  One of the arguments in favour 
of an earlier date is based on a number of omissions by Procopius in the Buildings, 
notably the Samaritan revolt of 555, the Tzani revolt of 557, and the collapse of the 
dome of Hagia Sophia in 558.  Arguments from silence, however, are always 
problematic, and as such their omission need not mean that Procopius was unaware 
of the events, as Whitby correctly asserts.179  Greatrex has acknowledged the 
danger in such argumentation, but suggested that Procopius’ claim that the enemy 
overran Thrace “recently” suggests that it could not have been written around 560, 
particularly if Procopius was referring to an incursion in 544.180  He notes that there 
                                                
175 Procop. SH 6.19, 24.29  Cf. Signes Codoñer 2003:  43. 
176 Croke 2005b:  414, n. 28.  Cf. Procop. SH 12.29 (2001 edition, page 83), where Haury 
substitutes διοικουμέ  for διοικουμένου.  
177 Whitby 1985:  144; Croke 2005b:  430.  The first emendation is from  μπροσθεν to  πισθεν, which necessiates the further emendation from γεγράψεται to γέγραπται.  Cf. 
Procop. SH. 18.38 (2001 edition, page 118). 
178 Early – Cameron 1985:  9-11; Greatrex 1994:  107-113, 2003:  46-52; Howard-Johnston 
2000:  21; Croke 2005b:  424-430; Treadgold 2007:  190-191.  Late:  Whitby 1985, 2000d; 
Evans 1996a:  303-306; Kislinger 1998; Roques 2000b:  43; Cataudella 2003:  397-400. 
179 Whitby 2000d:  63, n. 29. 
180 Greatrex 2003:  51.  Cf. Procop. Build. 4.10.9.   
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were some minor raids in 558 or 559, but they were less successful.181  Given the 
nature of panegyric, however, need the incursions have been so volatile?  What is 
more, if Procopius was trying to promote Justinian’s achievements, a successful 
resistance on the part of the Roman defensive system, which Justinian oversaw, 
would have served Procopius’ purposes well.   
There are three more arguments in favour of an earlier dating that need to be 
noted.  The first is based on the activities of three men, Artabanes, Arsaces, and 
Chanaranges:  all three were purportedly involved in a plot to assassinate Justinian, 
but were detected.  Since we have no evidence for their activities in the late 550s, 
this need not mean that those three men were no longer active.182  The second 
argument comes from an earlier paper in which Greatrex questions the speedy 
construction of the bridge over the Sangarios.183  Given the problems in the capital 
with Hagia Sophia, and the costs that would be involved in its repairs, Greatrex does 
not think that valuable funds would be diverted to the bridge.184  As regards the 
speed of the bridge’s construction – perhaps three years – this can be attributed to 
the importance of the route for the supply of troops and supplies for the Roman effort 
against the Persians in Lazica.185  The third and last counterargument centres on the 
trustworthiness of Theophanes’ account.  At A.M. 6052, which corresponds to the 
years 559-560, Theophanes claims that Justinian began construction on the bridge 
over the Sangarios.  Malalas’ text, as it survives, is not extant at this point; we cannot 
compare the two.  As such, doubts have been raised about Theophanes’ accuracy at 
                                                
181 Evans (1996a:  304), however, feels that the Kutrigur attacks best fit this comment.  
Kislinger’s (1998) attempt to connect the Kutrigur invasion with a reference in the Wars 
(2.4.10-11) is interesting, if ultimately unconvincing.   
182 Again, arguments from silence should be avoided. 
183 Greatrex 1995:  128-129. 
184 Yet, as Whitby (1985:  146) states, there seems to have been less construction work 
during the 550’s and thus, two major undertakings, notably the dome and the bridge, do not 
seem to be beyond the means of Justinian. 
185 Whitby 1985:  146. 
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this point.  Yet, the dates given in nearby entries are accurate, and we need not cast 
aside Theophanes’ attributing of the year 559/560 as the start date for the bridge’s 
construction.  Admittedly, this is the most problematic aspect of a later date for the 
Buildings.186  Still, the arguments in favour of an earlier date do not convince, and on 
balance we should date the Buildings to around 560.187 
 
The Other Faces of Procopius:  Philosophy and Engineering 
There are two more issues left to consider:  the possibility that Procpoius was a 
closet philosopher; and his suggested career as an engineer.  Kaldellis has recently 
argued that he was a philosopher who had mastered Platonic philosophy, and in 
particular the Gorgias, and the Republic, both of which are said to underscore his 
work. 188  There are a few overt references to Plato in the Wars.189  This could mean 
that Procopius’ knowledge was quite cerebral:  his allusions were esoteric, or so 
Kaldellis.  The lack of explicit references could also mean that Procopius did not give 
Plato much thought, and so kept his references to a minimum.  It could also be that 
Kaldellis overstates Procopius’ familiarity.190  In a paper on teachers in the Byzantine 
world Browning has said that “philosophy was always an optional subject, perhaps 
studied superficially by many, but in depth by only a few”; he adds that the Neo-
Platonic variety was the variant of choice among teachers and students of 
                                                
186 Whitby 1985:  137-141; Greatrex 2003:  50. 
187 Barring the discovery of some lost evidence, it is unlikely that there will ever be a 
consensus regarding the dates for any of Procopius’ works.  With that said, two points should 
always be borne in mind.  First, using hypothetical cross-references to other texts, such as 
from the Wars to the Secret History, are problematic, and should be used with caution.  
Second, a text need not have been finished in the year of the last known event recorded 
therein. 
188 Kaldellis 2004:  94-117.  See the rebuttal of Whitby (2007d:  74-76). 
189 We noted that his knowledge was not superficial; but references to Plato do not seem to 
pervade Procopius’ work. 
190 Such is the feeling of Whitby 2005b: 648-650; Whitby 2007d:  74-76. 
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philosophy.191  Procopius undoubtedly had some philosophical training, and indeed, 
as Whitby admits, “it would be surprising if Procopius did not have some knowledge 
of Plato.192  That need not mean, however, complete immersion. 
Kaldellis also believes that Procopius was enraged by the closure of the 
Academy in Athens by Justinian in 529, a story connected to Agathias’ tale about the 
Athenian philosophers and their flight to Persia, and a point on which he is 
conspicuously silent.193  My belief that Procopius was a Christian does not vitiate his 
philosophical leanings.  He could have been both, and the claim that as a result of 
those leanings he needed to conceal his true views, is perhaps overstated.  As 
Wildberg notes, “the early church fathers were steeped in philosophy, even if one 
might hesitate to count them as philosophers.”194  I am sceptical about Procopius’ 
alleged philosophical education in Athens and anger over Justinian’s anti-pagan 
legislation, the general effects of which were not felt for some time.195  Even if we 
                                                
191 Browning 1997:  102-103. 
192 Whitby 2005b:  650.   
193 “Not long before Damascius of Syria, Simplicius of Cilicia, Eulamius of Phrygia, Priscian of 
Lydia, Hermes and Diogenes of Phoenicia and Isidore of Gaza, all of them, to sue a poetic 
turn of phrase, the quintessential flower of the philosophers of our age, had come to the 
conclusion, since the official religion of the Roman empire was not to their liking, that the 
Persian state was much superior.  So they gave a ready hearing to the stories in general 
circulation according to which Persia was the land of ‘Plato’s philosopher king’ in which 
justice reigned supreme (Agathias 2.20.3, trans. Frendo).”  Agathias’ reference is the only 
one that we have for this exodus which took place c. 531; moreover, these seven 
philosophers, who were based in Athens, returned to the Roman empire not long after 
(Wildberg 2005:  330).  Had Procopius been so concerned with Justinian’s actions towards 
the Athenian philosophers, we must wonder why he did not refer to it, particularly in his 
Secret History.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the Academy was not a public 
institution, but rather a private one.  Teaching was done in the homes of the philosophers, 
and so despite the legal measures taken by Justinian, Platonic teaching continued in Athens 
for decades before finally disappearing towards the end of the sixth century.  Plus, most 
Athenian philosophers were also financed privately.  See Wildberg (2005:  316-340) for an 
overview of philosophy in the age of Justinian, and Watts (2006:  128-142) for a detailed 
discussion of the closing of the Athenian schools.  Watts (2006:  111-142, 232-256) also 
discusses the cultural and intellectual life of the Athenian and Alexandrian schools in the sixth 
century. 
194 Wildberg 2005:  334. 
195 Although this evidence is largely circumstantial, in the Buildings Procopius seems to be 
unfamiliar with Greece (though the same is true for Italy, which he was undoubtedly familiar 
with). 
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accept that Procopius was a philosopher, it is worth bearing in mind that for the most 
part, the philosophers of the Alexandrian and Athenian schools sought to harmonize 
both Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine:  if Procopius’ philosophical leanings were 
Platonic, we should not have found any neutral or positive Aristotelian allusions.196  
We should be surprised, therefore, if Procopius’ philosophical understanding betrays 
any firm convictions one way (i.e. Platonic or Aristotelian) or another.  One last point:  
in one of Procopius’ references to the Apology, he vilifies Justinian in the language 
employed by Plato in the charges against Socrates.197  Why might Procopius have 
used language used against a central figure in Platonic philosophy to slander 
Justinian?  Though he may have been familiar with some Platonic dialogues, and 
clearly some of the arguments developed in those dialogues, it does not pervade the 
Wars, or define Procopius the man.  
Might Procopius have been an architect or engineer?  That is the supposition 
expounded by James Howard-Johnston.198  Procopius has a demonstrable interest 
in architecture, water-works, and sieges.  Based on these observations, Procopius’ 
lack of literary credentials, and his somewhat limited knowledge, Howard-Johnston 
concludes that he was an architect or military engineer, and that is why he was 
appointed to Belisarius’ staff.  There are, however, some problems with this 
theory.199 
Howard-Johnston argues that Procopius’ focus on the building activities of 
Justinian in the Buildings betrays his true interests and background.  This is because 
he thinks that Procopius’ decision to fill an encomium with building works was 
unusual.  Yet, Procopius is not unusual in this regard.  Paul the Silentiary, for one, 
                                                
196 Sheppard 2000:  837-852. 
197 See Procop. SH. 18.29, and Pl. Ap. 19B. 
198 Howard-Johnston 2000:  19-30, and in particular 24-30. 
199 Kelso (2003) says that both Procopius’ and Ammianus’ references to siege artillery are in 
fact part and parcel of classicizing history. 
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composed an encomium entirely devoted to Hagia Sophia.200  Howard-Johnston 
bases his theory partly on his estimation of Procopius’ literary credentials.  Yet, 
Anthemius of Tralles, for example, the architect of Hagia Sophia, was also an 
author.201  To be sure, architects and engineers were literate individuals, who would 
have had both a primary and secondary education.202  Likewise, we argued above 
that Procopius was in fact well acquainted with the classics, only more deliberate in 
his use of references.203 
As regards his interest in water-works, that can be explained by Procopius’ 
disposition:  he was an inquisitive fellow.  In the manner of Herodotus, Procopius 
gives us a number of digressions covering a wide range of subjects.  He displays an 
interest in Armenian history; the sibylline oracle; linguistics; Persian weaponry; 
volcanoes; fantastic locales such as, for example, Britain and Thule; ancient military 
communications, and in particular the use of trumpets; Latin etymology; silk; 
shipbuilding; and the cursus publicus, to name but a few examples.204  Then there is 
the question of his focus on fortifications and their construction.  This is, I think, a 
product of both his experiences, and his appreciation of Thucydides.205  Both authors 
put considerable emphasis on sieges.  Furthermore, and Thucydides aside, 
Procopius’ interest must partially be a product of the type of warfare that was 
prevalent in his age.  Sieges were part-and-parcel of warfare in the east in Late 
                                                
200 Michael Whitby (pers. comm.) pointed out to me that a focus on buildings was not 
unusual.  In regard to Paul the Silentiary’s encomium, see Ma Whitby (1985). 
201 Browning 2000:  880.  He wrote a treatise On Unusual Devices, and a lost treatise On 
Burning-Mirrors. 
202 Browning 2000:  880. 
203 The number of references and allusions used by sixth century authors varied 
considerably.  See above pp 34-46. 
204 Wars:  1.5.35ff (Armenian history), 5.7.6ff (sibylline oracle), 5.18.6 (linguistics), 5.22.19 
(Persian weaponry), 6.4.21-30 (volcanoes), 6.15.1-36 (Britain and Thule), 6.23.23-29 
(trumpets), 8.5.13-14 (Latin etymology), 8.17.1-8 (silk), 8.22.9-16 (ship building).  
Secret History:  30.1-8 (cursus publicus). 
205 As regards Procopius’ relationship to Thucydides and sieges see Adshead (1990:  93-
119). 
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Antiquity, more so than they had been during the principate, and Procopius was 
intimately acquainted with the realities of siege warfare.206  In addition, his service on 
Belisarius’ staff exposed him to a number of protracted sieges, particularly those in 
Italy.  It is easy to imagine that he was called upon to participate in the defence of 
those cities.  Indeed, he was sent to procure supplies when Belisarius and the 
Romans were besieged in Rome.207  Thus, as regards Procopius’ predilection for 
discussions of fortifications, we need look no further than his varied interests, and life 
experiences, to find an explanation.   
                                                
206 During the late republic and Principate, the Roman armed forces usually sought to engage 
their foes in open battle.  Most fortifications across the empire before the accession of 
Vespasian were made of perishable materials such as wood and turf.  Indeed, in many parts 
of the empire, such as the lower Danube, it was not until well into the second century that 
permanent materials were used for the multifarious fortifications in the region.  To be sure, 
this shows that the Romans, in most cases, used them as launching pads for offensive 
operations and not as theatres for combat (i.e., defensive structures).   
207 Procop. Wars 6.4.1ff. 
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Chapter 2:  How to Describe a Battle in Antiquity 
 
In the last chapter I looked at Procopius’ personal background.  Now I want to 
turn to his cultural background by looking at the historiographical, rhetorical, and 
theoretical tradition within which he operated, as well as a sample of battle 
descriptions from some of his contemporaries.  How Procopius ordered his narrative, 
what he included and excluded, and how he explained the outcome were all 
conditioned by the chosen genre and its tradition, as well as the historical thought of 
his contemporaries. 1  His audience would have been drawn from among the elite, 
and they would have been well educated.2  For Procopius’ Wars to have been 
successful, which we know it was, both in the sixth century and the medieval period,3 
he would have had to have constructed his text in a language, and using a system of 
meaning, that his audience would have shared and understood.4  Our author 
Procopius was trying to communicate with his audience by writing a history of events 
that he thought was important; he was also trying to persuade the implied reader that 
                                                
1 The issue of genre is a complicated one, and one that has garnered much attention.  In the 
early twentieth century Jacoby (1909) expounded in his famous, and pioneering, article the 
development of Greek historiography, or at least as he saw it.  His views went unchallenged 
for nearly a century – Fornara (1983:  1-46) maintained them in his important overview of 
ancient historiography – until fairly recently.  The five sub-genres of history outlined by 
Jacoby are mythography, ethnography, chronography, contemporary history, and 
horography.  Marincola (1999), however, in an important critique of Jacoby’s views, lays out 
five sensible new categories for classifying historical works:  narrative or non-narrative; 
focalization; chronological limits; chronological arrangement; and subject matter.  Although 
Marincola is primarily concerned with historiography from classical Athens through high 
imperial Rome, his categories could just as well have applied to late antique historiography.  
Indeed, as it turns out, the three widely accepted sub-genres of late antique historiography, 
secular or classicizing history, ecclesiastical history, and the chronicle, tacitly follow those 
categories.  By the late sixth century secular and ecclesiastical histories started to converge, 
a development particularly evident in the works of Evagrius and Theophylact Simocatta, 
though they are not without precedent (Whitby 1992).  Of these three sub-genres, the only to 
survive the seventh century is the chronicle, although other sorts of texts emerged to fill the 
void (Cameron 1992; Haldon 1997:  425-435).  Cf. Mullett (1992) and Rosenmeyer (2006) on 
the vexed issue of genre in Byzantine and ancient literature.      
2 Though she is discussing an earlier period, Morgan’s (1998:  223-234) discussion is salient. 
3 Kalli 2004:  162. 
4 Cf. the pertinent comments of Rossi (2004:  10) in regard to the use of “narrative topoi”.  
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his views were correct.  When I turn to his text it will be important to bear these 
factors in mind.  On the other hand, Procopius was not writing in a vacuum, and 
where Cameron and Kaldellis, while adopting different approaches, have sought to 
situate him in the sixth century intellectual milieu, I shall do the same, though I shall 
limit myself to the description of battle.  Thus, this chapter is devoted to the means of 
describing battle in antiquity, at least as regards the literature,5 with special attention 
paid to the historical and theoretical literature, so that when it is time for us to 
examine Procopius’ descriptions of battle, we can read them, at least in part, in the 
same light that his contemporaries – his original audience, implied and actual – 
would have.  I begin my discussion with rhetoric, and the rhetorical models of combat 
which formed a part of the broader east Roman curriculum.  Then I provide an 
overview of ancient theories of historical writing, with a look at topics such as the 
arrangement of materials and the importance of veracity.  Military theory occupies 
the last section of part A beginning with Homer.   In part B I turn to some of 
Procopius’ contemporaries, and near-contemporaries (that is sixth century), and their 
descriptions of battle, whether found in chronicles, ecclesiastical, secular history, or 
military handbook, and whether they were written in Greek or Latin.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 I am leaving out discussion of battles in the visual arts, and media such as frieze sculpture 
(Trajan’s Column), book illumination (Vatican Virgil), and silverware (David plates). 
6 I am omitting the Syriac historians, such as Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, even though they 
could easily have been included. 
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PART A:  THEORY OF DESCRIBING BATTLE IN ANTIQUITY:  RHETORIC, 
HISTORIOGRAPHY, MILITARY 
 
I.  Rhetoric7 
In the previous chapter we briefly looked at the role of rhetoric in ancient 
education; here I want to expand upon that, and look more closely at the role of 
rhetoric in historical composition.  I argued above that Procopius himself would have 
had a rhetorical education.  Rubin included it in his overview of his education.8  
Some time after that Beck claimed that Procopius’ work betrays his familiarity with 
rhetoric,9 while years later Roques used the works’ rhetorical flavour to explore 
Procopius’ historical pedigree.10  By the thirteenth century Procopius was considered 
by some important Byzantine authors, such as Joseph Rhakendytes, as a model of 
rhetoric, a point worth bearing in mind.11  Indeed, although Procopius’ classification 
as a Byzantine historian is open to question, the importance of rhetoric in medieval 
Byzantium has long been recognized.12  The same is largely true for ancient 
historiography, following from the work of Wiseman,13 and later, Woodman.14  There 
                                                
7  From the start it should be clear that I do not hold to the derogatory view of rhetoric, with its 
supposed deleterious impact on later Greek writers, on which see the comments of Cameron 
(2006:  19).  At the same time, I am using the word in its more technical sense, rather than in 
a more general sense, such as that employed by Booth (1961) and Cameron (1991:  13). 
8 Rubin 1957:  304-306.  Cf. Kouroumali (2005:  84-91, 102-106), who also devotes 
considerable space to rhetoric in antiquity and its relation to Procopius’ text. 
9 Beck 1986:  18. 
10 Roques 2000a. 
11 Kalli 2004:  161-162. 
12 Ljubarskij (1998:  11) does not classify Procopius as a Byzantine historian, nor Agathias or 
Theophylact for that matter.  For him it is better to call them late classical.  On the issue of 
rhetoric in Byzantine literature see Hunger (1981).  He discusses various aspects of 
Byzantine rhetoric in his encyclopaedic Die Hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der 
Byzantiner, devoting 131 pages in volume 1 to it (1978:  65-196).  On the origins of rhetoric, 
and its later importance for Byzantine society, see Hunger (1978:  I, 65-74).  Similar views 
are held for the ancient world (Morgan 1998:  190).   
13 Wiseman 1979:  29-40. 
14 Woodman 1988 (cf. ibid. 2007:  142-143).  Marincola (1997:  13), for example, in his 
masterly Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, states that historiography was a 
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is a broad consensus that rhetoric had an important role not only in ancient and 
Medieval Greek society, but also in literary composition.  Despite a curtailing in 
freedom of speech, at least in relation to classical Athens and Republican Rome, 
orations, whether public or private, were still quite common in late antiquity,15 and 
though rhetoric’s greatest impact was probably felt in the realm of literature,16 its 
importance in late antique society at large should not be overlooked.17  In sum 
rhetoric was important, and many have argued that not only Procopius, but the works 
of other ancient historians, were shaped by rhetoric.  In this section I am going to 
focus on the progymnasmata as they formed a fundamental part of the ancient 
rhetorical curriculum, they provided the student with the tools needed to compose a 
literary work, including a history,18 and whether we accept that Procopius completed 
his rhetorical education or not, there can be little doubt that he would have studied 
these rhetorical exercises in detail. 
One of the key features of rhetorical education was the imitation of models; 
not only would students read selections from a range of different authors, at first 
primarily those from poets, and later from prose as well, but they would also strive to 
recreate them, in some form or other, not only as regards their structure and style, 
but also their language.19  Whereas in the primary and secondary stages of 
education the pupil’s learning was primarily passive, in this tertiary phase his 
                                                                                                                                      
branch of rhetoric in the ancient world.  Not all students of ancient historiography, however, 
have been convinced of rhetoric’s role, largely because of a negative understanding of its 
usage.  Noteworthy in this regard is Momigliano (1984) who, in a discussion of Hayden 
White’s (1981; cf. 1987) theories of narrativity, argued against the extensive use of rhetorical 
devices by ancient historians.  Cf. Laird 2006:  6; Nicolai 2007:  19-23. 
15 Russell 1998:  17; Cameron 1991:  80-84; Flusin 2004:  167. 
16 Gibson 2004:  104. 
17 Kennedy (1983:  52-53) notes that the primary goal of rhetorical education in late antiquity 
was “skill in literary composition”.  Brown (1992:  42) and Flusin (2004:  266) also stress 
rhetoric’s importance in late antiquity.   
18 Pernot 2005:  150.  cf. Heath 2004:  277-331. 
19 Cribiore 2001:  225; Too 2001:  290.  cf. Heath 2004:  216-221. 
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participation was active.20  The progymnasmata, which are the focus of this 
discussion, formed the backbone of the pupil’s training in literary education.21  Four 
such textbooks survive from antiquity:  those attributed to Aelius Theon, Pseudo-
Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus.22  The progymnasmata of Pseudo-
Hermogenes and Aphtonius are thought to have been the most popular by the sixth 
century, though these surviving works have much in common, and as such the views 
raised on all four deserve discussion; moreover, when modern scholars denigrate 
ancient battle descriptions, they often do so with implicit reference to the stock 
features contained in these handbooks.23   
All four theorists include a list of suitable exercises, possibly in the order in 
which they were to be done, though certainly in increasing order of complexity.24  
The latter three progymnasmata include twelve (Pseudo-Hermogenes), fourteen 
(Aphthonius), and thirteen exercises (Nicolaus) respectively, while Aelius Theon’s 
included ten; it should be noted that by the time Pseudo-Hermogenes is believed to 
have been writing,25 the practice of composing handbooks with preliminary exercises 
had achieved something of a consensus, and so Aelius Theon’s diverges the most.  
Indeed, in his treatise Aelius Theon provides a comprehensive introduction to his 
text, in which he discusses the value of the approach which he adapts, as well as a 
discussion of pedagogy.  While discussing the value of the exercises Aelius notes:  
“training in exercises is absolutely useful not only to those who are going to practise 
rhetoric but also if one wishes to undertake the function of poets or historians or any 
                                                
20 Morgan 1998:  198. 
21 Kennedy 1983:  53; Gibson 2004:  104; Pernot 2005:  197-199. 
22 For an overview of these four authors and their works see Kennedy (1983:  56-69). 
23 Shaw 1999:  133; Rossi 2004:  9. 
24 Morgan 1998:  191. 
25 On the author and date of this work see Patillon (2008:  165-170). 
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other writers.”26  Among the exercises illustrated by the rhetoricians the two that are 
most relevant to historiography are narrative (diegema) and ekphrasis, or 
description.   Also of note is the ethopoeia, or prosopopoeia, which involved the 
writing of a speech for a given character in a given situation.27  In the respective 
authors’ hierarchies of exercises these three elements come in the same relative 
order, with the narrative coming first and the ethopoeia second, just before the 
ekphrasis; the implication of their arrangement is that the latter is the most complex.   
Beginning with narrative, the main concern for all four authors is the 
definition, characteristics, and classification of narrative.  All four state that a 
narrative is the exposition ( κθεσις) of something that has happened, or as though it 
had happened.28  While discussing narrative, style is a particular concern of the 
rhetoricians, and in that regard, Aelius Theon, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus lay out a 
narrative’s characteristics, while Pseudo-Hermogenes avoids them.  For Aelius 
Theon the three most important characteristics of a narrative are clarity, 
conciseness, and credibility.  Aphthonius says that the most important characteristics 
of a narrative are clarity, brevity, persuasiveness, and, interestingly, what he calls 
Hellenism ( λληνισμός).29  On the other hand Nicolaus gives five, brevity, clarity, 
persuasiveness, charm, and grandeur, with, like Aphthonius, Hellenism ( λληνισμός) 
                                                
26 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 70, trans. Kennedy. 
27 This particular exercise reminds us of Thucydides’ famous comments about how he 
constructs his speeches (Thuc. 1.22.1).  I will not be going over the respective rhetoricians’ 
discussions of speeches, as they are in broad agreement on what is said. 
28 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 78; Pseudo-Hermogenes 2.1; Aphthonius 2.1; Nicolaus, Felten p. 
11. 
29 Aphthonius 2.4.  Kennedy (1983:  61) calls the last virtue, what I have deemed Hellenism, 
“purity of language”.  In the context this supposition seems to be entirely plausible, though his 
designation is not completely certain.  Aphthonius is believed to have been writing in the late 
fourth century (Patillon 2008:  49-52), and Nicolaus, who also mentions the word, not much 
later (fifth century), both well after the Second Sophistic, though much of the purism 
advocated by those who lived through it, such as Plutarch, Arrian, Lucian, and Dio, 
maintained its legitimacy among Greek writers for centuries to come.  On the practice of 
linguistic purism during the Second Sophistic see Swain (1996:  43-64); on Hellenism through 
the fourth century, especially in regard to its relationship to the rise of Christianity, Kaldellis 
(2007a:  120-172).  Cf. Brown (1992:  43ff), on a rhetorical education and “verbal decorum”. 
 63 
tacked on to the end.30  Pseudo-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus disagree on 
how many types of narrative there are.  For Pseudo-Hermogenes there are four 
types of narrative, the mythical, the fictitious or dramatic, the historical, and the 
political or private;31 for Aphthonius there are three, namely the dramatic, historic, 
and political.32  Nicolaus’ account betrays the hallmarks of a compiler, for he 
classifies narrative into both three categories, descriptive, dramatic, or mixed, and 
four categories, mythical, historical, pragmatic (or judicial), and fictitious.33  Over the 
course of their respective discussions the four authors often have recourse to 
examples from Greek literature.  Theon’s treatment of narrative is much longer, and 
more detailed, than those of his predecessors.  The bulk of the examples that he 
uses come from Greek historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Theopompus, 
though Homer too frequents the discussion.34  Indeed, while discussing the topic he 
devotes considerable attention to the narrative technique and style of Thucydides, at 
one point chastising it,35 at another praising it.36  Both Pseudo-Hermogenes’ and 
Aphthonius’ discussions are quite brief, though the former names Homer, Herodotus, 
and Thucydides.  Nicolaus also names those three authors.  In sum, of the three 
topics that I have highlighted, it is the narrative that the rhetoricians associate most 
with history, with Aelius Theon saying, significantly, that “historical writing is nothing 
other than a combination of narrations”.37 
Although narrative is understood as the most important part of historical 
writing, it is the ekphrasis that is most relevant when discussing battle in 
                                                
30 Nicolaus, Felten p 14.   
31 Ps. Herm. 2.3. 
32 Aphthonius 2.2. 
33 Nicolaus, Felten p. 12. 
34 Aelius Theon treats fewer subjects than his three successors; he also discusses them in 
more detail. 
35 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 80. 
36 Aelius Theon, Spengel pp. 84-85. 
37 Aelius Theon, Spengel, p. 60, trans. Kennedy.  Cf. Gibson 2004:  118. 
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historiography.38  By late antiquity ekphrases had emerged as something of a genre 
in and of itself, as evidenced by Paul the Silentiary’s description of Hagia Sophia; 
however, they were still incorporated in larger works, such as letters, sermons, and 
histories.39  Getting back to our rhetorical handbooks, Aelius Theon notes that 
ekphrases are frequently used by historians.40  Pseudo-Hermogenes and 
Aphthonius, while discussing ekphraseis, draw the bulk of their examples from 
Thucydides, while Aelius Theon, as with narrative, draws his examples from Homer, 
Herodotus and Thucydides.  The point, of course, is that these rhetoricians all 
recognize the place that an ekphrasis has in Greek historiography.  For all four, the 
definition of an ekphrasis is bringing what is shown before the eyes.41  Ekphrasis 
tends to be more expressive than narrative, and to be concerned with parts of things, 
rather than as a whole like a narrative, or so Nicolaus.42  Aelius Theon says that 
ekphrasis is somewhat similar to topos, or commonplace.43  On the other hand, 
Pseudo-Hermogenes notes similarities with both narrative and topos, though also 
encomium.44  Only Aelius Theon and Pseudo-Hermogenes give us the virtues of an 
ekphrasis, with both conceding that they are clarity and vividness.45  There is broad 
agreement over what sorts of things constitute an ekphrasis.  Indeed, the list of types 
of things that could be described was quite extensive, with the general categories 
being events, persons, places, and things.  Most significant for us is that the first 
                                                
38 It should be noted that the manuscript of Nicolaus breaks off before we get to ekphrasis, 
and so the treatment of ekphrasis that we have, and that I am using, is based on Felten’s 
reconstruction drawn from “composite commentaries” (Kennedy 2003:  162).  With this in 
mind, I shall limit my use of Nicolaus, though it is worth bearing in mind that whoever wrote 
what we are including under ekphrasis is in general agreement with the other three 
rhetoricians. 
39 Maguire 1998:  113.  On Paul the Silentiary and Hagia Sophia see Ma Whitby (1985). 
40 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 60. 
41 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 118; Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.1; Aphthonius 12.1; Nicolaus, 
Felten p. 68. 
42 Nicolaus, Felten p. 68. 
43 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 119. 
44 Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.7. 
45 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 119; Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.6. 
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three rhetoricians include war, battle, and the construction of siege engines, ships, 
and weapons of war, as suitable subject matter for an ekphrasis,46 and it is because 
of this that most ancient descriptions of battle are denigrated.47  What is more, an 
ekphrasis need not be on only one of these things, for they can also be mixed, and 
the example provided by Aphthonius is the night-battle at Syracuse described by 
Thucydides.48  What exactly do the rhetoricians suggest an orator or historian include 
in a description of a war or battle?  While discussing the education of the young, 
Aelius Theon simply refers to Thucydides’ descriptions of the siege of Plataea, and 
various cavalry and naval battles, without identifying the features.49  When he turns 
to the subject of ekphrasis he again singles out the Plataean siege, as well as the 
making of Achilles’ arms from Homer, and the preparation of a siege engine from 
Thucydides.50  It is Aelius Theon alone who singles out the siege of Plataea, while 
the night battles at Syracuse are mentioned by Aelius Theon, Pseudo-Hermogenes, 
and Aphthonius alike, as examples of an ekphrasis.51  A little later he says:  “in an 
ekphrasis of war we shall first recount events before the war:  the raising of armies, 
expenditures, fears, the countryside devastated, the sieges; then describe the 
wounds and the deaths and the grief, and in addition the capture and enslavement of 
                                                
46 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 118; Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.2; Aphthonius 12.1.  The 
reconstructed text of Nicolaus is the only one to give only a passing reference to war, which 
could be the result of its context (medieval Byzantine).  Indeed, ekphrases of works of art 
attract the writer’s attention (Nicolaus, Felten p. 69).  The fourth century orator Themistius, 
who had a full training in rhetoric, says that Homer and Thucydides are models for writing 
about war (Oration 15).  By the medieval Byzantine period, besides becoming a model for 
rhetoric, Procopius (and to a lesser degree Agathias) had become a model for describing 
battle, at least for the historians Leo the Deacon and John Kinnamos.  Cf. Brand 1976:  7; 
Russell 1998:  40; Kelso 2003; Kalli 2004:  161-162; Talbot & Sullivan 2005:  23.  
47 Not everyone, of course, has read the use of battle conventions as signs of literary sterility.  
Paul (1982) and Rossi (2004), for example, argue the contrary.  Indeed, as regards the 
ekphrasis Fowler (1991:  30) says “the signs [in both art and literature] are read according to 
systems of meaning that are cultural constructs”.   
48 Aphthonius 12.2; Thuc. 7.43-44.  cf. Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.3. 
49 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 68. 
50 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 118.  cf. Hom. Il. 18.478-614; Thuc. 3.21, 4.100. 
51 Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.3; Aphthonius 12.2. 
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some and the victory and trophies of the others”.52  Pseudo-Hermogenes gives a 
similar account.53  As with the earlier references to the siege of Plataea and Achilles’ 
shield, this passage, whether the version of Aelius Theon or Pseudo-Hermogenes, 
reads as an outline of a composite battle drawn, almost entirely, from Homer and 
Thucydides.  If there is one thing that the progymnasmata have in common in this 
regard, it is that Thucydides serves as an exemplary model for describing battle, and 
sieges in particular are highlighted.  At the same time, Homer left an impression.  
What these discussions do not do, however, is give much detail about what exactly it 
is from the respective ekphraseis in Thucydides that are so exemplary.  Aelius Theon 
and Pseudo-Hermogenes may both give an outline of what is to be included in war 
and battle, but that is all it is:  an outline.  In sum, for these rhetoricians a battle is 
considered a potential ekphrasis.  On the other hand, what exactly is to be included 
in such a description, is left open, for all that we have is a few general comments 
coupled with some Thucydidean references. 
This overview of rhetoric, and more specifically, the progymnasmata, has 
highlighted those elements deemed to be most relevant to a would-be historian.  All 
classicizing late antique historians, and their readers, would have had similar 
training, and they are all likely to have been familiar with the points expressed in 
these handbooks, whether they worked through one of those mentioned here, or 
                                                
52 Aelius Theon, Spengel p. 119, trans. Kennedy. 
53 Pseudo-Hermogenes 10.4:  “if we are speaking of an ekphrasis of a war, first we shall 
mention events before the war:  recruiting the soldiers, the expenditures, the fears; then the 
attacks, the slaughter, the deaths; then the victory trophies; then the paeans of the victors 
and the others’ tears and slavery” (trans. Kennedy).  Rossi (2004:  9), in an otherwise 
excellent introduction to her provocative book, mistranslates τὰς στρατολογίας as “the 
generals’ speeches”, when it should read “the levying of troops”.  The point is significant, for 
Agathias, who I believe had a more complete rhetorical training than Procopius, and 
subsequently, relied more heavily on his rhetorical background in his work, generally avoids 
pre-battle speeches before describing a battle, though he will report the levying of troops.  Cf. 
Agathias 2.4.1-2.6.6, the preliminaries to the Battle of Casilinum, one of the most detailed 
battle descriptions in the Histories, where extensive preparations are recorded, including the 
levying of troops, though only a couple of lines are devoted to exhortations (2.5.1). 
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some other that is no longer extant.  Narrative and ekphrasis are the two topics most 
appropriate for my discussion of descriptions of battle in the Wars.  Like the classical 
texts that they occasionally refer to, these progymnasmata often give quite precise 
references, without providing explication (Plataea), the implication being that the 
student would be familiar enough with the passage in question such that it was not 
needed.54  I now turn to historiographical theory. 
 
II.  The Essentials of Historiography55 
Procopius’ work is a classicizing history, and as such, it was bound, at least 
to some degree, by a number of conventions like battles, ethnographic digressions, 
geographical discussion, political narrative, and speeches.56  Over hundreds of years 
Greek authors developed a standard, and relatively static, set of criteria for the 
would-be historian.57  Most historians stress the importance of experience in writing 
history even if they themselves had limited familiarity with their subjects.  Polybius, 
for example, rails against Timaeus’ ignorance about the many places that he 
                                                
54 Cribiore 2001:  225; Pernot 2005:  150. 
55 Moles (1993:  88) said that the four principal extant writers on ancient historiographical 
theory are Polybius, Cicero, Dionysius, and Plutarch.  To that list should be added Lucian.  
Cf. the extended discussion of Fornara (1983:  91-141), as well as the overview of Potter 
(1999:  5-19).   
56 That is not to suggest, however, that using this conceptual framework was in any way 
limiting; in this regard I am very much in agreement with Kaldellis (2004).  Indeed, I intend to 
show over the course of this study that Procopius’ decision to write a ‘classicizing history’ in 
no way restricted the variety of his descriptions, and depth of explanation, and that it did not 
obscure the realities of war any more than a modern film might.  On the other hand, our 
problem with the means that Procopius, and his fellow historians, explained his work might be 
due to a different view on the importance of explanation in a history.  Pelling’s (1999:  348) 
comments are worth bearing in mind:  “Perhaps, indeed, we concentrate too much on causal 
explanation, central to our modern western historical explanations but not always so primary 
in the ancient world.”  
57 There was some dispute among historians and theoreticians about what should and should 
not be included in an historical work.  There was a consensus for most issues (such as the 
importance of truth which I shall turn to below), although some were still open to debate.  
Dionysius of Halicarnasus (On Thucydides) and Plutarch (On the Malice of Herodotus) 
looked at the same parts of Herodotus’ narrative, and Dionysius was positive towards 
Herodotus, while Plutarch was not.  Plutarch, of course, was hostile towards Herodotus 
because he presents his fellow Thebans as medizers.   
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describes, such as Africa.58  Historians must also pick a subject that is worth 
discussing; for Dionysius this was the first task of an historian.  As a result, every 
historian stresses the importance of their subject and the need for the deeds to be 
preserved for all time, or something similar.59  Herodian, for instance, says, “…such 
similar succession of reigns, variety of foreign wars, disturbances among the 
provincial populations, and destruction of cities in [both] Roman territory [etc.]… were 
rarely if ever recorded before.”60  Historians must also be free from prejudice,61 and 
have noble aims in composing their history – in other words, panegyric was 
unacceptable, as Lucian points out.62  Generally, this was only possible when an 
historian had the freedom to speak his mind; 63 if he did not, then the historian could 
be open to charges of malice, as Plutarch makes plain early in his treatise on 
Herodotus.64  
Perhaps the most important criterion identified for any would-be historian is 
adherence to the truth.65  In other words, an historical work must describe things “as 
they happened”.66  This conviction is found among both classical and classicizing 
historians from Herodotus to Theophylact Simocatta.67  Thucydides, Dionysius, 
                                                
58 Polyb. 12.3.2ff.  Procopius (Wars 1.1.3) was well qualified in this regard, having 
accompanied Belisarius to the Eastern frontier, North Africa, and Italy.   
59 Ultimately, like much else, this predilection goes back to Homer. 
60 Herod. 1.1.4, trans. Whittaker.  Procopius, of course, stresses the same thing – and 
rightfully so - for his subject matter, the wars of Justinian.  Cf. Procop. Wars 1.1.6. 
61 This is one of the chief charges hurled at Timaeus by Polybius (12.7.1). 
62 Lucian, Hist. conscr. 10. 
63 Some modern historians, including Honoré (1978) and Kaldellis (2004), believe that 
conditions during the reign of Justinian were not especially conducive to freedom of 
expression.  Procopius’ scathing invective in the Secret History would seem to support such a 
claim.   
64 Somewhat surprisingly, Plutarch makes the point about historians in general (Plut. On 
Malice 856B). 
65 See Potter 1999:  12-18, 144-150 (on verisimilitude).   
66 See too Aristotle (Poet. 1451a ff.) who says that, “the difference is that one [history] tells of 
what has happened, the other [poetry] of the kinds of things that might happen” (Poet.1451b, 
trans. Murray & Dorsch). 
67 I accept Blockley’s (Blockley 2003:  291) pronouncement that there was no unbroken 
historical tradition in Greek historiography from Herodotus to Theophylact, and I would also 
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Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, and Herodian all stress the importance of truth in their 
work.  Procopius is no exception:  “He [Procopius] believed that while cleverness 
was appropriate for rhetoric, story-making was appropriate for poetry, and truth for 
history”.68  Some historians, however, are a little less than straightforward in regard 
to the status of ‘truth’ in their accounts.  Herodotus, for one, is a bit more liberal in his 
presentation of ‘factual’ and ‘fictional’ evidence.69  Polybius, on the other hand, put 
truth on a pedestal:  in his vehement attacks on his predecessors and 
contemporaries he refers over and over to the importance of truth in history.  In fact, 
he goes so far as to say that history without truth is nothing.70  And yet Polybius, this 
most ardent of proponents for truth in historiography, identifies another important 
amendment to the importance of truth:  if an historian errs in his reporting of events, 
it is acceptable, so long as he has not done so through prejudice or ill intent.71  It is 
difficult to understate the importance that historians placed on truth; it is something 
we should bear in mind when we turn to Procopius’ text.72   
                                                                                                                                      
agree that there is much in common between classicizing and ecclesiastical historians in the 
fifth century (AD).  Yet, the distinction is appropriate given the similarities with their 
predecessors.  Cf. Scott 1981.   
68 Procop. Wars 1.1.4. 
69 “So much for what Persians and Phoenicians say; and I have no intention of passing 
judgement on its truth or falsity.  I prefer to rely on my own knowledge, and to point out who it 
was in actual fact that first injured the Greeks; then I will proceed with my history” (Hdt. 1.5, 
trans. De Sélincourt and Marincola). 
70 Polyb. 1.14.6.  Cf. Polyb. 2.56.11-12,  
71 See Plutarch (On the Malice of Herodotus), who bases much of his criticism of Herodotus 
on the allegation that he was unduly biased against the Greeks in favour of the barbarians, 
which resulted in – at least for Plutarch – some erroneous statements.  This sort of error in 
the eyes of Polybius is the worst crime that an historian could commit (Polyb. 12.12.4-5). 
72 Later Byzantine historians had this same conviction.  See, for example, the preface to Anna 
Komnene’s Alexiad in which she expresses ‘concern’ lest her readers deem that her history is 
“…wholly false and mere panegyric” (trans. Sewter).  Anna’s preface in fact includes many of 
the traits that we have outlined above.  Whether or not this tendency to imitate the prefaces 
of earlier Greek historians among later Byzantine historians was little more than mere literary 
affectation is an issue beyond the scope of this essay (see Kaldellis 1999b for some 
comments about this in regard to the work/s of Michael Psellus).  Suffice to say, I suspect 
that it was more than mere imitation.  Cf. Hunger 1969/1970; Scott 1981; Holmes 2005:  172-
202. 
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Another trait that shows up time and again in discussions of historiographical 
practice is the arrangement of the text.  In his letter to Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) 
in which he lays out the five most important tasks of an historian, Dionysius puts 
considerable stress on the construction of the narrative.  The second of those tasks 
is to pick an appropriate place to begin and end the narrative; the third is to 
determine what material to include and what material to omit in an historical 
narrative; and the fourth is to arrange the material properly and to put each point in 
its proper place.  In fact, it is significant deficiencies in some of these areas that 
leads Dionysius to censure Thucydides; 73 he was not the only ancient or Byzantine 
critic to highlight Thucydides’ arrangement.74  Plutarch, in his On the Malice of 
Herodotus, stresses some of the same issues.  He allows that some omission is 
permissible, so as long as nothing that deserves a place in the narrative is left out.  
Herodotus seems to have got this wrong, or, so Plutarch when he describes him as 
“omitting the good and failing to omit the bad”.75  Lucian’s discussion of the same 
issues is perhaps the most colourful for he likens an historian to a sculptor, such as 
Praxiteles, whose job it is to take the medium, which in this case is ‘the facts’, and 
                                                
73 As regards the second task Dionysius says:  “It would have been better, after describing all 
the events of the war, to end his [Thucydides’] history with a climax…” (trans. Usher).  As 
regards the third task:  “Thucydides, on the other hand, hurtles breathlessly through an 
extended description of a single war, stringing together battle after battle, armament after 
armament and speech after speech”, thereby implying that Thucydides was not selective 
enough when writing his history.  Finally, as regards the fourth task Dionysius says:  
“Thucydides keeps close to the chronological order…[and as a result] is obscure and hard to 
follow, for since many events occur in different places in the course of the same summer and 
winter, he leaves his account of earlier events half-finished and embarks upon others (trans. 
Usher)”.  Dionysius essentially expands upon these points in his On Thucydides.  It might be 
that it was concern over criticisms of these sorts that led Procopius to organize his Wars by 
theatre. 
74 As we saw above p 63, n. 35, Aelius Theon, the second century writer on rhetoric, criticizes 
Thucydides’ style and arrangement on a few occasions.  Tzetzes, a twelfth century 
commentator on Thucydides, struggled with Thucydides’ language (as many before and after 
him have), and as a response says that an historian should do the following:  “Now hear the 
best method of writing a history:|  Be grave and be clear, be persuasive and bland,| Be fierce 
when it’s needed, and sometimes expand” (trans. Standford).  On the other hand, some 
modern commentators, such as Hornblower (1994a, 1994b), have praised his selection.  Cf. 
Scott 1981:  61. 
75 Plut. On Malice 858B, trans. Pearson and Sandbach. 
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‘glue’ them together, ‘polish’ them, and ‘align’ them.76  But, this is not to belittle the 
task for he says:  “as to the facts themselves, he should not assemble them at 
random, but only after much laborious and painstaking investigation”.77  Even 
Polybius, that bastion of historicity, acknowledges that more goes into history than 
mere reporting of the facts, for he condemns Phylarchus because, “in general this 
author reports many things throughout his whole work without plan or purpose and 
seemingly at random.”78  Thus, it is not enough for an historian to report the truth and 
to describe things as they really were in his narrative; he must also assemble the 
facts in a meaningful way, paying careful attention to the construction and shape of 
the entire narrative.79   
The last feature I want to discuss is the role of the individual.80  Most 
historians emphasize the importance of the individual, and some to the point where 
the respective work is very much the history of one man. 81  Xenophon’s Anabasis is 
focused on the escape from Persia of a group of Greek mercenaries, though 
Xenophon himself is quite central.  Arrian was undoubtedly influenced by 
                                                
76 Lucian, Hist. conscr. 50. 
77 Hist. conscr. 47, trans. Kilburn. 
78 Polyb. 2.56.3, trans. Paton. 
79 It is because of this ancient stress on the literary quality of historiography that the 
application of modern literary theory, especially narratology, is entirely justifiable.  Indeed, 
ancient historians and theoreticians would have been perplexed by many modern historians’ 
fascination with scientific objectivity in historiography, and our failure to treat many of their 
ancient works as works of literature.  In this light, the works of scholars such as Haydn White, 
John Marincola, Tim Rood, and Chris Pelling are especially welcome, and valuable. 
80 Later ecclesiastical historians were also quite interested in individuals, and like their secular 
predecessors, major political leaders (emperors, and arguably, bishops), and generals.  In 
the last two books of his Ecclesiastical History Evagrius devotes considerable space to 
espousing the merits of a number of Roman generals.  Although those personages 
highlighted by Evagrius would have had no part in determining the outcome of the events he 
describes – for that was left to God – they were important for demonstrating, at least in part, 
how God worked.   
81 Although some historians may have focused their works on individuals, that does not mean 
that they would necessarily have excluded other relevant details, such as the actions of other 
important personages, and historiographical components such as speeches, and 
ethnographic and geographic digressions.  Thus, works such as Xenophon’s Anabasis and 
Arrian’s Anabasis of Alexander should still be considered, strictly speaking, histories, rather 
than biographies.  I would say the same about Tacitus’ Agricola.   
 72 
Xenophon’s work when he sat down to write his own Anabasis.82  But, whereas 
Xenophon does not explicitly base his narrative on his own achievements, Arrian 
centres his work on Alexander the Great; it is not simply the Anabasis, but the 
Anabasis of Alexander.83  In his letter to Lucceius Cicero does not explicitly claim 
that an historical work should be focused on one man, though he does note that the 
history of a particular period can be made more interesting by focusing on an 
individual:  “Which of us is not affected pleasurably, along with a sentiment of 
compassion, at the story of the dying Epaminondas on the field of Mantinea?”84   A 
little later Cicero adds:  “But in the doubtful and various fortunes of an outstanding 
individual we often find surprise and suspense, joy and distress, hope and fear; and 
if they are rounded off by a notable conclusion, our minds as we read are filled with 
the liveliest gratification.”85  Indeed, Cicero is trying to persuade Lucceius that his 
forthcoming history of the period can be made more interesting by focusing on the 
changes in his own circumstances (Cicero’s).  The individual clearly has an important 
role to play, particularly in terms of historical causation, for it is often the choices of 
one man that determine what will follow.  Now that we have illustrated the general 
                                                
82 Of course, Xenophon’s Anabasis should be considered a primary source, because it is a 
contemporary account, while Arrian’s is a secondary source. 
83 Both works are in seven books.  Procopius was also influenced by Xenophon, and perhaps 
had also read Arrian.  Given that the Wars is very much focused on Belisarius, even though it 
is the History of the Wars of Justinian, I wonder to what extent Procopius had originally 
conceived of the work as something of an Anabasis of Belisarius.  The work was first 
published in seven books much like the works of Xenophon and Arrian; moreover, the Wars 
tells the story of three different sets of expeditions, and Belisarius has a prominent role in all, 
something which he does not have in the eighth book.  Evagrius, for instance, in one of his 
first explicit references to Procopius says the following:  “It has been written by Procopius the 
rhetor in composing his history concerning Belisarius” (4.12, trans. Whitby).  George 
Kedrenos too describes Procopius’ work as an account of the stratagems of Belisarius (Geo. 
Cedrenus, Hist. 1.649).  cf. Pazdernik (2006) for some connections between Procopius’ Wars 
and Xenophon’s Hellenica. 
84 Cic. Fam. 22.5, trans. Bailey. 
85 Cic. Fam. 22.5, trans. Bailey.  Another interesting point about this statement is that Cicero 
is stressing the entertainment aspect of history.  For some, history was to not only report the 
truth, and provide lessons for the future, but also to entertain the reader (or in some cases, 
the listener).   
 73 
framework of a work of Greek historiography, it is time to turn to the specifics of 
military matters.  
 
Battles and Historiography 
A small number of authors discuss the description of battle, and their 
comments suggest that opinion on the matter varied.  The four writers that I shall 
focus on in this discussion are Polybius, Dionysius, Plutarch, and Lucian.86  I begin 
with Polybius’ analysis of Callisthenes’ description of the Battle of Issus.87  Polybius’ 
analysis is focused on technical matters pertaining to warfare.  Early on it becomes 
evident that his criticisms are based on his military background.88  One of the first 
faults that Callisthenes is charged with is confusion.  Polybius’ analysis is based on 
his own military experience, as well as his evaluation of Alexander’s generalship; 
Polybius finds parts of Callisthenes’ description of Darius’ order of battle hard to 
follow.89  Polybius is also concerned with Callisthenes’ forgetfulness,90 and his use of 
numbers, whether they apply to distances or casualties.91  Polybius finds 
Callisthenes’ account of Alexander’s advance particularly irksome, and his first point 
is that the topography of the battlefield does not fit with the alleged number of troops 
at Alexander’s disposal.92  Polybius feels that Alexander would never have put 
                                                
86 See Swain (1996:  298-329) for the relevant bibliography on Lucian, and Plutarch (1996:  
135-186), Hurst (1982) for Dionysius, and Champion (2004) for an interesting recent 
monograph on Polybius. 
87 Walbank (1967:  364) in his commentary on Polybius, feels that in this place Polybius is at 
his worst.  Bosworth (1980:  199), in his commentary on Arrian – who also discusses the 
Battle of Issus as we shall see – calls the criticisms petty and superficial.  Their complaints 
rest on Polybius’ tendency to pick on technical minutiae, which mean little to the overall 
description.  Walbank (1967:  364-376) and Bosworth (1980:  198-219) discuss Polybius’ and 
Arrian’s respective accounts of the battle in detail. 
88 Polybius saw combat from Greece to North Africa. 
89 Polyb. 12.18.8ff.  He alleges that Callisthenes has made Darius perform an action that is 
unnecessary given his reported position in the line.  Cf. Polyb. 12.18.10. 
90 Polyb. 12.18.12.  Cf. Walbank 1967:  371. 
91 Polyb. 12.19.1ff.  Cf. Walbank 1967:  371-372. 
92 Polyb. 12.20.1ff. 
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himself at such a disadvantage.93  Polybius then tells us what he thinks would have 
been the most likely formation/s required given the numbers and the conditions.  So, 
for example, Polybius asserts that “it would, therefore, have been considerably better 
to form a proper double or quadruple phalanx, for which it was not impossible to find 
marching room and which it would have been quite easy to get into order of battle 
expeditiously enough, as his scouts informed him in good time, warning him of the 
approach of the enemy.”94  Polybius then turns to the greatest problem with 
Callisthenes’ account:  the length of Alexander’s line.95  Polybius then notes some 
similar examples of “Callisthenes’ blunders”, and claims that there are too many to 
mention; as such, before concluding this digression (on Callisthenes) he highlights a 
couple of further so-called absurdities in the narrative, including a single combat 
between Alexander and Darius.96  What is significant here, at least for our purposes, 
is that Polybius has no problem with the plausibility of such a duel but rather how 
they attempted to intimate their intentions to fight each other in person, given their 
place in the battle at large.  With a brief reference to an alleged crossing of a river 
with the phalanx, Polybius’ digression draws to a close. 
Modern criticisms of Polybius’ attack on Callisthenes are valid.  But Polybius’ 
main points of departure from Callisthenes’ narrative, which all centre on Polybius’ 
understanding of how a battle works, and what is involved in the fighting itself, are 
                                                
93 “And what can be less prepared than a phalanx advancing in line but broken and 
disunited?”  Polyb. 12.20.6, trans. Paton. Cf. Walbank 1967:  374. 
94 Polyb. 12.20.7, trans. Paton. 
95 Somewhat significantly, as we shall see below, Polybius makes a reference to Homer here 
in regard to the compactness of the formation.  He qualifies this criticism with the following 
lines:  “Add to this that the whole line must have kept at a considerable distance from the 
mountains so as not to be exposed to attack by those of the enemy who held the foothills.  
We know that he made a crescent formation to oppose the latter.”  Polyb. 12.22.5-6, trans. 
Paton (slightly modified).  Walbank’s comments (1967:  375):  “Paton, ‘in a crescent 
formation’, is misleading”, are slightly pedantic for his suggestion, “troops stationed at an 
angle to the main line, in this case an angle backwards”, essentially describes the same 
thing, at least in this instance.   
96 Polyb. 12.22.2. 
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important for this discussion; Polybius is most rancorous when Callisthenes is 
describing the formation of Darius’ or Alexander’ armies, and their employment.  He 
is not concerned with what points to emphasize in the narrative, or necessarily their 
chronological order, but rather whether his military discussion describes military 
matters in a manner that is in accord with how Polybius understands them.  This is 
why, for example, when Polybius criticizes the alleged emplacement of the troops in 
front of the phalanx with the river so close and the troop numbers so high, he adds 
the following statement:  “For to be really useful cavalry should be at the most eight 
deep, and between each unit there must be a space equal in length to the front of a 
unit so that there may be no difficulty in wheeling and facing around.”97  Thus, for 
some Greek historians there are concerns in battle descriptions beyond the 
narratives themselves.98   
Despite his censure of Thucydides’ work as a whole – which we looked at 
above – Dionysius of Halicarnassus has very little to say about Thucydides’ 
treatments of battle.  In general, he believes that Thucydides’ battle narratives share 
many of the same features of the narrative at large:  “His treatment of land-battles is 
similar, being either unnecessarily extended or excessively condensed.”99  As the 
arrangement of the events is one of the main problems with Thucydides’ text in 
Dionysius’ eyes, it is certain that this sentiment extends to battle narratives.  
                                                
97 Polyb. 12.18.3, trans. Paton (slightly modified).  In Polybius’ own battle narratives generally 
he follows the precepts laid out in his critique of Callisthenes.  See, for example, his 
description of the Battle of Cynoscephalae (Polyb. 18.22.1-27.6).  Cf. Walbank 1967:  369. 
98 Polybius is not alone in his concern for, or at least emphasis on, formations and battle-
orders, topography, and troop numbers.  Justin (Iustin 11.9.1-10), Quintus Curtius (Curt. 3.7-
11), Diodorus (17.32.4-37), Plutarch (Plut. Alex. 20.1-5), and Arrian (Arrian 2.6-12) also 
describe this battle.  Of those authors, Arrian’s is most in line with Polybius’ views.  For 
Arrian, the outcome of the battle hinged on the generalship of Alexander, and his superior 
tactics.  This is encapsulated at 2.10 where Arrian says:  “There the action was severe, the 
Greeks tried to push off the Macedonians into the river and to restore victory to their own side 
who were already in flight, while the Macedonians sought to rival the success of Alexander, 
which was already apparent, and to preserve the reputation of the phalanx, whose sheer 
invincibility had hitherto been on everyone’s lips.”  Trans. Brunt. 
99 Dion. Hal. Thuc. 13, trans. Usher. 
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However, Dionysius is not dissatisfied with all of Thucydides’ descriptions of battle 
for in regard to the sea battle between the Athenians and Syracusans at 7.69.4-72.1 
he says:  “This and narratives like it seemed to me admirable and worthy of imitation, 
and I was convinced that in such passages as these we have perfect examples of 
the historian’s sublime eloquence, the beauty of his language, his rhetorical brilliance 
and his other virtues.”100  Dionysius is not concerned with the military knowledge that 
some historians felt should underscore any description of warfare, but the narrative 
alone and more specifically, “the powers of expression” of the historian.101  For 
Dionysius, the primary concern is the satisfaction of the reader, for, if he gets lost, 
then the historian, such as Thucydides, has failed.102 
Plutarch’s objectives are similar to those of Dionysius; his key points of 
contention with Herodotus are his points of emphasis rather than the vividness of his 
descriptions.103  One of the first criticisms that Plutarch lays out comes from the 
Battle of Marathon.  Plutarch feels that he detracts from the Greek, and principally 
Athenian victory, by including the number of casualties.104  Not only does the 
inclusion of this detail play down the victory, it is much worse than that:  “…the great 
edifice of victory collapses and the point of the famous exploit comes to nothing, 
indeed it seems not to be a battle at all or an action of any great importance, but a 
brief clash with the barbarians as they landed…”105  It is not so much Herodotus’ 
narrative that is receiving Plutarch’s censure, but rather his failure to “give credit 
where credit is due”:  Plutarch seems to be suggesting that following a noteworthy 
                                                
100 Dion. Hal. Thuc. 27, trans. Usher. 
101 See Dion. Hal. Thuc. 4. 
102 See Dion. Hal. Pomp. 3. 
103 Although we, modern readers, may not always agree with the points raised by Plutarch in 
regard to Herodotus, the Boeotian still gives us important insight into how Herodotus was 
read in antiquity, even if his reading is not necessarily representative.  A similar tract on 
Procopius would be of considerable value.  For Herodotus, see now Baragwanath (2008). 
104 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 862 B. 
105 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 862 D, trans. Pearson and Sandbach. 
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battle, such as the Battle of Marathon, it is the historian’s duty to acknowledge, and 
perhaps even exaggerate, the praise for the victory.106  Next, Plutarch discusses 
some of Herodotus’ other descriptions of battle.  Thermopylae is in the firing line; 
Plutarch believes that Herodotus has left out some important points and that as a 
result he ends up slandering Leonidas and the Thebans, the latter of which is not 
surprising given Plutarch’s Boeotian origins.107  In fact, Plutarch goes so far as to 
claim that Herodotus is not telling the truth in his narrative, and that he is wilfully 
misinforming his readers; more often that not this complaint applies to Herodotus’ 
treatment of important characters such as Themistocles.108  Another criticism hurled 
at Herodotus is his tendency to assign the motive for actions in a battle to something 
other than the individual, as is the case with the Spartans.109  As we have seen, 
Plutarch’s criticisms of Herodotus centre on his omissions and points of emphasis; 
but these criticisms are often quite petty.  Plutarch clearly had a bone to pick with 
Herodotus, and this is particularly clear in his treatment of “battles with 
barbarians”.110  In that passage Plutarch’s main points of contention are, again, 
Herodotus’ points of emphasis.  The right side, in other words the Greek side, is the 
one that should be emphasized for its success.  Herodotus’ characterization of the 
Greeks, and on occasion their foes, is also an issue.  By playing up the fighting spirit 
of the barbarians or downplaying their armament Herodotus is doing the Greeks a 
horrible disservice; or so Plutarch.  Indeed, a little later he says:  “…is there anything 
glorious or great left to the Greeks from these battles, if the Spartans fought with an 
                                                
106 This particular criticism is an important point for Procopius seems to be guilty of the same 
faults at the end of his narrative of the Battle of Dara; in fact, Plutarch’s criticisms as a whole 
could easily be applied to Procopius and thus his reading of Herodotus could provide some 
valuable insight into how Procopius might have been read in late antiquity. 
107 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 865 D ff. 
108 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 869 D-F.  On the truthfulness of Herodotus’ account see 
the comments of Moles (1993).  Cf. Wiseman 1993. 
109 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 871 E ff. 
110 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 873 E – 874 A. 
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unarmed enemy, and if the others were unaware that a battle was going on near 
by…”111  The only particular ‘military’ issue with which Plutarch is concerned is the 
morale and bravery of the soldiers, which even then is in keeping with his concern 
with characterization.112  For Plutarch the valour of the soldiery is more important 
than weaponry and equipment and he is alarmed that Herodotus has given these 
technological components such prominence.113  Despite his aim of slandering 
Herodotus, Plutarch sticks with the narrative features of battle descriptions, leaving 
aside the technical matters, much like Dionysius.  Characterization, and, as with 
Dionysius, what to emphasize are important issues that any historian must consider 
when narrating a battle. 
Lucian’s account is rather general, and it is a fitting closure to this section:  he 
stresses both the points emphasized by Dionysius and Plutarch, who focus on the 
literary side of a battle, and those emphasized by Polybius, who is concerned with 
the military theory behind the battle.  The context of Lucian’s narrative is the Parthian 
War of AD 162-165; as such, it is not surprising that war has a big role in his 
discussion.114  His aims are neatly outlined in the following passage: 
So first let us say what the writer of history has to avoid, from what 
contaminations he must in particular be free; then what means he must use in 
order not to lose the right road that carries him straight ahead – I mean how 
to begin, how to arrange his material, the proper proportions for each part, 
what to leave out, what to develop, what it is better to handle cursorily, and 
how to put the facts into words and fit them together.115 
 
                                                
111 Plut. On the Malice of Herodotus 874 A, trans. Pearson and Sandbach. 
112 For an overview of characterization in historiography see Pitcher (2007). 
113 Nearly a millennium later, Zosimus does the same, attributing the outcome of battles to 
military technology.  See, for example, his description of the Battle of the Milvian Bridge (Zos. 
2.15-16). 
114 See Lucian Hist. Conscr. 2. 
115 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 6, trans. Kilburn. 
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Battle is discussed early on for he comments on an unnamed writer who described 
“some incredible wounds and monstrous deaths”.116  He also claims that his casualty 
figures were quite preposterous, and inconsistent.  Lucian notes that experience is 
important when writing history, particularly as regards war; he discusses another 
unnamed writer who described a battle yet had no knowledge of weaponry or 
formations.117  Indeed, Lucian’s ideal historian should also know about generalship, 
have experience in a soldier’s camp, and have “the mind of a soldier”.118  Lucian then 
notes the importance of truth and clarity of expression before again returning to what 
is necessary, or at least recommended, for writing a description of battle;119 it is more 
than just experience and knowledge of military matters:  “Let his mind have a touch 
and share of poetry, since that too is lofty and sublime, especially when he has to do 
with battle arrays, with land and sea fights; for then he will have need of a wind of 
poetry to fill his sails and help carry his ship along, high on the crest of the waves.”120  
Not only must a history be carefully arranged, written by an experienced person, 
useful, and truthful, the previous line suggests that it must also be entertaining.  
Lucian is suggesting that the historian should be allowed some artistic licence to 
                                                
116 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 20.  I discuss this issue in regard to Procopius and the Gothic Wars 
below in chapter five pp 255-260. 
117 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 29. 
118 See esp. Hist. Conscr. 37:  “So give us now a student of this kind – not without ability to 
understand and express himself, keen-sighted, one who could handle affairs if they were 
turned over to him, a man with the mind of a solider combined with that of a good citizen, and 
a knowledge of generalship; yes, and one who has at some time been in a camp and has 
seen soldiers exercising or drilling and knows of arms and engines; again, let him know what 
‘in column’, what ‘in line’ mean, how the companies of infantry, how the cavalry, are 
manoeuvred, the origin and meaning of ‘lead out’ and ‘lead around’, in short not a stay-at-
home or one who must rely on what people tell him.” Trans. Kilburn. 
119 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 39-44.  Clarity of expression is one of the most important points for 
the rhetoricians.  See above pp 62-64. 
120 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 45, trans. Kilburn. 
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mould the battle into a pleasing narrative.121  Lucian provides a model of what he is 
advocating a bit later in chapter 49:   
In brief let him be then like Homer’s Zeus, looking now at the land of the 
horse-rearing Thracians, now at the Mysians’ country – in the same way let 
him look now at the Roman side in his own way and tell us how he saw it 
from on high, now at the Persian side, then at both sides, if the battle is 
joined.  In the engagement itself let him not look at a single part or a single 
cavalryman or foot soldier – unless it be a Brasidas leaping forward or a 
Demosthenes beating off his attempt to land; but first, the generals (and he 
should have listened to any exhortations of theirs), the plan, method, and 
purpose of their battle array.  When the battle is joined he should look at both 
sides and weigh the events as it were in a balance, joining in both pursuit and 
flight.  All this should be in moderation, avoiding excess, bad taste, and 
impetuosity; he should preserve an easy detachment:  let him call a halt here 
and move over there if necessary, then free himself and return if events there 
summon him; let him hurry everywhere, follow a chronological arrangement 
as far as he can, and fly from Armenia to Media, from there a single scurry of 
wings to Iberia, then to Italy, to avoid missing any critical situation.122 
 
At the very beginning of this passage we find a reference to Homer and that serves 
as the anchor for the rest of Lucian’s prescription; it is Homer who should serve as a 
model when describing battle, at least in regard to the narrative’s focus.  Sticking to a 
strict chronological framework is not essential:  it should be attempted in an historical 
narrative, but, if there is some contemporaneous action with the events the historian 
is currently describing elsewhere it is quite permissible to jump to them before 
returning to the events first narrated.  The narrative itself is the main focus of 
Lucian’s comments, but in keeping with his earlier statements about the military 
experience necessary for the historian he also stresses the role of the general and to 
a lesser degree the other commanders who participate.  At the same time a certain 
                                                
121 Cf. Lucian Hist. Conscr. 50-51.  Some ancient critics believed that poetry had a more 
important role than simply entertaining.  Aristotle, for example, said the following in regard to 
the differences between history and poetry:  “The difference is that one tells of what has 
happened, the other of the kinds of things that might happen.  For this reason poetry is 
something more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history; for poetry 
speaks more of universals, history of particulars” (Arist. Poet. 1451b, trans. Murray and 
Dorsch).  In the passage of Lucian, then, he could just as easily be subtly advocating not only 
poetry’s pleasing side, but also the universal sort of truth that poetry has.   
122 Lucian Hist. Conscr. 49, trans. Kilburn. 
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amount of explication of the respective formations and their implementation is in 
order.  Thus, for Lucian, describing a battle is more than just plugging contemporary 
events into a Thucydidean battle-narrative framework. 
Among historiographical theorists we see that the majority are more 
concerned with the dramatic impact of a description of battle rather than its 
plausibility and accuracy; Polybius, on the other hand is the opposite.  Though he 
recognizes that a vivid account does have its place, this is not to be done at the 
expense of an account’s verisimilitude.  Thucydides, whom I have not mentioned, 
though often concerned with plausibility, is generally interested in the emotional 
impact of a battle, most evident in his description of the battle in the Great Harbour at 
Syracuse.  Having looked at historiographical theory, it is time to turn to the military 
thinking which underscored the Greeks’ conception of combat. 
 
III. Greek Military Theory123 
Besides the thinking that lay behind the writing of history, there were a host of 
views on how the battle which they described worked.  The writing down of military 
theory, as with historiography, has a long tradition, which extends from Homeric 
Greece to the middle Byzantine period in medieval Constantinople.  Though it seems 
to have lacked the popularity of Greek historiography, at least among the literary 
                                                
123 A full discussion of Greek military theory is beyond the scope of this chapter.  As such, I 
have attempted to present a representative if general discussion at the expense of detail.  I 
have also had to be quite selective and so what follows in no way purports to present all the 
material to support each claim made.  Besides, Greek military theory has been discussed by 
a number of scholars whose influence should be clear from the following discussion.  For its 
Hellenistic development see Lendon (1999, cf. 2005 passim, 2007:  500-508).  Wheeler 
treats many of the issues discussed below in much greater detail (1979, 1982, 1983, 1988a, 
1988b, 1991, 2004a, and 2004b).  Anderson (1970) provides a useful overview of the 
Spartan military system, Xenophon, and military theory and practice in the fourth century.  
Pritchett’s far-reaching studies on the Greek state at war are also important, especially for my 
purposes, volume II (1974).  Much of Greek military theory was formulated in the Hellenistic 
age.  Besides the comments of Lendon referred to above, see Chaniotis’ (2005) detailed 
treatment of Hellenistic warfare.  Cf. Shipley 2000:  334-341.   
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elite, it is still an important part of the military thinking of the ancient world, which 
seems to have had an impact on at least some of the writers of histories, whether 
they were conscious of this or not.124  As Lendon notes:  “Greek historians, heavily 
influenced by a tactical conception of combat, usually used that model as the 
structuring armature of their accounts of battles:  the formation, deployment, and 
movement of forces tend to form the backbone of the narrative, with other material – 
stratagems, the brave deeds of individuals, remarkable occurrences like panics, 
paradoxes, and touching stories – included intermittently along the way.”125  Given 
that Procopius, as a classicizing historian, was part of the Greek historiographical 
tradition, we might expect that he would have been influenced by similar thinking.  In 
this section I shall provide a very general, and selective, overview of Greek military 
theory, focusing on Homer, because many Greeks believed that his works provided 
the basis for all discussions of military theory, and two representatives of the 
morale/tactics dichotomy in Greek military theory, Xenophon, being a proponent of 
the former, and Polybius of the latter. 
 
Homer 
Homer has cast a large shadow over Greek military thinking.126  Greek 
military theory can be traced back to Homer; indeed, to many a Greek Homer’s two 
epic poems, and in particular the Iliad, provide the basis for all future discussions of 
                                                
124 Lendon 1999:  276.  We saw this above with Polybius, and to a lesser extent, Lucian.  
Procopius, of course, also saw combat, even though unlike Ammianus, he was a secretary 
and not an officer.  Like Polybius before him, the theory that permeates Procopius’ Wars 
could have come to him not through any particular text, but through the officers he served 
with – Polybius would have fought, and controlled troops, himself.  Yet, we know that 
historians did consult military treatises, for Agathias refers to one at 2.9.2.  Given the lack of 
disclosure of sources by ancient historians, an overview of theoretical works is therefore not 
unwarranted.  Cf. Whitby (1988:  94-105) on the points of contact between the combat 
described by Theophylact and the treatise of Maurice. 
125 Lendon 1999:  316. 
126 Lendon 2005:  15-161, esp. 20-38. 
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the nature of warfare.  Early in his treatise on generalship, which dates to the first 
century (AD), Onasander, while discussing the choice of a general, includes a 
reference to Homer, which alludes to heroic leadership.127  This trend is even more 
pronounced in the Second Sophistic with Polyeanus’ Strategica and Aelian’s Tactica.  
Polyaenus, who published a collection of stratagems, possibly in different stages, 
opens book one with Homer, and provides several examples of the exploits of 
Odysseus, especially from the Odyssey.128  The second century theoretician Aelian 
claims, in his Tactica, that Homer was the first to write about tactical theory in war.129  
Maurice, the late sixth century writer of the Strategikon, includes a quotation from 
Homer in his collection of maxims.130  This should not, however, surprise us.  As we 
saw in the first chapter, Homer’s poems, and the Iliad in particular, were the core 
texts for early Byzantine education; so Homer will have been on the mind of any 
Greek intellectual – whether he had military experience or not – who took it upon 
himself to discuss the many intricacies of Greek warfare.  And why not?  Both the 
Iliad and the Odyssey describe select episodes in the lives of some of antiquity’s 
most famous generals, notably Achilles, Hector, and Odysseus.  The Iliad, of course, 
is dominated by selective scenes of warfare.131  What is more, the Iliad does not 
refer to one aspect of warfare, but rather provides examples of all sorts of military 
matters from single combat,132 battle between massed formations,133 and the use of 
stratagems and ambushes,134 to the speeches of generals before battle,135 their 
                                                
127 Onas. 1.7. 
128 Polyaenus Stratagems pref. 4-12. 
129 Ael. Tac. 1.1:  ὅτι Ὅμηρος πρῶτος περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τακτικῆς θεωρίας ἔγραψεν. 
130 Maurice Strat. 8.B.82. 
131 Homer was well aware of which parts of battle to emphasize, and which to pass over. 
132 Hom. Il. 22 (the final duel between Achilles and Hector). 
133 Hom. Il. 11.407ff (Odysseus standing firm in the battle-line). 
134 Hom. Il. 10.247ff (Odysseus leading a night raid; to the Greeks night attacks, particularly at 
this time, would fall under the category of stratagem).   
135 Hom. Il. 4.293ff. 
 84 
subsequent attempts to array the battle-lines,136 and the vast array of different 
weaponry from bows to spears.  On the other hand the Odyssey, though not 
specifically concerned with battle, is replete with stratagems, as Polyaenus’ 
references attest, and examples of, from a Greek perspective, effective leadership.  
Plus, the two works provide us with two distinctive types of general, the Achilles, fight 
from the front archetype, and the Odysseus, use cleverness and trickery, archetype.  
Indeed, regardless of whether an historian had a predilection for presenting one kind 
of general or another, or any type of warfare, with the exception of naval combat, he 
need only trawl the pages of the Iliad or, less likely, the Odyssey, to find a Homeric 
precedent.  With the exception of generalship, more often than not, single combat – 
as we saw above recommended by theoreticians of historiography when describing 
warfare – and massed ‘phalanx-like’ combat were what they remembered and chose.   
 
Xenophon137 
Xenophon’s proto-military treatise the Cyropaedia deserves some discussion 
for three reasons:  it generally presents one side of the morale/tactics dichotomy; it 
presents what Xenophon felt were the ideal characteristics of a commander, and 
Procopius himself seems to have read the text.138  There are a number of features of 
this text that merit discussion; however, I shall focus on Cyrus’ chat with his father 
Cambyses about his education in the arts of war. An unnamed man had trained 
                                                
136 Hom. Il. 16.169ff. 
137 Xenophon has much to say on warfare and so in the interests of brevity, I have 
concentrated on one of his texts, the Cyropaedia, in the belief that it is representative of the 
military doctrine that he espouses.  It also happens to be alluded to by Procopius (Build. 
1.1.13).  On the Cyropaedia in general see Due (1989); on the value of the Anabasis for 
military matter see Whitby (2004b) and J. W. I. Lee (2007 passim).  Cf. Lendon 1999:  290-
295. 
138 Besides, Xenophon seems to have transposed onto his fictional Persians the 
characteristics and values commonly attached to contemporary (i.e. early fourth century) 
Sparta.  For a more detailed exposition of Xenophon’s views on generalship and tactics, see 
Hutchinson (2000). 
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Cyrus on how to be a general and he taught him a number of things.  After referring 
to logistics and health Cyrus says the following:   
…he professed to have been teaching me generalship.  And thereupon I 
answered, ‘tactics.’  And you laughed and went through it all, explaining point 
by point, as you asked of what conceivable use tactics could be to an army, 
without provisions and health, and of what use it could be without the 
knowledge of the arts invented for warfare and without obedience.139 
 
In this passage Xenophon feels that tactics are only one small part of generalship.  
Morale and obedience are of considerable importance; this discussion also highlights 
the role that the general plays in their creation and maintenance.140  One important 
distinction drawn here by Xenophon is that between order and obedience:  order 
(τάξις) refers to the formation of the battle-line, and how closely together the men are 
drawn, while obedience (πείθεσθαι) refers to the behaviour of the soldiers towards 
their commanding officers, and, here in particular, their general.  Cambyses then 
advocates the use of stratagems; it is not enough to defeat one’s foe on the field in 
pitched battle alone. 141  A little later Cambyses clarifies his views on the matter: 
Contrive, then…as far as is in your power, with your own men in good order 
to catch the enemy in disorder, with your own men armed to come upon them 
unarmed, and with your own men awake to surprise them sleeping, and then 
you will catch them in an unfavourable position while you yourself are in a 
strong position, when they are in sight to you and while you yourself are 
unseen.142 
 
It is when the enemy is most vulnerable that one must attack.143  Cyrus then asks 
whether there are other ways to take advantage of one’s foe; Cambyses says that 
                                                
139 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.14, trans. Miller. 
140 Xenophon, according to his account, was instrumental in the Greek mercenaries’ escape 
from the Persian empire.  We should not be surprised, then, that he pays so much attention 
to generalship, particularly morale and obedience, since in some ways it was these traits that 
contributed most to the Greeks’ success.  Cf. J. W. I. Lee 2007:  43-108. 
141 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.27. 
142 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.35, trans. Miller. 
143 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.36.  Cambyses says that there is an abundance of opportunities provided 
over the course of a day by both the enemy and oneself; one has to eat, sleep, and attend 
the call of nature. 
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there are several, and that a general must learn from others and invent his own 
stratagems. 144  
After some discussion of the value of the hunt, particularly as regards the 
tricks used to catch small game,145 Cambyses comes to his concluding remarks, and 
in which he finally turns to the battle itself:   
But if it is ever necessary – as it may well be – to join battle in the open field, 
in plain sight, with both armies in full array, why, in such a case, my son, the 
advantages that have been long since secured are of much avail; by that I 
mean, if your soldiers are physically in good training, if their hearts are well 
steeled and the arts of war well studied.  Besides, you must remember well 
that all those from whom you expect obedience to you will, on their part, 
expect you to take thought for them.  So never be careless, but think out at 
night what your men are to do for you when day comes, and in the daytime 
think about how the arrangements for the night may best be made.  But how 
you ought to draw up an army in battle array, or how you ought to lead it by 
day or by night, by narrow ways or broad, over mountains or plains, or how 
you should pitch camp, or how station your sentinels by night or by day, or 
how you should advance against the enemy or retreat before them, or how 
you should lead past a hostile city, or how attack a fortification or withdraw 
from it, or how you should cross ravines or rivers, or how you should protect 
yourself against cavalry or spearmen or bowmen, and if the enemy should 
suddenly come in sight while you are leading on in column, how you should 
form and take your stand against them, and if they should come in sight from 
any other quarter than in front as you are marching in phalanx, how you 
should form and face them, or how any one might best find out the enemy’s 
plans or how the enemy might be least likely to learn his [Cambyses does not 
complete his thought]...I think, then, that you should turn this knowledge to 
account according to circumstances, as each item of it may appear 
serviceable to you.146 
 
Although this list includes some general comments, it reads like a table of contents 
for any of the military treatises that appear in the fourth century BC through to the 
                                                
144 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.37-38.  The use of stratagems was another important strand amongst Greek 
military theorists which, in some respects, stood beside the tactics/morale dichotomy.  
Significantly, we can find examples of all three (tactics, morale, stratagems) in the works of 
Homer. 
145 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.39-40.  The value that hunting had for instilling military skills was recognized 
throughout antiquity.  In late antiquity Maurice, or at least some external editor of the text, 
appended a discussion on hunting to his Strategikon.  For East Rome’s great political rival 
the Sasanid Persian Empire, hunting was highly esteemed by the nobility, as evidenced, for 
example, by the Legend of Mar Qardagh.  Cf. Walker 2006. 
146 Xen. Cyr. 1.6.41-43.  trans. Miller (with revisions). 
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high Byzantine period; 147 the Cyropaedia comes across as a proto-theoretical 
treatise.  Cambyses’ words cover just about any military engagement and 
contingency that Cyrus’ army would likely have faced.  Clearly, for Xenophon, a great 
deal was involved in warfare. 148 
For all of its fictional character, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia has a lot to say about 
Greek military theory.149  Plus, many of the points discussed by Xenophon in the text 
find their way into the ‘proper’ treatises which were to follow in the fourth century and 
later.  We also see the beginnings of an important dichotomy that was to arise in 
Greek military theory, which Lendon has drawn attention to:  an emphasis on tactics 
versus an emphasis on morale.150  For Xenophon it is on the general’s shoulders that 
the outcome of a battle ultimately rests.  Once the battle begins, however, it is the 
morale of the soldiers that plays the most decisive role; even if a tactical formation 
fails, a boost in morale can still salvage a victory.  Now I turn to an author who fell on 
the other side of the military theory dichotomy:  Polybius. 
 
                                                
147 The following list is by no means exhaustive:  Nicephorus II’s De velitatione bellica (from 
the tenth century) includes two sections on watch posts (1 and 2), a section on “the 
assembling and movement of the army”, and a section on “the siege of a fortified town”; 
Nicephorus II’s Praecepta militaria, which includes a section entitled “On the Encampment” 
(4); Syrianus’ Peri Strategias begins with a section on setting up camp, two consecutive 
sections (3 and 4) on night and day sentinels, what to do when you are attacked while on the 
march (section 12), how to cross a river and pass through a narrow place (section 14), 
marching through mountain passes (19 and 20), and siege warfare (21, cf. 26, 27); and 
Nicephorus Ouranus’ Tactica includes among a host of different sections one on passing 
through a variety of different terrains (64), and another on siege warfare (65). 
148 Perhaps the most interesting discussion of ‘how to build morale’ comes in the next book 
when Xenophon describes Cyrus’ decision while on campaign to use tents large enough for 
each company (...μέγεθος δὲ ὥστε ἱκανὰς εἶναι τῇ τάξει ἑκαστῃ...):  “…he thought that if they 
tented together it would help them to get acquainted with one another.  And in getting 
acquainted with one another…a feeling of considerateness was more likely to be engendered 
in them all (ἐν δὲ τῷ γιγνώσκεσθαι καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι πᾶσι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐγγίγνεσθαι, οἱ δὲ 
ἀγνοούμενοι ῥᾳδιουργεῖν πως μᾶλλον δοκοῦσιν)…”  Even here, although the morale would 
be fostered by the close proximity of the soldiers to each other, the morale of the men is 
dependent on the general.  Xen. Cyr. 2.1.25, trans. Miller.  
149 For a battle narrative with these precepts in action see book 7 of the Cyropaedia. 
150 Lendon 1999 passim. 
 88 
Polybius151 
Besides writing his history of the rise of Rome, Polybius also wrote a tactical 
treatise, which, regrettably, has not survived.  Despite this, it is possible to tease out 
some of Polybius’ views of warfare from the pages of his history.152  Indeed, Polybius 
did not hesitate to make his views heard and there are a number of digressions that 
treat military matters, a few of which we shall discuss here.  It is also clear that for 
Polybius tactics are fundamental to a battle’s outcome. 
In book five, in the context of the first Macedonian War, Philip makes a 
lightning attack on the Meliteans who were terrified, we are told, by its “suddenness 
and unexpectedness”.153  However, the attack is foiled because the Macedonians do 
not have the necessary equipment.  As a result of this blunder Polybius rips into the 
general:  “This is the sort of thing for which commanders deserve the severest 
censure.”154  The cause of Polybius’ diatribe is the apparent failure of Philip to 
prepare for the siege.  Furthermore, such a failure is disastrous for two reasons:  
firstly, in the attack the “bravest men” are exposed to danger without any negligible 
benefit; secondly, the ensuing withdrawal exposes the army to danger from the 
enemy who is emboldened by their failure.155   
In book six we find Polybius’ famous digression on the Roman political and 
military system; although little of what he says is directly relevant to this discussion, 
there are a couple of items of interest.  At 6.39 Polybius discusses the means by 
which the Romans encourage their soldiers to face danger.  He notes that there are 
                                                
151 A host of works have been written about Polybius.  For an overview see Walbank’s (1972) 
bief monograph; for a detailed treatment see his commentary (Walbank 1957-1979).  Lendon 
(1999:  282-285) discusses Polybius’ views of tactics.  On the intellectual framework that 
underscores Polybius see Champion (2004).  Cf. Sacks 1981:  125-132. 
152 “About this matter I have entered into greater detail in my notes on tactics.” Polyb. 9.20.4, 
trans. Paton. 
153 Polyb. 5.97.6. 
154 Polyb. 5.98.1. 
155 Polyb. 5.98.5. 
 89 
some rewards given out for merit;156 however, the first thing that he notes is the role 
of the general.  Thus, the first person responsible for boosting morale and 
emboldening the troops is the man in charge.157  The distribution of rewards in fact 
follows the laudatory words of the general.  Of the rewards themselves Polybius 
notes the following acts which garner prizes:  the wounding of an enemy; the slaying 
and stripping of an enemy – with a distinction between an infantryman and a 
cavalryman – in situations that do not necessitate combat on the part of the whole 
army, being the first man to mount the wall in a siege; and, helping save citizens and 
allies.  Polybius then goes on to say that “by such incentives they excite to emulation 
and rivalry in the field not only the men who are present and listen to their words, but 
those who remain at home also.”158  It is not only rewards, however, that are effective 
means of improving the soldiery.  Before Polybius discusses rewards he discusses 
the punishment of miscreants; moreover, punishment is described in more detail 
than the dispensation of rewards.  Polybius finishes off his discussion of rewards and 
punishments with the following statement:  “Considering all this attention given to the 
matter of punishments and rewards in the army and the importance attached to both, 
no wonder that the wars in which the Romans engage end so successfully and 
brilliantly.”159  Although he does not say so explicitly, Polybius is here acknowledging 
the role that morale and bravery can have in warfare whether instilled by positive of 
negative means.  What stands out for Polybius in this regard, however, is the manner 
by which the Romans endeavour to create soldiers with high morale who are 
                                                
156 On the relationship of this passage to Procopius’ encomium on Belisarius in the Wars see 
below pp 302-307. 
157 Polyb. 6.39.2. 
158 Polyb. 6.39.8., trans. Paton. 
159 Polyb. 6.39.11, trans. Paton.  Polybius’ discussion of punishments precedes his discussion 
of rewards and is incorporated into his section on the posting and duties of the night 
sentinels.   
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demonstrably brave:  the Romans are tackling a military issue in a manner that he 
considers novel.160   
Tactics and battle-order play a big part in Polybius’ conception of warfare;161 
and this is brought out clearly in his digression on the differences between the 
Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx following his narrative of the Battle of 
Cynoscephalae.162  A brief reading of Polybius’ narrative of the battle will show how 
important tactics were to Polybius’ analysis; the same is true in Polybius’ detailed 
narrative of the second Battle of Mantinea in 207 BC.163  Polybius opens his 
excursus by claiming that he is fulfilling a promise that he made earlier to compare 
the Roman and Macedonian equipment and formation when the opportunity 
presented itself.164  He then makes the following important qualification:  “and since 
now in our own times not once, but frequently, these two formations and the soldiers 
of both nations have been matched against each other, it will prove useful and 
                                                
160 In the next paragraph I discuss Polybius’ avowed emphasis on tactics.  With this in mind, 
what is perhaps novel about the Romans for Polybius is that they have achieved such great 
success while devoting so much attention to morale.  Cf. Lendon 1999:  294. 
161 See 10.22.4-7 where tactics play a much more decisive role in Polybius’ discussion of 
Philopoemen than morale. 
162 As I noted, a major dichotomy in Greek military thinking was between tactics and morale.  
Among the surviving military treatises, it is the emphasis on tactics which is pronounced.  
Noteworthy examples include the works of Ascelpiodotus, Aelian, Arrian, and later Syrianus.  
None of these authors devotes much space to morale in their handbooks.   
163 Polybius’ description of the Battle of Mantinea is recorded in book 11 from chapters 11 to 
18 is very characteristic of his didactic approach.  So much of what happens in that battle, 
and Polybius’ analysis of it, depends on tactics.  For a comparative example, in book 16 
Polybius says:  “but calculating everything accurately like the expert general he 
[Philopoemen] was and foreseeing that if Machanidas, when he came up, led his force 
forward without reckoning on the ditch, the phalanx would suffer what I have just described 
as actually happening to it, whereas if the tyrant took into consideration the difficulty 
presented by the ditch, and changing his mind, seemed to shirk an encounter, breaking up 
his formation and exposing himself in long marching order, he would then without a 
general engagement himself secure victory while Machanidas would suffer defeat.  This has 
already happened to many, who are drawing up in order of battle, being under the 
impression that they were not equal to engaging the enemy, either owing to their position 
or owing to their inferiority in numbers or for any other reason, have exposed 
themselves in a long marching column, hoping as they retired to succeed, by the sole aid 
of their rearguard, either in getting the better of the enemy or in making good their escape.  
This is a most frequent cause of error on the part of commanders.”  Polyb. 11.16.5-9, trans. 
Paton (my bold face). 
164 Polyb. 18.28.1.  
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beneficial to inquire into the difference, and into the reason why on the battle-field the 
Romans have always had the upper hand and carried off the palm, so that we may 
not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any 
reason for it”.165  Polybius is alluding to the fact, or so he saw it, that the reason for 
the Romans’ string of successes against the Macedonians, who had been very 
successful in Asia and Greece, was their superior battle-order.166  In the discussion 
itself Polybius notes that the phalanx is unstoppable in ideal conditions, that is, for 
frontal assaults;167 however, the role of the general is still pervasive, for suitable 
terrain is needed for the phalanx to be effectively employed. 168  One of the principal 
conclusions which Polybius draws from his comparison is tied to his belief that it is 
imperative for a general to be well-prepared:  the phalanx is only really useful under 
certain fixed conditions, and since Polybius knows that anything is possible while on 
campaign, it is the legion’s adaptability that makes it so effective.169  When Polybius 
turns to describe the battle itself, it is the tactical advantage, which the Romans 
enjoy, that turns out to be the decisive factor.170  While morale is important, and 
Polybius does refer to its role in combat, it is tactics that rule the field of battle, and it 
is up to the well-prepared general to determine which ones suit the occasion. 
 
 
 
                                                
165 Polyb. 18.28.5, trans. Paton. 
166 Interestingly, Polybius prefaces his detailed exposition of the differences (and following the 
introduction just mentioned) with some comments on the importance of generalship.  As 
important as tactics are, generalship trumps all else.  Livy, who used Polybius in his 
description of Cynoscephalae, also alludes to this tactical difference, and the importance of 
level ground.  Cf. Livy 33.4.1-4. 
167 Polyb. 18.29.1-2. 
168 Polyb. 18.29.6.  We also find, and as we saw above rather unsurprisingly, a reference to 
Homer and the tight ranks described in the Iliad.  Cf. Hom. Il. 13.131. 
169 Polyb. 18.32.1ff. 
170 Polyb. 18.21-26.  Livy (33.8-9), in his description of the battle, modifies Polybius by 
stressing for the importance of morale and tactics. 
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PART B:  THE PRACTICE OF DESCRIBING BATTLE IN THE SIXTH CENTURY 
We have seen the rhetorical, historiographical, and military theory that 
underscores descriptions of battle in antiquity.  I turn here to the practice of 
Procopius’ contemporaries, and near-contemporaries, to situate his battles in the 
Wars in the historical and military intellectual milieu.  I shall highlight a few points 
about a select group of sixth century authors, including Evagrius, Jordanes, John 
Malalas, Agathias, Urbicius, Syrianus, and Maurice.  As abundant as the evidence is 
from the reign of Justinian, I have included both earlier and later works to provide a 
more representative sample of how battle was described, and thought about, in the 
sixth century.  My focus here has been on the Graeco-Roman tradition, and the 
analyses that I provide are cursory, at best, given the constraints of this discussion 
and the thesis at large.  I have divided the writers by religious and secular history, 
and I begin with the ecclesiastical history and Evagrius. 
 
Part I:  Religious History 
Evagrius:  Ecclesiastical History 
In this section I focus on ecclesiastical history and the Christian chronicle, 
beginning with the former.  Initially, ecclesiastical historians were not concerned with 
secular events.171  Yet, as Blockley, among others, has noted, the boundaries 
between ‘ecclesiastical’ and ‘secular’ historiography blurred from the fifth century,172 
as secular matters played a larger role in the narratives of ecclesiastical historians.  
The ecclesiastical historians generally refer to warfare at some point in their 
                                                
171 In this discussion I am primarily concerned with battle.  I will not be going into detail about 
the nature of ecclesiastical histories.  For more information on the ecclesiastical historians 
themselves see Chesnut (1977), Liebeschuetz (1993), Leppin (2003), Whitby (2003), Van 
Nuffelen (2004), , and Treadgold (2007:  121-175).  On the development of Christian 
historical thought, and historiography, see Inglebert (2001:  289-553). 
172 Blockley 1981:  86-94.  Cf. Blockley 2003. 
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respective narratives.  Those discussions are often confined to the latter books and 
chapters of their histories.  This is true for those whom I do not discuss, such as 
Theodoret, Socrates, and Sozomen, as well as Evagrius, whom I do. 173     
Evagrius is interesting for a number of reasons, not the least of which is his 
use of Procopius for much of book four of his Ecclesiastical History.174  As with his 
predecessors, the amount of material devoted specifically to military matters is slight 
in the earlier parts of the history; they tend to be quite vague.  Moreover, when 
Evagrius does use the Wars, he often skips over Procopius’ descriptions of battle.  
For example, at 4.12 he says, “he [Procopius] records a first victory for the Romans 
in the territory of Dara and Nisibis, when Belisarius and Hermogenes as well were 
disposing the Roman armies.”175  In regard to the Battle of Callinicum he simply 
notes that, “he [Procopius] gives an emotional description of the invasion of the land 
of the Romans by Alamundarus…and how…Belisarius engaged them by the banks 
of the Euphrates on the eve of Easter day, under compulsion from his own army, and 
how the Roman army was destroyed because it did not accept the advice of 
Belisarius.”176  This tendency to omit large chunks of Procopius’ descriptions of battle 
is perhaps most clear, however, at 4.15, when Evagrius provides a near verbatim 
quotation from Procopius’ Wars 3.8.15-29.  There is an interesting omission in 
Evagrius’ quotation; he has omitted Cabaon’s battle array described at 3.8.25-28 as 
well as the fighting itself.  Just before the deliberate gap Evagrius says, “And on 
                                                
173 One particular aspect of battle that stands out among the ecclesiastical historians, and one 
to pay attention to, is the siege.  The only notable exception is Evagrius’ description (HE 
5.14) of the open-battle between Justinian (the general) and Khusro in 576.  For further 
discussion see Whitby (1988:  265-266).       
174 For a good introduction to, and discussion of, the problems associated with Evagrius see 
Whitby’s translation (2000e).  For Evagrius’ use of Procopius see Allen (1981:  171-207).  Cf. 
Whitby (2003:  477-492) and Treadgold (2007:  299-308). 
175 Trans. Whitby. 
176 Evag. 4.13, trans. Whitby.  For further discussion of Procopius’ narrative of the Battle of 
Callinicum see below pp 151-156, 347-348. 
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hearing this, he made ready for the encounter”.177  That sentence is immediately 
followed by, “And so most of the Vandals’, as he says, ‘were destroyed…”.178  The 
only other bit of the passage which Evagrius quotes directly from Procopius is the 
last sentence; the rest is essentially Evagrius summarizing and paraphrasing 
Procopius. 179   
The only open-battle which Evagrius describes is the Battle of Melitene in 
576.180  Sieges aside, this battle narrative is the most detailed description from any of 
the ecclesiastical historians.  Evagrius begins it by noting the preparations made for 
the war; he also notes that the general Justinian “collected such an army of heroic 
men”.181  The comment, “heroic men”, suggests that Evagrius might be falling back 
on standard rhetorical devices for his description.   Indeed, his description of the 
opening moments of the battle is reminiscent of some of the battle-narratives found 
in the works of earlier secular Greek historians:   
Now when he [Khusro] saw opposite him the Roman army, which was 
organized by Justinian, the brother of the Justin who had been miserably 
slain by Justin, meticulously equipped, the trumpets resounding the war cry, 
the standards raised for battle, the soldiery bent on slaughter and breathing 
rage though combined with exceptional good order, and cavalry of such 
numbers and quality as no monarch ever dreamed, with many appeals to the 
gods he groaned deeply at the unexpected and unforeseen event, and was 
unwilling to begin battle.182   
 
                                                
177 Evag. 4.15, trans. Whitby. 
178 Evag. 4.15, trans. Whitby. 
179 The apparatus to Bidez and Parmentier’s text of Evagrius, and, the apparatus to Haury’s 
text of Procopius, list the other differences between Evagrius’ quotation and Procopius’ text.  
Bidez and Parmentier, and Allen, suggest that the omission is due to some sort of scribal 
error or the like; but, I agree with Whitby that this is unlikely, for Evagrius’s statement, “as he 
says”, as well as the surrounding words which summarize the outcome of the encounter, 
suggest that Evagrius deliberately left out the battle.  See Allen (1981:  185), and Whitby 
(2000e:  215, n. 40).   
180 Evag. 5.14.  This battle is also described by Theophylact (3.12.12-14.11) and John of 
Ephesus (EH 6.8-9).  Cf. Whitby 1988:  264-266; and Syvänne 2004: 443-444.   
181 Evag. 5.14, trans. Whitby. 
182 Evag. 5.14, trans. Whitby. 
 95 
Despite the stylized character of this passage, and the battle, there are some 
interesting points emphasized by Evagrius.183  From the opening words Evagrius is 
keen to highlight the organization of the Roman army; he mentions it twice in the 
course of this sentence, once at the beginning and once in the middle:  “…the 
Roman army, which was organized by Justinian…”; “…combined with exceptional 
good order…”184  As we saw above, organization is considered by many Greek 
historians to be an essential ingredient in success on the battlefield; Evagrius’ 
emphasis on that point seems to suggest that he too may have recognized its 
importance.  Evagrius also stresses the role of numerical superiority in winning a 
battle.  This is not surprising:  the point is stressed over and over by ancient 
historians.185  Even though they seem to be little more than rhetorical devices, the 
notice of the war cries and the raising of the standards are also important.  Both of 
these psychological aspects could be used to intimidate one’s opponent.186  Besides 
the efficiency of the Roman troops – which was greater than any monarch could 
have expected – the last point which Evagrius stresses is the “unexpected or 
unforeseen event”.187  This is a factor emphasized, or at least discussed, over and 
over in secular historiography and military treatises.  Syrianus, for example, says, “a 
general should never have to say ‘I didn’t think of that’”.188  The sentence quoted is 
devoted in its entirety to issues of morale; Khusro’s is certainly failing and he seems 
                                                
183 See Whitby 2000e:  275, n. 14. 
184 “τὸ Ῥωμαίων στράτευμα ὑπὸ Ἰουστινιανῷ ταττόμενον”; “μετὰ τῆς εἰς ἄγαν εὐκοσμίας”. 
185 In the second half of book 7 of Maurice’s Strategikon, which is entitled “Points to be 
Observed on the Day of Battle”, chapters 3, 4, and 7 are all concerned with the strength, or 
apparent strength of one’s own army, and that of the opponent.  In chapter 7, for example, 
Maurice says:  “Apprehensive at the sight of such a large force, our men will quickly begin to 
lose courage” (Strat. 7.B.7, trans. Dennis).  
186 Maurice devotes a chapter each to trumpets and war cries (Strat. 2.17, “Trumpets”; 2.18, 
“The Battle Cry Sometimes Used”). 
187 Chesnut (1977 passim) briefly discusses the role of the unexpected in earlier Greek 
historiography, before discussing its role in ecclesiastical historiography, including how this 
colours Evagrius’ narrative.  Cf. Whitby 2000e:  xlvii ff. 
188 Syrianus Magister Peri. Strat. 20.6-7, trans. Dennis.  The quotation found in Syrianus’ text 
comes from Polyaenus’ Stratagems, 3.9.17.  Cf. Maurice. Strat. 8.1.26, 8.2.36. 
 96 
doomed to defeat.  Plus, Khusro has not prepared properly for this engagement, a 
major fault of the Persian commander and shah.189  Once the action of the battle 
actually begins – and it is described summarily – it is the bravery, or at least the 
initiative of a Roman Scythian ally, Curs, that leads to victory.190  Curs, who 
commands the Romans’ right flank, attacks the Persians and they are unable to bear 
the charge; as a result, they abandon their formation and are slaughtered.  It does 
not, however, end with this frontal assault; the Scythian wing manages to get behind 
Khusro’s line and attacks from the rear.  Once the Scythians defeat the Persians 
they go straight for the baggage and all the royal treasures to be found amongst it.  
The battle may be short, but Evagrius does note no less than seven significant 
points:  organization and good order, numerical superiority, psychological tactics 
(war cries), morale, the importance of careful planning and generalship at large, the 
ability of a battle line to withstand an assault, and the trouble that ensues when one 
army encircles another and attacks its rear.191  Plus, the narrative is devoid of any 
                                                
189 There are several chapters in the last two books of Evagrius’ Ecclesiastical History that 
deal with some aspect of generalship, which is not altogether surprising considering Evagrius’ 
interest in personalities (see Whitby 2000e:  xlviii ff).  In book 6, for example, chapter 3 is 
entitled, “Concerning the generalship of John and Philippicus and what they accomplished”; 
chapter 4 is entitled, “Concerning the generalship of Priscus, and what he experienced when 
his army mutinied against him”; and chapter 15 is entitled “Concerning the generalship of 
Comentiolus and the capture of Akbas”.  Chapters 4 and 15 are little than summaries of 
military operations led by the generals named; chapter 3, however, offers more detail about 
what Evagrius may have considered important characteristics for a general.  Concerning 
Philippicus he says:  “This man, after crossing the frontiers and ravaging everything in his 
path, became master of great spoils, and captured many people of noble birth…he engaged 
with the Persians and, after a fierce fight in which many distinguished Persians had fallen, he 
took many captives…and as a general he accomplished other things, by liberating the army 
from excesses and matters conducive to luxury, and by reining it in towards good order and 
obedience” (6.3, trans. Whitby).  The last point is a topos common in historiography 
throughout antiquity.  See Wheeler (1996) for a good discussion of the issue in relation to the 
Syrian legions of the early and high Roman Empire.  Theophylact too praised Philippicus’ 
military knowledge (Theophyl. Sim. 1.14.2-4; cf. Whitby 1988:  278-279; 279, n. 6, 288-289; 
and ibid. 2000e:  293, n. 13). 
190 The Scythians to which Evagrius refers might have been Huns.  They might also have 
been Bulgars, Sueves, or Gepids.  See Whitby 1995:  87-92. 
191 There is at least one other notable passage from this chapter.  Evagrius refers to “some 
skirmishing and a certain number of individual combats between men from the two armies, as 
normally happens” (Evag. 5.14, trans. Whitby), following the main phase of combat discussed 
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explicit cases where Divine Providence determines the outcome; instead it is 
explained in human terms.  Though the existence of an historical Battle of Melitene is 
open to debate, the narrative described by Evagrius provides many of the features 
that ancient writers felt were important in battle.192 
Evagrius’ account of the Battle of Melitene in 576 is one of the high 
watermarks of his descriptions of battle.193  Although he discusses many other 
military matters, and shows a particular fascination for generals, accounts of warfare 
are invariably little more than notices.  At 6.12 Evagrius constructs a speech for the 
patriarch Gregory of Antioch which he is alleged to have given to the mutinous 
troops.194  There are some interesting points made by Gregory.  He refers to Manlius 
Torquatus, for example, as a symbol of courage.195  Gregory also says in the speech 
that careful deliberation among the officers, and obedience among the soldiers, can 
have good results.  Perhaps what is most interesting about this speech, however, is 
that it is the only oration made to soldiers in the text and it is given not by a general, 
but a patriarch with whom he was acquainted.  Even though Evagrius has shied 
                                                                                                                                      
here.  The incidental nature of the comment points towards the commonness of single 
combat in the sixth century.  See below pp 261-264.   
192 Whitby (1988: 266), on the one hand, questions the existence of an historical Battle of 
Melitene; Syvänne (2004:  443-444, n. 7), on the other hand, is convinced that such a battle 
did indeed take place.  It could very well be that Evagrius’ account (and so too Theophylact’s, 
as well as John of Ephesus’) was little more than propaganda.  The narrative does, after all, 
have many of the features mentioned by Greek Classical Historians in their narratives of 
battles, as well as the two main strands of military thinking, tactics and morale.  He is likely to 
have based his account of the Battle of Melitene on some pre-existing account of a battle, or, 
if all he knew was the existence of the battle, he may have constructed his narrative based on 
what he learned from reading the battle narratives of someone like Procopius, for example, 
who mentions all of those seven features at some point or other.  With that said, Evagrius still 
had to choose what points to include, and stress, in his narrative, and the fact that he 
included such important points and put them together into a plausible account may also be 
significant.  Unfortunately, without further evidence the point is moot.  Cf. Blockley 1985:  
278, n. 239; Whitby 1994:  227-228. 
193 The other two are his descriptions of the sieges of Edessa (Evag. 4.27), and Sergiopolis 
(Evag. 4.28).  For the former see Whitby (2000e:  323-326). 
194 See Whitby 2000e:  301-302 with notes. 
195 Manlius Torquatus, who lived in the middle of the fourth century BC, is said to have 
received his cognomen as a result of a gold torque which he won from fighting with a Gaul in 
single combat.  This consul of 347, 344, and 340, is also said to have executed his son for 
fighting a duel against orders.  See Drummond (1996b), on whom this summary is based.   
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away from explaining things in terms of God in most other descriptions of military 
affairs, with the exceptions of Edessa and Sergiopolis, here, in this seemingly dire 
situation, it is a servant of God who averts disaster.  The last significant description 
of warfare found in Evagrius’ text is at 6.14 where he describes the siege of 
Martyropolis in 589.196  Evagrius describes the alleged treachery of Sittas and the 
failed siege of Phillipicus which followed.  Indeed, this narrative is very much focused 
on the failed efforts of Philippicus.  So, we learn that he pursued the siege even 
though “he did not possess any of the necessities for a siege”.197  Evagrius describes 
the construction of tunnels to bring down at least one of the towers.  He seems to be 
aware of the positional advantage which the Persians held; as a result, the missiles 
launched from the walls were shot with greater accuracy.  Philippicus is forced to 
retreat, but his reputation is restored somewhat when the Romans and Persians 
meet in battle not far from Martyropolis and one Persian hero falls.198  With the end 
of this chapter Evagrius’ military narrative effectively ends.   
Of the ecclesiastical historians, Evagrius has the most in common with 
secular historians.199  For our purposes, what is most striking is the degree to which 
the military narratives which he does include match – at least in terms of the points 
he describes – those of Evagrius’ secular predecessors and contemporaries.  As we 
have just seen, Evagrius places a premium on the importance of morale in battle, 
particularly in the Battle of Melitene.  Good order and obedience are also paramount.  
He is the only ecclesiastical historian to describe an open battle at any length.  Like 
his ecclesiastical predecessors, Evagrius is interested in the qualities that made 
                                                
196 Cf. Theophyl. Sim. 3.5.11-14. 
197 Evag. 6.14, trans. Whitby. 
198 In reality, however, the Romans lost.  Cf. Theophyl. Sim. 3.6.3. 
199 This point has long been recognized.  Treadgold (2007:  299-308) discusses Evagrius in 
the context of Procopius’ successors, a list which includes Agathias and Menander. 
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generals good, though he seems to be a bit more interested in their secular and 
strictly military qualities; like them he was interested in sieges.   
 
John Malalas:200  the Christian Chronicle 
I now turn to the Byzantine chronicler John Malalas.201  Though it might seem 
that chronicles might not be of much use in this discussion, the one discussed here 
does describe battle, at times in some detail.  Those military engagements that are 
described are presented in narrative form, even though they may be included in a 
larger chronicle format.  In addition, the audience for chronicles need not have been 
dissimilar to that of classicizing histories.  As such, their treatment of battle merits 
discussion.202   
Malalas’ chronicle is considerably longer than the earlier Constantinopolitan 
chronicler Marcellinus’; it is also more detailed.203  The amount of detail that Malalas 
devotes to battle varies; most of it is little more than a brief notice as we might expect 
for a chronicle.  Book eight, which is concerned with the Macedonians, devotes but 
one sentence to the conquests of Alexander:  “Alexander immediately set out from 
there [Troy] like a leopard and captured all lands with his generals.”204  Later in the 
text Malalas relates the conflict between Antiochus IV Epiphanes and Ptolemy IV and 
again the detail is sparse.  Antiochus actually invaded Egypt twice – 169-168 BC and 
                                                
200 The translations are drawn from the translation of Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al.  Thus, 
even though I have on occasion modified the translation given (using Thurn’s text), I have 
used their ordering of the work, which differs from the edition of Dindorf, and in some places 
from the edition of Thurn. 
201 For an introduction to chronicles see Croke (1990:  27-56), and Croke (2001:  1-13, 145-
169, 257-265). 
202 Beck 1965; Scott 1981; Ljubarskij 1998; Holmes 2005:  173ff.  Cf. Hunger 1978:  I, 257-
278. 
203 See Jeffreys (2003) for an introduction to Malalas.  For a more thorough study of many 
features of Malalas’ work see Jeffreys, Croke, and Scott (1990), on which my discussion is 
based.  Cf. Inglebert 2001:  528-531; Treadgold 2007:  235-255. 
204 Malalas 8.1, trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott et al. 
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again later in 168 BC – but this is relegated to a brief mention in Malalas.205  In book 
eleven Malalas records some of the events of the reign of Trajan including his 
invasion of the Parthian empire, but even then – and perhaps unsurprisingly – the 
added detail is for events in Antioch alone. 206  The battles on the eastern frontier are 
not discussed.  There are only two significant exceptions where battle is described at 
any length; they come in book eighteen which is concerned with the reign of 
Justinian, and perhaps surprisingly, book five which is concerned with the Trojan 
War.   
If the length of book five is anything to go by, Malalas was very interested in 
the Trojan War.207  There are two episodes of interest for us; the first of the two 
relates a battle involving Penthesileia and the Greeks.  Her army, which travelled to 
the battlefield from the Chersonesos, is composed of Amazons and “valiant men”.208  
After a few days rest, her forces march out onto the plain.  Malalas, through the voice 
of Teucer, then describes the order of battle of her forces, and those of the Greeks 
lined up opposite hers: 
Her army was divided into two divisions with the archers standing on the right 
and the left flanks, while the hoplite foot soldiers, who were more numerous 
than the cavalry, held the central position; Penthesileia was in the middle of 
the cavalry with her standard.  Then, after the Danoi had arranged 
themselves, they stood opposite them, with Menelaus, Meriones, and 
Odysseus opposite the archers; Diomedes, Agamemnon, Tleptolemus, 
Ialmenos, and Askalaphos opposite the hoplites; your dad Achilles, 
Idomeneus, Philoktetes, and the remaining commanders with their armies 
opposite the cavalry.209 
 
                                                
205 Malalas 8.23. It records a battle in which Antiochus’ men were defeated and then the 
general himself turns tail and flees. 
206 Malalas was a native of Antioch and the empire’s second city is the focus of the bulk of the 
text.  See Jeffreys 1990:  55-60. 
207 One of the main sources for the Trojan War narrative in Malalas is probably Dictys of 
Crete, on whom see Bobrowski (2007).  Cf. Malalas 5.41 (5.11, Thurn). 
208 Malalas 5.56 (5.26 Thurn), trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al.  ἀνδρῶν γενναίων 
209 Malalas 5.56 (5.26 Thurn). 
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Malalas highlights the Greek fighters by naming their commanders alone when 
describing their battle order, but omitting the names of those – Penthesileia aside – 
from the opposing force.  Following the description of the respective battle-orders 
Malalas then summarizes some of the main action.  Teucer kills a host of enemy 
soldiers, and the two Ajaxes destroy the hoplites.  Then Malalas focuses on the 
actions of Achilles – not surprising considering Teucer is speaking to Pyrrhus – and 
in particular his attempts to take down Penthesileia:   
And coming near her horse, he struck her with his spear and knocked her 
from the horse.  And then fallen, yet still alive, he dragged her away by the 
hair.  When the rest of the army saw that she had fallen, they turned in 
flight.210 
 
The dragging of Penthesileia is probably an allusion to Achilles’ dragging of the 
corpse of Hector; by this point in the Trojan war Hector had already perished.211  As 
with other historians, the death, or capture, of a leader has a deleterious effect on the 
army’s morale.  The fleeing Amazons are pursued and many are killed; those who 
are not killed are taken prisoner and distributed among the entire army. 
In Teucer’s speech Malalas tells us that there was another battle a few days 
later.  A certain Tithon arrives having brought some Indian cavalry and infantry, in 
addition to some “very warlike Phoenicians and their king Polydamas.”212  In fact, 
many other Indian princes came as well in a fleet, and “the contingent was so 
massive that neither Ilium nor its plains could receive them.”213  The commander of 
these allied Trojan forces is Memnon.  After some rest the massive Trojan force 
marches out onto the plains “wielding strange swords and slings and square 
                                                
210 Malalas 5.56 (5.26 Thurn), trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
211 This is not the first such reference to Penthesileia and her battle with the Amazons outside 
of the walls of Troy.  Cf. Apollod. Epit. 5.1-2; Quint. Smyrn. 1.18ff. 
212 Malalas 5.57 (5.27, Thurn). 
213 Malalas 5.57 (5.27, Thurn). 
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shields.”214  Memnon himself went out riding a chariot.  The sight of this large army 
and their strange weapons creates anxiety among the Greeks, as Teucer relates.  
While in this state of disbelief:   
And with a shout the Trojans, along with Memnon, attacked us; and we 
received their charge and many were wounded.  When a significant number 
from our army had fallen, we, the Greek commanders, withdrew since we 
could not withstand their numerically superior army.215 
 
Though a brief description it is no less evocative.  The attack is not just an attack but 
an ‘assault’ (ὁρμὴν).  And, the success of this shock is grounded in the superior 
numbers of the Trojan forces, which Malalas has highlighted over and over in the 
battle narrative to this point.  Malalas creates tension here because though 
Neoptolemus (the listener referred to in the passage), and the chronicle’s readers, 
would have known that the Greeks were ultimately successful, he has presented 
them in a perilous situation that challenges their expectations. 
When the battle begins anew the same scenario unfolds as many men start 
to fall.  It is at this point that Malalas shifts the focus of the narrative to a few select 
individuals:  “When the battle had begun, and many men had fallen, my brother Ajax 
ordered the kings of the Greeks to hold off the rest of the Indians and the Trojans.”216  
Ajax is highlighted first, followed by Memnon and Achilles.  The two Greek heroes 
then work in tandem to try and bring down the fearsome Indian king.  Malalas 
describes a fierce hand-to-hand combat between Memnon and Ajax, something we 
might well expect to find in a battle narrative involving Homeric heroes.217  In this 
                                                
214 Malalas 5.57 (5.27, Thurn) trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
215 Malalas 5.57 (5.27 Thurn), trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
216 Malalas 5.57 (5.27 Thurn), trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. (slightly modified). 
217 “When Memnon noticed Ajax attacking him he dismounted from his chariot immediately 
and came near him; they tested each other with their spears.  Ajax was the first to turn aside 
the other’s shield having turned it with his spear, as he attacked violently.  Those who were 
near the Indian Memnon rushed at Ajax when he had Memnon at a disadvantage, and your 
father Achilles saw this and, thrusting his spear at Memnon’s neck where the tendon was 
exposed, killed him unexpectedly.  When he fell confusion set in and the barbarians fled” 
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brief episode we again see the psychological impact the death of a leading 
commander has on its army:  the Trojan allied force is stunned by Memon’s death 
and turns in flight.  Perhaps significantly, Malalas calls them barbarians when they 
flee, rather than Trojans, even though he made it explicit earlier that the Trojan army 
was heterogeneous.  Another interesting feature of this incident is the dismounting of 
the leader to fight against his attacker.  The underlying features, however, are morale 
and heroism. 
I now turn to book eighteen of Malalas’ chronicle, which is concerned with the 
age of Justinian.  The amount of military detail varies considerably.  The Battle of 
Dara, for example, is only treated summarily.218  The Battle of Callinicum, on the 
other hand, is described in detail.219  At the beginning there is a reference to a 
standard; as with the narrative of Dara, it is to the Persian royal standard.  Here, 
however, unlike in his Trojan narrative, Malalas uses the term bandon to refer to the 
standard, a more contemporary term.  Malalas is vague about the size of the Persian 
force.220  When Malalas turns to the Roman figures, however, he is more specific; he 
says that Belisarius had a force 8,000 strong, Sunicas 4,000 strong, and Stephanus, 
Apskal, and Simmas 4,000 strong.  This difference could reflect the information to 
which Malalas had access, though it could just as easily be a point of emphasis.  In 
these early stages of the battle, and the preceding campaign, there are skirmishes, 
and references to Latin military terminology, as well as to Persian military 
                                                                                                                                      
Malalas 5.57 (5.27 Thurn), trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. (slightly modified).  Few 
historians relate death scenes with such anatomical detail.  Procopius is one such person 
and I discuss his descriptions below pp 255-260. 
218 Malalas 18.50. 
219 See Greatrex (1998:  193-212) for the battle and the campaign, and see below (pp. 151-
156, 347-348) for some salient features of Procopius’ description of the battle and additional 
bibliography. 
220 Malalas 18.60. 
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technology.221  Malalas also hints at the dramatic impact that the mindset of the 
Roman commanders will have on the Roman army, and its prospects, during the 
battle:  “Belisarius was angry with Sunicas because he had attacked the Persian 
army on his own initiative.”222  At this point the Romans are doing little more than 
reacting to the actions of the Persians; on the other hand the Persians seem to be in 
complete control:  “The Persians turned and stopped and, drawing themselves up, 
they encamped on the limes across the Euphrates and made plans.”223  By 
highlighting the discord Malalas alludes to a Roman defeat.   
Throughout Malalas identifies some of the commanders involved in the 
engagement. 224  As we would expect, his preference is to identify Roman 
commanders over their Persian counterparts.  Interestingly, those commanders he 
does name, whether Roman or Persian, do not necessarily have a role in the battle 
itself.225  Malalas now describes the arrangement of the respective forces before 
giving the date of the encounter, something he did not do for the Battle of Dara.226  
Unsurprisingly, we learn of certain commanders falling and the panic this causes 
among the troops.227  A standard is an item of significance again, and he continues 
to use the term bandon.  The battle is fierce and Malalas jumps around to describe 
different parts of the encounter.  At one point he describes a stratagem that the 
                                                
221 Malalas 18.60, “the fortress (castrum) of Gabboula”; τοῦ κάστρου Γαββουλῶν; “ditch” or 
“fossatum” τοῦ φοσσάου “iron caltrops”, “τρίβολος“; “wooden engines”, “ξύλων μηχανήματα“.  
Cf. “magister”, “ὁ μάγιστροσ”; “dux”, “τοῦ δουκὸς”; “limes”, “τὸ λίμιτον”. 
222 Malalas 18.60, trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
223 Malalas 18.60. 
224 Malalas has already identified Hermogenes, Alamundaras, Arethas, Belisarius, Sunicas, 
Stephanus, Apskal, and Simmas.  Now he identifies Dorotheus and Mamantios.  Later we are 
introduced to Andrazes, Namaan, Abros, and Stephanakios. 
225 Dorotheus, Mamantios, and Hermogenes, for example, are not referred to in the 
description of the fighting itself. 
226 “It was on the 19th April, on Holy Saturday, at Easter, that the battle took place.”  Malalas 
18.60, trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
227 “When the Phrygians saw their exarch fall and his standard captured by the Persians, they 
turned in flight and the Roman Saracens fled with them.”  Malalas 18.60, trans. Jeffreys, 
Jeffreys, Scott, et al. 
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Persians employed against the Romans; he notes that Apskal charged the centre of 
the Persian line; he then describes the rash of fleeing Roman contingents that begins 
with the death of Apskal.  After he falls and his men retreat, the Saracens join in the 
flight from the scene.  Malalas then tells us that the Isaurians turn and flee when they 
see the Saracens running from the battlefield.  This in turn is followed by the flight of 
Belisarius, for Malalas says that when the general sees the Isaurians fleeing, he 
decides that it is best that he too leaves the scene of the carnage.228  As with the 
battle between Memnon and Achilles/Ajax, we find a commander dismounting from 
his horse to fight on foot.  Sunicas and Simmas are singled out for continuing to fight 
while the rest seem to be retreating.229  Again, much like the Homeric duel, Malalas 
uses the fighting of these two commanders to describe in detail the violence of the 
battle:  “They killed two of them [Persians] and captured alive one named Amerdach, 
a warlike man whose right arm had been cut off at the elbow by Sunicas.”230  The 
battle draws to a close as night falls on Callinicum. 
There are several similarities between the Homeric era battles and the Battle 
of Callinicum.   Malalas tends to move from general to general, and in this he is 
following some of the precepts of Lucian.231  In two of the battles described here, the 
Memnon-Achilles battle and the Battle of Callinicum, the amount of detail steadily 
increases over the course of the narrative.  At the same time, the narratives begin 
from a bird’s eye view before eventually building up towards a single combat.  The 
                                                
228 This sequence of events is a clear demonstration of causation.  In fact, throughout this 
narrative Malalas seeks to explain what happened, both from the events which preceded the 
battle, and in the course of the battle itself; he even records the inquiries that followed once 
the news reached Justinian.  Even if a chronicler, such as Malalas, is inconsistent, there is 
still clearly a lot more going on than mere recording of events. 
229 Malalas 18.60. 
230 Malalas 18.60, trans. Jeffreys, Jeffreys, Scott, et al.  “...ἀλλα καὶ μεσολαβήσαντες τρεῖς ἐκ 
τῶν ἐξάρχων αὐτῶν δύο μὲν ἐφόνευσαν, ἕνα δὲ ζῶντα συνέλαβον τῷ ὀνόματι Ἀμερδάχ, 
ἄνδρα πολεμικόν, τῆς δεξιᾶς αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγκῶνος τμηθείσης ὑπὸ Σουνίκα.”   
231 See above pp 79-80. 
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single combats are significant in that it is in them alone that we find anatomical detail, 
a feature which will arise in my discussion of Procopius’ Gothic Wars.  What is more, 
we find further instances of heroism with the doomed commanders dismounting from 
their horses to fight on foot.  Both battle narratives also begin with the ordering of the 
respective lines, a brief reference to the two sides engaging each other, and then the 
subsequent withdrawal of part of one side’s forces:  in the Homeric battle it is the 
Greeks, who are victorious in the end, and withdraw following the first day of battle; 
at Callinicum it is the succession of Roman allies who withdraw.  There are also 
differences between the narratives, such as the terminology employed, and the 
length of the respective battles.  In the end, for Malalas the salient features were the 
ordering of the battle-line, the role of single combat, the bravery of individual 
combatants, morale, and the capturing of the standard. 
 
Part II:  Secular History 
Agathias:  Classicizing History232  
In this section I look at works that are ostensibly secular, including 
classicizing history, and another that seems to stand on his own, Jordanes.  There 
are only a handful of classicizing historians who might be called contemporary to 
Procopius and so could fit into this category:  Malchus, Peter the Patrician, Zosimus, 
and Agathias.  Unfortunately, as regards the first two authors, very little survives, and 
                                                
232 In my survey of the historical works of Procopius’ contemporaries I have stuck with the 
generally accepted categories used by modern historians of late antiquity (ecclesiastical 
histories, chronicles, secular or classicizing histories).  There are good reasons for doing this, 
as the respective types of history often have different focuses.  As I now turn to the 
classicizing historians, however, it will become clear that, at least as regards the description 
of battle, they have much in common.  As regards the term “classicizing history”, see Blockley 
(1981:  86-94).   
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what does, adds little to this survey of Procopius’ contemporaries.233  As there is 
some uncertainty about the date of Zosimus,234 I have decided to focus on Agathias 
alone. 
Agathias was a well-educated lawyer who seems to have spent most of his 
days in Constantinople.235  This self-proclaimed continuator of Procopius – and his 
preface bears this out well – also happens to have been an accomplished poet.236  
Agathias’ History, covering the years 552-559, is quite detailed.  He spends a 
considerable amount of space on military matters.  
When we look closer at Agathias’ descriptions, it is his effective, and 
intelligent, use of language that stands out most.  For example, early in the 
description of the siege of Cumae Agathias emphasizes the pace, tension, and 
chaotic character of the siege, as well as the threat posed by the Gothic commander 
Aligern, by repeatedly referring to the speed of the arrows shot from Aligern’s bow.  
He does this by opening chapter nine with a sentence that begins with ε θ ς.237  A 
few lines later, having reached the top, the soldiers start hurling their spears, and 
                                                
233 The fragments that we have of Malchus’ Byzantine History are largely concerned with 
diplomacy:  there very well might have been greater discussion of warfare in his work but we 
just do not know.  The bulk of the fragments come from Constantine Porphyrogenitus’ 
Excerpta de Legationibus, which was written in the tenth century, and so what we have is 
determined largely by the interests of the author/compiler of that work.  The same is true for 
Peter the Patrician’s work, which was concerned with ancient history rather than 
contemporary history.  However, there are even fewer fragments pertaining to Peter’s work:  
it takes up only thirteen pages in Müller’s FHG (425-437).  There is some discussion of Peter 
in Cataudella (2003:  431-441).  See Blockley’s (1981:  71-85) companion volume to his 
edition of the fragments of Malchus for the background.  For a concise overview of fifth 
century historiography, including some discussion of Priscus and Candidus see Blockley 
(2003:  289-315).  On the work of Menander as a reflection of the military proclivities of the 
late sixth century see Brodka (2007). 
234 Note the comments of Paschoud (2000:  ix-xx), who edited the French edition and 
translation of Zosimus. 
235 For more on Agathias see Cameron (1970), Kaldellis (1997, 1999a, 2003a), Brodka (2004:  
152-192), and Treadgold (2007:  279-290).  Cf. Whitby (1992:  31-38). 
236 See Agathias, pr. 6-12 for his comments about his poetic past and poetry’s worth, and pr. 
22ff for his role as continuator of Procopius. 
237 Agathias 1.9.1. 
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again, they do this right away, α τίκα.238  Agathias now stresses the quantity of the 
arrows tossed, before noting that Aligern and his Gothic army were themselves quick 
in replying, ο  σχολαίτερον.239  Then it is back to the arrows of Aligern, and Agathias 
notes:  “for his arrows moved through the air with much whizzing, and, as such, you 
could not guess their speed”.240  This poetic repetition is meant to bring the chaotic 
opening stage of the assault before his reader’s eyes.   
Agathias uses intelligent and poetic language in other ways, and they are 
often couched in allusions to Homer.  In chapter ten of book one, during that same 
siege of Cumae, he describes the tunnel, and the support beams, used to try and 
undermine Cumae’s walls.  Leaves and brushwood are placed under the support 
beams and set alight.241  The kindling is soon ablaze, and not long after that, the 
support beams are turned to ash, and the wall overhead collapses.242  This tactic 
enables Narses and his men to storm the city, but they are beaten back by tightly 
arranged Gothic defenders.243  Fire is a key characteristic of the urbs capta,244 and, it 
is closely associated with the burning of Troy.245  Given that the context here is the 
siege of a city, this is perhaps no accident; Agathias seems to be alluding to Troy 
and the Iliad.246  The language certainly suggests as much.247  On the other hand, 
                                                
238 Agathias 1.9.1. 
239 Agathias 1.9.1-1.9.2. 
240 Agathias 1.9.3. 
241 Agathias 1.10.6. 
242 Agathias 1.10.7. 
243 Agathias 1.10.9. 
244 On the history of the urbs capta topos see Paul (1982). 
245 See Rossi (2004:  24-30) for the connection between flames and Troy. 
246 Agathias uses φλόξ for flame, a word that Homer frequently employs in the Iliad.  Homer 
does not describe the burning of Troy in the Iliad of course; the best known description is 
Virgil’s in book 2 of the Aeneid.  He does, however, describe the burning of the Greek ships 
in book 16 (Il. 16.150ff.), which, to my mind, looks ahead to the later burning of the city.  What 
is more, I suspect that most, if not all, of Agathias’ readers would have made the connection 
between Homer, the Iliad, and the fall of Troy.  Interestingly, Aeneas consults the Sibyl from 
Cumae in book 6 of the Aeneid. 
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Agathias describes flames towards the end of book four in chapter 19 when he 
discusses the massacre of the Misimians.  In their rage an unnamed Roman sets fire 
to some of the Misimian huts, which, owing to their inflammable materials, burst into 
flames.248  Agathias also tells us that some of the victims were burned alive.249  In 
this instance Agathias uses πῦρ rather than φλόξ.  Although the main objects of the 
Roman rage in the massacre are the Misimian men, it is the suffering of the women 
and children that attract most of Agathias’ attention.  We find an important woman 
pierced through the chest with a torch, thus incorporating the images of the flames, 
and the suffering of women, in one sentence.250  Agathias does not stop there, and 
the suffering gets worse.  Children are seized from their mothers, some of whom are 
tossed to their deaths on the rocks, others hurled onto the tips of spears.251  As we 
would expect, Agathias criticizes the Romans for these immoral acts.252  Besides 
providing Agathias with an opportunity to discuss morality, the suffering of women 
and children is also a marker for the urbs capta as well as the Iliupersis, or fall of 
Troy.253     
The siege of Onoguris, a descriptive tour de force, includes some of the same 
characteristics that I have just described.  What stands out, however, is that Agathias 
does not simply reproduce them in the manner that he had before.  We have just 
seen how he uses the speed of arrows to heighten the pace and tension in the siege 
of Cumae.  In fact, missiles seem to be a favourite subject of Agathias, and in the 
                                                                                                                                      
247 Agathias 1.10.6-7.  Many of the words used are either rare, or have a Homeric pedigree, 
such as ἐκκρεμές (not Homeric, but rare), ὀρθοστάδην (rare), ταχυδαές (rare) ἐρηρεισμένα, 
αὖον, φλογὸς, and ἀντίθεσιν. 
248 Agathias 4.19.4. 
249 Agathias 4.19.5. 
250 Agathias 4.19.4. 
251 Agathias 4.19.5. 
252 Agathias 4.19.6. 
253 On the connection between the suffering of women and children and the urbs capta see 
Rossi (2004:  40-44). 
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course of this description he uses them again in a manner beyond mere reportage, 
likening the barrage of arrows to a blizzard:  “accordingly missiles were flying in rapid 
succession, such that their density shaded the whole sky as if they were naturally 
bonded to each other.  This scene resembled a great blizzard, or, a tremendous 
explosion of hail accompanied by violent winds”.254  Not only is Agathias using a 
similar subject, arrows, to create a tense, chaotic, and fast-moving scene; but, he 
has done it here in a slightly different, and arguably more interesting, way, through 
imagery, while making a subtle allusion to Homer.255  Leo the Deacon also used this 
image.256  The imagery in this battle is not all visual, for Agathias appeals to our ears 
as well, both through the words’ meaning and how they sound when read, to 
increase, or at least, maintain the heightened tension.  After returning to his much 
loved bows, Agathias describes the sounds of the engagement:   
The shouting rose to a great din and the trumpets on both sides sang in 
accompaniment the songs of a warrior.  The Persians were booming with 
their drums [τοῖς τυμπάνοις ἐβόμβουν] and raising the war-cry for the sake of 
intimidation, and the neighing of the horses, the clattering of the shields, and 
the crashing together of the breastplates led to some boisterous and 
disordered noise.257  
 
Agathias also returns to the images of flames following the Roman victory.  After the 
panicked Persian flight, he describes the Romans setting the wicker-roofs on fire, 
along with their siege equipment.258  The flames soon soar to the sky leading many 
of the Persians to suspect, falsely, that their side had been victorious and set the 
fortress alight.259  These Persians are cut down by the Romans.260  In sum, there are 
                                                
254 Agathias 3.25.1. 
255 During the battle of the Greek wall in book 12 the stones, “dropped to the ground like 
snowflakes which the winds’ blast whirling the shadowing clouds drifts in their abundance 
along the prospering earth” (Hom. Il 12.156-158, trans. Lattimore).  The vocabulary might not 
be the same, but the image certainly is.   
256 Leo diac. 1.8. 
257 Agathias 3.25.7. 
258 Agathias 3.28.1. 
259 Agathias 3.28.1. 
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a number of ways that this siege description builds on images and themes developed 
throughout the History.  The repetition of these Homeric allusions also forces us to 
confront the Homeric dimension.  Agathias follows Lucian’s dictum on cinematic 
coverage; after detailing the sounds of battle, Agathias focuses on the general 
Justin; he then zooms out to the Persians, flies over to the Dilimnites, before homing 
in on the commanders Angilas and Theodorus.261  By and large, there are a number 
of similarities between the historiographical theory advocated by Lucian, and the 
historiographical practice adopted by Agathias, at least as regards the description of 
battle.   
The most remarkable episode from the description of Onoguris is found in the 
latter stages of the siege when Agathias turns to Ognaris and the elephant, in a 
scene that brings together all of the elements that I have discussed thus far.  
Agathias is describing the rampaging pachyderms when he shifts his focus to a 
spear-bearer of Martin, named Ognaris.  This man finds himself hemmed in a narrow 
spot with death seemingly starring him in the face.  In a desperate move, he 
unleashes one last attack:   
…he struck the elephant that was bearing down on him ferociously 
with his spear and drove home the point, so that it was left dangling.  The 
elephant found the blow unbearable and, since it was brandishing the spear 
before its eye, it was horrified and so leapt backwards, and, whirling round his 
trunk like an uncoiling spring, struck many of the Persians and sent them 
headlong, now stretching it out as long as it could go, and emitting a harsh 
and wild noise.  Suddenly he shook off those seated on his back, and having 
hurled them to the earth, he trampled them to death.  Then he struck fear into 
the whole mob of Persians, startled the horses when he approached them, 
and cut through and shredded whatever he came across with his tusks.  The 
scene was filled with lamentation and confusion.262 
 
                                                                                                                                      
260 Agathias 3.28.3. 
261 Agathias 3.25.8-3.26.3 
262 Agathias 3.27.1-3. 
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This passage is reminiscent of the Iliad.  Homeric heroes tend to kill, or at least, 
maim, their foes, with a single blow. 263  Agathias himself uses it in at least two other 
scenes.264  During the siege of Cumae, for example, we read the following:  “When 
Aligern saw Palladius himself (someone who was not reckless in the eyes of Narses, 
but a leading man in the Roman army who ranked among the greatest 
commanders), clad with an iron breastplate and attacking the walls with great 
determination, he let fly an arrow at him from on high, and it pierced right through the 
man, his breastplate, and his shield”.265  Unsurprisingly, Agathias tends to reserve 
‘single blow’ incidents to descriptions of sieges.  This is the case here; however, the 
difference is that one lone man manages to do the same not to a fellow warrior, as in 
the incident with Palladius, but even more remarkably, to an elephant.  While 
personifying the poor pachyderm, Agathias likens the action of the trunk to a spring.  
And, in the last line, which records the lamentation evident at the scene, Agathias 
again evokes Homer.266  Indeed, through employing these techniques and allusions 
Agathias has brought this exciting, if gruesome, episode before the eyes of his 
reader.   
It is unlikely that Agathias spent any time in a camp, at least based on what 
we know about his life.  As such, and like many of the authors discussed here, there 
are a host of different opinions about Agathias’ credentials for the writing of a military 
narrative.  Cameron and Rance both censure Agathias, largely on the basis of his 
civilian background.267  On the other hand, Syvänne is a bit too generous.268  Yet, in 
                                                
263 For Homeric battle conventions see the summary of Kirk (1962:  372-375), and of Schein 
(1984:  76-82).  Cf. Renehan (1987:  110), and chapter five below where I discuss similar 
issues in the context of Procopius’ description of the siege of Rome. 
264 Some examples of the ‘single blow’ in Procopius’ Wars are found at 5.23.9-12, 6.2.14-18, 
6.2.22-24, 6.5.24-26, and 7.4.23-29.  For the Agathian examples see 1.9.4, and 4.19.4. 
265 Agathias 1.9.4. 
266 Hom. Il. 22.409.  Cf. Leo diac. 1.8. 
267 Cameron 1970: 37; Rance 2004a:  283-284. 
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some of his descriptions he does demonstrate rather impressive technical 
knowledge.  In his description of the battle of Casilinum in 554 he says:  “then 
Narses bent back and extended the wings to form an ἐπικάμπιον ἐμπροσθίαν (as 
these tactics are called)”. 269 This very manoeuvre, the epikampion emprosthian, is 
described by Asclepiodotus,270 Aelian,271 and Agathias’ contemporary, Maurice.272  
During that same description of the Battle of Casilinum Agathias uses the words συνασπισμός,273 which is the locking of shields together, and ξυλλοχισμὸς,274 which 
refers to a parallel arrangement of units deployed in a row.  Both words are rare with 
a classical pedigree; nevertheless, Agathias has used them correctly.  In the early 
stages of the siege of Onoguris Agathias gives an extended description of the 
‘wicker-roofs’ (σπαλίωνας), or sheds, commonly used during sieges to shield soldiers 
when approaching the walls.275  Although this is a far from exhaustive list, these 
examples do suggest that the civilian Agathias had some familiarity with 
contemporary military thinking, or at least, had enough sense to speak to the people 
who did.   
Overall, there are a number of common elements in Agathias’ descriptions of 
battle:  his tendency to play with the narrative order, for he is often interrupting the 
narrative to digress on some issue which is often only indirectly related to the events 
                                                                                                                                      
268 Syvänne 2004:  25. 
269 Agathias 2.9.2.   
270 Asclep. Tac. 11.1. 
271 Ael. Tac. 45.3. 
272 Maurice Strat. 12.a.7. 
273 Agathias 2.8.4; Asclep. Tac.3.6, 4.3; Ael. Tac.11.2-5; Arr. Tac. 11.3-4.  Maurice (Strat. 
12.a.7.52-53) uses the contemporary, if slightly different, term phoulkon.  Cf. Rance 2004a:  
273, n. 19. 
274 Agathias 2.8.4; Asclep. Tac. 2.5. 
275 Agathias 3.5.9.  Ammianus (19.7.3) too refers to wicker-roofs in his extended description 
of the siege of Amida in 359.  The words he uses are cratesque vimineas.  Differences aside, 
the respective authors’ descriptions of battle are fairly similar, at least as regards to their 
penchant for poetic language, and vivid narrative.  On Ammianus’ aesthetic see Sabbah 
(1978:  541-594); on his battle narrative technique Kagan (2006:  23-95). 
 114 
being narrated; when the narrative is progressing, the pace is rarely blistering, 
though he does tend to elide significant chunks of a battle; he tends to interject, 
particularly at the end, to inform the reader of the moral undertones of the individuals 
and groups involved in the battle (such as the Franks following the Battle of 
Casilinum); in keeping with the previous point, Agathias tends to present leading 
individuals in narratives as either good or bad, again part of the moral purpose 
underlying his History; and he tends to avoid any real discussion of fighting.  Thus, 
by and large, Agathias’ battle narratives are unique, are infused with many poetic 
elements, and in a related manner, have epic character.    
 
Jordanes 
Jordanes’ work is unusual, and does not neatly fit into any one of the 
categories I have discussed thus far; it has elements of a chronicle, as well as 
elements of a classicizing history.  As regards the historian himself, Jordanes seems 
to have led a similar life to Procopius; both men served in an administrative capacity 
under a high-ranking commander and both were provincials who headed to 
Constantinople, presumably where they spent the last few years of their lives.276  
Jordanes, an Illyrian, wrote two historical works, the Romana and the Getica.  In 
many ways the two pieces work together; Amory has gone so far as to postulate that 
                                                
276 There is a wealth of scholarship dealing with Jordanes.  See especially O’Donnell (1982:  
223-240), Goffart (1988:  20-111), Wolfram (1988:  3-18), Heather (1991:  3-67), Croke 
(1983), Croke (1987), Amory (1997:  291-307), Croke (2003:  363-375), Merrills (2005:  100-
169), Croke (2005a:  473-494), and Goffart (2006:  56-72).  Earlier scholarship had not been 
kind to Jordanes; he was regarded as little more than an epitomizer of Cassiodorus, 
particularly in his Getica (see, for example, Wolfram 1988:  3-18).  But, those studies listed 
above adopt a more positive position towards Jordanes.  Of that list, Amory (1997:  291-307) 
and Croke (2003:  363-375) are perhaps the best introductions to Jordanes.  Despite the 
considerable interest that Jordanes has attracted, scholars have generally been interested in 
his work only as regards what it has to say about the Goths.  To my knowledge, no one has 
yet to give Jordanes the kind of treatment that I am giving Procopius; I hope to rectify this in 
the future. 
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the Getica was “an excursus from the Romana”.277  A quick glance at the pages of 
the Getica seems to support such a claim.  Jordanes relegates military matters to 
brief references and tends to record only the final outcome of a battle.  So, at 7.50 for 
example Jordanes says:  “After conquering various tribes in war, and to be sure 
winning over the others through peace”.278  In some places foreign rulers, such as 
the classical Persian shah Xerxes, decide against engaging the Goths because of 
their martial virtues:  “He was not bold enough to try them in battle, being overcome 
by their courage and steadfastness”.279  According to Jordanes, the Macedonians 
also trembled in fear at the courage of the Goths:  “When the Macedonians saw 
them coming against them with confidence they were stupefied, and, so to speak, 
the armed were terrified of the unarmed.”280  Most references to battle do indeed 
read like chronicle entries.  As regards individuals, Jordanes passes over most 
emperors, except for those whom he felt were of significance to the Goths, such as 
Maximinus Thrax.281  In his description on the origins of this third century emperor 
Jordanes is keen to emphasize his military virtues.282  Indeed, Maximinus, who was 
of equestrian stock, did have a military background and his accession was thanks in 
no small part to the Danubian troops with whom he was campaigning on the 
                                                
277 Amory 1997:  294. 
278 Jord. Get. 7.20.   
279 Jord. Get. 10.64. 
280 Jord. Get. 10.65. 
281 He is otherwise known as C. Iulius Verus Maximinus.  Maximinus reigned from March 235 
until spring 238 when his troops mutinied and assassinated him.  For two complementary 
accounts of the reign of Maximinus see Potter (2004:  167-172) and Drinkwater (2005:  28-
33).  Cf. Campbell 1984:  68-69. 
282 See in particular Jord. Get. 15.84-91.  Maximinus Thrax is also discussed by Herodian, 
who was no fan, at 6.8.1-8.6.8, and the writer of the Historia Augusta (HA Max. 1.1-27.8).  
The vita of the two Maximini in the latter’s account draws heavily on Herodian’s.  Cf. 
Whittaker (1969:  lxxi-lxxxii) for Herodian’s characterizations of the emperors whom he 
discusses. 
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Rhine.283   Jordanes, however, tends to exaggerate his military pedigree; he claims, 
for example, that Maximinus was eight feet tall,284 that he won many prizes for his 
feats during the performance of some military games,285 and that he rose through the 
ranks with relative ease.286  When Jordanes discusses the accession of Theodosius 
I, he resorts to a topos, however true it might have been, in describing the actions 
which he took following the Battle of Adrianople.287  Moving on, Jordanes creates a 
Gothic king named Ostrogotha who is said to have fought a battle with his Gothic 
forces against the Gepids.288  In regard to the fighting itself, Jordanes says little 
beyond, “and there [the River Auha] they fought with such great valour, and since 
they fought with similar weaponry they turned against their own.”289  This sort of 
detail is typical of his battle descriptions, with one notable exception:  the Battle of 
the Catalaunian Plains. 
Jordanes’ description of the battle between Aetius and Attila is by far the 
longest and most detailed found in the Getica.290  Plus, the battle narrative itself is by 
                                                
283 Maximinus in fact spent most of his brief reign – though it was longer than many of his 
mid-third century counterparts – campaigning along the Rhine and Danube.  See Drinkwater 
2005:  28-33. 
284 Jord. Get. 15.85. 
285 Jord. Get. 15.86. 
286 Jord. Get. 15.87.  This is not to deny that Maximinus rose through the ranks for he 
certainly did; I am only implying that Jordanes’ account is a little misleading, for I do not think 
that it could not have been as quick as he suggests. 
287 Jord. Get. 139.  Cf.  Wheeler 1996. 
288 Jord. Get. 17.99-100.  Cf. Wolfram 1988:  29-40, 397-398, n. 61; and Heather 1996:  113-
117. 
289 Jord. Get. 17.99. 
290 Jord. Get. 36.190-42.219.  The battle took place in 451 and was fought between Aetius 
and his allied Roman forces and Attila and his Hunnic alliance.  There are a number of 
modern accounts of the battle, of which the most recent is Richardot’s discussion in the third 
edition of his La Fin de L’Armée Romaine (2005:  351-367).  See Thompson (1996:  137-156, 
esp 148ff), and Stickler (2002:  135-145) for the campaign leading up to the battle.  
Maenchen-Helfen (1973:  131) is completely unimpressed with the battle:  “It [the finding of a 
fragment of a Hunnic cauldron in northern France] gave new impetus to the search for the 
battlefield near the locus Mauriacus, a favorite hobby of local historians and retired colonels.”  
The historical significance of this battle is contested.  Heather (1995) doubts that it was as 
significant as Jordanes and Gregory of Tours make it out to be.  Croke (2001:  59), rather 
dismissively, says, “the Huns…were routed in 451 in the overrated battle of the Catalaunian 
Fields.” 
 117 
no means straightforward.  Jordanes is constantly playing with the order of the 
narrative and its pace.  From the onset we are told by the narrator Jordanes, in 
Homeric or Virgilian fashion, that the battle itself was of note:  “Oh fortunate 
battlefield, you have the trustworthy succour, the sweet comradery, and the comfort 
of those who themselves delight in enduring danger at the same time.”291 Jordanes 
frequently plays with the narrative order, and he often intrudes into the narrative 
itself.292  In the midst of another pause in the action, Jordanes explicitly highlights the 
battle’s complexity:  “since it was certainly a famous battle, just as it certainly was 
complicated and perplexing.”293  A prophecy concerning the death of a chief 
commander is related in the battle narrative, as is the topography of the battle site.294  
He also describes the order of battle and the positioning of the troops in the battle 
line; while describing the battle order he includes some comments about Roman and 
Hunnic tactics:   
They [the Romans and their allies] placed in the centre Sangiban…thus 
preparing with military caution to enclose with a faithful throng the man in 
whose disposition they were less than confident:  for it is easy to embolden 
one who has obstacles placed before their flight to fight of necessity…the 
Hunnic battle-line was arranged so that Attila was placed in the centre with 
his bravest men.295 
 
Jordanes’ characterization of Attila is ambiguous:  though many of the references 
suggest that Attila was a coward, there are some passages that leave the question 
                                                
291 Jord. Get. 36.190. 
292 “That portion of the earth accordingly became the threshing-floor of countless races.  Both 
battle-arrays bravely joined battle.  Nothing was done under cover, but they contended in 
open fight.” Jord. Get. 36.192.  There are two interesting points about these comments of 
Jordanes:  first, he puts a lot of emphasis on morale; second, he expresses a clear aversion 
for stratagems and trickery, which is something his contemporary Procopius does not, as we 
shall see below (pp. 168-169).   
293 Jord. Get. 37.194. 
294 Jord. Get. 38.197. 
295 Jord. Get. 38.198. 
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open. 296  In good classicizing fashion Jordanes gives us a catalogue of the nations 
participating in the battle on the side of the Huns.297  He also identifies some of the 
men, though, unsurprisingly, only the prominent individuals.  There is then a struggle 
for the summit of the hill, but it is brief; although this may very well have been the first 
phase of the battle, it also serves to provide suspense by delaying the central part of 
the fighting.298  During this phase Attila notices that his men have been thrown into 
confusion and he quickly decides to encourage them through a speech.299  The 
speech is quite long,300 and, immediately following it, the Huns rush into battle.  The 
narrative itself is detailed and graphic, if somewhat sparse on breadth of description.  
Again we find Jordanes stressing confusion and the magnitude of the battle; in fact 
chapters 207 and 208 are short on combat itself, and heavy on the gore that resulted 
from it.301  The scene then shifts, and, Jordanes roves around the battlefield singling 
out particularly noteworthy deeds.  He describes the death of Theodoric, which was 
foreshadowed by Attila’s soothsayers.  We also discover that both Attila and 
Thorismund nearly die in the course of the battle; the difference is that Attila ends up 
fleeing – the battle had essentially been decided – and Thorismund stays and fights 
                                                
296 See Jord. Get. 40.207.  We see here a point emphasized repeatedly by Procopius:  it is 
the duty of the commander to encourage the troops and discipline in battle is his 
responsibility.  See Whately 2008, and below pp 159-163. 
297 Jord. Get. 38.200. 
298 Jordanes was certainly not averse to omitting details about battles and there seems to be 
little other reason to do so here.  Jordanes has delayed the commencement of the action 
twice; his intention is certainly to amplify the excitement felt by the reader and so justify his 
claims that this battle is one to remember. 
299 Jord. Get. 39.202.  “Then Attila, when he saw that his army was thrown into confusion by 
what had just happened, thought that it would be best to bolster their spirits through 
extemporaneous address”. 
300 Jord. Get. 39.202-206.  In it Attila emphasizes five points: first, that his men do not need to 
be encouraged for their previous actions have proved their worth; second, that war is part of 
their very being; third, whoever attacks first is bolder and so the Huns should attack; fourth, 
the evidence suggests that the Romans are cowards and are in fact already afraid; fifth, and 
finally, Fortune has been preparing the Huns for victory in this battle, or in other words, the 
Huns have some divine powers on their side. 
301 Jord. Get. 40.207.  “They fought hand-to-hand; the battle was fierce, unwieldy, frightfully 
unrelenting, and it was like nothing anyone in the past had ever recorded”.   
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bravely though he is almost killed.302  The close calls do not stop there however; 
Aetius also nearly reaches his end in the midst of the confusion.303  When the battle 
ends we are told that the body count is immense and that still Attila is not afraid; in 
fact, Jordanes likens him to a lion pierced by hunting spears that paces back and 
forth around the entrance to his den.304  Several lines later we learn that 165,000 
men died in the engagement and the ensuing siege of Attila’s encampment; 15,000 
Gepids and Franks are also said to have perished in some fighting that took place 
before battle began.305   
Although Jordanes usually omits detailed discussions of battle, there are 
several points that we can take away from his description of the Battle of the 
Catalaunian Plains.  He doggedly reminds us that it was a confusing event, and 
perhaps his inclusion of several different episodes intermixed seemingly at random 
was deliberate; it would be hard to read his description without getting that sort of 
impression.306  Jordanes manipulates the arrangement of events quite frequently; for 
him the drama and excitement of battle are important.  In good historiographical 
                                                
302 Jord. Get. 40.210.   
303 Jord. Get. 40.211.  “Indeed Aetius too was separated by the confusion of night, when he 
wandered in the midst of the enemy…”. 
304 Jord. Get. 40.212. 
305 Jord. Get. 40.217. 
306 The intermingling of different episodes that perhaps do not belong in the order in which 
they are presented, or, better, are narrated, while other important episodes omitted, is clear 
when we look at the events in the order in which they are presented in the narrative:  the 
battle is great; he tells us where the battle took place; the catalogue of Roman allies; the 
battle begins and it is great; he summarizes the preceding campaign; he notes the prophesy 
that one commander would die; he again tells us where the battle took place; he again 
describes the Roman battle line; he describes the Hunnic battle line and their tactics; 
catalogue of nations participating on the Hunnic side; struggle for the summit; Attila’s speech 
to his troops; the battle begins (again) and it is great; he highlights the gore of the battle 
including how red the water of the nearby stream was following the battle; he describes the 
death of Theodoric; he describes the near death of Attila; he describes the near death of 
Thorismund; he describes the near death of Attila; the scene shifts back to Attila and his 
determination not to give up despite the number of dead bodies; the ensuing siege of the 
encampment; the Goths are upset at the death of their king; Thorismund now eager to 
avenge his father’s death; in this greatest of battles with such great nations participating 
Jordanes now gives us the number of dead.  Jordanes is clearly jumping around, but it is not 
because he himself is confused.   
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fashion Jordanes puts a lot of stress on individuals, in this description the four brave 
heroes who determined the course of battle; Attila, Aetius, Theodoric, and 
Thorismund.  The psychological preparedness – the mindset – of the participants 
was a crucial factor in the Romans’ success.  As regards the cause/s of a battle’s 
outcome, it is morale and heroism which are the key factors, not the respective 
armies’ tactical arrangements.  In this regard his description is very Roman.307  
Though Jordanes may not have known much about the battle itself, he may have 
drawn upon his own experiences to reconstruct this description of battle.308  This 
particular battle has a distinctively literary character and is full of classical allusions, 
much like Procopius’ book 8 as we will eventually see.  Although this may cast doubt 
on the battle’s ultimate importance, Jordanes has still relayed the confusion of a 
battle by mixing in many of the features outlined in part A above; he also preferred a 
psychological explanation and discussion of a battle rather than a tactical one. 
 
Part III:  Sixth Century Military Theory309 
After Aelian’s and Arrian’s respective works no specific military treatises were 
written in Greek prior to the sixth century.310  A handful of works were produced in 
                                                
307 Lendon 1999.  cf. Harris 2006. 
308 I think that Richardot’s (2005:  352) statement is a little unfair:  “Il n’a pas le goût du détail 
militaire d’un Ammien Marcellin.”  The fact is, Jordanes had different objectives from 
Ammianus (and a different educational background); besides, Ammianus is not as 
straightforward as Richardot suggests.  If Richardot had been referring to the text at large, 
then I would agree, but not on the basis of this battle narrative alone.  On Ammianus see 
Sabbah (1978), Matthews (1989), Barnes (1998), Drijvers and Hunt (1999), and Kelly (2008).  
309 For an excellent overview of late Roman military manuals see Rance (2007a:  343-348).  I 
omit Julius Africanus, on which see Dain (1967:  335-336), and the comments pertaining to 
military matters in the anonymous On Political Science. 
310 Two notable Latin handbooks were written:  the anonymous De rebus bellicis, a short 
treatise, which dates to the fourth century that is concerned with issues such as equipment 
and defence; and the Epitoma rei militaris of Vegetius, an important work, with some 
antiquarian characteristics, that may date to the fourth century, though more likely the fifth.  
On the former see the papers in Hassall and Ireland (1979), and Liebeschuetz (1994); on the 
latter see Goffart (1977), Barnes (1979), Zuckerman (1994), and now Charles (2007). 
 121 
the century, including the Epitedeuma, and the Tacticon of Urbicius;311 the Peri 
Strategias, the Rhetorica Militaris, and the Naumachia of Syrianus;312 and the 
Strategikon of Maurice.313  The Tacticon of Urbicius is little more than a summary of 
Arrian’s Tactica.314  The Rhetorica Militaris is somewhat unique, being a 
compendium of military speeches; Rance, following Zuckerman, says that it probably 
drew upon earlier rhetorical handbooks.315  Urbicius’ Epitedeuma, much like the 
earlier De rebus bellicis, offers an invention to help the reigning emperor in battle, in 
this case, Anastasius.  The Epitedeuma stresses both tactics and morale, for the 
author claims that it would be especially useful for infantry when up against 
cavalry,316 while also noting the defences of an encampment would help morale.317  
Yet, his invention has more to do with technology, or better, equipment, than tactics, 
with some sort of fencing and mounted ballistae defence-system described.318  
Syrianus’ Peri Strategias, or what we have of it, discusses a host of issues, ranging 
from strategy (στρατηγικῆς), forts (φρουφίων), and how one must prepare 
                                                
311 The works of Urbicius date to the reign of Anastasius, while the Strategikon dates to the 
590s.  The dates of the works of Syrianus, however, are more problematic, with dates 
between the sixth century and the late tenth century offered.  An edition, translation, and 
commentary of Urbicius’ brief Epitedeuma is provided by Greatrex, Elton, and Burgess 
(2005).  For the Tacticon see Förster (1877).   
312 The works attributed to Syrianus have attracted some attention.  The unity of the texts, and 
their attribution to the single author Syrianus seems assured, though earlier Dain (1967:  343-
344), for example, had treated the Rhetorica Militaris as the work of some other author.  
Some of the more recent works include Baldwin (1988), Zuckerman (1990), Lee and Shepard 
(1991), Cosentino (2000), and Rance (2007b).  The comments of Dennis (1984:  1-7) in his 
edition, and translation, of the Peri Strategias, are also of value.   
313 As regards Maurice, see Dennis (1984:  vii-xxiii) in his translation of the treatise, Whitby 
(1988:  130-132), as well as the comments of Rance in handful of articles (2000:  230-236; 
2004a:  266-269; 2004b:  105-106; 2005: 429-431; 2007a:  347-348), all of which build upon 
his work in his dissertation (1993).  Whately (2008:  251-254) discusses the relationship 
between generalship and discipline the Peri Strategias and the Strategikon.  For the impact of 
earlier Greek military manuals, whether ancient or late antique, on medieval Byzantine 
treatises, see Sullivan (1997:  181-195).  Overviews of Byzantine tactical manuals are 
provided by Dain (1967), and Hunger (1978:  II, 323-340). 
314 Greatrex, Elton, and Burgess 2005:  42-43. 
315 Zuckerman 1990:  219-223; Rance 2007a:  346. 
316 Urbicius 2.19-20. 
317 Urbicius 12.67-70. 
318 Greatrex, Elton, and Burgess 2005:  50-52. 
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themselves against siege machines (πῶς δεῖ παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς μηχανὰς 
τῶν πολιορκούντων), to armament (ὁπλίσεως), how one must guard against sudden 
attacks from the enemy (πῶς δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἰφνιδίους τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπιθέσεις), 
and the phalanx (φάλαγγος).319  Syrianus, like his predecessors in the genre, 
reworks some earlier material, a tendency particularly evident in his discussion of the 
phalanx.320  On the other hand, he devotes considerable attention to the defensive 
works of camps, cities, and fortifications, to surprise attacks, as well as when, or 
even whether, to make battle.321  Also of note is the role of the general, which is 
stressed as soon as Syrianus turned to military matters.  The only aspect missing is 
morale, which is not explicitly discussed in the text.  Nevertheless, late Roman 
warfare – and Byzantine for that matter – was very much about taking advantage of 
whatever opportunities were presented, rather than the earlier imperial practice of 
taking battle to the enemy at all costs.  This is reflected in the works of Urbicius and 
Syrianus; significantly, the charge of this task is very much assigned by these writers 
to the general, which takes us to the last text to discuss. 
Maurice’s Strategikon, a practical work, which manages to describe late 
Roman warfare while still adhering to many of the practices of the genre, is a text of 
considerable importance with an obvious slant towards tactics.  Its focus is didactic, 
and it is aimed at the would-be general, though it is meant to supplement training in 
                                                
319 Strategy:  Syrianus Magister, Peri strat. 4-5; forts:  ibid. 9; siege machines:  ibid. 13; 
armament: ibid. 16; surprise attacks:  ibid. 20; and the phalanx:  ibid. 15, 17-18, 21-23, 34, 
36.  One of the most contentious issues surrounding the works of Syrianus are their date of 
composition; although many date them to the sixth century, significant challenges have been 
raised, notably by Baldwin (1988), Lee and Sheppard (1991), Cosentino (2000), and Rance 
(2007b).  This bears on my usage of the text in this thesis.  As it stands, I find the arguments 
of Baldwin, Lee and Sheppard, and Consentino unpersuasive, though the points raised by 
Rance bear some consideration.  Thus, though there are grounds for excluding the works of 
Syrianus from discussions of sixth century warfare, the absence of conclusive evidence 
precludes this. 
320 Rance 2007a:  346. 
321 The stratagem is another major concern of Syrianus.  Cf. Rance 1993:  180ff. 
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the field rather than to replace it.322  Onasander’s treatise was certainly a major 
influence, though it is more likely to have provided the impetus for Maurice, rather 
than the explicit framework and material for the work.323  Cavalry manoeuvres make 
up a considerable portion of the work, in part a reflection of the sort of warfare that 
the army was engaged in, in part because the section on infantry seems to have 
been added later as a supplement.324  Like its sixth century predecessors, the 
Strategikon betrays a real interest in stratagems, and opportunism on the field of 
battle; besides the sections scattered throughout devoted to ambushes, the subject 
warrants an entire chapter.325  There is also a chapter devoted to surprise attacks.326  
One of the most innovative features of the Strategikon is the inclusion of a chapter 
devoted to the types of enemy that the army is likely to face, something which has no 
literary precedent in the genre of Greek military writing.327  As noted, there is 
considerable emphasis on tactics and formation.  Significantly, however, Maurice is 
concerned not only with the formations themselves, but with how they are created, 
how they operate, and the human efforts behind their employment.  Communication, 
discipline, morale, and training are all rightly regarded as essential to a unit’s ability 
to carry out any of the tactical manoeuvres described, or any of the other actions for 
that matter.  This conflation of the two strands of tactics and morale marks out the 
Strategikon as unusual among military manuals, though not histories.  Indeed, as 
Rance notes, “It also reveals an acute understanding of the realities of combat and 
                                                
322 See Maurice Strat. pr. 21-27. 
323 Cf. Rance 1993:  99ff. 
324 In other words, this work was first conceived of as a treatise on cavalry warfare, and only 
later was the infantry component added.  Chapter 12, the later addition, is something of a 
mixed bag lacking the unity of chapters 1 through 11, including, as it does, points which, in 
the earlier parts of the work, had been covered under separate chapters, such as the types of 
formation (12.A.1-7), armament (12.B.4-5), and the crossing of various types of terrain 
(12.B.18-21).  Thus, it does not provide evidence for the inferiority of late sixth century 
infantry, on which see Rance (2004a, 2005:  427-443, 2007a:  348-359). 
325 Maurice Strat. 2.5, 3.16, 4.1-5 (the chapter devoted to ambushes - Περὶ Ἐνέδρας). 
326 Maurice Strat. 9.1-5.  cf. Maurice Strat. 7.A.12. 
327 On these ‘ethnika’ see Wiita (1977). 
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an insight into the psychological preoccupation of both generals and troops.”328  In 
many ways, and as we might expect given the text’s practical purpose, as evidenced, 
in part, by its deliberately simple language, it marks a fitting final text since it 
incorporates the two strands of military thought referred to in this survey of Greek 
military theory, order and morale, as well as the equally important issues of 
generalship and the use of stratagems. 
 
Chapter Overview 
I opened this chapter by looking at three different, though often 
complementary, approaches to battle in antiquity.  The rhetoricians and historians 
put great stock on the arrangement of the narrative itself, its truthfulness, its clarity, 
and its vividness.  All three devoted some attention to battle deployment, tactics, and 
the importance of formation in battle.  Morale, however, was also sometimes 
attributed an important place in battle.  Homer, unsurprisingly, cast a large shadow 
over the three groups, though they often took quite different things from his texts, the 
Iliad and the Odyssey.  Procopius’ contemporary historians tended to include a 
hodge-podge of features from the three theoretical strands as regards what traits to 
include, how to arrange the text, and which conception of combat (tactics/morale) to 
focus on.  In regard to the latter, both Malalas and Maurice stress tactics and morale.  
Jordanes, on the other hand, plays with the arrangement of his material a great deal, 
while Evagrius includes a reasonable number of rhetorical elements in his Battle of 
Melitene.  It is now time to turn to the Wars to uncover Procopius’ grammar of battle.  
                                                
328 Rance 2007a:  347. 
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Chapter 3:  The Persian Wars 
 
Now that I have looked at Procopius’ personal and cultural background, it 
is time to turn to the Wars itself, beginning with the Persian Wars.  Of the four 
sections of the text, it is the first two books, which make up the Persian Wars, 
which have attracted the most attention.  Significant work has been done on the 
wars themselves, Romano-Persian relations, and Procopius’ depiction of Sasanid 
Persia.1  Nevertheless, an historiographical analysis of his descriptions of battle 
has not yet been undertaken.  In the previous chapter we saw that there were a 
number of features that Greek writers felt were important for writing a description 
of battle; moreover, an historian had to be selective, and careful, when arranging 
his material.  There are six factors that I want to examine in this chapter on the 
Persian Wars:  the programmatic battle and siege, which have a bearing on not 
only Procopius’ discussion of the Persian Wars, but also the Wars as a whole; 
how Procopius arranges his descriptions of the many varied pitched battles, 
skirmishes and sieges in the Persian Wars; the excitement of battle, or how 
Procopius makes his descriptions more engaging to his audience; Greek military 
theory and Procopius with regard to tactics and morale; Procopius’  
characterization of Belisarius and Khusro, which is tied to the prominent role that 
generalship plays in Greek battle descriptions; and finally a summary look at the 
importance of context in understanding Procopius’ narratives of battle in the 
Persian Wars.2      
  
                                                
1 Whitby 1986a, 1988, 1994; Blockley 1992; Howard-Johnston 1995; Shahîd 1995, 2002; 
Greatrex 1998; Greatrex and Lieu 2002; Haarer 2006; Börm 2007; Dignas and Winter 
2007; Lewin and Pellegrini 2007. 
2 In my discussion of these issues I will not be going over every battle and siege in detail; 
space precludes such an approach and many of the issues raised about some battles 
and sieges are relevant to others. Historical treatments of individual battles can be found 
in the works of Rubin (1957), Greatrex (1998), Haldon (2001), Syvänne (2004), Lenski 
(2007), and Lillington-Martin (2007), among others. 
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Part I:  The Programmatic Battle and Siege 
As some scholars have noted, the first battle in Procopius’ narrative of the 
Persian Wars, which features the Ephthalites against the Persians, serves as a 
programmatic battle.3  Some of the issues that surface in this description recur in 
the battle descriptions in the Persian Wars which follow.  Discipline is a problem 
in this battle, and the Hunnic king’s handling of it is exemplary.  Although his men 
are overly zealous to fight the Persians the Hunnic king manages to temper and 
then channel their zeal to the Huns’ advantage.  That advantage is the use of 
trickery – the employment of a trench which is carefully concealed – to lead the 
Persians to their doom.4  Besides leading the Huns to victory, the Hunnic king’s 
commendable actions also bring the issue of generalship into focus for the 
reader.  So much of what happens in this battle hinges on the performance of the 
two commanders.  On the one hand, the Persian king is impetuous and 
foolhardy, marching off to battle at the first opportunity, while paying little regard 
to the exigencies of the occasion.5  On the other hand, the Hunnic king is calm 
cool and collected, and as we have just seen, his management of his troops 
leads to their success.  Their king and commander is careful to take full 
advantage of the information at his disposal,6 including the qualities of his men, 
and the topography of the terrain.7  Conversely, the Persians and their king race 
with fury against the Huns and, as a result, fail to comprehend the danger 
approaching (i.e., the trench), so plunging to their deaths.  At the same time, his 
failure to control his troops also alludes to the problems that this will cause later 
generals.  The focalization of the battle primarily through the persons of the 
respective commanders points towards the important function that generalship 
will have in the narrative to follow.  Morale also plays a role in this battle, for the 
                                                
3 Lillington-Martin (2007), Whitby (pers. comm.).    
4 Procop. Wars 1.4.7-8.  cf. Maurice Strat. 4.3. 
5 Procop. Wars 1.4.2. 
6 Procop. Wars 1.4.6. 
7 Procop. Wars 1.4.7. 
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raising of the Hunnic banner, though in part to signal the breaking of the treaty, 
serves as a point around which the troops will rally.  Indeed, royal banners and 
unit standards surface again and again in the battle narratives found in the 
Persian Wars.  The trench itself is significant for it not only alludes to the 
aforementioned Herodotean battles, thereby providing an intertextual dimension, 
but it also plays an important role in future battles, such as Dara, for there too the 
Persians are worsted by an army utilizing a trench.   
Bearing this in mind, not only is the description of the fighting in the battle 
itself important, so are the comments of our narrator Procopius before the battle 
begins.  At the start of chapter 4 Procopius says, “not much later, taking no notice 
of the oath, he wanted to take vengeance on the Huns for their outrage”.8  
Although it seems to be relatively insignificant at this point, the problem of 
breaking an oath reappears on a number of occasions in the speeches found 
before and during Procopian battles.  By highlighting the problem at the 
beginning of this battle, Procopius signals its future importance.9  In this battle we 
also find a sudden reversal, or peripeteia, that comes as the Persians charge 
across the plain.  The Persians are in pursuit of the advance party of Huns sent 
to ensnare their attackers and, while the pursuers continue their headlong 
charge, they unknowingly plunge into the trench.  Here the reverse is quick, and 
complete:  their disorderliness contributes.  Good order plays an important role in 
the subsequent battles, and a commander who fails to arrange his troops 
appropriately does so at his own risk.  Thus, through this historical battle, 
Procopius has alerted us to some of the features of a battle that he feels we 
should watch out for. 
                                                
8 Procop. Wars 1.4.1.  Procopius actually notes a little earlier that (1.3.17-22) that Peroz 
also made a rather devious attempt to evade the disgrace of subjection to the Ephthalites 
by prostrating himself to the sun when ostensibly he was prostrating himself to the 
Ephthalite king. 
9 Khusro’s actions in 540 provide a Persian example of this.  
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The first siege related is the siege of Amida and, much like the 
Ephthalite/Persian battle, we can read it as a sort of programmatic siege.10  Most 
of the attention is focused squarely on Kavad; the Persian emperor is the driving 
force of the siege.  On occasion Procopius goes so far as to describe the action 
as if it is Kavad himself who is carrying out the siege while his men watch idly 
by.11  There are a number of elements mentioned here that crop up in future 
sieges including the repeated attempts by the attackers to breach the walls (at 
Amida this fails), the little attention that is given to the time scale of the siege 
itself, the advancing of the narrative in relative chronological order with a number 
analepses and prolepses (as with the pitched battles), the moving to the wall of 
siege works and ladders which inevitably fail in the first attempt,12 the use of an 
artificial hill by the attackers to remove the height advantage of the defenders,13 
and the use of mines to undermine the defences of a city or, conversely, by the 
                                                
10 There are two other detailed accounts of this siege which were written much closer in 
time to the events than Procopius:  the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite (50-54) 
and the Ecclesiastical History of Pseudo-Zachariah (HE 7.3-5.).  Pseudo-Joshua’s 
account is probably the best account and so the one to be consulted first regarding the 
events.  For the Anastasian war see Rubin (1957:  363-366), Greatrex (1998:  73-119) 
and Haarer (2006:  47-65).  Blockley discusses Anastasian foreign policy (1992:  86-96).  
For the siege itself see Greatrex (1998:  83-94), Trombley and Watt (2000:  53-63), 
Greatrex and Lieu (2002:  62-67), Syvänne (2004:  502), and Lenski (2007).  The older 
narratives of Bury (1923:  10-15) and Stein (1949:  77-106) are still useful.  Debié (2004) 
discusses the variant Greek and Syriac traditions of the battle. 
11 Procop. Wars 1.7.12.  Pseudo-Zachariah (HE 7.3, 7.4) and Pseudo-Joshua (276-281) 
also refer to Kavad’s energy in undertaking the siege.  Thus, it is also possible that this is 
a more general characteristic of sieges, rather than a Procopian characteristic (Whitby, 
pers. comm.).  With that said, both Pseudo-Zachariah and Pseudo-Joshua are more likely 
to say Kavad and his army rather than Kavad on his own.  Kavad is very much the focus, 
but his faceless army still carries on much of the fighting at his behest.  So, at the start of 
7.4 for example, Pseudo-Zachariah says:  “When Kawad and his army had been defeated 
in the various assaults which they made upon the city” (trans. Hamilton and Brooks).  At 
276 Pseudo-Joshua says:  “On the fifth of October, a Saturday, Kawad, king of the 
Persians, came from the north, and he and his whole army laid siege to the city of Amid, 
which is with us in Mesopotamia” (trans. Trombley and Watt).  Procopius, conversely, 
says:  “Kavad while besieging Amida attacked the walls on all sides with a mechanical 
ram” (1.7.12).  Thus, although it is subtle, the difference remains.  There are places 
where Procopius mentions Khusro with his whole army, but it is these instances where a 
shah himself fights that are unique.   
12 Procop. Wars 1.7.12. 
13 Procop. Wars 1.7.14. 
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defenders to undermine and counterattack the siege works of the attackers.14  
Women, who play such a conspicuous role in the siege narratives found in 
historiography, poetry, and tragedy, also play a role.15  In this particular instance, 
however, the women are not valiantly fighting against the attackers, and in the 
process playing a role reserved for the most desperate of situations, or wailing 
and crying in the ensuing sack, but instead are acting in a way most unbecoming 
to women, even prostitutes, or so Procopius.16  Their immoral behaviour – the 
lifting of their clothing to the Persian attackers – has three functions in this siege 
narrative:  it foreshadows the eventual sack of the city which Procopius relates 
through the Magi;17 it highlights the role of morality and the divine in a city’s or 
fortress’ sack or salvation;18 and it marks a turning point in the war itself, for the 
Persians had planned on departing prior to this and instead decide to stay and 
press on.19  Procopius then describes the Persian discovery of an undefended 
underground passage.   
                                                
14 Procop. Wars 1.7.14.  Whereas, on the one hand, the Persian actions are focalized 
through Kavad, the Romans, on the other hand, are characterized as essentially 
leaderless, their actions focalized collectively.  In this light, Procopius does not mention 
the death of the bishop.  The death of an important leader is often a key moment, and it 
does show up in other sieges that Procopius describes.  Pseudo-Zachariah (HE 7.3) 
mentions the death of the bishop and for him it is a turning point in the siege.  In Pseudo-
Joshua’s account he says that after the attackers were demoralized for failing in their 
attempt to breach the walls with the mound the citizens behaved somewhat 
inappropriately by mocking the Persian shah.  He notes that this is because the righteous 
bishop had passed away.  After discussing his life briefly and then returning to the siege 
Pseudo-Zachariah says that Jesus appeared to the dispirited Kavad and that things soon 
turned in his favour.  Pseudo-Joshua’s account refers to the negligence of the defenders 
(in Procopius’ case the monks) though he too alludes to the possibility of divine 
punishment (280).  Regardless, all three writers are drawn to the moral reasons for the 
city’s fall.  In Procopius’ case, by omitting the bishop’s death he draws attention to a 
slightly different moral reason, the lifting of the prostitutes’ clothing, for the sack of the 
city, as well as to the advantages that able leadership in war can provide.  On monks and 
sieges see Greatrex (2007).  Cf. Debié (2004) on the role of courtesans and the image of 
Jesus in the various accounts of the siege. 
15 Paul 1982; Rossi 2004:  40-44, 115-124. 
16 Procop. Wars 1.7.18. 
17 Procop. Wars 1.7.19. 
18 Procop. Wars 1.7.31. 
19 Their behaviour in fact seems to spark Kavad’s renewed efforts. 
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As with the traditional story of Troy, it is often when the attackers or 
defenders let up that trouble arises and the turning point in the siege arrives.20  
This often comes as a result of poor intelligence or a poor grasp of the situation.  
The defenders, for example, may not suspect an attack at a particular part of the 
fortifications and so, if such an assault occurs, as it does so here in the siege of 
Amida, they are caught unawares.  It is this unexpected event, which is also a 
feature of many of Procopius’ descriptions of battle, that is so crucial to the 
outcome.  After discovering a comparatively weak point in the walls of Amida, 
Kavad gathers a few men to try and breach them at night.  The Persians, as with 
their Greek counterparts at Troy, find their enemies inebriated and asleep after 
celebrating a festival.21  The attack that comes catches them completely off guard 
both literally and figuratively.  There is one final point about Procopian sieges in 
the Persian Wars that we can glean from this description:  here it is the Persians 
who are carrying out the siege and, by and large, most of the sieges described in 
the text are conducted by them.  What is more, they are more often than not 
successful in those sieges. 
There can be little doubt that these first descriptions of battle serve as 
introductions and guides for the engagements to follow.  Through them we, the 
readers, are introduced to those matters which Procopius feels are important for 
understanding battle in the manner that he does.22  Indeed, the question as to 
whether this first battle as well as the first siege are really meant to be signposts 
for the readers is addressed by Procopius himself.  It is significant that in the 
programmatic battle we find the Persians marching to defeat in pitched battle, 
and in the programmatic siege we find the Romans succumbing to the Persians.23  
                                                
20 Procop. Wars 1.7.15-19.   
21 Procop. Wars 1.7.23.  Their attempts to defend the city are desperate, but ineffectual.   
22 Procopius tends to act as a guide leading his readers down a particular path with a 
distinct interpretation like Thucydides, rather than presenting, perhaps, one path and a 
couple of possible interpretations like Herodotus. 
23 On Sasanid poliorcetics see Börm (2007:  169-171). 
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Midway through the description at 1.4.13 Procopius says:  “just as I have said”.  
This very phrase, or some derivation thereof, is found throughout the text,24 
although it might seem to be little more than an historiographical topos, it is in fact 
more significant.  By leaving these little reminders throughout his narrative 
Procopius is indicating to his readers that he wants them to bear in mind what he 
has already said.25  Each component of the text, such as the respective battles 
and sieges, is part of a larger whole, and though the practice of reading in 
antiquity was certainly a laborious task, the readers were meant to remember 
significant chunks as they went along, with earlier events, such as the two 
encounters discussed here, providing the interpretative keys for subsequent 
episodes.26 
 
Part II:  Narrative and Explanation in Procopius’ Descriptions of Battle27 
Narrative Order 
Procopius’ descriptions of battle are not all set out in strict chronological 
order and there is considerable manipulation of the details of the battles.28  The 
Battle of Oinochalakon opens with Procopius telling us that the emperor had sent 
Sittas from Byzantium against the Armenians.29  In the next sentence Procopius 
says:  “For Sittas had tarried there [Constantinople], since the Romans made the 
treaty with the Persians.”30  In the next line we first learn that Sittas arrived in 
Armenia, but Procopius includes an analepsis and says that Sittas delayed still 
further after receiving his orders from the emperor.31  From 2.3.9 to 2.3.15 
Procopius describes the events that took place prior to Sittas’ arrival at 
                                                
24 Procop. Wars 8.7.1; cf. Procop. SH 1.11. 
25 The significance and location of the various referents in the Persian Wars differ. 
26 Cf. Champion 2004:  1.  
27 My title for this section is borrowed from the subtitle of Rood’s (1998) monograph on 
Thucydides, which is largely focused on how Thucydides arranges the Histories. 
28 Though the focus here is on one pitched battle, what is said holds true for sieges too. 
29 Procop. Wars 2.3.8. 
30 Procop. Wars 2.3.9.   
31 Procop. Wars 2.3.9. 
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Oinochalakon in Armenia, albeit here in chronological order.  Then, Procopius 
quickly shifts to the men carrying the tablets, whom we now learn had taken 
another route and did not meet with the Aspetiani.32  These messengers had 
presumably left earlier and got lost over the course of both their, and the main 
force’s, journeys, though Procopius only mentions it now.  Next there is another 
analepsis for we learn that part of the Roman army had undertaken the march by 
a different route and along the way had attacked some of those very people with 
whom they were trying to forge an alliance.33  They too had presumably left at the 
same time as the rest of the army – though admittedly we cannot say for certain – 
and this would have happened, or rather could have happened, before the 
attempts had been made to make a treaty.34  From 2.3.19 to 2.3.21 events 
proceed in chronological order, but there is yet another analepsis at 2.3.21 when 
Procopius says, “but as it happens Sittas had thrust his spear in the ground”; we 
are not told when this happened though the language suggests that it happened 
a little earlier.  The rest of the narrative proceeds in chronological order.35   
These uses of analepseis in this battle, and in the other battles of the 
Persian Wars, are significant.  Throughout the descriptions Procopius makes 
references to the past, or at least puts current events in relation to the Roman 
past.  So, we learn that the Battle of Dara was the greatest defeat of the Persians 
for some time, that the route of the invasion that led to the Battle of Callinicum 
had never been used before, and that the Battle of Anglon was the worst loss that 
the Romans had ever suffered.  In this case, the Battle of Oinochalakon, we learn 
before the narrative even gets underway that it was the rebellion of the 
                                                
32 Procop. Wars 2.3.16. 
33 Procop. Wars 2.3.17. 
34 Procopius’ language does suggest that they may have left and encountered the 
Armenians before they knew of Sittas’ efforts to appease much of the Armenian 
populace:  “not knowing about the agreement”. 
35 I have not found any prolepses in the battle found in the Persian Wars, though that it is 
not to say that there are not any prolepses in the battles from the rest of the Wars.   
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Armenians that led to Justinian’s decision to launch a counter-strike;36 but, there 
were other events that occurred before the Romans reached Armenia – the first 
event noted – that made this battle even more tragic than it might otherwise have 
been.  Much of the narrative of the Persian Wars looks to the past, and Procopius 
is mindful that we, the readers, are conscious of this relationship between past 
and present; the contrast of which is presented in such a way that amplifies the 
magnitude of the events of this first section of the Wars. 
 
Rhetorical Emphasis:  Procopius’ Use of Numbers 
In Procopius’ descriptions of battle we get a selective presentation of 
events.  The complexity of battles necessitates this.  In order to get some idea of 
how Procopius chooses and emphasizes certain elements of a battle I shall focus 
here on one particular phenomenon:  his use of numbers in his descriptions.  
Procopius can be quite vague and inconsistent with his use of numbers, whether 
distances, troop sizes, hostages taken, or casualty figures.37  There are places 
where Procopius only provides an adjective like “many” or “few”.  The numbers 
used also tend to be round figures, like 2,000 for example, or approximations, like 
“around 2,000”.  Procopius is quite selective regarding the numbers he does 
report, and when he does report them he is selective in regard to when he reports 
them.  A look at the Battle of Dara will bear this out. 
In the Battle of Dara Procopius gives us a description with varying details:  
in this single battle his narrative is precise, vague, and incomplete.38  Procopius 
tells us that Belisarius, having been appointed General of the East by Justinian, 
                                                
36 Procop. Wars 2.3.1-7. 
37 For modern bibliography on related issues (numbers in historiography) see chapter 5 
below pp 268-281. 
38 For a reconstruction of the Battle of Dara using battlefield archaeology see Lillington-
Martin (2007).  Cf. Bury 1923:  82-85; Rubin 1957:  367-369; Greatrex 1998:  169-185; 
Haldon 2001:  28-35; Greatrex and Lieu 2002:  88-91; and Syvänne 2004:  461-462. 
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assembled “an army of much repute”.39  A few lines later Procopius describes the 
disposition of the respective armies and, beginning with the Roman army, says 
that Buzes was placed on the far left with many horsemen, as was Pharas the 
Herul with 300 fellow countrymen;40 on the right of those men were Sunicas and 
Aigan with 600 horsemen;41 on the far side he says that there were many 
horsemen under John, Cyril, Marcellus, and Dorotheus;42 at an angle to those 
men were 600 horsemen under Simmas and Ascan.43  Next, Procopius tells us 
that “the men with Belisarius and Hermogenes” stood at the back in the centre, 
with no hint of the number of troops arrayed at that position, let alone the types of 
troops they were.44  Having described the deployment of Roman forces, 
Procopius now tells us the totals for the two respective armies:  25,000 troops in 
the Roman army; 40,000 troops in the Persian army.45  A skirmish opens the 
battle and in the melee 7 Persians fall.46  We are not told the number of troops 
involved, and so there is no way of knowing how significant that loss was.  All we 
learn is that “a certain detachment of horsemen who held the right wing” left the 
collected Persian forces and attacked “the men under Buzes and Pharas”.47 The 
next part of the battle is the two single combats of Andreas, which brings the first 
half of the narrative to a close.   
Procopius tells us that on the following day the Persians were bolstered 
by an additional 10,000 troops,48 but once the main phase of the fighting on the 
second day begins we learn that Mihran only arrayed half of the Persian forces 
                                                
39 Procop. Wars 1.13.9. 
40 Procop. Wars 1.13.19. 
41 Procop. Wars 1.13.20. 
42 Procop. Wars 1.13.21. 
43 Procop. Wars 1.13.21. 
44 Procop. Wars 1.13.22. 
45 Procop. Wars 1.13.23. 
46 Procop. Wars 1.13.28. 
47 Procop. Wars 1.13.25.  Of course, Procopius quite probably expects that we remember 
the figures that he has just reported; however, this cannot be the case in those battle 
narratives in which specific figures are absent. 
48 Procop. Wars 1.14.1. 
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against the Romans.49  Our next indication of the numbers involved comes when 
“many Kadiseni” attack the Roman line opposite them, and kill quite a few men, 
συχνοὺς.50  In response, the “men with Sunicas and Aigan charge against them 
at top speed”.51  In the next line Procopius tells us that the 300 Heruls with 
Pharas got behind the enemy.52  In this part of the fighting we learn that “no less 
than 3,000 died in this struggle”.53  The Mihran now sends in the Immortals, in 
addition to “many others”.54  Belisarius and Hermogenes catch sight of this 
charge and order “the 600 men under Sunicas and Aigan” to go against them on 
the right.55  In addition, “they positioned at the back many of Belisarius’ men”.56  
This attack ends up dividing the Persian force in two so that most were on the 
right, while some were on the left.57  By the end of this second phase of the 
battle, after Mihran has sent in the Immortals, we get our last figure; we learn that 
the Romans killed “around 5,000”.58   
Procopius is selective in his use of numbers, not only within specific 
battles such as Dara, but also throughout the Persian Wars.  Let us now turn to 
casualties.  As we just saw in the Battle of Dara, Procopius said that seven men 
died in the opening phase of the battle, two single combatants died at the hands 
of Andreas, no less than 3,000 Persians died in the first of the two main phases 
of the fighting, and by the end of the fighting involving the Immortals, we learned 
                                                
49 Procop. Wars 1.14.29.  Admittedly, from the numbers given thus far, we might reckon 
that the total Romans arrayed would be 24,995 or 24,996, and as regards the Persians 
40,000 plus the 10,000 reserves sent minus the 2 single combatants killed by Andreas 
and the 7 who fell in the skirmish).  But, as we do not know what part of the Persian army 
the 9 casualties were from, it is difficult to reach a definite total; so, the best course of 
action would be to fall back on Procopius’ own methods and say that “perhaps as many 
as 25,000 troops were arrayed against the Roman line”.  This is only to give some 
indication of the problems with Procopius’ figures, as reliable as they may in fact be. 
50 Procop. Wars 1.14.38. 
51 Procop. Wars 1.14.39. 
52 Procop. Wars 1.14.39. 
53 Procop. Wars 1.14.42. 
54 Procop. Wars 1.14.44. 
55 Procop. Wars 1.14.44. 
56 Procop. Wars 1.14.44. 
57 Procop. Wars 1.14.47. 
58 Procop. Wars 1.14.51. 
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that the Romans killed “around 5,000”.59  No Roman figures, however, were 
given.  By contrast, in the Battle of Callinicum Procopius said that “they found that 
the number of their own dead bodies was no less than that of the enemy’s”,60 
which only tells us the comparative magnitude of the casualties, and not the 
number.61  The same is true for the Battle of Anglon in which he tells us that the 
Persians killed a large number of Romans with ease.62  In the Battle of Nisibis 
Procopius does give us the number of some Roman casualties, for we learn that 
the Persians killed 50 men and took the standard of Peter.63  The Romans, 
however, win the battle and in the counterattack 150 Persians are killed by a 
combined force of Romans and Goths.64  In the Battle of the Phasis River we 
learn that most of the Persians’ advance force of 1,000 men were killed, while 
some were taken captive.65  This left 4,000 Persian men in camp of the initial 
5,000-strong expeditionary force and by the end we learn that a significant 
number of Persians were killed in the dawn raid.66   What can we take away from 
all this data?  Well, Procopius tells us at the end of the Battle of Dara that the 
Roman victory was something which had not happened for a long time.  
Conversely, in the Battles of Callinicum and Anglon, the Romans were defeated.  
Although Procopius has not misled us in the two defeats, he also does not tell us 
how many Romans were killed – although there were heavy losses on both sides 
in these Persian Pyrrhic victories.  In the Battle of Nisibis the Romans were 
                                                
59 Procop. Wars 1.14.51. 
60 Procop. Wars 1.18.50. 
61 Despite the defeat, however, it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Persians.  In 
fact, the difference in the relative importance of the two major battles of the Persian Wars, 
the Battle of Dara, a Roman victory, and the Battle of Callinicum, a Roman defeat, is 
probably exaggerated; although the Romans won the former battle, the Persians 
immediately followed it up with yet another invasion, while in the latter battle, even though 
the Romans were defeated, the Persians suffered heavy losses, which had a major 
impact on their ability to continue the war. 
62 Procop. Wars 2.25.26.  Again, the information only gives us a sense of the magnitude 
of the Roman losses. 
63 Procop. Wars 2.18.22. 
64 Procop. Wars 2.18.25. 
65 Procop. Wars 2.30.39. 
66 Procop. Wars 2.30.45. 
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victorious and, as the battle was not described in as much detail as the Battle of 
Dara, there was no harm in giving the number of Romans killed.  Besides playing 
up the battles themselves, Procopius is trying to emphasize the heroics of 
Belisarius, for it was his actions that rescued the Romans from certain defeat.  
Had Belisarius not stepped in and snatched victory from defeat, that total of 50 
killed would have been significantly higher.  Besides, this figure is substantially 
lower than the number of Persian casualties reported only a few lines later.  
Going back to the Battle of Dara, we should bear in mind that Procopius is trying 
to emphasize this victory, a crucial moment in the narrative and something 
unique in his eyes in contemporary Roman history.  Undoubtedly there were 
losses on the Roman side, but the Romans had followed Belisarius’ instructions 
and as a result, against incredible odds, had defeated the Persians.  By contrast, 
the recently successful Belisarius had lost the Battle of Callinicum, and the best 
way to minimize its impact was to play up the magnitude of the casualties 
suffered by the victorious Persians and disguise Roman losses.  In general, 
Procopius’ numbers seem to be quite reliable, although we have seen that he is 
very selective with the numbers that he does use, and not unintentionally so.   
 
The Exhortation    
In this section I will look at the exhortation, and the letter too.  
Exhortations play a huge role in many of Procopius’ descriptions of pitched battle; 
they serve as important narrative markers; they provide a means of 
understanding the place of the battle in the narrative at large.  They highlight 
what is significant in the battle to follow, and they give the audience the criteria 
with which to evaluate the respective generals’ performances.   
In Procopius’ description of the Battle of Dara we find our first set of battle 
exhortations in addition to two sets of letters which have the same features as 
exhortations.  These letters and exhortations are presented one after another, as 
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per the historiographic convention, such that the effect is of an open dialogue 
between the Roman and Persian commanders.  They are more than mere 
historical flourishes on the part of Procopius.  They help us, the readers, to 
interpret the key events which have transpired thus far in the text, and to 
understand what will follow in the events to come.  Besides their textual function 
they also suggest the dominant position of the two speakers, at least in those 
cases where we have more than one speaker or letter writer.67  The fact that 
Belisarius and Hermogenes send a letter first suggests their dominance over 
Peroz.  Equally, Belisarius and Hermogenes speak last in the two sets of 
exhortations which follow the exchange of letters:  the Roman commanders have 
the first word and the last with the Persian commander “surrounded”.68   
When we take a closer look at the two sets of exchanges we can see 
more clearly how the exhortations and letters fit into, and provide a sort of 
interpretative key for, the rest of the narrative.  At the beginning of the first letter 
Belisarius and Hermogenes refer to justice and the causes of war implying 
thereby, that the Persians had been the cause of the current conflict.69  Despite 
the fact that the Romans were at least partly responsible for renewing hostilities 
by breaking a former agreement,70 Belisarius and Hermogenes ostensibly couch 
their letter with appeals to justice. 71  Besides being a subtle critique of Roman 
                                                
67 For a sensible study of the role of speech presentation in literature and historiography 
see Laird (1999).  Laird’s book is ostensibly concerned with Latin literature and 
historiography though he does discuss their Greek equivalents and his conclusions are 
applicable.   
68 The importance of exhortations in Procopius’ battle descriptions was highlighted by 
Kaldellis (2004:  29-34) and the following discussion is heavily influenced by his analysis.  
For the role of speeches in Thucydides’ combat descriptions see de Romilly (1956:  138-
150).   
69 Procop. Wars 1.14.1-2. 
70 Procop. Wars 1.9.24. 
71 The building of the fortress of Dara had led Kavad to declare war against Anastasius 
because of their previous agreement (1.2.15, 1.10.13).  Justinian, in a quiet moment in 
the long war (if we are to follow Greatrex’s (1998) pronouncements), decides to build yet 
another fortress which again contravenes the original treaty (1.13.2-4).  According to 
Procopius, Kavad used this as a pretext for renewed hostilities.  When Belisarius and 
Hermogenes reply to Peroz’s letter they do not answer his claim that the Romans broke 
the oath even though in both the exchange of letters and exhortations they address most 
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foreign policy this letter is also largely concerned with generalship, and to some 
degree the means by which a general can achieve significant recognition, rather 
appropriate for Belisarius’ first, and one of his most spectacular, victories.  In his 
reply Peroz responds to the charges levelled against the Persians; it is also 
somewhat curt, and perhaps ‘justifiably’ so.72  He corrects the Roman 
commanders by pointing out that it was their (the Romans’) actions that led to the 
current state of affairs.  There follows another exchange of letters which are 
much shorter.  In the response of Belisarius and Hermogenes they claim that 
Peroz’s counter-charges are unjustified.73  The two suggest further – and there is 
likely a lot of truth in this – that the crux of the matter is the Persian eagerness for 
war.  Not to worry however, or so Belisarius and Hermogenes, for they claim to 
have God on their side.74  When Peroz replies he refers to his own gods and 
according to him his gods are on his side.  As we later see, however, this was not 
the case. 
When the rapid exchange of letters concludes Peroz immediately 
launches into his pre-battle exhortation.  Conversely, as soon as Belisarius and 
Hermogenes are finished with the letters they array themselves for battle.  When 
compared to Belisarius’ actions, Peroz’s near immediate exhortation highlights a 
                                                                                                                                 
of the other charges levelled against them by Peroz.  In reality there were probably a 
number of reasons for the war, and despite the ambiguity of Procopius’ account he does 
seem to suggest that there was more than one cause.  Cf. Procop. Wars 1.11-12. 
72 It is much more believable for the second of a pair of letters to refer to issues raised in 
the first; this is less true for a pair of exhortations.  See Pazdernik (1997) for a detailed 
study of Procopius’ analysis of contemporary Roman politics. 
73 Procop. Wars 1.14.7. 
74 Procop. Wars 1.14.9.  Procopius’ religious views aside, he puts great stock in the role 
of God in determining the outcome of a battle or siege in the Persian Wars.  What is 
more, in his description (and analysis) of Roman success on the field of battle, and 
Persian success over the course of a siege, he suggests that the Roman defenders can 
only really succeed against the formidable challenge of a Persian siege through the 
assistance of God (more on this below on pp. 144-150).   
One of the problems with this passage is that if the Romans had been acting unjustifiably 
by breaking their oaths, would not an appeal to God be somewhat disingenuous?  What 
this probably suggests is that while the Romans may very well have broken the oath, it is 
still the Persians who must bear the brunt of the guilt for the war.  For Procopius God only 
acts against sinners, and since the Romans do win this, and ergo God must have been 
on their side, their, that is the Roman, fault for the conflict must be minimal to the 
Persians’.   
 140 
key mistake that he has made in this battle.  His letter had ended with an overly 
boastful claim that he would soon be bathing in Dara, and without any 
consideration for the necessities of war, he gives a speech to rouse the troops:  
Peroz is letting his emotions get the better of him.  And, following Belisarius’ and 
Hermogenes’ discussion of the importance of generalship for the outcome of war, 
we can see here that by letting his emotions overcome his reason he is leading 
his troops to defeat,75 a certainty given the place that leadership plays in 
Procopius’ understanding of battle.76 
In Peroz’ exhortation he outlines six criteria essential for Persian success:  
1 – the Persians must use their bravery (henceforth P1); 2 – the Romans are not 
usually orderly in their battle lines and so are unaccustomed to good order (P2); 3 
– the Romans are scared because they do not dare line up for battle without a 
trench (P3); 4 – the Romans have misconstrued the situation, thinking that the 
Persians will not enter battle when that is clearly not the case (P4); 5 – if the 
Persians fight at close-quarters it will allow them to show off their martial 
superiority over the Romans (P5); 6 – it is better to be brave in battle, for if they 
are not brave, they might face some serious repercussions from the Persian king 
(P6).  In the Roman counterpart Belisarius and Hermogenes lay out for their army 
                                                
75 Peroz’s namesake also let his emotions overcome him against the Ephthalites, and his 
actions foreshadowed the general Peroz’s actions here. 
76 Champion (2004) too recognizes logismos on the field of battle in Polybius’ Histories 
and considers it an important characteristic of a Hellene, the absence of which puts some 
person or group closer to, if not entirely in, the category of, barbarian.   Procopius’ use of 
historiographical topoi aside, the fact he does with some frequency call the Persians 
barbarians suggests that he feels that they have at least some barbarian qualities.  I am 
very much convinced by Champion’s arguments about Polybius’ characterization of the 
Romans, and in light of that, I see a lot of similarities between Polybius’ Romans and 
Procopius’ Persians.  By no means do I think that Procopius has a uniformly negative 
opinion of the Persians, but rather I think that he holds them up to a level nearly equal to 
that of the Romans.  This is in keeping with the views recently expounded by Börm (2007:  
90-275) on Procopius’ heterogeneous picture of the Persians.  When they act as they do 
here and let their emotions get the better of themselves, they move further to the 
barbarian side of the civilized/barbaric polarity.  Of course, when the Romans act the 
same way, they too move further to the barbaric end.  For the interplay between 
ethnography and historiography in late Antiquity see Greatrex (2000) and Maas (2003).  
On Roman identity and the Greek/barbarian polarity in late antiquity see Kaldellis (2007a:  
120-188).  Cf. Flower (2006) on Herodotus’ characterization of the Persians.  
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six factors:  1 – the Persians are not invincible as the previous battle indicated, as 
it was the heedlessness of the commanders and not a lack of bravery that led to 
defeat (R1); 2 – the Romans now have an opportunity to set things right for their 
empire (R2); 3 – if the Romans follow orders, they will win (R3); 4 – the generals 
say that the Persian confidence largely rests with the assumption that the 
Romans will be disorderly (R4); 5 – they admit that the Persians have the 
numerical advantage, but their infantry is little more than a mass of farmers who 
are there to serve the soldiers, they lack the weapons that could cause trouble for 
the Romans, and the fact that they have huge shields only goes to show that they 
really are not all that brave (R5); 6 – if the Romans themselves are brave then 
they will overcome the Persians and teach them a lesson for their folly (R6).77  
With these points raised, the battle begins. 
Before the exhortations themselves were given, the Romans had already 
been following their commanders’ precepts.  When the second Persian attempts 
to bait the Romans in battle line, not one soldier bit and all stayed in line, save 
Andreas, whom Procopius tells us was, strictly speaking, not a soldier himself 
(1.13.30, R3 and R4 contra P2).  Andreas’ actions against his Persian opponents 
proved to be a great morale booster.  He also provided proof, and in front of both 
armies, that the Romans are courageous (1.13.33, R6).  What is more, even 
when one part of the Roman force is engaged in combat, as Buzes’ and Pharas’ 
wing is before the single combat of Andreas, they return to their original position 
after fending off the Persians (1.13.27, R3 and R4 contra P2).  We see that the 
Persians are using their numbers to their advantage before the first volleying of 
arrows begins.  They do not line up their entire army, but half so that they can 
constantly rotate in fresh troops, a luxury that the Romans do not have (1.14.28, 
                                                
77 It is significant that Belisarius and Hermogenes do not contradict Peroz’s assertion of 
Roman wrongdoing:  they are not deceiving their men.  What is more, the two generals 
also do not claim that the Persian invasion is unjust, which would be wrong, but pass the 
matter over entirely.  This is to cast Belisarius, and to a lesser degree Hermogenes, as an 
honest man; this personal trait sticks with Belisarius throughout the Wars. 
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R6).  The battle opens with missile fire.  The Persians are not scared and do 
enter the battle, seemingly undeterred by what had transpired earlier (1.14.35, 
P3).  When both sides run out of missiles, the battle moves to close-quarters and 
the Persians start to gain the advantage over the Roman left flank (1.14.37, P5).  
But, the Romans use their trench and arrangement quite effectively, and the 
attack is soon repulsed, the barbarians return to their line, and many are 
slaughtered.  The use of the trench in this scene was not because a lack of 
bravery – which the Romans demonstrated with the lack of hesitation with which 
the supporting units charged the Persians – but in order to help the Romans 
overcome their numerical deficiency (R6 contra P3); moreover, this could only 
have worked if the Romans followed orders, which they did (R3).  In the second 
phase of the battle, when the standard falls, it is the Persians who are afraid and 
thus flee in terror (1.14.50-52, contra P1 and P6).  As a result of these factors the 
Romans did something remarkable, “for on that day the Persians were defeated 
in battle, which had not happened for a long time”.78  Because the Romans were 
able to do what was prescribed in their exhortation, they won.  For Procopius 
Belisarius and Hermogenes had a better grasp of the situation than Peroz.   
 
The Sudden Reversal 
Now I shall look briefly at the sudden reversal (peripeteia), a common 
enough element, which features in Procopius’ descriptions and serves an 
important role.  Procopius betrays on occasion an interest in morality and tragedy 
in his narratives of battle and the peripeteia is a key marker of that interest.  As 
with some of the other battles and sieges discussed, in the Battle of Dara we find 
the sudden reversal, only it is rather more complex than the simple pattern of 
momentum and success, sudden change, and momentum shift and reversal.  
The momentum ebbs and flows as the two armies clash throughout the 
                                                
78 Procop. Wars 1.14.54. 
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narrative.79  When we leave the opening single combats involving Andreas, the 
Romans have surely gained the momentum after entering the battle from a 
relatively inferior position.  By the time the main part of the fighting has begun the 
Romans find themselves struggling against the Persian missile onslaught and the 
momentum has shifted again, only this time in the Persians’ favour.  Another 
reversal comes when Pharas and his Herul contingent spring on the 
unsuspecting Persian troops.80  At the end of this stage the Romans have 
regained their lost momentum, though the Persians are not to be undone:  Peroz 
now sends in his Immortals and they manage to push back the Roman troops 
under Simmas and Ascan.81  With the momentum seemingly in the Persians’ 
favour Belisarius and Hermogenes send in reinforcements under Sunicas and 
Aigan, whose critical actions turn the battle decisively in the Romans’ favour.  
And, thanks to Belisarius’ and Hermogenes’ tactical awareness and quick 
reactions, the Romans win an unprecedented victory. 
In the Battle of Oinochalakon we find Sittas at the helm for the Romans.82  
It is not the Persians, however, whom the Romans face in this battle but the 
Armenians.  The Armenians in question had rebelled against the Romans and 
one of Sittas’ first actions was to win them over through persuasion.  Sittas’s 
words – conveyed through letters – seemed to win over one particular group but, 
by some chance (τύχ  δέ τινι), there was a communication break down, the 
treaty was not ratified, and the two sides came to blows.83  This abrupt change 
(peripeteia) brought an immediate end to the positive results that the Romans 
                                                
79 The description of the Battle of Satala (1.15.9-17), which in the narrative follows closely 
on that of the Battle of Dara, also has several changes of momentum which is remarkable 
given its relative brevity.  On the historical battle see Bury (1923:  85), who believes that 
this battle would have been accorded great fame had it not been overshadowed by Dara.  
Procopius’, and/or Belisarius’ possible absence may also play a role in the battle’s 
marginalization.  Cf. Rubin (1957:  369-370), Greatrex (1998:  185-189), Greatrex and 
Lieu (2002:  91), and Syvänne (2004:  434). 
80 Procop. Wars 1.14.37-40. 
81 Procop. Wars 1.14.44-45. 
82 Procop. Wars 2.3.8ff.  This battle is discussed briefly by Syvänne (2004:  440).  Cf. 
Rubin (1957:  381-382). 
83 Procop. Wars 2.3.16. 
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had attained.  Sittas had managed to win over some Armenians through peaceful 
means and they seemed to be about to avoid further conflict;84 he had acted quite 
sensibly.  With this unexpected problem, however, things change, and Sittas now 
becomes run by his emotions, much like Peroz at Dara, and he loses his sense of 
reason.85  This misfortune dogs Sittas throughout the Battle at Oinochalakon and 
he is struck down in an accident with a Herul soldier.86   
 
God, Morality, and the Urbs Capta 
Sieges are quite different creatures from pitched battles and this is borne 
out by Procopius’ descriptions of sieges during the Persian Wars.  During the 
Persian campaigns it is usually the Persians who are carrying out the siege.  And, 
just as the elements of a siege are different from those of a pitched battle, so too 
in many cases is how those sieges are to be explained.  In other words, the “why” 
of a Procopian siege is often different from that of a Procopian pitched battle and 
in this section I want to highlight some of the “whys” of a Procopian siege.  In 
addition, I also want to point out how an individual siege fits into the narrative as 
a whole.  The role of women, and the peripeteia (discussed in the context of 
pitched battles above), also merit some discussion here, as does the urbs capta, 
and as such on occasion I shall have recourse to refer to those features.  To do 
all of this I am going to be selective and focus on Antioch. 
The siege of Antioch has attracted more attention by scholars than most 
other aspects of the Persian Wars.87  In my analysis God plays a big role, but 
contra Cameron I do not take Procopius’ reference to the hand of God as a 
                                                
84 This is something that Belisarius had countenanced earlier in his first joint letter to 
Peroz in the Battle of Dara.  For Belisarius and Hermogenes an able general brings 
peace from war (1.14.2).   
85 Procop. Wars 2.3.19. 
86 Procop. Wars 2.3.21-29. 
87 On the siege see Bury (1923:  96-98), Stein (1949:  489-490), Rubin (1957:  384-387), 
Downey (1953:  342-344), Whitby (1989:  539), Evans (1996b:  156-157), Greatrex and 
Lieu (2002:  104-105), and Syvänne (2004:  503).     
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statement of blind faith,88 and contra Kaldellis I do not think that the contradiction 
between God and Tyche is necessarily problematic.89  Furthermore, I think that 
we can move closer towards understanding Procopius’ focus on God if we 
consider that one of the themes which Procopius develops throughout the 
Persian Wars pertains specifically to his descriptions of battle.  Procopius’ Wars 
is partly a didactic work, and one of his aims is to present his readers with 
historical exempla so that they might know how to act when confronted with 
similar situations to those described.  We have started to see how this runs 
through the Persian Wars, particularly as regards the dichotomy between the 
Romans in pitched battles and the Persians in sieges.  The Persians are better at 
sieges, both historically and historiographically.  For Procopius if the Romans 
want to withstand a fierce Persian assault they need the assistance of God.  This 
is how the Romans manage to survive the siege of Edessa.  In that description, 
even though Procopius is not as explicit as Evagrius is in ascribing its survival to 
God, the fact remains that he does. 90  Now what makes the description of the 
sack of Antioch unique is Procopius’ reference to God in a narrative in which He 
does not lend a helping hand.  What Procopius seems to be concerned with here 
                                                
88 Cameron 1985:  117. 
89 Kaldellis 2004a:  204-206.  Cf. Whitby (2007d:  83-87). 
90 Although Procopius does not refer to an image as Evagrius does in his description of 
the siege of Edessa, he does subtly attribute the city’s salvation to the work of God.  At 
2.12.7 Procopius says that Khusro is determined to take the city because its citizens are 
convinced that the city has divine protection.  The story of Abgar follows, and as soon as 
the scene draws to a close, and Procopius returns to a summary of Khusro’s actions 
leading up to the siege, he notes that the Persians had trouble even reaching the city:  
God is already helping the Edessene cause (2.12.32).  In the next chapter Procopius 
refers to the sack of Antioch and singles out the pious behaviour of the residents of 
Edessa:  pious people are not likely to feel the wrath of God (2.13.3)   A few lines later, 
and after an analepsis in which Procopius refers to the desire of Kavad to capture the 
city, he singles out a certain priest named Baradotos from Constantina, “a just man and 
especially loved by God” (2.13.13).  Again, the implication is that one loved by God is not 
likely to suffer the same fate as a sinner (or sinners in the case of Antioch) for 
Constantina too was spared a siege.  Khusro fails in this siege and when he tries again 
four years later Procopius explicitly tells us that the Persians are defeated because of 
God (2.26.3).  So, the only way that the Romans can survive a siege undertaken by the 
Persians is with the assistance of God, and although Procopius has not referred to any 
images as Evagrius did for his conflated description of the siege, he too believes that God 
played a decisive role.  Cf. Whitby 2000e:  323-326. 
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is the severity of the sack, which is in marked contrast to those other sieges he 
has described in which the cities fell.  Let us now see exactly how God figures in 
this description.   
The siege starts much like many of the other ones found in the Persian 
Wars.  Khusro and the army arrive at the city and prepare for the siege after their 
diplomatic overtures fail.91  Procopius then intervenes in the narrative by telling 
us, through a counterfactual, that more of the inhabitants would have left the city 
had not the commanders of the troops in Lebanon arrived.92  After they have 
arrived and prepared their camps, the Persians try again to persuade the 
Antiochenes to pay-off their would-be attackers.  The response, however, is less 
than favourable for Khusro and his forces; the residents clearly have no intention 
of handing over such a significant amount of money.  What is more, the 
Antiochenes engage in behaviour that is all too reminiscent of the prostitutes at 
Amida.93  These acts may have been typical parts of a siege, and so what is 
significant here is his attempt to highlight this again.  In regard to those at Amida 
he says “...καί τινες ἑταῖραι ἀνελκύσασαι κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ ἐσθῆτα Καβάδῃ ἄγχιστά 
που ἑστηκότι ἐδείκνυον ὅσα τῶν γυναικῶν γυμνὰ φανῆναι ἀνδράσιν οὐ θέμις”,94 
whereas in regard to those at Antioch he says “...πολλὰ ἐς τὸν Χοσρόην ὕβριζόν 
τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων καὶ ξὺν γέλωτι ἀκόσμῳ ἐτώθαζον”.95  We are reminded of 
al-Mundhir’s speech to Khusro at 1.17.36-38 in which he also noted the 
luxurious lifestyle of the residents.  In this second passage Procopius tells us that 
the Antiochenes are not terribly serious and that they are engaged in trivial 
                                                
91 Procop. Wars 2.8.1. 
92 Procop. Wars 2.8.2. 
93 Again they are heaping their insults upon the Persian shah specifically and not, at least 
in Procopius’ account, the Persian forces.  It is very much Khusro himself who is attacking 
the city. 
94 Procop. Wars 1.7.18.  cf. Procop. Wars 1.7.17. 
95 Procop. Wars 2.8.6. 
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things; in the first he more or less tells us what those activities are.96  All in all, the 
behaviour of the Antiochenes is not only shameful, but it leaves them unprepared 
for the siege:  the city and its people have reached such great heights of 
prosperity that they are ripe for a fall.  Again, as with the siege of Amida, the 
disgraceful actions enrage the attacking shah, here Khusro, and only impel him to 
capture the city.97 
Unfortunately for the Romans, but fortunately for Khusro and the 
Persians, the shocking behaviour of the populace does not subside, even as the 
assault intensifies.  Eventually the momentum begins to swing in favour of the 
Persians and the defenders start to panic, and without the safety of secure 
fortifications, their courage dissipates.98  The soldiers immediately retreat when 
they hear a crash as they assume, because of their inability to comprehend the 
situation, that the towers have collapsed.  Ironically enough, the only citizens who 
stay and fight at this stage are those who had been involved in factional strife, 
and for Procopius hardly the most reputable in a city of sinners and cowards.99  At 
this stage, after singling out the defence of the young men, Procopius returns to 
the spineless soldiers, and the many men, women, and children, who can think of 
nothing else but escape.100  Although Procopius does not censure the women 
and children, he most certainly does the men who flee with the women, and the 
soldiers who trample them in flight.101  Even here, when the people should be 
working together they can think of nothing but themselves and the only ones 
                                                
96 At 1.17.37 al-Mundhir says:  οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου οὐδενὸς τῷ ταύτης δήμῳ ὅτι μὴ πανηγύρεών 
τε καί τρυφῆς μέλει καὶ τῆς ἐν θεάτροις ἀεί πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονεικίας; at 2.8.6 Procopius 
says:  εἰσὶ γὰρ οὐ κατεσπουδασμενοί, ἀλλά γελοίοις τε καὶ ἀταξίᾳ ἱκανῶς ἔχονται. 
97 Another significant feature, which I have omitted, is the departure from the city of the 
Bishop Ephrem. 
98 Procop. Wars 2.8.16. 
99 Procop. Wars 2.8.17.  Procopius had described the Nika Revolt earlier at 1.24.1ff and 
though there may have been other forces at play in that incident, it is hard to deny that 
Procopius felt that a considerable amount of the blame rested on the members of the 
factions.  Cf. Cameron 1985:  166-167; Greatrex 1997; and Kaldellis 2004:  123-126. 
100 Procop. Wars 2.8.18. 
101 Procop. Wars 2.8.19. 
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willing to stand up are young ruffians.  At 2.8.23 Procopius interrupts the narrative 
to remind us that the city was the jewel of the East:  its reverse (peripeteia) and 
fall were therefore imminent.  Zaberganes’ comments are illustrative of the 
Antiochenes’ immorality:  “…but you wish to show mercy upon those who are not 
worthy of being saved, and are eager to spare those who by no means want it”.102  
The sack that comes is quite brutal and at 2.8.35 the Antiochenes have been 
reduced to a wretched state.103   
At the start of chapter 9 Khusro gives a speech to the ambassadors of the 
city following which Procopius says:  “for he was the cleverest of all men at 
saying that which is not, in concealing the truth”.104  This comment suggests that 
Procopius is telling us that we are not to take at face value some of the things 
that Khusro has said.  Indeed, Procopius then goes off on a tirade against the 
Persian shah.  Yet, Khusro does actually make four interesting comments:  God 
does not give the good without the bad,105 that “because of this we do not have 
laughter without tears”;106 “that I captured this city without any trouble, which in 
reputation and in reality is especially noteworthy and is in land of the Romans, 
and I gained victory after God acted offhand, as you doubtless see”,107 and that 
“the suffering Antiochenes are the cause of this, for when the Persians were 
                                                
102 Procop. Wars 2.8.31. 
103 At the end of chapter 8 Procopius tells us a story about two illustrious Antiochene 
women who fled the city when they perceived that it was doomed.  They are afraid of 
being captured and raped by the Persian sackers and flee into the river Orontes and 
disappear.  As we have seen women always play a conspicuous role in Procopian sieges, 
much as they do in many other historians.  Their inclusion is interesting.  Women had 
played a minor role in this narrative; perhaps the only significant thing to note here is that 
whereas earlier the Roman defenders had failed to perceive the gravity of their situation 
(2.8.16), it is only when all is lost that it dawns on some of the citizens what is transpiring.  
Thus, one might suggest that their awareness of the situation mirrors that of the reader 
who now, once the significant events have passed, can see that it was their immoral 
behaviour that led to their downfall. 
104 Procop. Wars 2.9.8. 
105 Procop. Wars 2.9.1. 
106 Procop. Wars 2.9.2.  We are reminded of the laughing which the populace engaged in 
when they were mocking Khusro when he arrived:  they had the laughter (2.8.6), now 
they have the tears.   
107 Procop. Wars 2.9.3. 
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storming the walls they were not able to push them back”.108  The first comment 
is true and the clever Khusro has opened his speech by saying something that is 
what he says it is; the second comment is also true and it fits in well with the first.  
The last two points that I have highlighted are the more interesting bits for it is 
here that Khusro speaks in the manner that Procopius says he does.  In the 
preceding narrative it is quite clear that this Persian victory was not easy, and in 
at least two spots the action was both intense and evenly balanced.109  God did 
give the Persians victory, and in this Khusro is certainly right, but the Antiochenes 
do not realize this, and that is where he deceives.  In the last comment Khusro 
says that the citizens are the cause of the horrors that Khusro has unleashed and 
again he is being deceptive.  Yes, the Antiochenes are the cause of the troubles 
which befall them, but it is not, strictly speaking, for the reason that Khusro 
states, and is in fact, as we the readers now know, due to the wrath of God at 
their immoral actions.110  If we jump ahead to chapter 10 we find Procopius’ 
extensive intervention about the calamity that struck Antioch.  Taken alone, and 
out of context, it suggests that, just as Procopius claims, he (Procopius) does not 
understand why God raised a man or place and then brought it down for no 
apparent reason.111  But we have just seen Procopius provide us with all the 
interpretive tools that we need to understand what might not be openly apparent 
to us, the audience.112  After all, in the preface he does tell us that he decided to 
write the Wars, at least in part, in order to provide some insight for those future 
readers who find themselves in a similar predicament.113  Although it might seem 
inexplicable at the time, with the help of Procopius’ text these sorts of events will 
                                                
108 Procop. Wars 2.9.5. 
109 Procop. Wars 2.8.9-12; Procop. Wars 2.8.28-29. 
110 Cf. Whitby 1989:  538. 
111 Procop. Wars 2.10.4. 
112 Procop. Wars 2.10.4. 
113 Procop. Wars 1.1.2. 
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become clear to future readers, and, in the face of similar problems, they now 
know how to act appropriately.   
The urbs capta was a stock literary motif throughout antiquity, and it 
features in the sack of Antioch.114  At the end of Procopius’ description we find 
some of the stock elements of an urbs capta, and by proxy a reference to the 
iliupersis.  Khusro orders the army to enslave the survivors,115 and to burn the 
city.116  We do not get many references to blood and wounds, though there is one 
notable exception in a speech given by Khusro.117  Instead of generic masses of 
lamenting women and children Procopius focuses on one particular woman and 
her child, in a pathetic scene in which the ambassador, Anastasius, is himself 
brought to tears.118  A Procopian innovation is his personal interjections in which 
he openly addresses his audience to convey his own expressions of horror at 
what had happened.119  It is in this discussion of the urbs capta that we can see 
Procopius successfully setting his work into the historiographical tradition, though 
not slavishly, for he also puts his own stamp on the events and the writing of 
history. 
 
Part III:  The Excitement of Battle 
The importance of the preface for Greek historiography has long been 
recognized.  It sets a work in a particular genre thereby providing the interpretive 
framework with which the reader can understand it.  As Champion has noted, it 
has another function:  it grabs the reader’s attention.120  Once an historian had 
                                                
114 Paul 1982, Rossi 2004:  17-53.  On the relationship between history and tragedy see 
Rutherford (2007).  On the historical experience of a siege in late antiquity see Lee 
(2007a:  123-146).  On Persian actions after the capture of a city see Börm (2007:  171-
177). 
115 Procop. Wars 2.9.14. 
116 Procop. Wars 2.9.17ff. 
117 Procop. Wars 2.9.4. 
118 Procop. Wars 2.9.9-10. 
119 Procop. Wars 2.10.4. 
120 Champion 2004:  1. 
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grabbed his reader’s attention, however, he had to keep it.  In what follows I shall 
discuss some of the ways that Procopius strove to keep his readers’ attention in 
his battle descriptions. 
 
Narrative Pace 
One way to keep the readers’ attention was to vary the narrative’s pace, 
so making the story more exciting.  Procopius quite often plays with the narrative 
pace of his descriptions of battle in the Persian Wars; the same applies to sieges.  
In this analysis I shall look at the full narrative of the Battle of Callinicum to show 
how Procopius changes the pace throughout an entire description of battle, and 
one scene from the Battle of Anglon to show how Procopius changes the pace in 
greater detail by focusing on one passage from a campaign. 
Procopius opens the Battle of Callinicum with a summary of preparations 
for the invasion, and over the first few lines the pace moves at a pretty constant 
rate.121  However, there is soon a pause as Procopius intervenes to comment on 
the uniqueness of the invasion, at least as regards its route.122  While Procopius 
is saying this the action cannot proceed.  The intervention is brief and soon 
Procopius is again summarizing the action, only now Procopius’ gaze has shifted 
to Belisarius and he has included an ellipse between the last point described 
about the Persians, and Belisarius receiving the news.123  The Romans were 
certainly not idle in the interval, and something must have happened between the 
summary given through the gaze of Kavad, Procopius’ pause, and the 
resumption of the summary through the gaze of Belisarius.  Even when the 
summary does resume, the pace is not what it had been at the start of the 
campaign:  there is a delay before the action proceeds; Belisarius is unsure about 
how to proceed and so at first does nothing.  Once he makes up his mind the 
                                                
121 Procop. Wars 1.18.1. 
122 Procop. Wars 1.18.3. 
123 Procop. Wars 1.18.4. 
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action accelerates and then continues apace.  There is another pause only a 
couple of lines later with Procopius again the omniscient narrator describing the 
Roman troop deployment.124  The narrative then resumes and the Roman use of 
Fabian tactics is described.125  There is another pause in the narrative when 
Procopius briefly tells us about Easter.126  The narrative moves forward again 
once Belisarius realizes that trouble is brewing in his army and he calls them 
together to give an exhortation.127  The next few lines are occupied with 
Belisarius’ speech,128 and the pace slows down considerably as the general 
attempts to calm his unruly troops.  Following the first exhortation there is more 
summary, though it is fairly detailed as Procopius tells us about the near mutiny 
of the Roman troops, and Belisarius’ shock, which results in a change of plans.129  
Before the narrative has a chance to pick up, Procopius describes for us the 
arrangement of the Roman troops.130  The narrative then shifts to the Persians 
and through the gaze of Azarethes their actions are summarized, though 
briefly,131 before Azarethes’ exhortation.132  Once the short Persian exhortation 
has ended the fighting begins.133   
Procopius does not include many details in his summary of the exchange 
of missiles once the combat itself begins; in addition, the narrative soon grinds to 
yet another halt as Procopius intrudes to tell us the difference between Roman 
and Persian archers.134   Following this most recent of Procopius’ pauses there is 
another ellipse.  Surely a considerable amount of time had passed between the 
commencement of combat, and its requisite summary which included a vague 
                                                
124 Procop. Wars 1.18.5-8. 
125 Procop. Wars 1.18.8-15. 
126 Procop. Wars 1.18.15. 
127 Procop. Wars 1.18.16. 
128 Procop. Wars 1.18.17-23. 
129 Procop. Wars 1.18.24-25. 
130 Procop. Wars 1.18.26. 
131 Procop. Wars 1.18.27. 
132 Procop. Wars 1.18.28-29. 
133 Procop. Wars 1.18.30-31. 
134 Procop. Wars 1.18.32-35. 
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reference to valorous deeds, and the reference to two-thirds of the day having 
passed immediately following Procopius’ intervention.  The fighting must have 
continued and it may have included some instances of single combat, for 
example.  In the next few lines of the battle there are no pauses, although the 
amount of detail given varies from scene to scene.  So, for example, at 1.18.37 
Procopius tells us that the Romans had grown weak by what was presumably 
late afternoon.  A few lines later Procopius describes the actions of some 
individual combatants such as Ascan, Belisarius, and Peter.135  All in all this brief 
discussion shows that Procopius varies the pace rather considerably over the 
course of a description of battle.  He frequently alternates between brief 
summaries of what would presumably have been quite time-consuming actions, 
such as the marching of the troops at the beginning of the battle, and then the 
constant tarrying of the Romans a little later; pauses, where Procopius tells us 
things like the uniqueness of one part of the engagement, or the difference in 
efficiency of the respective archers; and ellipses, where Procopius skips over 
entire events as he does when the fighting begins.  Thus, Procopius uses 
ellipses, summaries, descriptions of scenes of varying detail, and pauses over 
the course of his battle narratives to vary the pace in the Persian Wars.  
Now I turn to one passage from the Battle of Anglon.  At the beginning of 
the battle Narses is angry, having been convinced that his men had let the 
Persians escape.  So, he takes off with his army, and eventually they line up 
against and engage their Persian opponents.  Unfortunately, at least for the 
Romans, the battle later turns in the Persians’ favour, with Narses’ death spurring 
a devastating attack from Naved.  Roman and allied troops start falling and soon 
are turned to flight.  Heretofore, Procopius had been narrating at a fairly 
moderate pace, with some of the changes that we saw in the Battle of Callinicum.  
                                                
135 Procop. Wars 1.18.41-43. 
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Yet, towards the end of Procopius’ description, when the momentum has shifted 
in the Persians’ favour, the pace accelerates rapidly: 
But the Romans did not withstand the enemy and they all fled as fast as 
they could, neither thinking of defending themselves nor did they have in 
mind any venerable or any other noble thing.  But the Persians suspecting 
that they had not in fact turned in ignoble flight, but that they were 
preparing to use some ambushes against them, pursued them as far as 
the rough ground and then turned back, not daring to fight a decisive 
battle on level ground a few against many.  The Romans, however, and in 
particular all the generals, thinking that the enemy were still pursuing 
them fled even faster, stopping for nothing, and they were urging on their 
horses as they ran with a whip and a cry, and throwing their breast plates 
and other weapons in haste and confusion to the ground.  For they did not 
have the courage to array themselves against the Persians if they 
overtook them, but they placed their hopes of safety in their horses’ feet 
alone and, to sum it all up, the flight became such that hardly any one of 
their horses survived, but when they stopped running, they fell down right 
away and died.136 
 
Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες τοὺς πολεμίους ἀνὰ κράτος ἅπαντεσ ἔφευγον, 
οὒτε ἀλκῆς μεμνημένοι οὔτε τινὰ αἰδῶ ἤ ἄλλο τι ἐν νῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔχοντες.  
Πέρσαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑποπτεύοντες οὐκ ἐσ φυγὴν ἀναίσχυντον οὕτω 
τετράφθαι, ἄλλ᾿ ἐνέδραις τισὶν ἐσ αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι , ἄχρι ἐσ τὰσ δυσχωρίας 
διώξαντες εἶτα ἀνέστρεφον, οὐ τολμῶντες ἐν τῷ ὁμαλεῖ ὀλίγοι πρὸς 
πολλοὺς διαμάχεσθαι.  ῾Ρωμαῖοι μέντοι, καὶ διαφερόντως οἱ στρατηγοὶ 
πάντες, δίωξιν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οἰόμενοι ἔφευγον ἔτι 
μᾶλλον, οὐδένα ἀνιέντες καιρὸν, θέουσι μὲν τοῖς ἵπποις ἐγκελευόμενοι 
μάστιγι καὶ κραυγῇ, τοὺς δὲ θώρακας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅπλα ῥιπτοῦντες 
σπουδῇ τε καὶ θορύβῳ ἐσ ἔδαφος.  ὀυ γὰρ ἀντιτάξασθαι καταλάμβανουσιν 
αὐτούς ἐθάρσουν Πὲρσαις, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν μόνοις τοῖς τῶν ἵππων ποσὶ τὰσ τῆσ 
σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας εἶχον καὶ, τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, τοιαύτη γέγονεν ἡ φυγὴ 
ὥστε τῶν ἵππων σχεδόν τι αὐτοῖς οὐδεὶς διεβίω, ἀλλ᾿ ἡνίκα τοῦ δρόμου 
ἐπαύσαντο, πεσόντες εὐθὺς διεφθάρησαν.  
 
The phrase “as fast as they could (ἀνὰ κράτος ἅπαντεσ)” comes in the first line 
which marks out this passage as one with a fairly high tempo. 137  Perhaps it is 
not surprising that flight is emphasized throughout a passage in which the fleeing 
Romans are described at length, but the constant reference to their flight, and the 
act of fleeing itself, both suggest a high pace.138  Most of the episode is told 
                                                
136 Procop. Wars 2.25.29-32. 
137 Ana kratos is literally translated as “with all their strength”, but Dewing’s translation, 
adopted here, fits well with epheugon, and helps convey the force of the Roman flight. 
138 The flight itself, or the act of fleeing, is referred to in each of the four lines that make up 
this passage. 
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through the gaze of the fleeing Romans themselves, which also keeps the pace 
high.  So, we get phrases like “οὒτε ἀλκῆς μεμνημένοι οὔτε τινὰ αἰδῶ ἤ ἄλλο τι ἐν 
νῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔχοντες.”  In the middle of the scene we learn that even the generals 
were consumed with fright because they believed that the enemy was still 
pursuing them:  “δίωξιν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οἰόμενοι”.  Thus, 
this was not simply a case of rash fear on the part of inexperienced and over-
zealous foot-soldiers, combined with poor leadership:  there was more going on.  
Additionally, Procopius’ inclusion of the line regarding the Persian actions 
juxtaposed with the lines pertaining to the Roman actions serves to accentuate 
not only their desperation, which we see is ill-founded, but the madness which 
resulted too:  these factors contribute to the fast pace.  The actions of the 
Romans is another major contributor to the tempo; in the middle of the scene we 
find out that the Romans had not slowed their mad dash, but were “fleeing still 
faster (ἔφευγον ἔτι μᾶλλον)”.  Towards the end of the passage the Romans start 
throwing off their armour:  “τοὺς δὲ θώρακας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅπλα ῥιπτοῦντες 
σπουδῇ τε καὶ θορύβῳ ἐσ ἔδαφος.”  In the end, the mad dash for safety leads to a 
complete disregard for the very creatures that were helping the Romans to 
escape what they feared was certain death.  So:  “τοιαύτη γέγονεν ἡ φυγὴ ὥστε 
τῶν ἵππων σχεδόν τι αὐτοις οὐδεὶς διεβίω”.  In those actions described by 
Procopius and just noted, it is in many cases the rhythm of the words themselves 
that increase the pace.  Finally, Procopius also uses tricolon crescendo to 
increase the pace.  At 2.25.31 there are two consecutive tricolon crescendos.  In 
the first half of the line we get:  “The Romans, however, (῾Ρωμαῖοι μέντοι),” then, 
“and in particular all the generals (καὶ διαφερόντως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες),” and 
at last, “thinking that the enemy were still pursuing them fled even faster 
(δίωξιν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οἰόμενοι ἔφευγον ἔτι μᾶλλον),”.  
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The second half of the line is structured almost identically to the first:  “stopping 
for nothing (οὐδένα ἀνιέντες καιρὸν),” then, “and they were urging on their 
horses as they ran with a whip and a cry (θέουσι μὲν τοῖς ἵπποις ἐγκελευόμενοι 
μάστιγι καὶ κραυγῇ),” and finally, “and throwing their breast plates and other 
weapons in haste and confusion to the ground (τοὺς δὲ θώρακας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 
ὅπλα ῥιπτοῦντες σπουδῇ τε καὶ θορύβῳ ἐσ ἔδαφος).”  Thus, Procopius also 
employs a number of different tools within individual passages to increase the 
pace beyond those identified for battles as a whole. 
 
Foreshadowing 
Foreshadowing can also be used by an author to spur his reader on.  
There is one significant example of foreshadowing used by Procopius in the 
Persian Wars, and it is found in the Battle of Dara.  After the opening skirmish a 
lone young Persian approaches the Roman line and challenges the soldiers 
arrayed to a single combat.139  The only person who accepts is Andreas, a bath 
attendant of Buzes, and he successfully defeats the young Persian.  Then, 
another older Persian approaches the Roman line and goads them as well, but 
Andreas defeats him too.  Both of Andreas’ victories result in the death of the 
Persian combatant.  Somewhat surprisingly, modern commentators have not 
recognized the literary character of these single combats.  Greatrex summarizes 
Procopius’ account of the single combat, as does Haldon.140  Syvänne simply 
says that there were a number of single combats.141  Yet, this part of the narrative 
is more than mere narrative.  Malalas’ version of the battle, which many scholars 
believe is based on official documents, makes no mention of an Andreas; 
                                                
139 See Trombley’s (2002:  246-247) brief comments about single combat during the reign 
of Heraclius.. 
140 Greatrex 1998:  177; Haldon 2001:  32. 
141 Syvänne 2004:  461. 
 157 
moreover, although a single combat is referred to, it happens at a different stage 
of the battle.142  In addition, although these cases of single combat are rather 
reminiscent of the many found in Homer’s Iliad, this is not just a case of 
Procopius playing homage to Homer, for they in fact foreshadow the outcome of 
the battle at large.  After the exhortations when the battle begins, there are two 
main Persian attacks.  In the first phase Peroz keeps half of the Persian forces at 
bay, and then commences the assault.143  The Romans manage to repel this 
attack; so, Peroz decides to send in his crack troops, the considerably more-
experienced Immortals.  However, their charge is also repelled, and the Romans 
win the battle with the two sides retiring just as they had following Andreas’ single 
combats.  So, not only do the two parts of the single combat episode match the 
principal parts of the battle at large, so does the relative experience of the 
different attackers, and the proportion of attackers.144   
 
Perceptions and Access to Information 
Another way that Procopius builds tension is by restricting a character’s 
access to certain details in a narrative; this skews the perceptions of that 
character.  At the same time the readers are kept abreast of what is happening, 
or about to happen, and it is this discrepancy between the respective perceptions 
of the situation that builds tension, particularly when we, the readers, know that 
something bad, such as the sack of a city, is about to happen.145  In his 
                                                
142 Malalas 18.50. 
143 Procop. Wars 1.14.28ff. 
144 I am not denying the existence of single combats altogether, even in this battle, but am 
pointing to the deliberate literary exploitation of their narration.  Cf. Wheeler (2007:  194-
203) for single combat in Archaic Greek warfare, Lendon (2007:  507ff.) for Hellenistic 
and Republican warfare, and Rance (2007a:  376-377) for late antiquity. 
145 To a certain degree this might have been the case for many of Procopius’ 
contemporary readers on a different level for they may have known what had happened 
before reading the Wars.  What I want to highlight here, however, is those instances 
where Procopius explicitly alerts us of this discrepancy between what one set of 
characters perceives about the situation, and another group of characters perceives 
about that same situation.  The numbers vary, and so here the discrepancy is between 
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description of the siege of Sura Procopius tells us both Khusro’s emotional state 
and what he was thinking about when he had his meeting with the bishop.146  We 
learn that after the crying, the begging, and the promising of a healthy ransom, 
Khusro was still enraged at the people for not letting him into their city.  Khusro 
manages to conceal his rage to the bishop, and Procopius again explains why.147  
Not only does he manage to conceal his true feelings, he manages to persuade 
the bishop that he will do them no harm.  The bishop, along with some Persian 
courtiers, heads back to the city in what we the readers can only expect to be 
good spirits.148  Procopius tells us in detail the role that the bishop’s Persian 
companions are to play in the plot.149  We now know the specifics of Khusro’s 
ruse.  These courtiers do as Khusro bids; at the same time the Persian troops 
advance to the walls.150  At this point the citizens are completely unaware of what 
is about to happen:  “When they came close to the fortifications, the Persians on 
the one hand, while saluting the bishop, stayed outside, while the residents of 
Sura, on the other hand, seeing that the man had become exceedingly happy, 
and that he was being attended with great honour by the enemy, forgot all their 
troubles and opened the entire gate and received the priest and his followers with 
much applause and shouting in praise”.151  At this juncture the Persians toss a 
stone to prevent the gates from closing, and it is only then that some residents of 
Sura, that is the guards, start to realize what is happening.152  When the attack 
                                                                                                                                 
Khusro and the citizens of Sura.  I should point out too that the reader always plays an 
important role in this.  
146 Procop. Wars 2.5.13-17.  On the siege of Sura (Sergiopolis) see Bury (1923:  93-95), 
Rubin (1957:  382-383), Greatrex and Lieu (2002:  103-104), and Syvänne (2004:  503). 
147 Procop. Wars 2.5.15. 
148 Procop. Wars 2.5.17. 
149 Procop. Wars 2.5.18-19. 
150 Procop. Wars 2.5.21. 
151 Procop. Wars 2.5.21. 
152 Procop. Wars 2.5.23-24. 
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comes it comes quickly (εὐθὺς), and it is only when the slaughter ensues that the 
tension is released.153    
 
Part IV:  Greek Military Theory and Procopius 
Now that we have seen how Procopius keeps his readers engaged with 
his narrative it is time to move on to how he explains the battles, and to return to 
the text’s didactic function. 
 
Discipline, Confusion, and Disorder154 
Two factors which for Procopius are integral to a battle’s outcome are the 
discipline of the respective armies and the order of the battle line.155  There are a 
number of occasions where Procopius stresses the indiscipline and disobedience 
of the Roman army in battle; though he will also do this for other armies.  Rather 
significantly, wherever indiscipline is presented as a problem in the Persian Wars, 
the discussion is invariably couched with some mention of a failure of leadership.  
                                                
153 That does not mean that the reader’s emotional engagement with the text ceases, as 
the citizens experience unspeakable horror at Khusro’s hands. 
154 I discuss the material in this section at greater length in Whately (2008). 
155 Discipline is a multi-faceted term that encompasses the somewhat disparate issues of 
the obedience of soldiers in battle, and their willingness to hold the line in the face of 
enemy attacks; the actions of the soldiers towards the inhabitants of besieged cities and 
surrounding lands; and the obedience of the soldiers to their commanding officers, and 
here I am thinking about those places where disobedience to the soldiers’ commander/s 
leads to mutinies.  As this analysis is focused on the battle itself, it is only the former that 
is relevant to this discussion. 
Nevertheless, neither the treatment of civilians nor the mutinies of soldiers are 
unimportant issues.  The prevalence of the latter, at least its character during the 
Justinianic period, is to a certain degree misunderstood.  Kaegi (1981) believed that the 
reign of Justinian ushered in a new age of military unrest and that from that period on it 
became firmly entrenched in late Roman society.  The problem is, military unrest had 
always been a problem in the Roman state, and the sixth century was not necessarily any 
worse than any of the previous six centuries.  Brian Campbell highlighted this important 
point in a paper given at a conference in Oxford (July 2, 2006).  The major difference is 
that the sixth century authors are vocal about these uprisings while their counterparts 
from the Principate are conspicuously silent.  There were several major mutinies caused 
by unrest among the troops:  c. 66 BC (Pompey), 36 BC (Lepidus), AD 14 (Pannonia), AD 
68-69 (Nero), AD 89 (Germania), AD 175 (Avidius Cassius), AD 192-193 (Septimius 
Severus), and AD 235 (Severus Alexander) to name but a few.  Thus, the significant 
difference is not the appearance of the mutinies themselves in the sixth (and to certain 
degree late fifth) century, but the attitudes of those who described them.  On discipline in 
the Republican and Imperial periods see Moore (2002) and Phang (2008).  For some 
comments on the historiography of discipline in late antiquity see Whately (2008). 
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As we have seen this relationship between discipline and leadership is stressed 
in the first battle and this example provides a proto-type against which all 
commanders will be measured.  Let us now examine some of the other 
descriptions.  
In the Battle of Dara Procopius describes in considerable detail the 
Roman battle-line.156  He also includes some information about these tactical 
manoeuvres which could only be effected through strict discipline.  For example, 
after describing the left flank of the line, Procopius notes that Sunicas and Aigan 
with 600 horsemen were positioned on its right to support those troops should 
they be driven back.157  To be effective the horsemen would have to attack en 
masse, which takes strict discipline; in addition, the timing itself would have been 
difficult.  At the end of the battle-line description Procopius tells us that the 
Persians “were astounded at the good order of the Romans”.158  The importance 
of order and discipline is even clearer in the battle exhortations.159  Five of the six 
points emphasized by Peroz in his speech refer to the bravery of the Persians or 
Romans, and the good order, and lack of confusion, of the Roman troops.  In the 
exhortation of Belisarius and Hermogenes, which is closely modelled on the 
speech of Peroz, the two Roman generals emphasize their own bravery and 
claim that the Persian confidence is false for it rests on the supposition that the 
Romans will be disorderly in battle.  Once the fighting does begin the Romans 
manage to stay in control, and they are obedient to their commanders throughout 
the course of the battle, which surely contributed to their success.160  This was 
even true when the Immortals are unleashed on the Roman right flank.161  And, 
after putting the Persians to flight, they manage to stay in order and ignore the 
                                                
156 Procop. Wars 1.13.19-24. 
157 Procop. Wars 1.14.39. 
158 Procop. Wars 1.13.24. 
159 See the discussion of battle exhortations above pp 137-142. 
160 Procop. Wars 1.14.34ff. 
161 Procop. Wars 1.14.44-45. 
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temptation to pursue them.162  Ironically, the one place where the Romans – or 
Roman in this case – show any disobedience comes in the second single combat 
involving Andreas, and it led to a tremendous boost in Roman morale.  Andreas 
had been ordered not to repeat his actions against the younger Persian,163 but he 
ignores this and meets, and defeats, his older adversary.  In fact, in this battle it is 
the Persians who are confused and disoriented; at the end of the battle when 
Baresmanas’ standard falls, “the barbarians become terribly afraid and no longer 
think of defending themselves, but flee while in much disorder.”164   
By the Battle of Callinicum the tune has changed and the Romans are 
quite disorderly and disobedient.  It is the indiscipline of part of the Roman 
contingent that is the principal cause of all the trouble in this battle, despite the 
protestations of some scholars.165  We are told from the beginning of this 
narrative that the Persians had been on the verge of defeat, but that the Roman 
troops grew restless:  Belisarius has to take his men – and most of his officers as 
it turns out – aside and implore them to relax, as they were on the cusp of a 
bloodless victory.  This fails and Belisarius is compelled to urge on his troops.  By 
placing the discussion of indiscipline so early in the narrative, and by making it 
the impetus for the attack itself, Procopius is emphasizing this factor.  Once the 
battle begins and it starts to go wrong following the withdrawal of the Arab 
federates and the eventual collapse of the Roman line, Procopius again returns 
to this issue of discipline.166  We, the readers, are not to forget that the Romans 
had had victory in their hands.  This hastily arrayed Roman battle-line – thanks to 
                                                
162 Procop. Wars 1.14.53. 
163 Procop. Wars 1.13.35. 
164 Procop. Wars 1.14.50. 
165 See in particular Cameron (1985:  125, 146-147, 158) and Shahîd (1995:  134-142).  
Greatrex (1998:  195-207) and Whitby (1992:  75-77) are quite right to lend more 
credence to Procopius’ description of events than scholars such as Cameron or Shahîd 
have.   
166 Procop. Wars 1.18.38-40. 
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the insubordination of Belisarius’ men and his failure to deal with the situation - is 
in the end defeated by the Persians.   
From the onset of the narrative of the Battle of Nisibis the Romans march 
with great order.167  This is soon overshadowed, however, when we learn that 
there are some men who are less than enthusiastic about heeding Belisarius’ 
orders.168  Belisarius acts quickly to restore discipline and having summoned his 
men he says:  “But I see that many of you are giving way to a great deal of 
disorder and that each man himself wants to be commander-in-chief of the 
war”.169  In fact, throughout this speech Belisarius is constantly playing up the 
contrast between disorder and order; in that same line just referred to Belisarius 
closes with:  “when many in the army follow their own inclinations it is impossible 
for the army to do what it must”.  Despite Belisarius’ best efforts, Peter disobeys 
and camps too close to the fortifications; moreover, Peter and his men end up 
“moving around in no order”.170  Not surprisingly, the Persians had been 
observing the Romans from the safety of their walls and when they catch sight of 
this, they charge out after them.  When the two sides come to close-quarters 
confusion is added to the disorder and the unruly group seems doomed, just as 
Belisarius predicted it would, and they would have been defeated if Belisarius 
had not reacted well after anticipating such a calamity.171  Although Belisarius 
had done well to anticipate the events – another notable quality for a general – he 
failed, for the second time, to keep his men disciplined in the stages immediately 
preceding battle.  Peter is, however, even more culpable than Belisarius for not 
only did he disobey his commander, but he failed to discipline his own troops.  
Finally, in the Battle of Anglon the Romans encounter more problems when 
Narses’ anger spreads throughout the whole army:  “The troops broke camp, 
                                                
167 Procop. Wars 2.18.1. 
168 Procop. Wars 2.18.4. 
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170 Procop. Wars 2.18.16. 
171 Procop. Wars 2.18.20. 
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accordingly, and without the guidance of generals and without observing any 
definite formation, they moved forward in complete confusion”.172  Their order is 
still not restored by the time that the fighting begins, for they line up in a 
disorderly fashion.173  Procopius does seem to absolve them of much of the 
blame by saying that this disorderliness was due to the rough terrain.174  Still, 
given that some of the same figures responsible for the disorder of the Battle of 
Nisibis are involved, such as Peter, it would seem that we, the readers, are to 
remember what had happened in that last battle.  The Romans lose the battle, 
and additionally Narses loses his life.  Order and discipline were key factors in 
Procopius’ conception of battle in the Persian Wars, and in the battles discussed 
here, the onus fell on the commanders to maintain that discipline.175 
 
The Psychology of Battle 
Psychology has a big role in battle for Procopius and there are a number 
of specific matters that surface fairly consistently.  These include zeal, anger, 
bravery, and fear.  Let us begin with zeal.   
Eagerness to fight can be both a blessing and a curse in battle.  Alone, it 
will not lead to defeat; but, when it is not checked, it can, in conjunction with 
factors such as disorder and disobedience, increase such a possibility.  In the 
                                                
172 Procop. Wars 2.25.13. 
173 Procop. Wars 2.25.17. 
174 Procop. Wars 2.25.18. 
175 This connection between generalship and discipline is found in some other 
contemporary, or near contemporary, writers such as Agathias (1.6.19, 2.1.2, 2.9.1, 
5.14.1-4), Syrianus (4.22), Maurice (passim, especially Maurice’s preface), and 
Theophylact Simocatta (2.9.1, 2.9.14, 3.1.7-9, 3.12.6-7, 6.7.6-7, 8.6.2).  Theophylact, for 
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significant leader, be he an emperor such as Maurice, or a general such as Priscus.  
Thus, much as the battle between Ephthalites and Persians in Procopius’ Persian Wars 
serves as a template with which all following battles are to be compared, so this list 
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Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, Pseudo-Zachariah of Mytilene, John Malalas, and Evagrius. 
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Battle of Dara, for example, the eagerness of Andreas in the single combat with 
his second Persian foe is paramount.  Both men are quite eager to fight each 
other, yet Andreas is able to walk away victorious.176  What is more, this zest for 
battle, which was channelled into a victory of sorts for the Romans, boosted the 
morale of the soldiers watching, manifested in the roar which erupted from the 
wall following his win.177   
Anger, or something approximating anger, can be channelled to bolster 
one’s morale; at the same time, it can also be disastrous.  The Ephthalites are 
angry at their king in the first battle for letting the Persians get away with the trick 
involving the proskynesis.178  He, however, is able to check that anger and the 
Ephthalite Huns win the battle.  In that same battle Procopius presents us with 
the problem that arises when you have “a lot of anger towards the enemy”:179  the 
Persians are blinded by their rage, do not notice the stratagem employed by the 
Huns, and plunge to their deaths.  In the Battle of Dara, after sending a young 
Persian to his death against Andreas, the angry Persians foolishly send another 
man to his death, though “they were pained by what happened”.180  In the Battle 
of Callinicum the Roman army becomes distressed at Belisarius’ use of Fabian 
tactics:  “The army insulted him neither among themselves nor in a corner, but 
they came shouting and called him soft and a destroyer of their zeal to his face, 
even some of the commanders committed these acts of depravity with the 
soldiers, and demonstrated their boldness with this”.181  Although Belisarius ends 
up changing his plan in an attempt to use this eagerness – Belisarius even claims 
in an exhortation that he was unaware how eager these troops were for battle – 
the Romans are later defeated.  Sittas attempts to forge an alliance with the 
                                                
176 Procop. Wars 1.13.36. 
177 Procop. Wars 1.13.38. 
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180 Procop. Wars 1.13.33. 
181 Procop. Wars 1.18.24 
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Armenians in the Battle of Oinochalakon; but, there is a communication problem 
and some confusion results, which leads him to butcher some of the Armenian 
women and children.182  We do not actually know if Sittas is angry, though 
Procopius alludes to the possibility; his later actions, however, suggest that this is 
the case.  In that same battle Sittas’ spear is shattered due to the carelessness of 
a Herul horseman.  Sittas “was particularly distressed by this” and is then 
identified by the Armenians.183  Sittas’ actions give him away, which then leads to 
his death.  The ill-fated Battle of Anglon gets off to a bad start when the Roman 
general Narses accuses his commanders of letting the Persians escape, and 
then lashes out at them for what he regards as insolence.184  This, however, 
backfires, as it soon spreads to the rest of the army, who end up lashing out at 
each other.  Hence, the Romans march off in disarray and this angst leads to a 
heedless charge, and a Persian ambush.   
Courage, bravery, and fear all play a part in Procopian battles.185  In the 
Battle of Satala the Romans find themselves outnumbered; but, Sittas uses a 
dust cloud stratagem to fool the Persians into thinking that it is they who are 
outnumbered by their attackers.186  This deft move on Sittas’ part frightens the 
Persians and contributes to the Roman victory; it also emboldens the Roman 
troops.  The sight alone of the charge of part of the Roman army is enough to 
raise the morale and give them courage.  When the Romans, though 
outnumbered, come charging down the hill against the Persians amassed below, 
their compatriots become invigorated and come charging out of the 
fortifications.187  In the Battle of Callinicum, when Mundir and Azarethes, their 
                                                
182 Procop. Wars 2.3.18. 
183 Procop. Wars 2.3.22. 
184 Procop. Wars 2.25.11. 
185 For an interesting overview of the representation of courage in Roman literature see 
Harris (2006). 
186 Procop. Wars 1.15.12. 
187 Procop. Wars 1.15.13. 
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Saracen allies, learn the location of the enemy’s position, they get scared and 
flee.188     
Single combat and individual feats of bravery can boost morale.   
Andreas’ two victories in the Battle of Dara encourages the troops; his victory 
over the older Persian in particular rouses his comrades:  “Then a roar went up 
from the wall and from the Roman army as great, if not greater, than before”.189  
The bravery of the Thracian Florentius in the Battle of Satala also plays a huge 
role.190  Indeed, Florentius’ seizing of the standard adds to the Persian fear and 
this in turn leads to disorder and then defeat.191  At the beginning of the Battle of 
Callinicum Procopius notes that many valorous deeds were performed.192  A little 
later, Procopius singles out the actions of Ascan who, despite facing seemingly 
insurmountable odds, manages to hold out and kill numerous Persian notables.193  
Ascan’s brave actions in turn persuade Belisarius to keep on fighting as long as 
Ascan holds out, despite the perilous situation that Belisarius himself is in.194  
Unfortunately for Ascan, he is later butchered by the Persians.195  By the end of 
the battle confusion has settled in and the Romans find themselves in 
considerable trouble.196  In the battle in the pass, before the Battle of the Phasis 
River, the heroic stand on the part of the 100-strong Roman garrison also boosts 
the morale for the Roman troops.  Somehow they manage to hold off the whole of 
the Persian army at the pass, at least for a while.  Although it did not immediately 
lead to victory, it is not long after that the Romans manage to expel the Persians 
from Lazica for good.197  Although the scale here is smaller, Procopius is alluding 
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194 Procop. Wars 1.18.41ff. 
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to the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, though it is less likely that he is 
specifically referring to the description of Herodotus.198  Thus, the psychology of 
battle has an instrumental role in the outcome of a battle. 
 
The Standard199 
The standard – or even a flag or banner – could be an important tool in 
battle.  In the battle between Ephthalites and Persians the king’s banner is used 
as part of the stratagem to lure the Persians into the trench.200  The seizing of an 
enemy’s standard in and of itself could both boost the morale of the party doing 
the seizing, and sink the morale of the one whose standard is seized.  In the 
Battle of Satala Florentius leads a group of horsemen and, after charging the 
Persian line, he seizes the general’s standard and bends it to the ground.201  This 
is an important moment:  “For when the barbarians could no longer see the 
standard, they became quite disorderly and were consumed with fear and, having 
gone in their camp, they were silent, since many men fell in battle.”202  When the 
Roman army manages to divide the Persian army in the Battle of Dara, it is not 
before the Persians see their standard bearer fall that they perceive what dire 
straits they are in.203  Peter’s standard is captured in the Battle of Anglon.204  The 
next day Procopius tells us that the Persians “set up on a tower instead of a 
trophy the standard of Peter”.205  Admittedly, these events do not alter the battle’s 
momentum as the Romans are doomed from the onset of combat due to some 
other problems; still, this incident probably lowered the Roman morale at the 
moment when the arrival of Belisarius might have allowed them to salvage the 
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201 Procop. Wars 1.15.15. 
202 Procop. Wars 1.15.16. 
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204 Procop. Wars 2.18.22. 
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situation.  After intercepting the advance party of 1,000 soldiers in the Battle of 
the Phasis River, the Romans hasten to the Persian camp and after 
overwhelming the dazed Persian soldiers, they take, among other things, their 
standards.206 
 
The Stratagem and Military Trickery207 
A stratagem is a lot of things: 
Cleverness, innovation, resourcefulness, deceit, trickery, seizing the 
proper moment for action – all encapsulated in the word ‘stratagem’ – 
came to represent a basic doctrine of ancient military theory; intelligence 
in generalship and the superiority of brains over brawn.208 
 
Herodotus and Thucydides are both aware of the role of stratagem in warfare.209  
And, with the change in the nature of warfare in late antiquity, it is perhaps not 
surprising to see Procopius’ interest in stratagems.210  From the first battle 
between the Persians and the Ephthalites Procopius highlights – though implicitly 
– the stratagem as an important factor in battle.211  Before the Persian forces 
engage the Ephthalites in battle, the Huns build a trench which they then conceal.  
They also conceal their own forces.  An advance party is sent to draw the 
attention of the Persian expeditionary force.  The Persians see the advance 
party.  The party then reverses and returns to the predetermined location, with 
the Persians in hot pursuit.  When the Persians arrive they charge heedlessly into 
battle, thence the ditch, and hence to their deaths.  Consequently, the Persians 
perish to a man.  In the Battle of Satala the vastly outnumbered Romans use a 
dust cloud stratagem to make the Persians think that it is them who are 
                                                
206 Procop. Wars 2.30.44. 
207 For a good discussion of the stratagem in Classical Antiquity see Wheeler (1988a).  
For the sixth century see Syvänne (2004:  282-290).  Cf. the discussion of Lynn (2003:  
12-25) and Gat (2005:  391-400, 505-508, 609-618).  
208 Krentz and Wheeler 1994:  vi-vii. 
209 Krentz and Wheeler 1994:  vii. 
210 Kaegi 1990:  63-64; Krentz and Wheeler 1994:  xvi. 
211 See Kaegi (1990) and Lendon (1999) for, in the first case an overview of the stratagem 
and the nature of war and battle in Procopius; and Lendon for the Greek fondness for 
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outnumbered.212  In the Battle of Dara we find a stratagem similar to that 
employed in the first battle, and it shows that it need not be the commander-in-
chief who provides the impetus to use a stratagem.  Pharas comes up to 
Belisarius and Hermogenes and proposes taking his men, hiding with them on a 
slope, and then springing themselves on the unsuspecting Persians.213  A similar 
stratagem is employed in the Battle of Satala.  Sittas takes out 1,000 of his men 
and conceals them in the many hills surrounding the city, while Dorotheus is 
ordered to stay inside the fortifications at Satala until further notice.214  After 
defeating the advance force of 1,000 Persians in the battle in the pass before the 
Battle of the Phasis River the Romans hurry to the Persian camp in the middle of 
the night.215  The plan is to come upon them in the night and catch them 
unawares, which they do; this decisive battle ends the conflict in Lazica.216     
 
Winning with Numbers 
Procopius may be vague concerning the actual reporting of numbers in 
his descriptions of battle, but this does not prevent him from emphasizing the 
importance of having more soldiers than your enemy.  When Belisarius makes 
his exhortation towards dawn on the second day of the Battle of Dara, the fifth 
point that he makes is that the Persians are more numerous than the Romans.217  
It is significant that Procopius does not make Belisarius open the exhortation with 
a discussion of the army’s numerical inferiority, but instead pushes their other 
strengths.  When Belisarius does highlight the disadvantage, he claims that the 
Persian infantry is little more than a disorganized mass of farmers who are there 
                                                
212 Procop. Wars 1.15.12. 
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to serve the Persian soldiers.218  If we look ahead to the Battle of Callinicum we 
find that the situation is reversed:  the Romans have the numerical advantage 
and under Belisarius’ leadership are deftly employing Fabian tactics.219  This 
state does not last, and Belisarius’ officers and soldiers eventually grow 
restless.220  As a result they force Belisarius’ hand, the Romans engage the 
Persians, and walk away with a heavy defeat.  A little earlier in the Battle of 
Satala, the Romans are greatly outnumbered; thus, Sittas decides against 
fighting the Persians on flat terrain, as that would put them at a disadvantage.221  
Finally, in the Battle of Anglon, Naved and the Persians manage to turn the tables 
against Narses and the Romans.  What had been a disorderly Roman pursuit of 
the Persians turns into a mad Roman flight from the Persians.  However, the 
pursuit only goes so far; Naved prevents his obedient soldiers from continuing 
beyond the rough terrain out of fear that that would make it a few against many 
on level ground.222  Thus, for Procopius, numerical superiority is an important 
factor to consider when entering a battle, but a good commander can work 
around it. 
 
Encirclement 
One further means of defeating a foe in battle – and described by Procopius – is 
getting behind the attackers.  Encirclement is an important element in the Battle 
of Dara; we learn that the Persian skirmishers halt their attack on the Romans 
who have turned in flight.223  Procopius tells us why he thinks they stopped:  “But 
the Persians did not pursue them, but stayed put, fearing, I suppose, some move 
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on the part of their foes to surround them.”224  When the central part of the battle 
commences, and the Roman left flank is pushed back by the Kadiseni, Pharas 
and the Heruls come charging down the hill and get behind them.225  These 
Heruls, who were used in support, were to get behind the attackers;226 it was their 
job to get behind the Persians so that they might become surrounded by both the 
troops of the left flank and the horsemen themselves.  In the Battle of Callinicum 
the Persians manage to get behind the Roman cavalry.227  This disaster only 
further deepens the Roman exhaustion and the surrounded troops turn and flee.  
These same soldiers come upon Belisarius and he struggles valiantly to prevent 
his group from being surrounded.228  Sittas fights bravely in the Battle of 
Oinochalakon and it is only when an enemy combatant gets behind him that he is 
finally killed; this happens after he has already lost part of his scalp.229  So, 
encirclement, when used effectively, can have a devastating effect in battle.   
 
Part V:  The Characterization of Belisarius and Khusro230 
There are two figures who dominate the narratives of battle in the Persian 
Wars:  Belisarius and Khusro.  Although their historical importance is undeniable, 
and the prominent place in the narrative that Procopius affords them is certainly 
in part due to this fact, Procopius goes beyond mere reportage of the events and 
structures much of his narrative around those two men.231  This is not surprising, 
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for the individual had long been a big part of Greek literature and society, and 
great individuals such as Alcibiades and Brasidas had enraptured Procopius’ 
Athenian forerunners centuries before.232  Indeed, Procopius’ interest in great 
individuals such as Belisarius has been recognized by his readers for some 
time.233  Not only is Belisarius’ role in Procopius’ magnum opus recognized, so 
are his military accomplishments:  the Wars of Procopius could be read be as an 
extended essay on the generalship of Belisarius.  The place of Belisarius and 
Khusro in the battle descriptions reflects the important role that Procopius saw 
commanders playing in the outcome of a battle.234  Indeed, much of Belisarius’ 
contemporary reputation, and the near legendary status he attained in the later 
Byzantine Empire, hinged on his generalship.  Thus, in order to understand 
Procopius’ own conception of how a battle worked we must also look at how he 
characterizes the leading commanders, especially Belisarius.   
The Persian Wars mark the beginning of his career.  With Belisarius in 
mind, it might well seem that the best way to describe Procopius’ narrative style 
when it comes to battle is as a command-centred approach; however, that would 
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234 The dominance of commanders in general may reflect Procopius’ desire to write for his 
presumed audience, and it may reflect Procopius’ sources.  Such are the suggestions of 
Rance (2005:  429), who is concerned primarily with the Battle of Busta Gallorum. 
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be too simplistic.235  Instead, I would suggest that for Procopius these generals 
also serve as symbols of the armies which they lead. 236  By focusing on 
Belisarius and his exploits on the field of battle, Procopius argues over the course 
of the Persian narrative that Roman success is tied to the field of battle.  When 
Khusro is the focus of the attention the Persians are invariably successful, unless 
the Romans are fortunate enough to have God on their side as the Edessenes 
did.  To defeat the Persians the Romans must try and meet the Persians in the 
field, rather than in siege warfare, when- and wherever possible.  Indeed, the 
military didactic element of the Wars is perhaps no more clear than it is when 
Procopius characterizes Belisarius and Khusro.  
The central part of the narrative can be divided into three sections all 
centred around Belisarius and Khusro.  The first section focuses on Belisarius 
and the Romans in pitched battles, the second section on Khusro and the 
Persians in sieges, and the third on Belisarius versus Khusro in a mixture 
between battles and sieges.  To borrow and modify the statement of Cameron, as 
regards warfare Procopius is utilizing the parallelism not of Justinian and Khusro, 
but rather Belisarius and Khusro.237  During those same three sections Procopius 
spends comparatively little space characterizing the armies that those two 
commanders led.  Belisarius makes his dramatic debut in the field at Dara.238  In 
this first battle Belisarius and Hermogenes share responsibilities.  Admittedly, this 
is in part because of the historical reality.  Over the course of the narrative, 
however, the focus increasingly narrows on Belisarius.  At the start the two 
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generals share responsibilities.239  Only a few lines later the focus begins to shift; 
when Peroz seeks out his foes he seeks out Belisarius.240  In the midst of the 
exchange of letters Procopius seems to “forget” about those other generals with 
Belisarius.241  This (the forgetting) happens one more time following Pharas’ 
suggestion to the commanders.242  Despite Procopius’ emphasis on Belisarius he 
has not yet emerged as the dominant figure.  Over the course of the fighting 
Procopius still refers to both commanders.  What is clear from Dara, however, is 
that Belisarius has played an instrumental role in its outcome, though the 
congratulations must go to both Belisarius and Hermogenes.243  Belisarius has 
not yet emerged as the dominant battlefield individual, though he is well on his 
way to doing so. 
In the next battle in which he was engaged, namely the Battle of 
Callinicum, Belisarius performs rather poorly:  just as the Roman army is not 
consistently successful, neither was Belisarius.244  Before the engagement while 
the Persians are on their march back to their own territory the Romans shadow 
their movements.  These Fabian tactics had been working well and Belisarius is 
eager to continue.245  Unfortunately, the soldiery does not approve of this 
avoidance of battle.246  A few lines later, Belisarius decides to try and explain to 
them his position in exhortation:  his attempt fails.  Procopius’ description 
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suggests that the soldiers and officers grew close to mutiny through the abuse 
they heaped on Belisarius; as a result, Belisarius changes his mind and decides 
to urge them on to battle.247  Belisarius has lost his position of authority and to try 
and bring some semblance of order he assents to his unruly soldiers’ demands.  
A few lines later Belisarius’ Persian counterpart Azarethes also gives an 
exhortation, though he does so from a position of authority.248  Once the speech 
is done, Procopius does not describe the reaction of the Persian soldiery, 
whether one of disdain or enthusiasm, but simply describes Azarethes’ arraying 
of the battle-line.  There is no need.  Azarethes is in control and his rhetoric has 
effectively won his men over to his point of view.249  Thus, regardless of the 
outcome of the battle, which was a significant victory for the Persians, the real 
problem here is that Belisarius lost his authority in the first narrative of battle in 
which he was in sole command.  Plus, the two principal parts of the Roman army, 
its head (Belisarius the commander) and its body (the soldiers), each entered the 
battle with a certain degree of independence.  This lack of unity was disastrous.    
By and large those battles in which Belisarius figures are pitched battles.  
And, in many of them the Romans are successful.  Procopius remarks on the 
importance of the Roman victory following Dara, and although there are some 
later successes, such as the Battles of Satala, Nisibis, and the Phasis River, the 
Romans’ performance is somewhat mixed.  There are a number of places where 
the Romans lose such as the battles of Oinochalakon and the Battle of Anglon.  
Nevertheless, when the Romans do win, if there is a unifying factor in their 
success it is good leadership in pitched battle.  To defeat the Persians the 
Romans should try and stick to pitched battles, and when they do come to blows, 
the forces must be united.  Not surprisingly, these issues come to a head in one 
                                                
247 Procop. Wars 1.18.24-25. 
248 Procop. Wars 1.18.27-30. 
249 After the exhortations in the Battle of Dara the situation had been reversed for the 
Roman troops were never on the point of mutiny and, Belisarius and Hermogenes were in 
complete control. 
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speech, and battle, involving Belisarius.  As noted above, Belisarius had some 
problems with Peter in the battle of Nisibis; and it was only his good sense and 
awareness of the battlefield situation that led to a Roman victory.250  Belisarius 
refers to disorderly conduct early in his exhortation.251  He also says that the men 
must act as one.  The ability of the Persian commander Naved is amplified and 
Belisarius assures his men that an engagement with their foes at the walls of 
Nisibis will end in disaster.252  But, he adds that if the Romans engage with the 
Persians in the open (in pitched battle), on grounds of their choosing, they will be 
successful.253  In this, Belisarius’ last battle in the Persian wars, he manages to 
defeat the Persians thanks to his leadership, and because he met them in the 
field, not in a siege.254  Belisarius’ role, and that of leadership in general, is crucial 
to Roman success in battle, or so Procopius.255  In addition, it is in pitched battle, 
rather than in a siege, in which the Romans should expect to succeed.  Thus, 
Belisarius is in many respects representative of the Roman army, and for that 
matter the Roman state in its actions in warfare in general.   
At the end of book 1 Khusro makes his debut.  The focus for much of the 
narrative had been Belisarius and, despite the mixed results, the Romans had 
faired well in the pitched battles in which they were involved.  Although the 
Persians had eventually been successful at Amida after a protracted siege, the 
same was not true against an unprepared populace at Martyropolis.  With Khusro 
now at the head of the Persian state and its armed forces the situation 
changes.256  The military narrative at the start of book 2 is dominated by Khusro 
and so this marks the start of the second section of the Persian wars.  Besides 
                                                
250 See above pp 161-163. 
251 Procop. Wars 2.18.6. 
252 Procop. Wars 2.18.11-13. 
253 Procop. Wars 2.18.14-15. 
254 Of course, this is despite the fact that Peter’s insubordination nearly led to disaster. 
255 The leadership was exemplary at the last Battle of the Phasis River.   
256 See Whitby (1994) for the role of the shah in the Persian Empire’s military operations.  
Cf. Börm (2007:  93-97). 
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the more specific focus on Khusro, the Persian army too garners far more 
attention from Procopius than its Roman complement.  To demonstrate Khusro’s 
dominance I want to focus on one particular description.   
Khusro makes his first real appearance on the field of battle at the siege 
of Sura and the image Procopius develops is mixed.257  From the beginning the 
action is very much focalized through him:  “After again finishing such a great 
journey he reached the city of Sura which is on the Euphrates, and halted very 
close to it”.258  When the bishop comes before him to plead for the city the 
interaction of the two men becomes the focus of the narrative; even here, 
however, what we find is Procopius describing the actions of the bishop, but the 
actions and the thoughts of Khusro.  Procopius also intervenes in the narrative to 
explain Khusro’s actions, and he does so to prevent trouble from future 
encounters such as this.259  As the context here is that of a siege we are 
reminded of Belisarius’ and Hermogenes’ words to Peroz in the first letter before 
the fighting at Dara.260  The two had countenanced peace above all else, for the 
two had stated that the job of the commander is to bring about peace by any 
means possible.  By trying to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and by using his 
wits to overcome future opponents Khusro is acting as a wise commander.  
Khusro has also managed to keep his emotions under control, again the mark of 
a good general.261  For all of Khusro’s emotional self-control, there is an important 
point to note here which will become particularly relevant when we turn to the 
narratives of the Vandal Wars and the Gothic Wars:  Khusro can keep his 
emotions in check, is in complete control of his army, and for all intents and 
purposes is a good general; but, that does not make him a compassionate 
person.  Khusro manages to control his anger when the bishop comes before him 
                                                
257 Procop. Wars 2.5.8ff. 
258 Procop. Wars 2.5.8. 
259 Procop. Wars 2.5.15. 
260 Procop. Wars 1.14.1-3. 
261 Procop. Wars 2.5.15. 
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but as soon as his stratagem is put into action, he unleashes his wrath on the 
unsuspecting populace.262  After the reckless slaughter the Persian shah does 
decide to show kindness to the citizens of Sura, and Procopius intervenes to give 
us his three possible explanations as to why:  humanity or kindness, love of 
money, or because of the love of a woman.263  The fact that Procopius discusses 
the latter possibility in some detail suggests that this is the interpretation that he 
wants us to follow.  As with most descriptions of a siege we find a woman playing 
a prominent role,264 and as with Procopius’ narrative of Amida, it is for a 
somewhat unusual reason:  Khusro demonstrates some human tenderness.265  
Khusro is successful in most of the battles he engaged in.  Yet, even though 
Procopius highlights Khusro’s pre-eminence in the field, he does not let him off 
the hook; his comments following the sack of Antioch bear this out.266  Khusro is 
a very capable commander and, as we saw, is in control of his emotions on the 
field of battle.  When the battle ends and the rout begins – in the case of sieges 
the sack – his dark side emerges.  Although Procopius does not approve, it 
makes Khusro a frightening foe to come up against in battle. 
The third section of the text begins with the reappearance of Belisarius in 
the eastern theatre.  This penultimate section of the Persian Wars is marked by 
Procopius’ placing of the actions of Belisarius and Khusro in succession:  
Procopius will describe the actions of Belisarius, then immediately describe the 
actions of Khusro.  Historically both actors were now heavily involved in the 
campaigns in the eastern theatre, but Procopius does more than simply describe 
the historical reality and shapes this part of the Persian Wars so that we the 
                                                
262 Procop. Wars 2.5.26. 
263 Procop. Wars 2.5.28. 
264 Women feature in many of the actions in which Khusro is involved, which might be 
meant to play up the king’s masculinity at the expense of Justinian and the Romans. 
265 When I say unusual I mean unusual in the sense that the woman is neither fighting to 
defend the city, nor wailing as it is sacked, though her purported actions do serve both 
usual functions. 
266 Procop. Wars 2.9.8-13. 
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readers can compare the actions of one of the commanders with the other.  What 
is more, the last episode aside, Belisarius and Khusro are rarely described in the 
same episode; the only exception comes near the end of the Persian wars at 
chapter 21, 267 which is the pivotal moment for this comparison, at least in regard 
to the Persian Wars.268  Procopius did not need to change chapters to alter the 
focus from Belisarius to Khusro and vice versa while describing the events.  Yet, 
that is just what he did.  He takes a similar approach in book 1 when he 
discusses the plots formed against the rulers of the two empires:  1.23 is focused 
on the plot against Khusro, while 1.24 is focused on the plot against Justinian.  
Here Procopius also leaves grammatical markers that draw attention to his 
characterization and the contrast between of the two great individuals.  At 2.15.35 
Khusro is the subject of a rather long extended sentence.  When the next chapter 
starts Belisarius is the subject of the first sentence and we find a δ .269  This 
                                                
267 It is here, after the siege of Sura/Sergiopolis, that the two great commanders finally 
meet, or at least, occupy the same place in the text; at the end of this chapter Belisarius 
exits the Persian Wars and Procopius describes the remaining chapters of book 2 much 
as he did the first chapters of book 1.  Proem and the programmatic battle and 
programmatic siege aside, the main events for the development of the narrative take 
place in the rest of book 1.  The same is largely true for book 2:  Khusro stills play a major 
role (much as Belisarius did at the start of book 1 before Khusro enters the narrative) and 
we find the final battles which lead to peace (as far as Procopius’ narrative is concerned) 
following the Battle of the Phasis River.   
268 At this moment in the text when Belisarius and Khusro engage in negotiations for 
peace we are reminded of Belisarius’ words (along with Hermogenes’) in the Battle of 
Dara.  There he had said that the best general was the one that could bring about peace 
from war (1.14.2).  Here, at least at the close of this episode, it does seem that Belisarius 
would merit that sort of praise for he seems to have brought peace from war.  Indeed, at 
the beginning of the chapter Khusro sends a certain Abandanes to Belisarius’ camp to 
find out what sort of general he is (2.21.1).  Plus, Procopius claims that the Romans were 
louder in their praises for Belisarius with these actions than they were for the conquest of 
Africa (2.21.28).  However, contained in the last few lines of this 21st chapter of book 2 of 
the Persian Wars is some implicit criticism of Belisarius.  For, although Procopius says 
that Khusro was actually fleeing from the Romans here thanks to the efforts of the 
general, at 2.21.30, only one line later, Procopius says that Khusro disregarded the 
agreement and subsequently caused more trouble before the end of the chapter.  Thus, 
in the context of the Persian Wars Belisarius for Procopius does not deserve the highest 
praise.  And, ironically enough, though Procopius says that Belisarius may have outwitted 
Khusro (2.21.29), in effect it was the other way around.  Here again Procopius’ relatively 
simple language is also quite clever. 
269 Procop. Wars 2.16.1.  In this instance the δ  is used in an adversative sense rather 
than in a copulative sense; I believe that Procopius is introducing the actions of Belisarius 
in contrast to those of Khusro, and it is not just marking the transition to a new idea 
without a sense of contrast implied (Smyth 1984:  644). 
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pattern continues through to the end of chapter 16.  In the last sentence 
Belisarius is subject again and we find a μ ν immediately following his name.270  
Chapter 17 opens with Khusro as subject and unsurprisingly a δ  immediately 
following his name.271  Procopius uses a similar practice on two occasions over 
the next few chapters.272  Whenever we come across Belisarius in this part of the 
narrative he wants us to think about Khusro and vice versa; the same is surely 
true for the first two sections, the first which focused on Belisarius, and the 
second which focused on Khusro.   
The descriptions of battle in the Persian Wars are largely explicable 
through Procopius’ characterizations of its two principal figures:  Belisarius and 
Khusro.  But, the characters represent more than historical personages, for they 
also symbolize the respective forces as a whole.  Belisarius the general is 
characterized in detail in the first section of the Persian Wars, Khusro the general 
in the second section.  In the third, the two are juxtaposed, and the ultimate 
evaluation of their respective performances, particularly in relation to each other, 
is, in Herodotean manner, left up to the audience.   
 
                                                
270 Procop. Wars 2.16.19. 
271 Procop. Wars 2.17.1.  See Smyth 1984:  657. 
272 Just before the end of chapter 17 Khusro had been the subject (2.17.27-28); at the 
start of chapter 18 Belisarius is the subject and we find a δὲ next to his name and so, on 
the one hand, it could be used in the adversative sense here (2.18.1).  On the other hand, 
there is a μὲν in the last sentence in which Khusro is named at 2.17.27, and so Procopius 
likely constructed the parallel through μὲν and δὲ; although he is not named, Khusro is the 
subject of the following sentence at 2.17.28, the last of the chapter.  Belisarius dominates 
the next two chapters and so there is nothing to say about them in this regard.  At the end 
of chapter 19, however, the contrast is emphasized again.  In the second last sentence of 
the chapter the second invasion of Khusro is the subject and we find a μὲν (2.19.49).  In 
the last sentence Belisarius, whose actions had dominated the last two chapters, is again 
the subject and we find a δὲ next to his name.  Thus, although Khusro is not the subject 
of the preceding sentence it is not just any invasion, but Khusro’s invasion, and he is 
explicitly named.  At the start of chapter 20, with Belisarius now summoned to 
Constantinople, Khusro is the subject again, and we find a δ , here probably used in an 
adversative sense, though a copulative sense cannot be ruled out (2.20.1).  Even at 
Belisarius’ departure from the Persians Wars, at the end of chapter 21, Procopius still 
sees fit to juxtapose Belisarius with Khusro:  “These things happened to the Romans in 
the third invasion of Khusro, and Belisarius was summoned by the emperor and came to 
Byzantium, so that he could be dispatched to Italy again, where already the affairs of the 
Roman were in a entirely bad state” (2.21.34). 
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Part VI:  Context 
We now come to the last section of this chapter, and here I want to focus 
in more detail on the relationship between battles and the rest of the text, that is, 
the textual context, as well as the contemporary intellectual context, insofar as it 
pertains to warfare.  Much as the first battle between the Persians and the 
Ephthalites serves as a programmatic battle for the rest of the narrative, there are 
other points discussed in Procopius’ narrative that have a bearing on the 
descriptions which follow and which precede.  In fact, what is immediately clear is 
that when approaching the battles in the Wars, context is paramount.273  To 
understand his rhetoric of combat it is important to look not only at the battles on 
a case by case basis, but also in connection with one another, and the narrative 
at large.  To illustrate this I am going to focus on one particular episode.  Then I 
shall direct my attention to contemporary military thinking,274 and look at one case 
that points towards Procopius’ engagement with sixth century military theory. 
After the battle which succeeded Amida Procopius says the following 
about generalship:  “however they did nothing worthy of note, because no one 
was made commander-in-chief for the war, but with the generals of equal rank 
they stood against the views of each other and none wanted to come together”.275  
This comment comes at the end of what had been a disastrous campaign for the 
Romans when, as he states, the Romans were something of a hydra.  This 
narratorial intervention is significant, and it only becomes relevant when we come 
to the battles yet to come in the narrative.  When one man (or as at Dara two – 
though as we saw above Belisarius dominates the narrative) has supreme 
command of the Roman forces, they are likely to win; on the other hand, when 
                                                
273 Rood (1998:  9) stresses the importance of understanding how the text as a whole 
works for deciphering seemingly odd features of Thucydides.   
274 Kaldellis (2007b) has recently discussed select aspects of contemporary military 
policy, and Procopius’ reaction to it.  Though his points are interesting, his argument is 
ultimately unconvincing.  Kaldellis, surprisingly, demonstrates a lack of engagement with 
recent scholarship on late Roman warfare. 
275 Procop. Wars 1.8.20. 
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the Roman forces are not united, and are divided by envy, they will invariably fall 
to defeat at the hands of their foes.276  These same themes are noted in 
Belisarius’ exhortation before the Battle of Nisibis. 
One of the episodes for which context is particularly important is the 
siege, and later sack, of Antioch; here we have to go beyond the immediate 
events surrounding the sack and look to the narrative at large.  Much has been 
made of Procopius’ tirade and seeming mystification after the Persians had 
sacked the city.277  The turning of the standards, which is said to have foretold the 
disaster, has been given far too much prominence.278  The key which Procopius 
provides for understanding the siege and sack comes in the middle of book 1.  
Peroz returns to Persia after his disastrous campaign to meet the wrath of Kavad.  
After dispensing with the mihran Kavad starts to consider how to avenge the 
Persian losses.279  Before he can come to any sort of decision al-Mundhir 
(Alamoundaras), his Lakhmid ally, tells him in the form of a speech what he 
thinks Kavad should do.280  In the course of the speech al-Mundhir tries to 
assuage Kavad’s fears after the disasters in the year 527 and later.281  He tells 
him that part of the problem was the fact that the Persians entered the fray on a 
                                                
276 Two later readers of Procopius, namely Theophanes (Theoph. 174, 19-26) and 
Kedrenos (Cedr. 643, 3-9), refer to incidents where discord among the Roman forces had 
a deleterious effect.  The episode comes almost verbatim from Malalas (18.4) and is also 
found in the Paschal Chronicle (Chron. Pasch. 618, 1-13).  Some of the events are 
recorded by Procopius as well (1.12.1-24), who gives us a fuller, though not necessarily 
more reliable, account.  Procopius does not mention the dismissal of Belisarius but 
merely notes that he was bettered in battle (1.12.23) before being appointed as 
commander of the troops at Dara (1.12.24).  What is significant about Theophanes and 
Kedrenos is that they both give very positive accounts of Belisarius throughout unlike 
Malalas and the Paschal Chronicle.  As a result, I am tempted to suggest that their 
inclusion of this detail in an otherwise positive appraisal of Belisarius is due to their 
reading of Procopius, who emphasizes strong leadership and united forces.  Of course, 
the simpler possibility is that Procopius did not provide either chronicler with the detail 
they wanted about this episode and liked what they saw in Malalas and so decided to use 
that account.  Cf. Whitby and Whitby (1989:  109, n. 337), and Greatrex (1998:  143) for 
this episode. 
277 Cameron 1985:  117; Kaldellis 2004:  127.  Cf. Greatrex and Lieu 2002:  103-109. 
278 Procop. Wars 2.10.1. 
279 Procop. Wars 1.17.29. 
280 Procop. Wars 1.17.30-39. 
281 See Greatrex (1998:  151-228) for the outcome of the Persian wars. 
 183 
level footing with the Romans, and whenever someone does this they are liable 
to the vicissitudes of fortune:  it is better to outwit an opponent and overcome 
them by hitting them when they are at a disadvantage.  And, luckily for the 
Persians, such a situation exists in the case of the fabled city of Antioch:   
They also say that the city Antioch is there, the first of all cities in regard 
to wealth and size and population in the Eastern Roman Empire; it is 
unguarded and void of soldiers.  For the people of this city care for 
nothing other than their festivals and luxury and their seemingly endless 
zest for competition in the theatres against each other.  Thus, if we go 
against them when they least suspect it, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that we would take the city with a lightning strike all the while coming 
across none of the enemy forces, and then immediately make it back to 
the land of the Persians, before any of their soldiers in Mesopotamia learn 
what has happened.282 
 
Kavad is convinced by al-Mundhir’s plan largely because the Lakhmid king was 
experienced in war.283  The Persian shah decides to carry out the operation just 
as al-Mundhir prescribed:  suddenly and quite unexpectedly.284  The initial result 
of this attack is the Battle of Callinicum; although the Persians had not originally 
planned on engaging the Romans they do, and defeat them in the process.  
Getting back to Antioch, however, we find a city which Procopius has marked out 
as unguarded and licentious.  In the grand Greek historiographical tradition 
Antioch is ripe for a great reversal of fortunes and, through this little exchange 
between Kavad and al-Mundhir, Procopius has provided his first allusion to the 
later event.  Thus, when we reach the siege and sack of the city later in book 2 
we, the readers, are well prepared and better able to comprehend Procopius’ 
tirade. 
Besides providing some keys to the interpretation of particular events, 
such as the sack of Antioch, Procopius also puts the tactical and strategic 
doctrine that he espouses in the Persian Wars into contemporary thinking about 
                                                
282 Procop. Wars 1.17.36-38.  Cf. Cataudella (2003:  406-415) for some interesting 
discussion of the significance of the use of the name “East Roman Empire” by Procopius. 
283 Procop. Wars 1.17.40. 
284 Procop. Wars 1.18.1ff. 
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war.285  Buzes has just been made commander of the eastern frontier from the 
Euphrates to Persian territory. 286  At 2.6.3 Buzes gives a speech to the “first men 
of the Hierapolitans” after he learns of the events at Sura.  Although it is rather 
long, I think that it is worth quoting in full:   
On the one hand, whenever there is a struggle against attackers of equal 
strength, it is not unreasonable that they should come to blows in the 
open with the enemy; on the other hand, for those who in contrast happen 
to be much weaker than their opponents, it would be more expedient to 
circumvent their enemy through certain stratagems rather than to array 
themselves openly against them and enter into foreseen danger.  You 
have heard how great the army of Khusro is.  And if he himself wants to 
go out against us in a siege, and if we prevail against the enemy from the 
walls, it is likely that we will run out of provisions, while the Persians, on 
the other hand, will recover all they need from our land, and no one will 
stand against them.  And if the siege is prolonged in this way I think that 
the fortifications will not be strong enough against the assaults of the 
enemy, for in many places they happen to be assailable, and certain 
irreparable harm would befall the Romans.  But if with a portion of the 
army we guard the wall of the city, while the rest of us occupy the heights 
surrounding the city, sometimes we shall engage in guerrilla warfare with 
the camp of our foes, while at others times with those dispatched to 
secure provisions, and these attacks will force Khusro to break off the 
siege immediately, and to make his retreat in a short time, for he will not 
at all be able to bring in his assault against the fortifications without fear, 
nor will he be able to provide any of the provisions for so great an army.287 
 
                                                
285 Towards the end of the Persian Wars at 2.30.15 Procopius goes into considerable 
detail about some measures taken by Mermeroz to strengthen Petra.  This comes 
following Dagistheus’ withdrawal after his failed siege attempt; when we consider that the 
siege of Petra in Lazica is the last siege described in the Persian Wars, and only two 
other conflicts remain in the narrative, namely the Roman stand in the pass near the 
River Phasis and the Battle of the River Phasis itself, it seems a bit out of place.  When 
we remember that most of the sieges involved the Persians assaulting a Roman fortress 
or city, this little digression perhaps should be read as a synopsis of Procopius’ precepts 
for withstanding a siege.  Much like Buzes’ speech, besides the mention of issues that 
surfaced in Procopius’ description of sieges, many of the points raised in this discussion 
are also found in the military handbooks.  The Persian defenders had been keen to avoid 
alerting the Romans of their low numbers (2.30.16).  Maurice (Maurice Strat. 10.1) 
mentions similar concerns, though when discussing sieges he refers to the attackers and 
not the besieged; however, not alerting the enemy of one’s numbers is a common enough 
concern in his treatise (see, Maurice Strat. 7.B.3, 7, for example).  With the walls in a bad 
state, and a lack of suitable provisions not present, Mermeroz gets his men to fill up gaps 
in the wall with the linen bags used to carry provisions with sand (2.30.19).  Maurice 
(Maurice Strat. 1.2.42) refers to the satchels that Roman soldiers brought along on 
campaign to carry some of their supplies and, although Procopius is here describing 
Persian practice, there is no reason to believe that it is not relevant for the Romans. 
286 The episode in question, which runs from 2.6.1 to 2.6.25, is also one of the few parts 
of the text where Justinian has an active role. 
287 Procop. Wars 2.6.3.6. 
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Not surprisingly Buzes’ words manage to persuade his listeners and the scene 
then shifts to Justinian.  Almost immediately following his speech, however, 
Buzes leaves.  What is more, when the narrative returns to Hierapolis at 2.6.21, 
none of the suggestions given by Buzes in regard to the defence of the city are 
implemented.  In the end Khusro leaves the city because he is paid off by the 
citizens.  These facts suggest that Buzes’ speech has a more general purpose.  It 
touches on many of the characteristics of a Procopian battle that I have described 
above and in fact reads like a passage from a military treatise such as Maurice’s 
Strategikon.288  Many of Buzes’ comments reflect general Roman tactical 
concerns.  One of those is the numerical deficiencies that we also saw in the 
Battles of Dara, Satala, Callinicum, and Anglon.  When numbers do not favour 
the Roman side Buzes suggests the use of skirmishing or guerrilla-style warfare 
and the avoidance of pitched battle. 289  And, of course, there is the recourse to 
stratagems to overcome a foe.290  Buzes also comments on the efficacy of the 
Persian army and the role of the shah Khusro in its success, both concerns 
prevalent in military treatises, and the Strategikon in particular.291  The 
importance of provisions during a siege is also an issue prominent in the 
handbooks stressed here by Buzes.292  These precepts marked out by Buzes 
show up in many of Procopius’ descriptions of battle.  As we saw above, their 
                                                
288 This is despite the fact that Maurice wrote his handbook nearly 40 years after 
Procopius wrote his history, and recognizing that each work is, to a certain degree, a 
product of its own time.  Nevertheless, warfare had not changed substantially from 
Procopius’ time to Maurice’s, and many of the changes were likely negligible.  For an 
overview of contemporary (sixth-century) military theory see chapter two above pp. 120-
124. 
289 Cf. Syrianus Magister Peri strat. 33; Maurice Strat. 8.2.56, 81; 12.B. 1; Syvänne 2004:  
114-115.  
290 See Rance (1993:  180-207) for a discussion of stratagems in sixth century tactica and 
in the context of sixth-century warfare in general, and above pp 168-169 for stratagems in 
some of Procopius’ battle descriptions.  Stratagems underscore much of Maurice’s 
discussion.  See especially book four in this regard. 
291 Maurice. Strat. 11.1:  “They obey their leaders on account of fear; wherefore they 
withstand trouble with patience and resist their enemy on behalf of their homeland.  They 
prefer to strive eagerly to succeed by planning and generalship …They are impressive 
when laying siege, but even more impressive when besieged.” Cf. Syvänne 2004:  328-
350; Börm 2007:  169-171. 
292 Syrianus Magister Peri strat.. 9-10; Maurice. Strat. 10.3. 
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correspondences with contemporary military treatises suggest that Procopius’ 
understanding of battle in the sixth century reflects to some degree the military 
doctrine espoused by the Roman military command.    
 
Chapter Overview 
I began this chapter by looking at how Procopius prepares us, his 
audience, for the battles which are to come in the Persian Wars by highlighting 
some common elements of his descriptions in the programmatic narratives, the 
battle between the Ephthalites and Persians, and the siege of Amida.   I also 
looked at how he arranged his text, and the way that this brought out the drama 
of his narrative.  In this first part of the Wars, Procopius put much more emphasis 
on tactics than morale, though we also see that generalship, and his 
characterization of the leading commanders, played an important role in a battle’s 
outcome.  In the next chapter, where I turn to the Vandal Wars, I shall open again 
with questions of textual unity.
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Chapter 4:  the Vandal Wars 
 
Unlike some aspects of Roman North Africa in late antiquity, such as Saint 
Augustine,1 and Egypt, the Vandal Wars and the reconquest are subjects that have 
attracted limited attention.2  Again, Procopius is the principal source for most of what 
he describes,3 and most narrative accounts merely follow his lead.4  The war itself 
marks the beginning of Justinian’s campaigns of reconquest; it also contributed 
significantly to the fame of Belisarius.  In this chapter I begin by devoting 
considerable space to the artful way that Procopius orders his narrative, and through 
this, how he engages with his audience.  This includes a look at, among other things, 
narrator interventions, exhortations, internal referencing (prolepses, etc.), and the 
unity of the text.  As in other chapters, I shall give some attention to Procopius’ 
characterization of the Roman general, not only by way of his actions in battle, but 
                                                
1 North Africa’s most famous son, St. Augustine, has, on the other hand, attracted 
considerable attention.  It is the period after the Vandal conquest that has been least studied, 
with the period around the Arab conquest least of all, though that is largely attributable to the 
lack of sources, a problem that plagues much of Vandal through Arab Africa’s study.  The 
best overview of Roman North Africa from the Punic war onwards is that of Mattingly and 
Hitchener (1995), which is, nevertheless, a review of modern scholarship, particularly as it 
pertains to the material remains. 
2 For a long time the primary discussion of Byzantine North Africa (from 533 onwards) was 
that of Diehl (1896), which is still relevant.  Pringle’s (1981) two volume study of fortifications 
brought much of the military issues surrounding the Byzantine period up-to-date, though even 
it is now three decades old.  Cameron’s (2000:  559-569) overview touches on the main 
issues with the conquest and occupation.  Modéran’s (2003:  35-38, 313 – 414, 565 - 633) 
detailed study of the Berbers in late antiquity discusses some aspects of the Roman 
reconquest.  Zarini (1997:  34-46) is also of interest in this regard.  There also has been a fair 
amount of work on Corippus, on whom see the works of Cameron (1996a:  12-25; 1996b:  
167-180), Zarini (1997, esp. 3, esp. 3-63), the introduction to Shea’s translation (1998:  1-62), 
and Schindler 2007. 
3 As a comparison, the eastern focused Malalas (18.81) devotes a lone entry to the Vandal 
War, and even then only in relation to Belisarius’ triumph.  On the other hand, the ninth 
century chronicler Theophanes (Chron. 186-216), having found nothing of note in Malalas 
excised much of Procopius’ narrative and included it in his chronicle, and to such an extent 
that it is one of the most detailed entries in the text.  Why he decided to devote so much 
attention to Procopius and Africa is another matter, particularly since by his time Africa had 
long since fallen out of Roman hands while Italy, which receives short shrift, was still, at least 
to some degree, a part of the Byzantine world.  Cf. Marc. Com. 534. 
4 Stein (1949:  311-328)’s account is little more than a summary of Procopius, though with 
good reason, I would argue.  Cf. Bury 1923:  2.124-148.   
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also through the comments given by his colleagues and foes in direct discourse.  
Procopius also wants his readers to compare Belisarius with those Roman 
commanders identified in the Vandal Wars’ introduction; thus we shall examine how 
well he meets the criteria alluded to in his discussion of those individuals.  The 
careful attention that Procopius pays to the order of his narrative brings out not only 
the skill with which he writes, but also some of the ways that he manipulates the text 
to engage himself more fully with his audience, and in turn to engage his audience 
more fully with the text.  His description of the nature of the fighting informs the 
reader of the unique character of the warfare in Africa, while statements of military 
doctrine underscore the connection with contemporary military theory and its didactic 
role.  I shall also examine the military theory which underscores the descriptions of 
battle to be discussed, including issues such as tactics and order, morale, and 
stratagems.  After this I identify some points of contact between the theory that 
Procopius expounds, and that found in military treatises.  The tie that binds the 
seemingly disparate issues of the underlying military theory, Procopius’ careful 
arrangement of the text, and his characterization of Belisarius, especially his 
generalship, is didacticism.  By finishing with a look at Procopius’ characterization of 
Belisarius I bring together the military and narrative issues already discussed, while 
also setting up my comments about didacticism in the Vandal Wars. 
 
Part I:  The Artful Historian and Reader Engagement 
I begin by looking at the many ways that Procopius artfully constructs his 
narrative, and in the process engages with his audience.  The topics range from 
narrative order to narratorial interventions, and from that, his narratorial insight into 
the thoughts and feelings of the respective characters, a feature which contributes to 
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the drama of the events, and causes the reader to respond to the text itself.5  Indeed, 
if there is one thing that stands out most about this part of the Wars, it is the number 
of features that actively engage the reader in the events described in the text.  On 
the other hand, while encouraging the reader (both real and implied) to consider 
other possible outcomes to the events themselves, so participating in a pseudo-
Herodotean dialogue, Procopius continues to guide his audience subtly towards the 
interpretation that his narrator holds.6  After I have gone over a number of these 
features, I turn to the unity of the text, both the Vandal Wars as a stand alone text, 
and its place in the wider narrative.   
 
Narrative Order 
In most respects Procopius manipulates the order the same way that he did 
in the Persian Wars; the important exception is his use of prolepses.  A good 
illustration of his practice comes from the Battle of Ad Decimum.7 
Just before the battle begins we learn that the Romans had arrived at 
Decimum.8  In the first line of the narrative, however,9 the order is changed and 
                                                
5 See Morrison’s (2006) study on the reading of Thucydides’ Histories, for some suggestions 
about how the Athenian historian gets his audience to engage with the events he describes.  
6 Whereas Thucydides, on the one hand, generally provides his readers with a particular 
interpretation of the events he describes, Herodotus, on the other hand, engages in a 
dialogue with his audience, providing a number of possibilities which he often leaves to the 
reader to decide which is the most probable.  On Thucydides see Rood (1998); on Herodotus 
Baragwanath (2008).  Cf. Pelling 2000:  44, 83. 
7 This battle has attracted a lot of attention from scholars.  Rubin (1957:  412-413) discusses 
the battle only briefly, and says that much of the description is rooted in Procopius’ own 
worldview before ultimately crediting the victory to the Belisarius’ initiative.  Syvänne (2004:  
434-436) describes the course of the battle itself, paying attention to tactics and related 
issues.  Brodka (2004:  78-82) focuses on the generalship of Belisarius and the role of an 
individual in determining the course of events, partly in relation to the effects of fortune, while 
Kaldellis (2004:  182-184) focuses on the role of fortune alone in determining the battle’s 
outcome.  If there is one thing that modern commentators have agreed on, it is the decisive 
character of the battle for the war.  The battle itself is quite long, running from 3.18.1-3.19.33, 
though in comparison to battles in the Persian Wars and the Gothic Wars, little of this battle is 
actually devoted to the fighting involved between the two sides.  I discuss this further below 
pp. 216-218.  cf. Pringle 1981:  17-21. 
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Procopius tells us what the Vandals had been up to on that same day.  Procopius’ 
intervention, which follows shortly thereafter, includes a prolepsis, for he refers to 
some of Belisarius’ actions – such as his preparations – which he has not yet 
described in the narrative.10  Thus, before Procopius has described the battle-line we 
already know that John will go on ahead, and that the Massagetae will march on the 
left.  When the first skirmish begins a few lines later we return to a linear 
chronological order.11  Procopius then manipulates the order yet again, and at this 
point he includes an analepsis; he goes back to describe what Gibamunus had been 
doing during this little skirmish.12  After this description there is an ellipsis and we 
now find that at least part of both armies are positioned close to each other.13  But, 
the linear order soon disappears as Procopius includes another analepsis to 
describe part of the march to Decimum, even though before the battle began he had 
told us that they had arrived.14  For the next few lines the order is chronological; in 
fact it is here that Procopius describes in greater detail the battle order that he had 
referred to at the beginning of the battle.  There is further manipulation of the order at 
3.19.18; we learn about some of the movements of the Vandal horsemen 
approaching Belisarius’ advance party, but only after Procopius has described the 
debate among the allied commanders about how to respond to this threat.  The 
linear order returns, before there is another prolepsis when Procopius refers to the 
Roman seizure of the treasure at Carthage following the victory in this latest major 
narrator intervention.15  Following this intervention there is one last manipulation of 
                                                                                                                                      
8 Procop. Wars 3.17.17. 
9 Procop. Wars 3.18.1. 
10 Procop. Wars 3.18.3. 
11 Procop. Wars 3.18.7. 
12 Procop. Wars 3.18.12. 
13 Procop. Wars 3.18.15. 
14 Procop. Wars 3.19.1. 
15 Procop. Wars 3.19.28. 
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the order, an analepsis, for Procopius goes back to describe what Belisarius did 
once the allied soldiers, who had been fleeing the approaching Vandal horsemen, 
reached him.16  As dictated by the historiographical theorists and rhetoricians 
discussed above in chapter two, Procopius carefully manipulates his narrative.  
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this is his use of prolepses, the function of 
which I delve into below in my discussion of textual unity.   
 
Focalization 
By and large, Procopius expresses ‘point of view’, or focalization, in the 
Vandal Wars in the same way that he did in the Persians Wars.  In the text we find 
cases of, for example, single external focalization, single internal focalization, and 
multiple focalization, where there is a primary and a secondary focalizer, one or both 
of whom might be an internal and/or external focalizer.  In what follows, I set out 
some examples from the Battle of Cape Bon.17   
As noted in the Persian Wars, Procopius usually writes in the third person.  In 
the battle of Cape Bon in 468 we begin with Procopius as the external narrator-
focalizer (Procopius was not present at the battle):  although Basiliscus is the subject 
of the first rather long sentence, Procopius includes an extended past contrary-to-
fact conditional.18  In that conditional Procopius blames the Roman failure on the 
cowardice (ἐθελοκακήσας) of Basiliscus.  Procopius then tells us that if Basiliscus 
had demonstrated a little more bravery, the Romans would have easily defeated the 
Vandals.  It is unlikely that Basiliscus could have conceived of the dire consequences 
                                                
16 Procop. Wars 3.19.30. 
17 On this battle see the summary of Syvänne (2004:  507).  Rubin (1957:  407), on the other 
hand, is uninterested in the battle.  Like the battle between the Persians and Ephthalites 
discussed in the previous chapter, this too acts as a sort of programmatic-battle for some of 
the events at sea that come later in the text.  See below pp. 212-216.    
18 Procop. Wars 3.6.10. 
 192 
of his lack of bravery.  Instead, the story here is focalized through an omniscient 
narrator, Procopius, who knows how things turned out, but also has – relatively 
speaking – all of the information before him.  Before this long sentence ends, 
however, the focalizer has become Gaizeric, who is an internal focalizer.  Gaizeric 
himself is the subject of the second part of the sentence:  his name is in the 
nominative (Γιζέριχος) and it is concerned with Gaizeric’s astonishment 
(κατωρρώδησεν) at the size of Leo’s fleet, and the capture of Sardinia and Tripoli.19  
There are also some more complex examples of focalization in this battle.  A little 
later at 3.6.15 we have an example of multiple focalization; in this sentence 
Procopius is the primary external narrator-focalizer, and Gaizeric is the secondary 
internal focalizer.  We know this because the first clause of the sentence includes 
both the third-person imperfect singular of the verb πράσσω (ἔπρασσε) for the 
subject Gaizeric which marks out Procopius as the focalizer for he is describing what 
he, as the narrator, saw Gaizeric do; and it includes the verb ο ομαι as a nominative 
masculine singular middle participle (οἰόμενος), which agrees with Gaizeric, and 
which marks out Gaizeric as the focalizer since what follows is what Gaizeric thought 
might happen.  Towards the end of the battle, when the Roman ships are ablaze, the 
story is focalized through the endangered soldiers, who are collectively an internal 
focalizer (they were at the battle).20  Though Procopius is the one describing the 
frantic behaviour of the soldiers running around trying to stem the spread of the fire, 
it is the soldiers of the Roman fleet who are panicked (θόρυβός τε, ὡς τὸ εἰκος, εἶχε 
τὸν Ῥωμαὶων στόλον τε) at 3.6.20, not Procopius.  As we have seen, even in as 
comparably short a battle such as this, Procopius shifts between many different 
                                                
19 Procop. Wars 3.6.11. 
20 Procop. Wars 3.6.18ff. 
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focalizers; at points they might be simultaneous, and both internal and external to the 
story.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Narrator Interventions21 
An important feature in some of Procopius’ descriptions of battle in the 
Vandal Wars is the narrator intervention, the importance of which is manifold.  There 
are quite a few in the Vandal Wars – more so than in the Persian Wars – and I shall 
set some of them out here.  Generally, there are both explicit examples in which 
Procopius intervenes in the first person, and more subtle interventions, where tools, 
such as diction, help mark those points where Procopius intervenes. 
At the beginning of the Battle of Cape Bon, and after Procopius had noted the 
arrival of the fleet from Carthage, he blames the Roman failure on the cowardice 
(ἐθελοκακήσας) of Basiliscus.  Procopius then tells us that if Basiliscus had 
demonstrated a little more bravery, the Romans would have easily taken the 
Vandals, and he does this using a past contrary-to-fact conditional.  Through this 
intervention Procopius highlights the importance of this battle in the narrative that is 
to follow.  This battle is the first described in the text; it is also the last great attempt 
of Rome to re-conquer Africa prior to the Justinianic reconquest.  His comments 
underline the spectacular nature of the reconquest of Belisarius to follow:  the 
Romans came so close to achieving this same goal in 468 and the only element 
missing was an able general.  This particular intervention is used primarily to 
highlight the importance of what he is describing, or is about to describe, in this text, 
a pattern which will emerge throughout. 
                                                
21 My discussion here builds on the perceptive comments of Gribble (1998), which are 
concerned with narrator interventions in Thucydides.  Cf. Hornblower (1994b:  152-159), 
Rood (1998:  251, 256, 280), and Gribble (1999:  169-188) for further discussion of narrator 
intrusions in Thucydides; and Scott (1981:  63-64), Hinterberger (1998:  35-36), and Talbot 
and Sullivan (2005: 28-31) for narrator intrusions in Byzantine historiography. 
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At the beginning of the Battle of Ad Decimum we get one of the largest, and 
most explicit, narrator interventions in the Vandal Wars.  This is one of the most 
significant interventions in the narrative for two reasons:  it reminds the reader of 
what transpired at Cape Bon and so keeps him/her cognizant of what has transpired; 
it prepares the reader for what is to follow in the ensuing narrative, thus 
foreshadowing Rome’s, and Belisarius’, ultimate victory.  Before the narrative begins 
Procopius interrupts his description of Gelimer’s actions on the eve of battle to 
comment on the significance of what was to befall the Vandals.22  He also uses a 
past contrary-to-fact conditional to let us know what he thinks would have happened:  
For if Belisarius had not gone with this sort of deployment, and ordered the 
men with John to take the lead, with the Massegetae to go on the left side of 
the army, we would not have been strong enough to escape the Vandals.23  
The fact that at the beginning of the Vandal Wars Procopius gave us a similar sort of 
conditional in the battle of Cape Bon, both in terms of its grammar and content, 
suggests that he is referring back to that very narrator intervention.  Here in the 
Battle of Ad Decimum that missing element is present:  the Romans again come 
within a whisper of defeat, and yet this time they have a brilliant general in Belisarius.  
This intervention, then, not only reminds us of what happened earlier, but it also 
points us towards the events that follow.  The intervention itself may not be subtle, 
but the foreshadowing is:  we know the capabilities of the enemy, everything is in 
place, and we should expect a Roman victory.24  As both the intended and modern 
readers know, that is indeed what happened, and through this intervention Procopius 
has carefully manipulated their expectations.   
                                                
22 Procop. Wars 3.18.2ff. 
23 Procop. Wars 3.18.3.  Procopius actually uses another past contrary-to-fact conditional at 
3.18.4. 
24 Interventions also play a role in Procopius’ arrangement of the narrative. 
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There is another major intervention towards the end of the Battle of Ad 
Decimum at 3.19.25; surprisingly, even if Procopius had not used the first person, 
there are a host of other narrative signs that mark it out.  In this intervention there is 
a hint of anticipation as he says, “having in his hands victory in the war”, because, at 
this point in the narrative, as Procopius will explain, the battle has not yet been 
determined.  Procopius also says that he cannot explain what happened, and is 
sceptical about those who would point to the work of God.  He then includes not one, 
but two extended past contrary-to-fact conditionals.  In the first conditional Procopius 
feels bold enough to conjecture that, “I do not think that Belisarius would have 
withstood him”.25  Furthermore, at the end of that conditional Procopius includes 
some superlatives:  “so great did both the number of Vandals and the fear of them 
among the Romans appear to be.”26  This one major intervention, or perhaps series 
of interventions, is significant for some of the reasons outlined in the previous one at 
3.18.2, but it also represents what might be called a moment of dramatic irony; here 
Gelimer had the Roman army in his hands, but threw it all away at the sight of his 
brother’s corpse.  Although he did not know that he would not get another chance as 
good as this one to defeat the Romans, we, the readers, guided by our narrator’s 
insights into Gelimer’s thoughts, do:  “[an opportunity] which he would no longer be 
able to take.”27  Furthermore, at the end of this battle, in which Gelimer threw away 
certain victory, we see that the situation, as Procopius presents it, is a reversal from 
that of the Battle of Cape Bon where the general Basiliscus threw away a certain 
victory for the Romans.   
There are a few other types of interventions including some further uses of 
superlatives (which we saw in the 3.19.25ff intervention), and casual reminder 
                                                
25 Procop. Wars 3.19.26. 
26 Procop. Wars 3.19.27. 
27 Procop. Wars 3.19.28. 
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interventions.  In the Battle of Ad Decimum at 3.18.11 Procopius uses an actual 
result clause to describe the carnage that has taken place in the battle thus far:   
And the massacre of the Vandals in the 70 stades became so great that the 
ones who beheld it would have guessed that it was the work of 20,000 enemy 
troops.   
Procopius plays up the scale of the devastation again to emphasize the importance 
of this battle.28  There are some other occasions where Procopius uses superlatives 
when describing battles.  Sometimes the interventions are little more than reminders, 
and might best be called casual interventions.  So, in the Battle of Tricamarum in 533 
Procopius is anxious to remind us that the Huns had been scheming against the 
Romans, and had decided to hold back from combat to wait for a victor to emerge 
before fighting themselves.29  There is another casual intervention at the start of the 
Battle of Mammes in 534.  Procopius says, “here the four leaders of the Berbers 
whom I mentioned a little earlier,” [and so we, the readers, should remember].30  
Only two sections later Procopius intervenes (casually) again to remind us that he 
had already described the circle of camels.31   
As this survey has shown, Procopius uses a host of both explicit and implicit 
interventions in the Vandal Wars, a significant feature of which is his use of the first 
person, something which in part foreshadows the practice of later Byzantine 
historians.  What is more, they play a role in highlighting the importance of the 
events, and in assisting the readers’ interpretation of them. 
 
                                                
28 It is always important to keep in mind that Procopius is trying to demonstrate that the wars 
which he is describing are the most important in human history, and so each battle contained 
therein should be seen in this light.  Cf. Procop. Wars 1.1.6:  “It will be clear that there is 
nothing that is greater or mightier than what transpired in these wars if you want to prove 
beyond any reasonable doubt with the truth.”  
29 Procop. Wars 4.3.7. 
30 Procop. Wars 4.11.15.  The naming of personages, both Roman and otherwise, is an 
important issue which I discuss further below pp. 204-207.  Trying to identify Berber titulature 
using Procopius is difficult because of his ambiguity.  Cf. Modéran 2003:  435ff. 
31 Procop. Wars 4.11.17. 
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Procopius’ Use of Numbers 
As noted in chapter three Procopius’ reporting of numbers is an important 
issue in the descriptions of battle.  Here I look at Procopius’ practice in the Vandal 
Wars, highlighting some of the similarities with the Persian Wars, while noting 
instances where he looks ahead to the Gothic Wars.  In the Battle of Cape Bon the 
only figure provided by Procopius is the 280 stade distance of the town where the 
Roman fleet was anchored from Carthage.32  There is a skirmish at the beginning of 
the battle of Ad Decimum, and, in the melee, Procopius tells us that John killed 12 of 
Ammatas’ men.33  After Ammatas’ defeat we learn the following about the Vandals:  
“For they were travelling in no order and were not arranged for battle, but in 
squadrons, and these were small; for they marched in [squadrons of] 20 or 30.”34  At 
3.18.12 we learn that 2,000 came with Gibamundus to Pedion Halon, which is 40 
stades from Decimum.  Only a couple of lines later Procopius tells us that “there was 
a certain man among the Massagetae…who led a few men.”35  Following the 
skirmish between the Massagetae and the Vandals Procopius simply tells us that 
“they were all disgracefully destroyed.”36  Belisarius stationed his forces in an 
encampment 35 stades from Decimum.37  As regards the number of forces present, 
we only learn that Belisarius gave his exhortation to “the whole army”.38  The figures 
given by Procopius continue to be vague following the exhortation; we get “all the 
horsemen”,39 “the whole army”,40 “rest of the army”,41 “a great deal of Vandal 
                                                
32 Procop. Wars 3.6.10. 
33 Procop. Wars 3.18.6. 
34 Procop. Wars 3.18.8. 
35 Procop. Wars 3.18.13. 
36 Procop. Wars 3.18.19. 
37 Procop. Wars 3.19.1. 
38 Procop. Wars 3.19.1. 
39 Procop. Wars 3.19.11. 
40 Procop. Wars 3.19.12. 
41 Procop. Wars 3.19.13. 
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horsemen”,42 “Uliaris the bodyguard of Belisarius happened to be there with 800 
guards”,43 and then at the end of the battle, and in regard to casualties, “having lost 
many there”.44  
The first reference to the size of the army in the Battle of Tricamarum comes 
before one of Belisarius’ exhortations, and as with the Battle of Ad Decimum, all we 
learn is that he summoned “the whole army”.45  After that exhortation we get our first 
figure, though not without another vague reference:  “After such words of exhortation 
Belisarius sent all the horsemen, except [πλὴν] for 500”.46  The next day Belisarius 
followed “with the infantry and the 500 horsemen.”47  We also learn from Procopius 
that Tricamarum, where the Romans encountered the Vandals, was “150 stades 
distant from Carthage”.48  Following an exhortation of Tzazon Procopius says, 
“Martinus and Valerian and John and Cyprian and Althias and Marcellus held the left 
flank and as many others [ὅσοι ἄλλοι] who were leading the Foederati”.49  In regard 
to the opposite side of the Roman line we learn, “and the right by Pappas and 
Barbatus and Aigan and as many [ὅσοι]  led the cavalry units.”50  The next definite 
number that we get is again the 500 horsemen with Belisarius.51  There follows a 
bunch of vague descriptors:  “with the rest of the army”,52 “John selected a few of 
those under him”,53 “John again led out more [πλείους] of Belisarius’ guardsmen”,54 
                                                
42 Procop. Wars 3.19.15. 
43 Procop. Wars 3.19.23. 
44 Procop. Wars 3.19.31. 
45 Procop. Wars 4.1.12. 
46 Procop. Wars 4.2.1. 
47 Procop. Wars 4.2.2. 
48 Procop. Wars 4.2.4. 
49 Procop. Wars 4.3.4. 
50 Procop. Wars 4.3.4. 
51 Procop. Wars 4.3.6. 
52 Procop. Wars 4.3.7. 
53 Procop. Wars 4.3.10. 
54 Procop. Wars 4.3.12. 
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“with almost all [πᾶσι σχεδὸν] of Belisarius’ guards and spearmen”,55 and “then the 
whole Roman army”.56  We learn that, “less than [ἥσσους  ] 50 of the Romans died 
in this battle, but of the Vandals about [μάλιστα] 800.”57  In the melee that follows, 
and after the brief interlude when he supplies us with seemingly definite figures for 
the casualties, Procopius again uses vague descriptions, before finishing with 
something more definite; so we get “some few domestics”,58 “but when those that 
perceived”,59 “killing all men upon whom they happened”,60 “95 years”,61 and “around 
[μάλιστα] the middle of the last month”.62  The emerging pattern is that Procopius 
shies away from referring to the size of both Roman and Vandal forces involved in 
particular engagements, which is very much in keeping with the narrative at large.  
Too much attention on the precise figures would detract from his efforts to craft a 
dramatic, surprising, and brilliant victory in this conquest. 
There are a range of different figures used in the Battle of Mammes, and here 
he looks ahead to the Gothic Wars.  Solomon decides to lead his “whole army” 
against the Berbers after he reads a letter.63  The Roman commander also attempts 
to boost the morale of his troops through an exhortation in which he says that 
“around 50,000 [κατὰ μυριάδας πέντε] Berbers have gathered and already defeated 
500 Romans”.64  When Solomon dismounts from his horse to fight on foot, he urges 
the rest of the soldiers to do the same and then charges a portion of the enemy circle 
                                                
55 Procop. Wars 4.3.12. 
56 Procop. Wars 4.3.15. 
57 Procop. Wars 4.3.18. 
58 Procop. Wars 4.3.21. 
59 Procop. Wars 4.3.22. 
60 Procop. Wars 4.3.24. 
61 Procop. Wars 4.3.28. 
62 Procop. Wars 4.3.28. 
63 Procop. Wars 4.11.14. 
64 Procop. Wars 4.11.23. 
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with “no less than [οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ] 500”.65  At the battle’s conclusion Procopius says, “it 
is said that 10,000 [μύριοι] Berbers died in this struggle”.66  Solomon marches off 
with his whole army against the Berbers at the start of the Battle of Mt. Bourgaon.67  
After Solomon’s exhortation he orders Theodorus to lead 1,000 foot soldiers.68  
When the battle has ended, Procopius reports that, “50,000 [μυρίδες πέντε] Berbers 
died in this encounter”,69 “but not one of the Romans”.70  There are some more 
figures in the Battle of Mt. Aurasium.  Belisarius “chose 100 of his spearmen and 
guards”.71  A little later we learn that “Belisarius gathered about [ἀμφὶ] 2,000 of his 
army”.72  This force overtook the rebellious troops at Membressa, 350 stades from 
Carthage.73  At the end of this battle we learn that Belisarius did not pursue them, 
“the army being much too small”.74  Germanus encamps within (ἄπο) 35 stades of 
the city of Carthage at the beginning of the Battle of Scalae Veteres.75  With Stotzas’ 
withdrawal to Numidia, Germanus gives chase and arrives with his whole army.76  He 
then lines up his army and places all the infantry along the wagons,77 places the best 
of the horsemen on the left of the infantry, and all the rest on the right flank.78  
Procopius then describes, albeit in minimal detail, the arrangement of the opposing 
forces including many 1,000’s (μυριάδες πολλαί) of Berbers.79  Towards the end of 
                                                
65 Procop. Wars 4.11.51. 
66 Procop. Wars 4.11.55. 
67 Procop. Wars 4.12.2. 
68 Procop. Wars 4.12.17. 
69 Procop. Wars 4.12.25. 
70 Procop. Wars 4.12.25. 
71 Procop. Wars 4.15.9. 
72 Procop. Wars 4.15.11. 
73 Procop. Wars 4.15.12. 
74 Procop. Wars 4.15.46. 
75 Procop. Wars 4.16.10. 
76 Procop. Wars 4.17.2. 
77 Procop. Wars 4.17.4. 
78 Procop. Wars 4.17.5. 
79 Procop. Wars 4.17.8. 
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the battle we learn that Stotzas managed to escape with a few men.80  Germanus 
attacks the mutineers’ camp and sends some of his followers to attack one side.81  
When the rebellious troops still in camp learn that their defence has been breached 
they flee, and Germanus rushes in with all the rest of the army.82  When the soldiers 
get drunk with lust for booty, Germanus, and a few men, heave reproaches on 
them.83  Many of the Berbers pursue the mutineers.84  Stotzas, at the very end, 
briefly considers taking up the fight anew before thinking better of it and fleeing with 
100 men.85  Finally, Stotzas retires with some few Vandals to Mauritania.86 
Though not a complete list, the previous catalogue does give us a good 
indication of the sorts of figures that Procopius uses in the Vandal Wars.  Overall, he 
is less likely to use definite figures in the Vandal Wars in comparison to the Persian 
Wars.  In the Battle of Dara, for example, Procopius gives us a wide variety of 
different figures.  Procopius tells us how many troops the Romans and Persians had 
at Dara,87 the number of reinforcements brought by the Persians,88 and on two 
separate occasions, the number of troops under specific Roman or allied 
commanders.89  He also gives us some definite casualty figures.90  In what is 
arguably the centre-piece battle of the Vandal Wars, the Battle of Ad Decimum, 
Procopius is a little less clear about the numbers involved.  We might well assume 
that the total size of the Roman force participating in the battle equalled the total 
                                                
80 Procop. Wars 4.17.24. 
81 Procop. Wars 4.17.26. 
82 Procop. Wars 4.17.28. 
83 Procop. Wars 4.17.30. 
84 Procop. Wars 4.17.31. 
85 Procop. Wars 4.17.33. 
86 Procop. Wars 4.17.35. 
87 Procop. Wars 1.13.23. 
88 Procop. Wars 1.14.1. 
89 Procop. Wars 1.3.19, 1.3.20. 
90 Procop. Wars 1.14.41, 1.14.51. 
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given at the beginning of the narrative,91 and certainly phrases like “the whole army” 
and “all the horsemen/cavalry” do suggest as much; but, we also find similar 
language in the Battle of Scalae Veteres in regard to Germanus’ army.  Plus, this 
latter battle took place four years after the original invasion and we have no way of 
knowing what happened to the many soldiers and units involved after Belisarius’ 
initial conquest, at least based on Procopius’ narrative.   Thus, it is hard to 
reconstruct the numbers involved in the many battles from Procopius’ figures.92  The 
Vandal Wars is rife with qualifiers such as “about”.  Procopius’ sparse usage of 
definite figures might lead us to believe that those figures point towards the accuracy 
of those he does use:  if he did not know the figures involved, he would not use 
them.93  This is part of Procopius’ attempts to wield his authority, by subtly arguing 
that his account is to be trusted.94  Procopius on occasion juxtaposes figures that he 
claims are accurate, with figures that are nearly accurate.  In the Battle of Mt. 
Aurasium, for example, we get “100 of his spearmen and guards”,95 ”about [ἀμφὶ] 
2,000 of his army”,96 and “350 stades distant from Carthage”.97  When the reader 
comes across the middle figure he/she is likely to assume that it is a definite figure, 
regardless of the qualifier “about”, because of its proximity to two other figures where 
no such qualifier is given.  Conversely, the inclusion of one qualifier such as “about”, 
in a set of figures in close succession, persuades the reader that the two definite 
figures are accurate, for if they were not, the reader would expect that Procopius 
                                                
91 Procop. Wars 3.11.1ff. 
92 Cf. the comments of Treadgold (1995:  60, 2007:  219-220). 
93 Cf. Hornblower (1994b:  150-152) on Thucydides and numbers. 
94 Cf. Marincola 1997; Dewald 2007. 
95 Procop. Wars 4.15.9. 
96 Procop. Wars 4.15.11. 
97 Procop. Wars 4.15.12. 
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would have included a qualifier as he did with the 2,000.98  Even when the qualifiers 
are used with numbers that stand alone, they are likely to have the same effect.  So, 
when Procopius says things like, “no less than [οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ] 500”,99 “it is said that 
10,000 Berbers died in this struggle”,100 “less than [ἥσσους ἢ] 50 of the Romans died 
in this battle, but of the Vandals about [μάλιστα] 800”,101 and “within [ἄπο] 35 stades 
of the city of Carthage”,102 we, the readers, are likely to give his numbers more 
credence because of his inclusion of the qualifier, even though here they are not 
juxtaposed with definite figures. 
Finally, on occasion Procopius will highlight a specific number, though it may 
not always be clear why.  In the Battle of Tricamarum, for example, Procopius is 
constantly referring to a group of 500 horsemen marked out by Belisarius:  “after 
such words of exhortation Belisarius sent all the horsemen, except [πλὴν] for 500”,103 
“he [Belisarius] followed with the infantry and the 500 horsemen”,104 and  “Belisarius 
arrived at the opportune moment with the 500 horsemen”.105  Here, despite the 
timely arrival of Belisarius’ troops, they did not serve a terribly important function in 
the fighting that followed.  Instead, it is the few men selected by John that really 
initiated, and succeeded in, the actual fighting.106  In sum, Procopius’ numbers in the 
Vandal Wars serve a number of purposes.  The references to the myriads of 
Berbers, for example, highlight their barbarity, while also looking ahead to his use of 
                                                
98 Cf. Procop. Wars 4.11.23:  “around [κατὰ] 50,000 Berbers have gathered and already 
defeated 500 Romans”.   
99 Procop. Wars 4.11.51. 
100 Procop. Wars 4.11.55. 
101 Procop. Wars 4.3.18. 
102 Procop. Wars 4.16.10. 
103 Procop. Wars 4.2.1. 
104 Procop. Wars 4.2.2. 
105 Procop. Wars 4.3.6. 
106 Another example of a repeated group is the 800 guards of Uliaris who are referred to a 
few times in the Battle of Ad Decimum. 
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similar figures in the Gothic Wars.  On the other hand, Procopius is much less 
precise than he is in the Persian Wars, a feature which helps him to highlight the 
events that he describes, while not drawing the readers’ attention away from what 
were likely two forces, Romans and Vandals, that were quite similar in size.  If the 
numbers were not significant, this would have challenged Procopius’ supposition that 
his wars were the greatest ever, so leaving him open to the sorts of charges that 
Thucydides lays against Homer, owing, in no small part, to the numbers that Homer 
uses in his works.107  Finally, his extended use of qualifiers and selective use of 
precise figures, which are often juxtaposed, emphasizes the authority, and so, 
trustworthiness, of Procopius the historian and narrator. 
 
Narrative Markers:  Names 
Like the use of numbers, the use of names, or rather, whom Procopius 
names and whom he does not is an important issue.  To examine this aspect in 
depth I am going to focus on one battle, the Battle of Tricamarum.108  The first 
person named in the narrative is Gelimer:  his name is also the first word of book 4.  
Its placement marks him out as a significant personage:  Gelimer is to play an 
important role in this battle.  He is the commander-in-chief of the combined African 
and Sardinian Vandal forces.  Of the two Vandal exhortations given in the course of 
the narrative, the one by Gelimer himself and the other by his brother Tzazon, it is 
the exhortation of Gelimer that is both longer, and more noteworthy.  Furthermore, 
Gelimer is not only the last Vandal named, but also the last Vandal of importance for 
the battle itself:  when he turns tail and flees the scene, his disgruntled kinsmen 
                                                
107 Thuc. 1.3, 1.9ff. 
108 This battle has attracted less attention than Decimum.  See Rubin (1957:  417), Kaldellis 
(2004:  185-187), and Syvänne (2004:  436-437). 
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follow suit.109  The rest of the battle is filled with some disciplinary problems which 
Belisarius encounters; by that point the fighting has ended and the Vandals no 
longer play a part.   
Even those characters who make brief appearances in the narrative are 
important.  There is one such character named in the course of the battle.  A certain 
Laurus, a Carthaginian, is named early in the narrative.  According to Procopius, he 
was charged with treason and impaled by Belisarius.  This reference to Laurus is 
interesting for Procopius is usually unconcerned with the relative unknowns in his 
descriptions of battle, particularly those not directly involved in combat, unless they 
have performed some daring deed.  As the fighting has not yet begun, that is clearly 
not the case here; however, this episode does fall in the midst of Procopius’ 
discussion of the problems with the disingenuous Huns.  Since Belisarius attempts to 
win over the Massagetae with gifts, the inclusion of the detail about Laurus is part of 
Procopius’ attempt to present Belisarius as favourably as possible.  Belisarius is 
prepared to do whatever it takes to achieve his desired ends; he is also cognizant of 
the situation.  Though Belisarius is quite happy to try and pacify some unruly allies 
through gifts, he is also prepared to use violence, or the threat of violence, if 
necessary.110   
What about patronymics?  Although the patronymics are not specifically given 
for any character in the battle, Procopius does highlight Tzazon’s relation to Gelimer, 
the most important Vandal in the Vandal Wars:  he is one of Gelimer’s brothers.  
Tzazon is named a few times throughout the Vandal Wars and more often than not 
Procopius calls him the brother of Gelimer.111  He is first mentioned immediately 
                                                
109 Procop. Wars 4.3.20-23. 
110 On the importance of discipline in the Vandal Wars see below pp. 218-222. 
111 At 3.11.23 when Tzazon is first introduced he is marked out as Gelimer’s brother.  When 
we meet him again at 3.24.1 we are again told that he is the brother of Gelimer.  At 3.25.10 
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following Gelimer’s exhortation to the African Vandals:  “After Gelimer spoke such 
words he ordered his brother Tzazon to give a separate exhortation to those who 
came with him from Sardinia.”112  At 4.3.1 Tzazon’s name is given without the familial 
relation, although when Procopius is describing the Vandal deployment he again 
notes that he is Gelimer’s brother.113  When the battle gets underway, the next two 
places where we find Tzazon his relation to Gelimer is not given;114 but at the last, 
and most significant point, it is:  “but many of the best of the Vandals fell, even 
Tzazon himself the brother of Gelimer.”115  The death of Tzazon is arguably the 
turning point of the battle; not long after his death Gelimer decides to flee.116  
Admittedly, Procopius says that Gelimer left straightaway after he found out that 
Belisarius was approaching with the infantry and the rest of the army; however, 
rather significantly, Procopius also says that after Gelimer found out about Belisarius’ 
approach he left without saying a word.  Earlier in the Battle of Ad Decimum the 
turning point came when Gelimer came down from the hill and saw his brother 
Ammatas’ corpse.117  Tzazon’s introduction is after the death of Ammatas; the 
constant affirmation of Tzazon’s relation to Gelimer is certainly to remind us that the 
turning point was Ammatas, Gelimer’s other brother’s, death.  Thus, though 
Procopius might say that Gelimer fled the scene at Tricamarum as a result of tactical 
considerations, we are to understand that Tzazon’s death was no less important a 
reason for his flight.118   
                                                                                                                                      
Tzazon is again identified as Gelimer’s brother.  The lone exception, prior to the Battle of 
Tricamarum, is at 3.25.24 and here Tzazon is in the company of Gelimer and the two 
embrace:  there is no need for Procopius to mark out the familial relation here. 
112 Procop. Wars 4.2.23. 
113 Procop. Wars 4.3.8. 
114 Procop. Wars 4.3.10, 4.3.12. 
115 Procop. Wars 4.3.14.. 
116 Procop. Wars 4.3.20. 
117 Procop. Wars 3.19.29. 
118 The case could also be made that by constantly stating Tzazon’s relation to Gelimer prior 
to the Battle of Tricamarum itself Procopius is anticipating the ultimate outcome of that battle. 
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When we take a closer look at the secondary commanders (those who are 
not the commander-in-chief) whom Procopius names we see that yet again he marks 
out those – in this case the one – personages who play an important role in the 
narrative.  Procopius names John the Armenian at 4.2.1.  During the same battle, but 
a little further on, when describing the Roman deployment Procopius gives the 
following names:   
Martinus, Valerian, John, Cyprian, Althias, and Marcellus held the left wing 
and there were as many other commanders of the Foederati, Pappus, 
Barbatus, and Aigan held the right wing and as many others led the cavalry 
squadrons.119  
Though several names are listed, none are given their patronymics, or ethnicity; 
moreover, there are several commanders who are not named.  Of course, none of 
the regular soldiers (i.e., non-officers) are listed either, but neither Procopius’ 
audience nor Procopius himself were interested in those soldiers.  After naming 
some of the commanders of the two wings Procopius then tells us that John was 
arranged in the centre.120  So, while undoubtedly there are places where Procopius 
decides to include the ethnicity of a commander as a mark of clarity, he has not done 
so here.  In this particular situation where two Johns are named in close succession 
we would expect Procopius to clarify the matter with the inclusion of “the Armenian” 
had clarity been his chief concern; however, he does not.  What is more, Procopius 
does not include “the Armenian” after the respective character’s name, the John in 
the centre, at all in the rest of the narrative.121  John the Armenian, on Belisarius’ 
advice, makes three sallies against the middle of the Vandal line.  It is in the third 
charge that one of the principal moments of the battle took place:  the death of 
                                                
119 Procop. Wars 4.3.4. 
120 Procop. Wars 4.3.5. 
121 We know that the John in the centre (4.3.5) is John the Armenian because Procopius tells 
us that the John taking the centre also had the general’s standard, which John the Armenian 
was entrusted with at 4.2.1. 
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Tzazon.  During the fierce battle that ensued when the two forces crashed against 
each other Tzazon dies; John the Armenian played an instrumental role as the 
commander of the Roman charge.  Again, here with John’s entry into Procopius’ 
narrative of the Battle of Tricamarum at 4.2.1, and with the addition of the ethnic title 
“the Armenian”, Procopius has singled out a character that is to play an important 
role in the narrative which follows.  Classical and classicizing historians are known 
for their selectivity regarding who is to be named in a text.  Procopius sticks to this 
trend, with one notable exception.  When he does include additional information it 
serves an important function in the narrative.  What is more, where a person is 
named in the narrative is also significant. 
 
Exhortations 
As we saw in chapter three, the pre-battle speeches have quite an important 
role in the structure of the narrative:  they help both characters and readers 
understand what has just transpired, and they alert them to what might unfold.122  
Kaldellis, following from the work of de Romilly, looked at the connection between 
speech and action in the Battle of Mammes,123 and persuasively argued for a strong 
relationship between speech and text in that battle.  How does this mesh with the 
cases from the rest of the Vandal Wars?  Exhortations are more frequent in the 
Vandal Wars than in the Persian Wars; but, many have a character distinct from 
those found in the Persian Wars.  As noted by Kaldellis with regard to Mammes, we 
still find exhortations that lay out what it is that Procopius thinks the respective 
general, or generals, need to do in order to be successful in battle.  The key 
                                                
122 On speeches in general in ancient historiography see Fornara (1983:  142-168), 
Rohrbacher 2002:  159-162, Pelling (2006 – specifically concerned with Herodotus), and 
Marincola 2007b.   
123 De Romilly 1956:  144-150; Kaldellis 2004:  29-33. 
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difference, however, is the inclusion of a greater number of ideological issues in the 
exhortations from the Vandal Wars than in the exhortations found in the Persian 
Wars.  In this section I shall focus on the exhortations of the Battle of Tricamarum, 
though I shall have occasion to refer to select other speeches. 
To begin, a disclaimer:  the set of exhortations in the Persian Wars was not 
devoid of ideological matters:  in the Battle of Callinicum Belisarius tells his men that 
God will help those who find themselves in danger when it is not of their own 
making.124  Yet, whereas the previous exhortations were heavy on military matters, 
here, Procopius has more recourse to other concerns.  So, there are a number of 
exhortations where we find some variation on the claim:  “we are here to recover 
what is ours”, with the ‘ours’ referring to the land in dispute.125  In the same vein 
there are also appeals to patriotism, such as there is in the Battle of Ad Decimum.126  
These arguments advocated by Belisarius also work both ways, however; Vandal 
and Berber commanders alike make similar claims.  In the Battle of Ad Decimum we 
get links to justice and God in Belisarius’ exhortation at 3.19.6ff.  Those are some of 
the issues raised in Procopius’ battle exhortations.  Now, let us take a closer look at 
the exhortations in the Battle of Tricamarum.  
The first thing that Belisarius says in his exhortation is that the men do not 
need an exhortation because they have already defeated their foes decisively, 
clearly an attempt to boost their morale.127  Next, Belisarius tells the men that the 
end of the campaign is in sight.128  The importance of numbers, a theme referred to a 
few times in the Persian Wars, is brought up again here, though on this occasion 
                                                
124 Procop. Wars 1.18.17ff. 
125 On Procopius, Justinian, and the justification for the war see Beck (1986:  41-43), 
Pazdernik (2005), and Brodka (2004:  73-75). 
126 Procop. Wars 3.19.8. 
127 Procop. Wars 4.1.13. 
128 Procop. Wars 4.1.15. 
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Belisarius claims that valour is more important than numbers.129   Belisarius again 
appeals to the past achievements of the Roman troops, and says that because of 
this success, their enemies are afraid of them.130  Belisarius urges them that if they 
lose this battle, they will lose their own land.131  Morale, the dominant theme thus far 
in the exhortation, is alluded to again:  Belisarius reminds his men that they won the 
last battle without the infantry whereas on this occasion they are entering battle with 
the whole army and God propitious.132  Next, Belisarius tells his men to seize the 
moment, and includes a little digression about the motives of Fortune.133  Finally, 
Belisarius tells his men that the Vandals will not fight any better than usual knowing, 
and perceiving, that their family is threatened, and he says instead that this is quite 
draining for them.134  In this particular exhortation, there are few points that pertain 
directly to operations and tactics on the battlefield.  The same is true of Gelimer’s 
exhortation.  Before we go through the exhortation however, I must first point out that 
Belisarius’ speech and Gelimer’s speech are connected, for the end of Belisarius’ 
speech at 4.1.25 is the beginning of Gelimer’s speech at 4.2.8 – this is an example of 
anadiplosis.135  Moving on to the speech itself, as noted, Gelimer tells his men that if 
they do not win they will be handing over their women, children, and land to the 
Romans, and that they will be enslaved.136  Next, he tells them that their hopes rest 
squarely on their shoulders.  He also emphasizes that they should fear defeat, and 
not the number of dead bodies:  they should let fear guide them to success.137  The 
                                                
129 Procop. Wars 4.1.16.  As we saw above, Procopius does not give us the total number of 
troops involved in the battle, and so we do not know what the difference in size was between 
the two opponents.   
130 Procop. Wars 4.1.16-17. 
131 Procop. Wars 4.1.19. 
132 Procop. Wars 4.1.21. 
133 Procop. Wars 4.1.23. 
134 Procop. Wars 4.1.24-25. 
135 That is, rhetorical anadiplosis. 
136 Procop. Wars 4.2.11.  On the theme of freedom and slavery see Pazdernik (1997, 2000). 
137 Procop. Wars 4.2.12. 
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African Vandals were not to concern themselves with what happened earlier, for 
Fortune was the cause of the Roman victory.138  The Vandals have more valour than 
the Romans.139  Gelimer also points out that they have a numerical advantage over 
their Roman foes.140  Further, Gelimer says that the empire has been handed down 
to them by their ancestors and so they must uphold this.141  Gelimer tells his men to 
forget about the wailing of their women and children even though he himself can no 
longer continue because of it, or so he says.142  On two separate occasions in this 
speech Gelimer refers to the wailing of women and children, a feature with tragic, 
and rhetorical, overtones.  The suffering of women and children is a means of 
playing up the pathos of the scene according to the rhetoricians, as we saw above in 
chapter two.  By employing these elements in his speech Gelimer is highlighting the 
tragic character of their own situation to his men in the hopes of spurring them on.  
As regards the real and implied audience, it increases the drama of the scene by 
framing the Vandals’ predicament using a system of meaning the audience would 
understand (rhetoric and tragedy).143   
In closing, Gelimer tells his men that they will never get back their 
possessions if they do not win now,144 so they must show their mettle.145  Having 
highlighted the points stressed by the two generals, it is clear that the exhortations 
from this battle are not terribly concerned with what the generals must do tactically to 
                                                
138 Procop. Wars 4.2.15. 
139 Procop. Wars 4.2.17. 
140 Procop. Wars 4.2.18. 
141 Procop. Wars 4.2.18. 
142 Procop. Wars 4.2.20.   
143 Also of significance is the fact that while it is the Romans who claim to be fighting for their 
own land, it is the Vandals who actually have families on that land.  Cf. Rossi (2004:  9-10, 
17-53), on Virgil, epic, rhetoric, and tragedy. 
144 Procop. Wars 4.2.21. 
145 Procop. Wars 4.2.22. 
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achieve success.146  Instead, both generals appeal to their men’s emotions, 
patriotism, and personal bravery.  Plus, it is also clear that there is a close 
correspondence between the two exhortations.  We saw that the end of Belisarius’ 
speech leads into the beginning of Gelimer’s.  Even the issues stressed are similar, 
and complimentary.  So, while Belisarius stresses that numbers are not important, 
Gelimer tells his men that their superior numbers will help them.  Whereas Belisarius 
says that the Vandal concern over their loved ones will lessen their performance, and 
the death of Tzazon does turn out to be quite significant, Gelimer tells his men that 
for that very reason they must fight harder.  There is one last point to highlight about 
the Battle of Tricamarum:  in this particular battle there are three separate 
exhortations.  Moreover, what makes this unique is not the fact that there are more 
than two exhortations, but rather that the additional exhortation is given by a third 
commander.  We have Belisarius’ exhortation to the Roman forces, Gelimer’s 
exhortation to his African Vandals, and then Tzazon’s exhortation to the Sardinian 
Vandals.  Yet again, the exhortations from a particular description of battle often 
correspond to each other to a considerable degree:  it is as if the second general 
was responding to the points made by the first general, even though they are done 
for the benefit of Procopius’ audience.  Also, the exhortations of the Vandal Wars 
often stress issues – morale, ideology, religion, and emotions – that are not as 
prevalent in the exhortations of the Persian Wars.  Clearly then, using Tricamarum 
as a case study, we can see that there are significant differences between the 
exhortations in the Persian Wars and the exhortations in the Vandal Wars. 
 
 
                                                
146 There is, however, some tactical discussion in the exhortations of the Battle of Mammes; 
furthermore, just as between the first two exhortations in the Battle of Tricamarum, there is a 
close correspondence between the speech of Solomon and the speech of the Berber leaders. 
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Textual Unity and Internal Referencing   
One feature highlighted by a handful of scholars is the unity of the Vandal 
Wars, with the general point being that this part of the text betrays more evidence of 
unity than any other part of the Wars.147  There are good reasons for this postulation, 
though I shall also argue that there are also markers which tie the Vandal Wars to 
the whole.  Let us begin by surveying examples of foreshadowing, as well as other 
examples of internal referencing in the text, from both the introduction and beyond.  
Both Evans and Kaldellis correctly note that the introduction to the Vandal 
Wars prepares the reader for what is to follow,148 and, as I noted earlier, the situation 
as presented in the introduction is often the reverse of what will later transpire.  So, 
not long after we first meet Gaizeric Procopius says:  “Gaizeric, taking advantage of 
the negligence of Basiliscus, did the following.”149  This looks forward to the Roman 
Belisarius who takes advantage of the folly of Gelimer, ultimately leading his force to 
victory, while marking out a theme I discuss later, the importance of able 
generalship.150  A couple of chapters later we find the Vandals roughing up the 
Christian Romans, a practice that Belisarius is keen that his soldiers later avoid.151  
While sailing to Africa Belisarius and the expeditionary forces are often dogged by 
poor weather,152 and when night came after they arrived in Malea, the ships find 
themselves in peril, crowded in a narrow space.  Fortunately for the Romans, the 
sailors remain calm, communicate effectively, and manage to use their poles to push 
                                                
147 Evans 1972:  63; Treadgold 2007:  197. 
148 Evans 1972:  61; Kaldellis 2004:  179. 
149 Procop. Wars 3.6.12. 
150 Below, in part III (pp. 238-245), when I discuss characterization and generalship I argue 
that one of the key themes of the text, as argued by Procopius, is the importance of good 
generalship, and that it is this that prevented Rome from re-taking Africa in 468, and Gelimer 
from holding off Belisarius in 533/534. 
151 Procop. Wars 3.8.20. 
152 Cf. Brodka 2004:  73-75. 
 214 
off the neighbouring ships.153  This is in stark contrast to what had transpired during 
the Battle of Cape Bon, when the similar efforts of the Roman sailors are 
unsuccessful.154  Where the Romans earlier met with disaster, they are now meeting 
with success.  Indeed, a few chapters later Procopius intervenes, noting that the 
presence of abundance of water presaged an easy victory.155  Below I relate the 
incident involving the drunken murder committed by two Massegetae.156  At the 
conclusion of this event, the Huns do not surface until book four.  At this point they 
decide to hold back from the war until a victor emerges.157  Though these two events 
appear, at least at first sight, to be isolated incidents, in the earlier incident Procopius 
is surely alluding to the continued problems that these barbarians would cause for 
the Romans.  Indeed, in this same sequence Procopius notes the actions of the 
Carthaginian Laurus, who is later charged with treason,158 in the course of which he 
pauses the narrative to note that this man had been attempting to court the 
Massagetae through all manner of gifts.159  This reference to Laurus brings together 
the two events, the earlier impaling of the Massagetae, and Belisarius’ current 
attempts to win the Huns over with presents.160  As this survey has pointed out, there 
                                                
153 Procop. Wars 3.13.5-7. 
154 Procop. Wars 3.6.19-20.  cf. Hom. Il. 9.487-488. 
155 Procop. Wars 3.15.35. 
156 Procop. Wars 3.12.7ff; and below pp 231-232. 
157 Procop. Wars 4.1.5ff.  According to Thompson (1996:  23), it was common practice for 
classicizing authors to associate the Huns with the earlier Herodotean Massagetae (1.216).  
Herodotus is indeed the most likely source for this name, and interestingly enough, and 
historicity aside, Herodotus had noted the tendency of the Massagetae to be drunk on the 
smoke of a certain plant (1.202).  Thompson (1996:  41) notes that Theodoret, though not 
necessarily a classicizing author, does so.  Claudian (in Rufin. 1.328), who most certainly is, 
does the same.  Maenchen-Helfen (1973:  4) adds Themistius, and significantly for my 
purposes, Procopius to the list of authors who equate the Massagetae with the Huns.  On the 
other hand, Batty (2007:  372-374) discusses Ammianus Marcellinus’ (31.2.12) association of 
the Massagetae with the Alans. 
158 Procop. Wars 4.1.8. 
159 Procop. Wars 4.1.9. 
160 The Huns and Massagetae are mentioned as the same peoples by Procopius at 3.18.12-
13. 
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are a considerable number of places where Procopius alludes to the 
interconnectedness of events, and text, in the Vandal Wars.  
Besides the references to events within the Vandal Wars, there are also 
references to events in both the Persian Wars and the Gothic Wars.  A common 
feature of warfare in the Gothic Wars, as we shall see, is Procopius’ focus on 
gruesomeness.  This sort of graphic detail is not found in the Persian Wars, and it 
first surfaces here in the Vandal Wars, though not yet in the form it would later take 
when Procopius is describing events in Italy, especially during the siege of Rome.  At 
3.23.17-18 Procopius tells us where Diogenes suffers his wounds, though he does 
not attribute his injuries to single blows or single combat, nor does he describe 
protruding missiles.  These sorts of details increase significantly in book four, 
particularly as we move closer to the text’s conclusion.  There is horrid a scene a bit 
later in which Aigan is hacked to pieces,161 and his companion Rufinus has his head 
chopped off, and then taken as a trophy, by the Berber commander Medisinissas.162  
The scene most evocative of the Gothic Wars rather significantly comes towards the 
end of the Vandal Wars.  We find more gruesome detail and, notably, it comes as the 
result of a single shot, which, as with the episodes in the Gothic Wars, fells a 
combatant.  John successfully hits Stotzas in the groin with one shot from his bow, a 
blow which, miraculously to the modern reader, kills the mutineer.163   The last such 
gory episode comes when Artasires chops off a piece of Gotharis’ head.164  With 
Gontharis seriously wounded, Artabanes finishes him off by plunging a sword into his 
left side.165   
                                                
161 Procop. Wars 4.10.10:  κρεουργηθεὶς.   
162 Procop. Wars 4.10.11:  τῆς τε κεφαλῆς αὐτὸνἀφαιρεῖται.  On Medisinissas see Modéran 
(2003:  435). 
163 Procop. Wars 4.24.11. 
164 Procop. Wars 4.28.27. 
165 Procop. Wars 4.28.29. 
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Gruesome details aside, there are other more direct means of alluding to the 
Gothic Wars.  So, while camping at Tricamarum Procopius includes a prolepsis 
which looks forward to victory in Italy, and which involves the burning of the tips of 
spears.166  As noted at the start of the paragraph, besides looking forward, Procopius 
also looks back.  In the course of his description of the Battle of Tricamarum 
Procopius refers to the approach of the Vandals while the Romans were eating their 
meal.167  The event seems innocuous enough, but if we go back to the Battle of 
Callinicum,168 as well as the skirmish around Nisibis we find the Romans caught in a 
similar predicament.169  Soldiers would presumably always eat before combat,170 and 
so when Procopius does note this fact, it is surely significant.  Earlier Belisarius had 
been aware of the dangers with eating too soon and had warned his commander 
Peter of this.  What is most surprising about this particular episode is that he seems 
to have forgotten the advice that he had given earlier.   
During the second phase of the assault at Mt. Aurasium, an unnamed Roman 
decides to scale the tower.171  While making his ascent he is ridiculed by the Berber 
women above, in a scene which echoes the taunting of Khusro at Amida from the 
Persian Wars.172  Then as now, this hubristic act on the part of women presages their 
side’s eventual defeat.  While describing the Vandal Wars, then, Procopius is 
cognizant not only of the relationship of events within, but also of the relationship of 
events without, in other words, with the text at large.   
                                                
166 Procop. Wars 4.2.5-7. 
167 Procop. Wars 4.3.1. 
168 Procop. Wars 1.18.15. 
169 Procop. Wars 2.18.17. 
170 Onas. 12; Veg. Mil. 3.11.3. 
171 Procop. Wars 4.20.26.  On the battle see Rubin (1957:  425) and Syvänne (2004:  466). 
172 Procop. Wars 1.7.18. 
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Part II:  The Nature of Warfare173 
I now turn to the nature of the combat described by Procopius.  As with the 
Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars, the battles described here have a distinct 
character.  As I did in the last chapter, here I shall look at some of the theory that 
underscores Procopius’ descriptions.  I shall also look more closely at the specific 
correspondences with military manuals.  Before I get into these matters, however, I 
want to explore the general nature of the warfare described, which is remarkable for 
the limited number of pitched battles included, and where they are, the general lack 
of detail concerning the actual fighting.  Procopius is more concerned with the actors 
involved, and what the battle means, than with what happens, a practice we did not 
find in the Persian Wars, and, generally, we will not find in the Gothic Wars. 
 
Guerrilla Warfare and the Absence of Fighting 
As with the battles described in the respective sections (Persian Wars, Gothic 
Wars) of the rest of the Wars, those found in the Vandal Wars have a distinctive 
character. The most distinctive feature is arguably the emphasis on small-scale 
guerrilla-style combat, and the pronounced absence of descriptions of fighting itself 
in Procopius’ battles in the Vandal Wars. 
Book three is generally devoid of combat, with the exception of the Battle of 
Cape Bon, and the decisive Battle of Decimum.  The description of the former, one of 
the briefest in the text, is restricted to the collision of the ships at sea.  On the other 
hand the latter, the description of which takes up two chapters, only mentions 
combat in passing.174  Procopius notes that Ammatas and his team of Vandals kill a 
                                                
173 Bravery, Fear, and encirclement are almost as prevalent in the Vandal Wars as they are in 
the Persian Wars.  As such, I have decided not to include a discussion of those, no less 
important, elements. 
174 Procop. Wars 3.18.1-3.19.33. 
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host of John’s men.175  A few lines later, the historian merely notes that John and his 
men kill all those they encounter while they flee.176  One of the major phases of the 
battle is restricted to a couple of lines:  “The Vandals did not await those charging 
them, but, having broken their line, barely perceived the battle and were all 
shamefully destroyed.”177  In the next chapter are some exhortations, more of 
Procopius’ interventions, and considerable discussion of tactical concerns, and 
possibilities.178  When Procopius turns to the other major battle of the text in book 
four, Tricamarum, we find one of the few exceptions to his Vandal Wars practice.  In 
it are more traditional elements, such as the disposition of the respective troops in 
the battle lines,179 the attempts by the generals to encourage the troops,180 and a 
series of sallies that presumably are meant to include some fighting.181  Even here, 
however, the fighting is generally atypical.  There is no exchange of arrows, limited 
discussion of the close-quarters fighting, and only the faintest of references to the 
integrity of the respective lines.182  Once the conquest phase of the war ends, with 
the possible exception of Mammes, the warfare described is by and large restricted 
to guerrilla-style small-scale encounters.  The engagement round Mt. Bourgaon is 
little more than a stand-off.183  What fighting there is centres on the adjacent peak 
                                                
175 Procop. Wars 3.18.5-6. 
176 Procop. Wars 3.18.10. 
177 Procop. Wars 3.18.19.  The lack of attention to the fighting might be because Procopius 
was not privy to the information about the battle itself, a point suggested by the following line 
at 3.19.1.  Nevertheless, there are many other battles in which he would not have been 
present, such as the Battle of Busta Gallorum, and yet in these he still provides considerable 
detail about the fighting itself.   
178 Tactical concerns and interventions:  Procop. Wars 3.19.11.13, 3.19.26-28.. 
179 Procop. Wars 4.3.4-8. 
180 Procop. Wars 4.3.9.  In this case it is Gelimer specifically described as wandering through 
the ranks exhorting his troops.   
181 Procop. Wars 4.3.10-15. 
182 Procop. Wars 4.3.15. 
183 Procop. Wars 4.12.4,22. 
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stratagem, and the panic and flight that it causes.184  Indeed, Procopius expressly 
states that the Berbers have no intention of engaging the Romans in open combat 
following their thumping at Mammes.185  The siege, if one can call it that, of Mt. 
Aurasium, is filled with the same lack of interest in fighting.186  Towards the end of 
book four, when the focus of the warfare described turns to that between Roman and 
Roman, we find more of the same.187  Although military matters dominate events in 
the Vandal Wars just as they do in the rest of the Wars, as we have just seen, little of 
that is specifically concerned with fighting itself.  Bearing this in mind, it is time to turn 
to what military issues Procopius does then focus on. 
 
Morale and Discipline 
Morale is no less relevant in the Vandal Wars than it was in the Persian 
Wars.  In fact, in the rest of the narrative (that is outside of the battles) morale plays 
a big role both for the soldiers and the civilians, though this is not the place to 
discuss those other aspects.  We saw above that to a certain degree morale was 
emphasized more in the exhortations in the Vandal Wars than it was in the Persian 
Wars.  Plus, some new elements associated with morale are introduced into the 
descriptions of battle, and some old ones are used in slightly different ways.  Thus, 
there are a number of situations where the barbarian commander/s moves among 
his forces exhorting them on into battle:  they are distinct from the artificial 
exhortations discussed above, and instead they seem to be the sorts of exhortations 
that we would most likely expect to have existed in an actual battle.  The Romans on 
occasion apply techniques designed to frighten their enemies before they engage 
                                                
184 Procop. Wars 4.12.17:  the description of the stratagem.  The ensuing rout is described at 
4.12.21-24. 
185 Procop. Wars 4.12.4. 
186 Procop. Wars 4.13.30. 
187 Procop. Wars 4.26.10, 4.26.27. 
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them.  So, we get the Romans yelling and shouting as they prepare to enter battle.  
We also find traditional elements such as the standard:  it had a role clearly 
commensurate with its role during the Principate, though it seems to have been even 
more important in the Vandal Wars than in the Persian Wars.  These then are some 
of the key factors.  Let us now look at some of these issues in more detail. 
The connection between discipline and generalship is prevalent in the Vandal 
Wars just as it had been in the Persian Wars.188  Indeed, modern scholars have 
frequently remarked on the importance of discipline in the Vandal Wars.189  
Indiscipline can, and often does, lead to serious problems in battle.  The Vandals 
fleeing following the first skirmish in the Battle of Ad Decimum travel in no order and 
in small groups.190  As a result, they are cut down by the Romans.191  In the Battle of 
Mt. Bourgaon, when the Berbers realize that they are being fired at from two sides, 
they decide to turn and flee; however, because they have limited escape options, 
they panic, their discipline lapses, and they flee through a narrow vale and end up 
trampling each other.192  By the end of the stampede the body count is enormous, or 
so says Procopius.193   In the Battle of Mammes Solomon and 500 troops charge one 
part of the Berber circle and, as a result, the Berbers pull back and retreat.194  The 
Romans follow the fleeing Berbers and cut them down.195  When a general turns and 
flees in battle the effect can be quite devastating, and if not in terms of the number of 
                                                
188 One significant difference is that in the Vandal Wars we see it emphasized even more in 
the marches to and from battle (cf. 3.12.8-22; 3.16.1ff; 3.20.2; 3.20.22ff; 4.14.7ff, and here a 
mutiny arises when Belisarius is not there and the army lacks strong leadership; 4.15.17ff; 
4.15.28ff; 4.17.28ff). 
189 See, for example, Bury (1923:  131), Stein (1949:  317), Evans (1972:  64), Brodka (2004:  
83-84), and Whately (2008:  246).   
190 Procop. Wars 3.18.8. 
191 Procop. Wars 3.18.10ff. 
192 Procop. Wars 4.12.22ff. 
193 Procop. Wars 4.12.25. 
194 Procop. Wars 4.11.51-54.  Modéran (2003) does not discuss the battles which the Berbers 
waged against the Romans in the reconquest period in detail, though he does discuss the 
wars of which they were a part. 
195 Procop. Wars 4.11.54. 
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casualties, then in psychological terms.  At the end of the Battle of Tricamarum 
Gelimer considers turning back and renewing the fight, but quickly decides against 
this and turns in flight.196  His kinsmen are shell-shocked, and turn and follow their 
leader both stunned and afraid.197   
What are the ways that a commander could boost, maintain, or restore 
morale, and with it, discipline?  In these examples discipline is tied to generalship, 
and in turn, connected to the importance of order, a feature frequently emphasized 
by the tactical authors, Maurice included.  Belisarius, and the other commanders, 
deal with disciplinary problems in a host of circumstances; in a variety of different 
ways, and with varying success.  If one feature stands out, it is Belisarius’ 
multifaceted approach to these issues, as well as the important role that his own 
persona plays.  One means of restoring order in battle was to yell at the troops.  
Belisarius does just that in the Battle of Ad Decimum and yells at the soldiers, and in 
particular Uliaris and the 800 guardsmen who fled when the Foederati reached them 
after they themselves had fled from the Vandals.198  Belisarius also does this 
following the mad scramble for booty at the end of the Battle of Tricamarum.199  
Germanus also encounters some recalcitrant troops in the Battle of Scalae Veteres 
and ends up heaping abuse on those soldiers to try and restore order.200 Sometimes, 
however, more drastic methods are required.  Procopius describes some of the 
infidelities of the Huns at the start of the Battle of Tricamarum.  In the middle of that 
discussion Procopius includes the story of a certain Laurus, who had been charged 
with treason.201  As a result, Belisarius impales the man on a hill, thus sending a 
                                                
196 Procop. Wars 4.3.19-20. 
197 Procop. Wars 4.3.20-21. 
198 Procop. Wars 3.19.30. 
199 Procop. Wars 4.4.7. 
200 Procop. Wars 4.17.30. 
201 Procop. Wars 4.1.8. 
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clear warning to would-be miscreants.  Procopius even notes the unmistakable fear 
this instilled in the rest of the men:  here fear has been twisted to the general’s 
advantage.  Commanders can also boost morale by riding through the ranks and 
exhorting their men.202  Gelimer does this in the Battle of Tricamarum,203 and 
Germanus seems to have done the same in the Battle of Scalae Veteres.204  Finally, 
a commander could take matters into his own hands and charge the foe himself.  
Solomon does something along these lines in the Battle of Mammes.  When he sees 
that his men are panicking, Solomon leaps down from his horse and urges his men 
to do the same.205  The men then formed a fulcum to ward off missile fire and 
Solomon himself along with 500 men charge the circle of Berbers.206  Procopius 
outlines a wide variety of different ways that a commander has to restore the morale 
of his troops. 
Fear, the low point on the morale spectrum, can cause other problems 
besides indiscipline and the concomitant urge to flee.  When the Vandals encounter 
their first Hun in the Battle of Ad Decimum they are stricken with panic and are 
unsure about how to react.  As a result of the debilitating fear of this unknown, but 
reportedly (to the Vandals) warlike people, the Vandals do not withstand the attack 
and are all killed.207  But, fear can affect both sides in battle.  The foederati hear 
about the encounter between John and Ammatas and grow anxious; they do not 
                                                
202 These examples are distinct from the exhortations created by Procopius and put into the 
mouth of the commanders; as noted they probably represent, and with considerable 
accuracy, how a commander actually did exhort his troops. 
203 Procop. Wars 4.3.9. 
204 Procop. Wars 4.17.24. 
205 Procop. Wars 4.11.50. 
206 Procop. Wars 4.11.51.  On the fulcum see Rance (2004a, 2007a:  366-367).  
Unfortunately Modéran does not specifically discuss the military characteristics of the 
Berbers, such as the camel circles described by Procopius, in his detailed monograph.  Cf. 
Modéran 2003:  338-340. 
207 Procop. Wars 3.18.19. 
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know what they ought to do.208  Suddenly a dust cloud appears near the hills and a 
substantial force of Vandals rushes down upon them.209  The two sides almost come 
to blows, but the foederati are too frightened of their foes and instead flee.  This fear 
also seized Uliaris, Belisarius’ guardsman.210  In some cases, one army may even try 
to frighten their foes.  When John makes his third charge in the Battle of Tricamarum 
they run with “much shouting and a great noise”.211  This clamour is surely meant to 
intimidate, or even frighten the Vandals.  There are others things that can frighten 
soldiers besides the sight of their foes.  The omen described by Procopius in the 
Battle of Tricamarum frightens the soldiers, even though it turned out to be a positive 
occurrence.212  Much of the fear described here comes from a lack of knowledge of 
one’s foe and the situation.  During the early phase of the expedition, in the 
Thucydidean discussion between Belisarius, Archelaus, and the other Roman 
commanders, fear is highlighted as one thing that might lead to defeat.213  As long as 
a commander can control this fear, success is likely to follow.214  In sum, if there is 
one point to take from my discussion of discipline and morale, it is the importance 
that Procopius ties to the general in its maintenance. 
 
 
 
                                                
208 Procop. Wars 3.19.15. 
209 Procop. Wars 3.19.15. 
210 Procop. Wars 3.19.22-24. 
211 Procop. Wars 4.3.13. 
212 Procop. Wars 4.2.6-7. 
213 Procop. Wars. 3.14.1-2.  On the Thucydidean points of contact see Evans (1972:  65), 
Pazdernik (2000:  160), and Kaldellis (2004:  265, n. 59).  The Thucydidean passage that is 
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Herodotus.  Cf. Procop. Wars 3.10-18-21, Hdt. 7.8-18, Evans (1972:  63), Pazdernik (1997:  
148, 2000:  153-159), and Kaldellis (2004:  180-181). 
214 One of the express aims of the Vandal Wars is to provide military guidance for would-be 
generals.  Note Procopius’ comments at 3.14.1. 
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The Standard 
The standard makes its Vandal Wars debut in the Battle of Tricamarum; its 
placement at the beginning of this stage of the battle is surely significant.215  Later, 
when describing the disposition of the Roman forces for the last stage of the battle, 
Procopius again highlights the standard.216  Plus, during the third and successful 
charge, Procopius tells us that John took not only almost all of Belisarius’ spearmen 
and guards, but also the general’s standard before making his charge.217  In the 
Battle of Scalae Veteres the standard of Germanus emboldened Stotzas.  For, when 
he caught sight of the general’s standard he decided to charge the man with the 
standard.218  In this situation the standard is used as a marker, or, rather, as a target 
for one army’s attack; it is also used, albeit indirectly, to embolden the opposing 
troops, for Stotzas exhorts his men when he sees Germanus’ standard.219  In that 
same battle we learn that even rebellious Roman soldiers hold their standards in 
high regard; when the mutineers are put to flight they abandon their ranks, but still 
manage to scoop up their standards.220  In the Battle of Mt. Bourgaon the standard is 
used in an interesting new way, that is, as part of a stratagem to deceive the Berbers 
about the Romans’ numbers.  The Romans run into some trouble because the 
                                                
215 Procop. Wars 4.2.1. 
216 Procop. Wars 4.3.5.  I should point out that there are some discrepancies in Procopius’ 
discussion of the standard.  When he first introduces it, he says “and the standard (σημεῖον), 
which the Romans call bandon (βάνδον) (4.2.1)”.  Procopius calls the standard the general’s 
standard (4.3.5, σημεῖον τὸ στρατηγικὸν; 4.3.13, τὸ στρτηγικὸν σημεῖον) the next two times 
that he mentions it in this battle.  Cf. Dennis (1981) on battle flags in Byzantine warfare.  
Maurice discusses flags and standards at various points in his treatise (Strat. 2.14, 2.15, 
2.20, 7.1).  Cf. Veg. Mil. 3.5. 
217 Procop. Wars 4.3.13. 
218 Procop. Wars 4.17.14. 
219 In this case the standard is clearly the general’s.  Still, if Maurice’s Strategikon is any 
indication, there was a myriad of different standards in use by the Roman army.  The 
standard, then, is yet another instance where there seems to be a correspondence between 
Procopius’ and Maurice’s respective works (though there are also some significant 
differences); many of the discussions of the use of the standard in Maurice’s work have a 
parallel in Procopius’ battle descriptions.    
220 Procop. Wars 4.17.17. 
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Berbers manage to get an elevated position halfway up the mountain; as a result, 
they are not willing to engage the Romans on level ground.221  Procopius notes that 
the Berbers left the peak unoccupied because they did not think that they could be 
attacked from that position.222  To counteract this problem, Solomon sends 
Theodorus, the leader of the Excubitores, to go secretly to the summit on the east 
side of the mountain with 1,000 foot soldiers and some standards (τ ν σημείων τιν ).223  Once this special unit had reached their destination, they are to wait 
through the night until the morning and then, “displaying the standards to shoot”.224  
When daybreak comes, and Solomon sends the rest of the Roman troops to the 
base of the mountain to engage the Berbers, those soldiers are distraught when they 
see the seemingly foreign troops on the summit, not yet being able to distinguish 
them from their foes.225  But, when they recognize that the standards are their own, 
they fight with extra vigour.226  In addition, when the Berbers realize that they are 
surrounded, their morale dissipates and soon are scrambling to escape.227  Thus, on 
this occasion, the standard serves two purposes:  not only does it embolden the 
Roman soldiers, but it also adds to the panic of the Berbers.   
Generally, the standards are protected at all costs, and care is taken to 
ensure that they are not left behind, which suggests that they are quite important.  
Although there are no battles where a standard is seized, or where the bearer falls 
and the army’s morale subsequently plummets, the fact that on at least one occasion 
a fleeing Roman army running in disorder still manages to take their standards with 
them suggests that they were still extremely vital objects.  
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225 Procop. Wars 4.12.20. 
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Plunder, Booty, and the Characterization of the Roman Army 
Procopius’ characterizations of the Roman army are more complementary in 
the Vandal Wars than they are in the Persian Wars.  The Roman army described by 
Procopius in the Persian Wars had a penchant for plundering; and in many cases the 
main focus of the army seems to have been a search for booty.  Plunder and booty 
are an aspect that surfaces again, but it seems to be of even greater importance to 
the narratives here; moreover, it is a problem not only for the indigenous Roman 
soldiers but also for their allies, and in particular, the Huns.  In fact, in some of the 
seditions booty, or rather the fear of the soldiers or allies that they may not get their 
due share of booty, is the cause of their discontent.  Thus, despite the fact that the 
characterization of the Roman army is in many ways more favourable in the Vandal 
Wars than it had been in the Persian Wars, Procopius certainly had his reservations, 
at least about certain issues.  Given its relationship to the characterization of the 
armies, I shall examine the propensity to plunder in the Vandal Wars, both on its own 
merits, and in this regard.   
In the Battle of Cape Bon, as the Roman ships smoulder in the bay, the 
Vandals start carrying both the soldiers and their weapons off the sinking ships:228  
this action in this programmatic-battle highlights the fact that plunder is going to be 
an important objective of the military engagements, only here the Romans are the 
victims.229  Plunder and booty surface again at the start of the Battle of Tricamarum 
and it promises to be a key issue in the outcome of this battle.  The Huns, the 
Romans’ wayward allies, were concerned about being robbed of their deserved 
                                                
228 Procop. Wars 3.6.21. 
229 As with the comparison noted earlier, Basiliscus and Belisarius (above pp. 191-196), the 
situation here is reversed. 
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booty following Roman victories.230  One tactic that Belisarius employs to ease their 
concerns is to shower the Huns with gifts before the fighting begins.231  This seems 
to work because the Huns do not jeopardize the Roman army’s success in the battle.  
It is not only the barbarians, however, that have a penchant for plundering:  the 
regular contingents of the Roman army are not immune to the allure of booty.  
Plunder takes up most of the last stage of the Battle of Tricamarum.  After the death 
of the prominent Vandals and their concordant flight, the Romans turn almost 
immediately to their corpses and remove the gold from their bodies.232  But, it is 
when Gelimer himself and his kinsmen turn and flee that the booty-driven feeding 
frenzy really begins.233  The key factor, as described by Procopius, is the sheer 
volume of booty that the Vandals had left behind, and he emphasizes this through a 
negation:  “They found in this camp such an incredible quantity of goods as had 
never been in one place.”234  Procopius then tells us that the Vandal plundering of 
Roman property had been going on for years, and that their land was incredibly 
fertile.  Whether or not this is meant to justify the Romans’ actions is another matter, 
though this may be what Procopius is implying.  From there the situation 
deteriorates; the success in battle is threatened due to the reckless plundering of the 
Roman soldiers:  it is important to note that at this stage the Huns, who had 
complained about booty at the beginning of the battle, are not mentioned in the 
narrative which follows.  One particular passage that gives us a clear exposition of 
the problems with the Roman army at this point– though it also includes an important 
exception – comes at the end of the Battle of Tricamarum: 
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232 Procop. Wars 4.3.17. 
233 Procop. Wars 4.3.20-22. 
234 Procop. Wars 4.3.25. 
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For the soldiers being extremely poor men having become all of a sudden 
masters of a great deal of money, and of bodies [women] in their prime and 
extremely good-looking, were no longer able to check their minds or to find 
any satiety in their possessions, but were so drunk, being drenched by their 
current good fortunes, that each one wanted to take everything himself back 
to Carthage.  And they were going about not in squadrons, but alone or by 
twos, wherever hope led them, searching everything roundabout in the 
valleys and the rough country and wherever a cave turned up or anything that 
might lead them into danger or an ambush.235 
 
At this point it is clear that greed has taken over the army, and as a result the 
soldiers are leaving themselves vulnerable to a possible Vandal counter-attack.  
Belisarius is rightfully concerned and it is not until the following day that he is able to 
restore order.236  After the Battle of Mammes the narrative ends with the Romans 
gathering and enslaving all of the Berber women and children.237  In addition, the 
Romans take all of the camels as booty.238  Following the Battle of Mt. Bourgaon the 
Romans round up even more Berber women and children as booty to the point 
where, “they could sell a Berber boy for the price of a sheep to those who wished to 
buy.”239  Towards the end of the Battle of Scalae Veteres plunder rears its head; yet 
again, the Romans put themselves into the same sorts of problems that they had 
following the Battle of Tricamarum:  “There the soldiers seized the valuables with no 
trouble and did not take into consideration their opponents and did not obey the 
exhortations of their general any more, being in the presence of loot.”240  Again, it 
takes some desperate pleading on the part of the Roman general, in this case 
Germanus, to bring things under control.  Clearly, plunder is a serious problem.  
Besides referring to the propensity to plunder in the fighting itself, Procopius 
also refers to the penchant for plundering in two of the battle exhortations.  The 
                                                
235 Procop. Wars 4.4.3-4.  On the reckless behaviour of these soldiers and the problems it 
gives them later in Africa see Kaegi (1981:  45-50). 
236 Procop. Wars 4.4.1. 
237 Cf. Modéran 2003:  340-341. 
238 Procop. Wars 4.11.56. 
239 Procop. Wars 4.12.28. 
240 Procop. Wars 4.17.29. 
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leaders of the Berbers – no names are given – in their exhortation to their troops 
before the Battle of Mammes tell them that they have much to fight for because if 
they lose, they will be enslaved.241  Prior to the Battle of Mt. Aurasium Belisarius 
gives an exhortation to the imperial troops.242  First, Belisarius points out that the 
imperial troops will be fighting against kinsmen; but he assures them that they 
themselves did not begin the battle but were drawn into it by their rebellious peers.  
Thus, the friendship bonds are immaterial for friends they were no more.  Then, and 
of particular relevance for this discussion, Belisarius says the following: 
That the men who are lined up against us are enemies and barbarians and 
whatever worse name someone might call them is shown not only by Libya 
which has been plundered by their hands, or by those who live here who 
have been wrongly killed by them, but also by the many Roman soldiers, 
whom these hostiles have dared to kill, although the only charge that they 
can level at them is that they are loyal to the state.243  
There is one further exhortation that specifically refers to plunder and it comes from 
Stotzas and follows the Battle of Mt. Aurasium.  On this occasion the loyal Roman 
troops have lined up – Procopius even names the arrangement of the loyalist forces -
, are prepared to fight against the mutinous troops, and are about to engage them 
when Stotzas goes before them.244  In his exhortation Stotzas tells the soldiers that 
they have suffered the same problems as the rebellious ones, and those problems 
include payments in arrears, and a lack of access to the plunder that is rightfully 
theirs.245  The speech works and the rebellious army is now larger.  So, throughout 
the Vandal Wars narrative plunder is presented, by and large, as a problem; now that 
we have identified the references, we need to examine its significance. 
                                                
241 Procop. Wars 4.11.40.   
242 Procop. Wars 4.15.16ff. 
243 Procop. Wars 4.15.20. 
244 Procop. Wars 4.15.50-53. 
245 Procop. Wars 4.15.55.  The regular payment of soldiers was a serious problem for the 
army in the sixth century, on which see Jones (1964:  668-679), Kaegi (1981:  41-119), 
Whitby (1988:  165-169, 1995:  110-116, 2000a:  291-292), and Lee (2007a:  85-89, 2007b:  
403-410). 
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In Procopius’ narrative plunder is associated with the victors, which is what 
we would expect.  Before battle commences in the Battle of Mammes we saw that 
the Berber commanders, whom Procopius did not think were significant enough to be 
named, argued that the Berbers should fight to prevent themselves from being 
enslaved – becoming booty – by the Romans.246  This same concern led a certain 
John, a general under Basiliscus, to jump overboard to his death which he preferred 
to being captured by the Vandals at the end of the Battle of Cape Bon.247  
Throughout the descriptions of battle in the Vandal Wars then, and in these two 
examples in particular, the validity of the victorious side plundering the defeated side 
is not questioned.  There are, however, two important stipulations associated with 
that implicit understanding between the armies pitted against each other in all of 
these battles: first, the plundering must be sanctioned by the officers to ensure order, 
and safety, following victory; second, that plunder should be accessible to all, regular 
and allied contingents alike.  In regard to the first stipulation, when the Romans are 
successful and begin to plunder the enemy camps, it is not the plundering that is 
chastised, but the disorder that ensues and the potential danger that follows when 
the soldiers’ booty lust is not checked.  In the Battles of Tricamarum and Scalae 
Veteres the disorder nearly leads to disaster; similar disorder following seeming 
victory led to disaster on at least one occasion in the Persian Wars.  In the Battle of 
Anglon in 543, after capturing a spy and some heated debate, the Romans march off 
in disorder ready for plunder.  Although they manage to deploy themselves when 
they encounter Naved’s Persian forces, they suffer heavy casualties and are 
                                                
246 It is clear that Procopius considers humans to be an object of plunder.  So, men, women, 
and children can be just as valuable to a successful army as weapons and expensive goods. 
247 Procop. Wars 3.6.24. 
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defeated.248  In all of these cases the men ignored their commanders, and this put 
the army at a serious disadvantage.  From the point of view of the officers, as long as 
the army did not leave itself vulnerable to attack, there was no problem.   
The second stipulation associated with plunder was its accessibility.  We 
have already looked at the concerns of the allied Hun units in some detail, but what 
about the regular Roman units?   In the midst of the series of mutinies in book four 
Belisarius in the Battle of Mr. Aurasium states that one of the charges that the loyalist 
troops can level at the rebellious troops is that Libya has been plundered at their 
hands.  Yet, in a later exhortation, before a battle that does not materialize, Stotzas 
tells the loyalist troops lined up against him that all of the troops, both friend and foe, 
have not received their due access to plunder.  The speech works and this group of 
loyalist troops joins Stotzas’ rebellious force.  Procopius is keen to highlight some of 
the problems experienced by the soldiers.  Twice Procopius links the problems with 
plunder to the poverty of the soldiers.249  Plus, he also claims through one of 
Belisarius’ exhortations that the only charge250 – and judging by his language a 
legitimate charge – that the rebellious troops can level at the loyalist troops is that 
they have been loyal to the state.  Procopius berates Justinian for not paying the 
soldiers in the Secret History,251 and here, though more subtly, he seems to be 
substantiating that complaint; plus, his comments about the mad search for plunder 
following the Battle of Tricamarum seem to absolve the soldiers of much blame.  In 
sum, Procopius argues in the battles of the Vandal Wars that plunder is only a 
problem when it is not checked by the officers, and when it is not evenly distributed.  
                                                
248 Granted, the circumstances in this episode from the Persian Wars are a little different – 
the propensity to plunder arises before the battle even begins – but the same sorts of 
concerns are involved. 
249 Procop. Wars 4.4.3 and 4.15.55. 
250 Procop. Wars 4.15.20. 
251 Procop. SH 24.2ff. 
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It is when these factors are ignored that Procopius tends to cast the desire for 
plunder of the respective armies in a negative light.   
 
Procopius and Military Treatises252 
 Throughout the Vandal Wars Procopius gives us a lot about tactics and 
military doctrine both in the speeches of the characters involved and his own narrator 
interventions.  Indeed, in some respects Procopius is keener to present the 
intellectual side of combat, rather than the combat itself.  In this section I want to 
identify these comments, and look for parallels in the military treatises. 
One of the first statements of military doctrine comes from the lips of 
Belisarius following the impaling of the Massagetae.  Having called together his men 
he says the following:   
If the words were given to men who were coming to war now for the first time, 
I would need a long time to persuade you, through my speech, how great a 
support justice is for gaining a [victory] trophy.  For those who do not know 
well the fortunes of such contests think that the end of war is brought about 
through arms alone.  But you, who have defeated an enemy many times who 
is not inferior to you in body and is who is by nature sufficiently manly, you 
who many times have been tested by your enemy, and, you are not ignorant, 
I think, that although it is men who are continually fighting in both armies, it is 
God who acts as judge and then decides who to give victory to in battle.  
Since things are indeed thus, it is fitting to give less attention to a healthy 
body, ability in arms, and any other preparation in war than to those things 
which depend upon God.253  
  
The next ‘philosophy of war’ statement is only a few chapters later and, 
unsurprisingly, it too comes from the mouth of Belisarius; he notes that “warfare is by 
nature subject to the unexpected”.254  While describing the march to Carthage 
                                                
252 Any number of points could have been discussed in this section, particularly, for example, 
the importance of discipline, particularly given its importance in the Vandal Wars.  
Nevertheless, I have decided, in the interests of brevity, to restrict myself to points that best 
correspond to the military doctrines, or rather, general maxims, found in the manuals for 
reasons that will become apparent at the end of this section. 
253 Procop. Wars 3.12.12-14. 
254 Procop. Wars 3.15.25. 
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Procopius notes that Belisarius sent ahead John the Armenian with 300 of his 
guardsmen to scout the route, while he put the allied Massagetae on the left, with he 
himself and his best troops in the rear.255  The exhortation before Decimum provides 
the next set of statements.  Here Belisarius stresses that practice leads to skill, and 
he tells his men to keep weapons and anything else that might slow them down, 
including their provisions, in their stockade.256  Procopius then intervenes to tell us 
his tactical plans:  he decides not to risk battle with the Vandals first, whom he had 
just noted his men were not familiar with, and instead sends forth some cavalry to 
test their foes.257  When the text turns to the next major battle, Tricamarum, 
Belisarius modifies his statements noted at the start of this discussion:  “for it is not 
by numbers of men or the measure of one’s body, but by the arete of the spirit that 
war is wont to be decided”.258  When Belisarius leaves Africa, at least temporarily, 
and is replaced by Solomon, we find Procopius espousing different military doctrines, 
and ones more in keeping with those noted in the Persian Wars.259  Solomon, during 
his first major contest with Berbers, prepares against being encircled by his foes.260  
In that same encounter, the Battle of Mammes, Solomon gives an exhortation in 
which he lays out his own doctrines.  Early on he stresses the superiority in 
equipment that the Romans have over the Berbers.261  A few lines later he says that 
firing arrows at the camels would bring confusion and disorder, traits in keeping with 
his comments about encirclement, because of their relationship to order in the battle 
                                                
255 Procop. Wars 3.17.1-3. 
256 Procop. Wars 3.19.7-10. 
257 Procop. Wars 3.19.11-13. 
258 Procop. Wars 4.1.16. 
259 This fact, in and of itself, alludes to the potential trouble that the Berbers will give the 
Romans, for that is who Solomon fights against.  On the conflict between Berbers and 
Romans see Modéran (2003:  607-644). 
260 Procop. Wars 4.11.21. 
261 Procop. Wars 4.11.25, 29. 
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line.262  Then Solomon says:  “for daring, when it is commensurate with ability, is 
perhaps of some profit to those who use it, though it leads to danger when it exceeds 
this”.263  In the engagement around Mt. Bourgaon the primary objective is to take the 
peaks, thus being able to take the enemy from higher ground.  The Berbers manage 
to take one hill, though to their detriment, they leave the other untouched.264  In this 
same battle we find the stratagem in which Solomon attempts to deceive the Berber 
soldiers about the actual size of the Roman force.265  A chapter later, during the 
skirmish at Tigisis, the Berbers fail to make adequate provisions and find themselves 
tired, thirsty, and so prone to attack.266  Belisarius returns later in book four, and at 
the end of an exhortation he notes:  “for it is not by means of the number of those 
fighting, but rather by the order and manliness that victory in war is wont to be 
measured”.267  In the Battle of Scalae Veteres, when Germanus is the general in 
charge, he takes care to ensure that the rear of his line is reinforced in the hope of 
emboldening his men.268  This is very much in keeping with the doctrine of Solomon 
noted above, with the exception being that Germanus here reinforces his rear 
through a novel way, that is, through the use of wagons.269  Germanus’ usage of the 
doctrine which stresses order is more plausible here than it was against the Moors, 
as in this case he is arrayed against his fellow Romans under the leadership of 
Stotzas.  The last notable comments about tactics come from our narrator Procopius 
later in the same battle:   
When Stotzas came quite close to the enemy, and he saw the standard of 
Germanus, he exhorted those with him to move against him [Germanus].  But 
                                                
262 Procop. Wars 4.11.33. 
263 Procop. Wars 4.11.35. 
264 Procop. Wars 4.12.5-8. 
265 Procop. Wars 4.12.17. 
266 Procop. Wars 4.13.8. 
267 Procop. Wars 4.15.29. 
268 Procop. Wars 4.17.4. 
269 Procop. Wars 4.17.4. 
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all the mutinous Heruls who happened to be arrayed with him [Stotzas], did 
not follow, but even prevented him with all their strength, saying that they did 
not know the power of Germanus, or what sort they were; however, they 
knew well that all those who were lined up on the right wing of the enemy 
would, by no means, be a match for them.  Thus, if they proceeded against 
those men, these men would not withstand them and turn in flight, and, as is 
likely, throw the rest of the army into confusion; on the other hand, if they 
direct themselves towards Germanus and he drives them away, their entire 
cause will immediately by destroyed.270  
 
These comments of Procopius, in regard to the thinking of the Heruls, describes well 
the reasoning behind the fear of being turned in flight, recognizing, as they do, that 
most casualties come in this part of a battle.  These select examples, then, are 
representative of the sorts of tactical thinking employed, and espoused, throughout 
the Vandal Wars.  How well do these mesh the views presented in some of the 
military manuals?   
The first case, the selection from a speech of Belisarius, 271 essentially states 
that the ultimate arbiter of victory in battle is God.272  Vegetius, though not exactly 
attributing all success to God, certainly recognizes his role in the Empire’s ultimate 
success in war.273  In the preface to Maurice’s Strategikon the first entity named is 
God, and it is to him whom the author says directs matters.274  In that same preface, 
and several lines later, the author claims that the two most important things are God 
and justice,275 again in keeping with Procopius and Belisarius, and that “thus the best 
                                                
270 Procop. Wars 4.17.14-15. 
271 Syrianus, a possible contemporary of Procopius, refers to Belisarius in his text.  See 
Syrianus Magister peri Strat. 33.35.  My reasons for including Vegetius, who am I not 
suggesting Procopius read, is that his text is both extensive and, I feel, generally reflective of 
broader views held by other military thinkers.  I also believe, in accordance with the views 
recently expounded by Charles (2007), that the text probably dates to the middle of the fifth 
century and so, perhaps, not as far removed from Procopius’ time as one would at first 
believe.  For detailed bibliography on Vegetius see Charles (2007); for Syrianus and Maurice 
see my discussion in chapter two above pp 120-124. 
272 Prayer is another matter, and we have at least one incident in which Belisarius prays 
before battle (Wars 3.19.11).  Maurice would have been pleased (Strat. 8.2.1). 
273 See, for example, the two following passages:  Veg. Mil.  pref. 1, 2.5.3-4. 
274 Maurice Strat. pref. 1-3.  
275 Maurice Strat. pref. 36. 
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general is armed with the favour of God”.276  On the other hand, the Peri Strategias 
of Syrianus is not extant in full, and so for all we know, God may have been referred 
from the beginning in this text as well.  With that said, at the start of chapter two 
God’s role is outlined.277  The unexpectedness of war features in the military 
manuals.  Maurice, for one, says that a general should never be caught by 
surprise.278  Syrianus alludes to the same thing, doing so by use of a quotation.279  
Syrianus and Maurice have different views as regards how the army should be 
deployed when marching through enemy territory.  Syrianus, on the one hand, says 
that the generals should be on the side where an attack by the enemy is expected,280 
though generally they should be placed on one, or both flanks, depending on the 
type of ‘phalanx’.281  Syrianus also notes that some men should be sent ahead to 
scout the land, and that they should be mounted, and of a high standard.282  In its 
original incarnation Maurice’s handbook was concerned solely with cavalry; as such, 
the bulk of it is concerned with a mounted force, and so only partly of relevance to 
this discussion.  While discussing the procedure for marching through enemy terrain 
Maurice does not specify where the general is to be placed, or even whether the best 
troops are to be kept at the rear.  On the other hand, the baggage train is to be kept 
in the middle when the general fears an enemy attack.283  If there is no danger of 
                                                
276 Maurice Strat. pref. 45.  cf. Maurice. Strat. 8.2.1. 
277 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 2.3-5. Although there is some doubt about whether the text 
was even written in the sixth century, in the absence of conclusive evidence I have decided to 
include it, while acknowledging that its ascription to the sixth century is by no means certain. 
278 Maurice Strat. pref. 53-55, 8.2.98. 
279 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 20.5-6.  The quotation is from Polyaenus (Stratagems 3.9.17). 
280 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 20.20-23 
281 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 20.16-18. 
282 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 20.28-44. 
283 Maurice Strat. 9.3.87-88.  As an aside, reading Procopius’ narratives in light of the points 
made by the military theorists can inform us of the reasons for some of the actions.  Thus, in 
the episode in the Vandal Wars to which I am referring here (3.17.3-4), Belisarius may have 
placed himself, and his best troops, at the rear of the column because he feared, or, 
expected, an attack from the rear.  On the other hand, I should note that there was one 
school of thought which stressed that the general should not be at the front of the line.  
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attack, the general is to be placed at the front along with his best troops.284  In 
chapter twelve, however, the later addition in which he does discuss mixed 
formations he says that, in keeping with Belisarius’ practice, cavalry should be sent 
ahead, though he also suggests that they be sent to the rear.285  All of the points that 
I have highlighted from Belisarius’ exhortation before Decimum surface in the military 
treatises.  Vegetius, in a section devoted to military exercises, notes that it is through 
continual exercise that the art of war is transmitted.286  Indeed, the heading of the 
first section in chapter one is:  “The Romans Defeated All Peoples by the Training in 
Arms Alone”.287  The second maxim from Maurice’s list of military sayings stresses 
the importance of training.288  In his chapter devoted to the baggage train, when 
leaving an encampment to attack an enemy Maurice recommends that only 
essentials be brought along.289  Maurice cautions against attacking an enemy with 
which the general is unfamiliar.290  Syrianus too considers the matter of great 
importance, devoting an entire section to when to engage an enemy in battle in 
which the first point noted is gathering intelligence on one’s foes.291  Unsurprisingly, 
Vegetius discusses similar issues.292  Andreia or virtus are singled out as important 
factors in one’s success by both Vegetius and Maurice; indeed, the two authors 
include near identical entries in their respective lists of maxims.293  As noted above, 
the doctrines espoused by Solomon and Germanus largely stress the importance of 
                                                                                                                                      
Indeed, in the Gothic Wars Procopius refers to the problems an overly active general can 
cause.  See chapter five below pp 293-301. 
284 Maurice Strat. 1.9.29-35. 
285 Maurice Strat. 12.B.19.2. 
286 Veg. Mil. 2.23.6-10. 
287 Veg. Mil. 1.1.1. 
288 Maurice Strat. 8.2.2. 
289 Maurice Strat. 5.3. 
290 Maurice Strat. 7.A.1.25-27. 
291 Syrianus Magister peri strat. 33.2-6. 
292 Veg. Mil. 3.9.4-7. 
293 Veg. Mil. 3.26.10:  amplius iuvat virtus quam multitudo; Maurice Strat. 8.2.8.21-22:  
ἀνδρεία μᾶλλον καὶ τάξις ἤ πλῆθος τῶν μαχομένων οἶδεν εὐεργετεῖν. 
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order in the battle line.  In chapter two I noted that this was one of the main strands 
of thinking among Greek military theorists.294  This also has currency among more 
contemporary military theorists, Romans included.295  Once a battle-line is breached, 
the rout that ensues is the place in which most casualties ensue; thus, all three 
writers noted here discuss the rout at some point or other.296  An issue which 
surfaces time and again both in Procopius’ Wars and the military treatises is the 
issue of troop numbers.  All advocate finding out the enemy’s numbers, and both 
Vegetius and Maurice note that numbers alone are not sufficient to ensure 
success.297  Besides noting that numbers are not the most important factor, Maurice 
also provides the means of deceiving an enemy as regards one’s own troop 
numbers.298  The importance of adequate provisions, so preventing oneself from 
being weakened by lack thereof, is constantly stressed.299  Finally, equipment too is 
seen to play an important part, particularly when one is seen to be coming up against 
an inferior foe.300  Indeed, it should be noted that one of the principal problems with 
his contemporary army that Vegetius rails against is their poor equipment.301  In sum, 
though I have only looked a few passages from the Wars, and these three 
theoreticians, it is representative.  We should not be surprised that there is a close 
                                                
294 See above pp. 81-91. 
295 Most of Vegetius’ treatise is concerned with training, order, and the recreation of the old 
legion.  See, for example, the extended discussion at 3.14.  Syrianus excerpts, and abridges, 
some of the earlier discussions on the phalanx; he even devotes an entire chapter to tactics 
(14).  Maurice is no exception, for he devotes a considerable proportion of his text to both 
cavalry and infantry formations.  In this chapter three is particularly noteworthy. 
296 Veg. Mil. 3.22, 3.25; Syrianus Magister peri Strat. 38.  Interestingly, most of Maurice’s 
discussion of the rout centres on what to do when engaged in the pursuit of a fleeing enemy.  
See, for example, Maurice Strat. 8.1.22.  Cf. Veg. Mil. 3.26.16. 
297 See, for example, the following passages, both of which I referred to above:  Veg. Mil. 
3.26.10, Maurice Strat. 8.2.8.21-22. 
298 Maurice Strat. 8.2.38. 
299 As regards foods and provisions, see, for example, the following passages:  Veg. Mil. 
3.26.17; Syrianus Magister peri Strat. 6.30-32; Maurice Strat. 8.1.30. 
300 Maurice’s so-called ‘ethnika’ (11), on which see Wiita (1977), is particularly illustrative in 
this regard.  Cf. Syrianus Magister peri Strat. 16, in which he discusses the sorts of 
equipment to be used.  
301 Veg. Mil. 1.20. 
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correspondence between military doctrine noted by Procopius, and the factors 
discussed by Vegetius, Syrianus, and Maurice.  Furthermore, it is no coincidence 
that the bulk of the points noted by Procopius correspond with the maxims listed by 
both Vegetius and Maurice.  Neither of their lists were original constructions; as 
such, the points included had widespread, and longstanding, currency amongst 
ancient military thinkers.  We would expect Procopius to include a number of them, 
though we cannot say whether he got them from those officers he served with, or 
military manuals he may have read.  In truth, it was probably some combination of 
both possibilities.302  With the specifically military matters now discussed, it is time to 
turn to the related issue of Belisarius, and Procopius’ characterization of the man, 
and his leadership abilities. 
 
Part III:  Characterization and Generalship 
In the last chapter I looked at Belisarius’ generalship in relation to that other 
major figure in the Persian Wars.  To a lesser extent I shall do the same thing here, 
though the other characters, such as Gelimer and Solomon, will be discussed more 
as comparanda rather than as stand alone figures.   
Generalship, or, rather, the characterization of the leadership of Belisarius, is 
a topic that has garnered much attention by those scholars who have turned their 
attention to the Vandal Wars.303  A basic dichotomy has emerged, with Belisarius 
regarded as an exceptional general on account of his brilliant victory over the 
Vandals on the one hand, and with Belisarius as a lucky general, or at least one 
whose abilities have been exaggerated on the other hand.  Diehl’s opinion of 
                                                
302 On the other hand, if Procopius had only read selections of military treatises, one thinks 
that this is the bit – the list of general maxims that is – that he is most likely to have read.  As 
I noted above in chapter two (p. 112), Agathias (2.9.2) claims to have read at least one 
military treatise. 
303 On characterization in ancient historiography in general see Pitcher 2007. 
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Belisarius is mixed at best, highlighting the general’s carelessness, and his over 
dependence on good fortune.304  Bury’s is more measured, noting his disciplining of 
poorly behaving troops, while also remarking that Gelimer and the Vandals 
essentially handed victory to the Romans.305  The same is true for Stein, at least as 
regards his victories in Africa, though he takes the line that Procopius generally 
praised Belisarius, though not consistently.306  Evans notes that the expedition was 
led by “an able commander”, though he is cognizant of Procopius’ characterization of 
Belisarius.307  Cameron tends to see Procopius’ characterization of Belisarius in the 
Vandal Wars as glorification, particularly in regard to the general’s triumph.308  Beck, 
in his short book on Procopius, claims that the Roman victory was down to intelligent 
leadership of Belisarius, though like Cameron, he notes Procopius’ role in creating 
this picture.309  Pazdernik characterizes Procopius’ characterization of Belisarius as 
nuanced, in turn noting the subtle criticism, stressed through an allusion to 
Xenophon’s Hellenica,310 as well as the abilities that the general had, particularly 
when paralleled with Brasidas, though here praising his control over his troops rather 
than his generalship per se.311 Kaldellis, in the same vein as Diehl, accords 
Belisarius little credit for the success, and in fact argues that Belisarius’ victory was 
not down to his virtue, but rather his good fortune.312  Brodka, who speaks highly of 
Belisarius’ leadership, recognizes the role that chance plays, and suggests that 
Belisarius, through Procopius’ characterization, does deserve credit for his ability to 
work to neutralize the effects of the unexpected, while also being able to see any 
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308 Cameron 1985:  176. 
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advantage presented.313  Treadgold also notes Procopius’ praise for Belisarius’ 
victory, though he notes that there are exceptions.314  The purpose of my recounting 
of the bulk of the views on Procopius’ characterization of Belisarius in the Vandal 
Wars has been to show that there is nothing in the way of consensus, and that the 
issue deserves further discussion.  How does Procopius characterize Belisarius’ 
generalship? 
The performance of Belisarius in the Vandal Wars is meant to be compared 
with those commanders noted in the introduction.315  Among other things, through 
this introduction Procopius is presenting us with the standard regarding generalship, 
and Africa, in the Roman past.  In the first few lines, when Theodosius the Great is 
mentioned, Procopius says that “he had become an especially just man and good at 
warfare”.316  It may well be that Procopius is comparing Justinian with Theodosius, 
but it is Theodosius’ military qualities which are significant in this regard here.  A few 
chapters later we meet Aetius and Boniface, generals who are particularly strong and 
very experienced in war.317  Of course, we must not forget the Vandals, for they too 
in the past had notable generals; Belisarius is to be measured against not only 
generals of the Roman past, but also those of his foes.  How he performs is in no 
small measure determined by the performance of his enemies, and the same is true 
for his predecessors.  Procopius says that Gaizeric was extremely well practised in 
warfare.318  When he turns to the reconquest campaign of 468 he again highlights 
the Vandal general’s abilities, in the process contrasting them with those of 
Basiliscus:  “Now the hesitation of the general prevented this [victory], whether it was 
                                                
313 Brodka 2004:  75-83. 
314 Treadgold 2007:  197. 
315 Evans 1972:  62-63. 
316 Procop. Wars 3.1.2. 
317 Procop. Wars 3.3.14. 
318 Procop. Wars 3.3.24. 
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caused by cowardice or treason.  Gaizeric, benefitting from the negligence of 
Basiliscus, did the following”.319  Though Procopius is not sure which of the two 
possibilities led to failure, the fact that he raises them means that he felt that they 
were important; the following line then points out which one was most likely, namely 
cowardice.  Several lines later we meet the principal contemporary Vandal 
commander Gelimer.  Procopius notes that Gelimer is “the one who was thought to 
be the best warrior of the time”.320  What is significant about this statement is that 
Procopius presents his ability in warfare as a possibility alone, for he does not say 
that he was the best, as he had with the earlier generals, only that he was thought to 
be the best, so implying that this opinion would later change.  On the other hand, 
when Belisarius is introduced in the same chapter, this is what he has to say:  “for he 
was clever at forming plans and would accomplish the plans without hesitation”.321  
Procopius presents it as fact, not conjecture.  Also, in correspondence with what he 
had just said about Gelimer, Procopius notes that Belisarius was clever (ὀξὺς) at 
forming plans,322 while Gelimer was clever or cunning (δεινός).  This more or less 
brings the introductory portion of the text to an end, as Procopius now moves the 
narrative into contemporary events.  With these select characteristics outlined, we 
are to bear them in mind as Belisarius proceeds. 
Belisarius, in good classicizing history fashion, gives a number of speeches 
throughout the Vandal Wars.  A rather significant point is how Belisarius puts his 
men on the same level as his own, often referring to them as fellow soldiers.  We find 
this in the first line of his first speech when he is discussing their options to his fellow 
                                                
319 Procop. Wars 3.6.11-12. 
320 Procop. Wars 3.9.7. 
321 Procop. Wars 3.9.25. 
322  ξ ς can mean quick, though I think here we are meant to understand clever, as this best 
corresponds with what Procopius says about Gelimer.  Plus, I do not think that Procopius 
would repeat himself, as he notes he carried the plans out without hesitation. 
 243 
commanders (ξυνάρχοντες), 323 men who, I should add, Belisarius had supreme 
authority over despite his words.324  When Belisarius first addresses the common 
soldiery he uses similar language (ἄνδρες συστρατιῶται).325  In his return to Africa 
during the mutiny, he continues to address his men in the same way.326  This was a 
practice endorsed by ancient writers, theoreticians in particular, throughout 
antiquity.327  Besides his egalitarian approach to his commilitones Belisarius also 
vindicates Procopius’ statements about his good planning.  The discussion with 
Archelaus about the best place to land shows not only that Belisarius will not put 
himself on a level far above his fellow officers, but also that he is willing to take 
valuable advice, particularly if it benefits his planning, and his chances of 
successfully carrying out his objectives in Africa.328  On the route to Carthage 
Belisarius takes great care to protect his column, and assuage any fears his soldiers 
might have.329  While Belisarius is ensconced in Carthage, he has some discussions 
with the Huns about their willingness to fight with the Romans as previously agreed.  
Belisarius is rightly cautious, and with the Vandals not yet soundly defeated, he takes 
the necessary preparations to shore up Carthage’s defences.330  A few lines later, 
                                                
323 Procop. Wars 3.15.18. 
324 Procop. Wars 3.11.18.  cf. Pazdernik (1997:  158-159), his discussion is very much in 
keeping with what I have to say here.  The same can be said for Brodka (2004:  77-79) as 
regards my discussion of Belisarius’ planning. 
325 Procop. Wars 3.19.2.  The only Vandal commander to address his troops in the same way 
is Gelimer’s brother Tzazon before Tricamarum (Procop. Wars 4.2.24).  The Berber 
commanders, who are not named, also refer to their men as fellow soldiers before Mammes 
(Procop. Wars 4.11.38).  Stotzas, in two separate exhortations, refers to his men as fellow-
soldiers (Procop. Wars 4.15.54, 4.16.12).  I think that the fact that it is Gelimer alone who 
does not address his troops in this manner, and ultimately fails, goes back to what Procopius 
had said earlier about Gelimer’s concern for his own well-being alone (Procop. Wars 3.9.7-8). 
326 Procop. Wars 4.15.16. 
327 Maurice (Strat. 8.1.1,3), for example, says that the general should act in a way that is not 
above his men.  Theophylact (Thephyl.. Sim. 3.1.7-9), on the other hand, describes an 
episode in 587 or 588 in which the failure of the general Priscus to follow an ancient custom 
and walk among his troops leads to trouble. 
328 Procop. Wars 3.15.1-36.  cf. Thuc. 6.47-49. 
329 Procop. Wars 3.17.1-5. 
330 Procop. Wars 4.1.7. 
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Procopius, the narrator, reminds the reader that Belisarius had prepared himself, and 
by proxy, the army, as best as possible, before an exhortation to his troops.331  
Significantly, Belisarius notes in that speech that he now has God on his side, a 
marked contrast to Gelimer, who, in a letter to his brother Tzazon, acknowledges that 
the opposite is true for him.332  Where Belisarius alludes to the arête of his men in his 
speech before Tricamarum, Gelimer, in his corresponding speech,333 implies that his 
men are suffering from a lack of arete, and, in Homeric fashion, the shame that 
comes with it.334  As a result of this pronounced lack of courage, Gelimer must ride 
through the ranks before the battle begins to embolden his troops.335  In this battle 
Gelimer performs his second major inexplicable action, for he jumps off his horse 
and flees towards Numidia, which is in stark contrast to Belisarius who from the 
beginning is keen to not only share the burdens of warfare with them, as the 
language he uses to address them suggests, but also takes great pains to plan his 
attacks, and does his utmost to ensure that they are carried out.336  When Belisarius 
returns to Africa, and he seeks about restoring order during the mutiny of Stotzas, we 
find him not only employing a host of means of winning back the loyalty of the 
mutinous troops to the emperor, but also, again, much better prepared, and 
perceptive than his opponents.337  Finally, during one phase of the Battle of Mt. 
Aurasium Procopius notes that Belisarius had arrayed and entrenched his troops 
                                                
331 Procop. Wars 4.1.12. 
332 Gelimer:  Procop. Wars 3.25.11; Belisarius:  Procop. Wars 4.1.21.  
333 Procop. Wars 4.1.16. 
334 Procop. Wars 4.2.15-17. 
335 Procop. Wars 4.3.9. 
336 Procop. Wars 4.3.20.  Of course, Procopius does not claim that Belisarius was infallible, 
for at 4.4.1ff he notes that Belisarius, ever aware of the situation, grew frightened at the 
disorder following Tricamarum.  Furthermore, he intervenes to tell us that the army would 
have perished had the Vandals turned against them.  Yet, this does not happen, and 
Belisarius sets about restoring order, this time through a speech, which shows that the 
Roman general had a host of means at his disposal at keeping his men in line, from severe 
punishments, to promises of gifts, to personal direct appeals. 
337 On the rebellions in Africa and the late antique state see Van Nuffelen (2007). 
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next to the River Bagradas while the mutineers had put themselves in a difficult 
position.338 
In this discussion there are points that I have left out.  There are, of course, 
the famous interventions of Procopius before both Decimum and Tricamarum in 
which he alludes to the fact that the Vandals should have won if Gelimer had acted 
differently, while also noting that he seemed to have been motivated by more 
powerful forces.  I also generally avoided discussing the issue of discipline and 
morale.  Belisarius had to deal with discipline problems throughout, as most 
commentators have noted, and Procopius seems to suggest that it was Belisarius’ 
absence which led to the later mutiny.339  There are also a handful of moments in 
which Belisarius seems overwhelmed by the task before him, one example of which 
comes early in the narrative.340  Yet, one of the primary points stressed by Brodka 
was Belisarius’ ability to take advantage of the opportunities presented, in marked 
contrast to Gelimer.341  Procopius refers to Belisarius’ ability to do just that on a 
handful of occasions, particularly in book four, both implicitly and explicitly.342  Both 
Belisarius and Gelimer were presented with the opportunity to emerge victorious in 
this war; the difference is that Gelimer failed to realize this, and so, take advantage 
of it.  Kaldellis is right to highlight the role that fortune undoubtedly played in the 
outcome of the war, though we should not underestimate Belisarius’ own role in the 
outcome.  As noted, one of the traits for which Basiliscus draws Procopius’ ire is his 
negligence during the attempted reconquest.  By comparison, in his speech before 
Tricamarum, Belisarius notes that they, the Romans, should not put the war off by 
                                                
338 Procop. Wars 4.15.13.   
339 Evans 1972:  66. 
340 Procop. Wars 3.14.1-2. 
341 Brodka 2004:  80-83. 
342 Procop. Wars 4.1.22, 4.3.6, 4.15.42-44. 
 246 
reason of negligence.343  Procopius puts Belisarius in direct apposition to Basiliscus, 
who had a much superior force to that available to Belisarius.344  On the other hand, 
he does the same to Gaizeric and Gelimer.  Of course, there is a third pairing to go 
with these two sets of appositions:  if Basiliscus is to Belisarius what Gelimer is to 
Gaizeric then it follows that Belisarius is the same to Gelimer.  Indeed, I noticed 
above in a different context that many of the events from the introduction are 
presented in the form of mirror images, in other words, reversed in the central part of 
the narrative; it is no different with these central generals.  Pazdernik is right to draw 
attention to the complex image of Belisarius that Procopius presents, for even though 
Belisarius has many laudable attributes, he is not without his faults.345  Gelimer 
himself is not without positive traits, for even though it comes too late, he does 
eventually perceive his plight.  Does Procopius glorify Belisarius?  Strictly speaking, 
no.  On the other hand, he is not divested of any role in the expedition’s success.  As 
we might well expect, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  Belisarius surely 
attains unimaginable success, and God is on his side.  Yet, he consults his officers, 
plans carefully, and has moments where he loses confidence, and occasionally, the 
control of his troops.   
 
Chapter Overview  
As with the Persian Wars, Procopius guides his readers through his narrative 
by introducing elements within the first few chapters that have set the course for 
subsequent events.  In the Vandal Wars, however, Procopius the narrator engages 
much more directly with his audience by intervening in the text in the first person, 
and using names and numbers to mark out an episode’s importance; unlike the 
                                                
343 Procop. Wars 4.1.22. 
344 Procop. Wars 3.6.11. 
345 Pazdernik 1997, 2000, 2006. 
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Persian Wars, he also encourages the audience to other possible outcomes to the 
events described.  Tactics play a role again, as do the leading commanders, though 
we find that morale has become a much more central feature of battle.  There is thus 
considerable variety between the battles presented in the Persian Wars and the 
battles presented in the Vandal Wars.  In the next chapter, focused on the Gothic 
Wars, we will see that Procopius takes this emphasis on consistency within his 
discussions of particular theatres even further, by introducing new elements which 
are specific to his description of the Italian campaign.  Textual unity, here broadened 
to the Wars as a whole, will again open the chapter.
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Chapter 5:  The Gothic Wars1  
 
 
The Gothic Wars is one of the most contentious parts of the Wars.  Firstly, 
either the Thucydidean parallels are most suspect here, or, the intertextual 
elements are most insightful.  Secondly, the war that it describes is one of the 
most controversial aspects of the age of Justinian.  Although this thesis is not 
explicitly focused on the historical reality, apart from the intellectual climate that 
emerges from a study of descriptions of battle in a traditional historical genre,2 
with this section of the Wars more than any other we are confronted with reality 
head on.  On the one hand, a look at Malalas’ Chronicle, or Evagrius’ 
Ecclesiastical History, seems to confirm the arguments put forth by Kouroumali3 
and Scott4, among others, that the wars with the Goths were peripheral to 
Justinian’s frontier policy, behind Persia,5 the Balkans,6 and even North Africa.7  
On the other hand, Procopius devotes more pages to the war in Italy than he 
does to any other frontier.  The textual reality is thus in stark contrast to the 
presumed historical reality.  Even some of Procopius’ numbers seem to support 
the argument for unimportance, for the small number of troops quoted in relation 
to the overall East Roman forces does suggest, at least if we take them at face 
value, that the importance of the campaign was minimized by Justinian.8  Yet, 
                                                
1 Given the later publication date of book 8, and the fact that it covers the ongoing wars in 
all theatres, as indicated by Procopius (Wars. 8.1.1-2), I have not included it in my 
discussion of the Gothic Wars, and instead, I shall treat it separately in the next chapter.   
2 I am ignoring the implications of pigeon-holing the work within one genre, even though, 
as we shall see, it is more problematic in this part of the Wars than elsewhere.  See 
Marincola (1999) for the problems with genre and historiography. 
3 Kouroumali 2005. 
4 Scott 1985. 
5 Greatrex (2005) provides a good synopsis of the east during the reign of Justinian.  Cf. 
Kennedy (2000) for an overview of Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria in the sixth 
century, and above p. 125, n. 1.  
6 See now Sarantis (2005) for the Balkans during the reign of Justinian.  Cf. Whitby 
2000c. 
7 See Cameron 2000, esp. 559ff. 
8 See Hannestad (1960), Thompson (1982:  80), Cameron (1985:  148), Treadgold (1995:  
61), Liebeschuetz (1996), Kouroumali (2005:  225-226) and below pp. 268-281 for a 
discussion of the use of numbers in the Gothic Wars.  There is a great discrepancy 
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Roman expeditionary armies in the sixth century were never overly large, as 
scholars have pointed out.9  The army at its peak during the war in Italy, at least 
20,000 strong, was not demonstrably smaller than the forces available for the 
preceding, and more often than not, concurrent wars in Africa, the Balkans, and 
the East.  Indeed, while accepting that Justinian may have summoned Belisarius 
to Constantinople post Ravenna out of fear, the fact remains that he was widely 
regarded as the greatest Roman general for much of Justinian’s reign; moreover, 
it is significant that he was commander-in-chief over the Roman forces in Italy on 
two separate occasions.  Though only a few points, I feel that they are pertinent, 
and that they ultimately point to the importance of the Gothic War.10  In this 
chapter, as with the previous two, I open by looking at issues pertaining to textual 
unity,11 here the relationship between Procopius’ comparison of Homeric and 
contemporary horse-archers in the preface and the combat described around 
Rome.  I then turn to some other heroic traits of the battle described, before 
discussing his usage of numbers in the text, and its connection with the 
characterization of the respective armies.  I close by looking at the models of 
generalship, again focusing primarily on Belisarius, though I also consider Vittigis 
and Totila. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
between Procopius’ use of numbers for armies, for casualties, and for distances.  Almost 
unfailingly Procopius will give a precise figure for a distance (accuracy is another question 
that I have no intention of addressing largely because I do not think that it is relevant for 
my discussion), even though in the same passage he may give a vague qualitative 
number (‘many men’ for example) for the troops.  As an interesting contrast, Hornblower 
(1994a:  27) says that Thucydides is “less than precise about figures for distance”.  Cf. 
Morpeth (2006) for the qualitative and quantitative numbers deployed by Thucydides.  I 
have adopted Morpeth’s terminology as regards numbers.  More on this below p. 276 
9 Whitby 1995; Rance 2005; Elton 2007a. 
10 As regards the silence of authors like Malalas and Evagrius, this can be explained 
through the consideration of the scope, focus, theme and overall character of their 
respective works.  As regards Evagrius, for example, there were not many miracles that 
could figure in his work. 
11 In chapter three I looked at how the Ephthalite/Persian battle and Amida help guide our 
expectations for the later battles in the Persian Wars, while in chapter four I looked at the 
concomitant role that the Battle of Cape Bon had for our understanding of the nature of 
Belisarius’ success in the Vandal Wars. 
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Part I:   Battle in the ‘Belisariad’   
Horse-archery 
I am going to open my analysis of the Gothic Wars by turning back to the 
preface.  Within this is found the much debated comparison between 
contemporary horse-archers, and their Homeric forebears.  For some the 
comparison is an example of Procopius failing to duplicate the historiographical 
practices perfected by Herodotus, and Thucydides;12 some see it as a subtle 
criticism of Justinianic defence policy;13 and yet others as a reflection of the 
historical reality.14  I lean towards the last of the three theories, though even here 
I think that the argument can be developed further, for the reflection is a bit more 
nuanced than most have suspected.  For Procopius the horse-archer was the 
soldier par excellence, and having discussed the issue sporadically to this point, 
he provides his decisive evidence for the theory in the most heroic of theatres of 
war, the Gothic Wars.15  Besides bringing out the Homeric connection, this 
comparison also highlights Procopius’ didacticism.  Like Thucydides and Polybius 
before him, one of Procopius’ aims is to provide useful exemplars and insights for 
future generals.  In fact, I might go so far as to suggest that the structure of the 
Wars, much like the chapters on the various opponents of the empire found in 
                                                
12 Cameron 1985:  36-38; Kouroumali 2005:  25-33.  
13 Kaldellis 2004:  17-24; Kaldellis 2007b. 
14 Kaegi 1990:  69-72; Breccia 2004; Syvänne 2004:  44-45; and Whitby 2005a:  360.  
Geoffrey Greatrex (pers. comm.) has suggested to me that the preface may represent 
Procopius’ input in a wider societal debate on the efficacy of infantry versus cavalry.  
Indeed, a central debate in sixth century military thinking is the efficacy of infantry versus 
cavalry; this debate has been picked up by modern scholars.  Greatrex, Elton, and 
Burgess (2005:  70-72) and Kaldellis (2007b) are right to draw attention to this issue.  
Although the effictiveness of cavalry and infantry in the sixth century has attracted 
considerable scholarly attention, contemporary (sixth century) reactions have not.  One of 
the more perceptive discussions of the issue, though presented through a fictional debate 
between Modestus and Bessas, can be found in Robert Graves’ (1954:  33-40) Count 
Belisarius.  Note, especially, the speech of the young Belisarius (1954:  39-40).  On the 
sixth century infantry see Rance (2005); on the cavalry Elton (2007b). 
15 Maurice opens his treatise, the Strategikon, with a discussion of the armament of the 
cavalryman, and much of that is devoted to archery.  Cf. Maurice Strat. 1.2.17-18; 1.2.29-
32. 
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Maurice’s Strategikon,16 is ordered in such a way as to provide three theatres 
with the tactics to use against a varied assortment of foes.  This may not be the 
only, or even the most important, of Procopius’ aims, but I think that it is one that 
needs to be considered.  So, with this in mind, let us turn to Procopius’ preface, 
and then see how Procopius develops this thesis. 
Like scores of historians before him, Procopius includes many of the 
standard features for a preface.  The comparison between archers, however, is a 
bit unusual.17  In the section concerned with horse-archers Procopius makes 
some typical historiographical comments, such as that the greatest deeds have 
taken place in these particular wars,18 and that they are greater than the deeds 
accomplished in any other known war.19  It is then that Procopius turns to Homer 
and the archers:  he alludes to those of his contemporaries who believe that 
greater wars were fought in antiquity.20  Procopius needs to counter this, and 
begins his assault by denigrating the names used to identify ancient warriors.21  
He then refers to a quality which I discuss below, namely the arete of those 
ancient combatants:  “…and they think that this arete has not at all come down to 
the present”.22  Much as the Gothic Wars represents the medium through which 
Procopius can make his case about the tactical superiority of the horse-archers, 
so too can he use it to argue that the Roman soldiers do indeed have this arete 
for which they are censured.   Procopius then pulls out one of the definitive 
arguments for his case:  his experience.  He says that their opinion – about the 
lack of arete of modern soldiers – is, “based on a complete lack of experience 
                                                
16 Maurice discusses the habits of the empire’s various foes in book eleven.  
17 Both Herodotus and Thucydides discuss Homer (without necessarily naming him) in the 
introductions to their respective works, and Thucydides refutes the primacy of the events 
of the Trojan War.  Cf. Hdt. 1.3-4; Thuc. 1.3-14.   
18 Procop. Wars 1.1.6.     
19 Procop. Wars 1.1.7. 
20 Procop. Wars 1.1.7. 
21 Procop. Wars 1.1.8. 
22 Procop. Wars 1.1.8. 
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concerning these things”.23  Procopius, of course, like Thucydides, Xenophon, 
and Polybius before him, had a world of experience in these matters, unlike his 
detractors, whether real or imagined;24 he saw first hand the deadly force that 
these horse-archers wielded.  The Homeric archers had no horses, shields, or 
spears, and Procopius jumps on these glaring faults;25 what is more, they were 
not self-sufficient, and were instead reliant on the protection of their comrades, or 
whatever objects might be present, on the field of battle.26  Procopius suggests 
that they lacked courage, and were wont to flee when things started to go awry.27  
Then, in a comment reminiscent – and surely not by coincidence – of Procopius’ 
later comparison of Roman and Persian archers in the Persian Wars at 1.18.32-
34, he says:  “Besides these things they used their skill with such indifference 
that, having brought their bowstring to their chest and launched their arrow, it was 
blunt and harmless to those that it hit”.28  Having outlined the problems with 
ancient archers Procopius now turns to the contemporary ones: 
Contemporary bowmen wear a breast plate in battle, and put on greaves 
that extend to their knees.  Their arrows hang from the right side, while 
their sword hangs from the left.  There are even some who have a spear 
fastened to themselves, and some who have a small shield on their 
shoulders, without a handle, of such a kind that cover their face and their 
neck.  They ride horses as expertly as possible, and while moving at full 
speed, they can string their bow without any difficulty, and have such skill 
that they can shoot at others whether pursuing or fleeing their enemy.  
They draw their bowstrings right up to their face until it is nearly beside 
                                                
23 Procop. Wars 1.1.8. 
24 I think that the question of whether there were detractors, or this was simply a rhetorical 
exercise, is of no significance for my argument, or Procopius’ for that matter.  The fact is 
he felt the need to make such an argument, which as noted, is fairly unique in the ancient 
historiographic corpus.  It should be noted, however, that much of the tone of book 8 
points towards the existence of hostile critics.  See chapter 6 below p. 308, n. 6. 
25 Procop. Wars 1.1.9. 
26 On the character of Homeric warfare see Van Wees (1988, 1994, 1997, 2004:  153-
165), Lendon (2005:  20-38), Hunt (2007), Rawlings (2007:  19-42), and Wheeler (2007). 
27 Procop. Wars 1.1.10-11.  In his stimulating chapter on “Warfare in ancient literature:  
the paradox of war”, besides noting Procopius’ predilection for gore, Hornblower (2007:  
40-42) discusses the variable views of archers in classical antiquity, especially 
concerning Greek (Athenian) archers.   
28 Procop. Wars 1.1.11.  Significantly, in this passage from the Persian Wars Procopius 
says that some of the soldiers, from both sides (Roman and Persian), “made noteworthy 
displays of deeds of valour/arete” (1.18.31).  Although Procopius really pushes his 
argument in the Gothic Wars, he starts alerting his readers to this heroic character of 
contemporary combat from the beginning, that is, the Persian Wars. 
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their ear, so filling their arrow with such power that they always kill 
whomever falls in its path; and neither a shield, nor a breast plate alike, 
can in any way check its impetus.29 
 
Besides hinting at a Homeric connection through the single-blow success of their 
shots, and subtly associating this Odysseus-like achievement with Belisarius, 
Procopius quite succinctly lays out the tactical strengths that have helped bring 
the Romans success.30  In that passage the factors that Procopius feels mark out 
the Roman horse-archers are their corselets, their greaves, their additional 
weaponry, their shields, the skill with which they ride horses, and their mastery 
with the bow.31  For Procopius, they are the ideal warriors.  Yet, as we have seen 
in the two previous chapters, they play a very small role in Roman success.  
When faced with the equally formidable Persian horse-archers they have mixed 
success.  Victories are interspersed with defeats.  When the Romans do win, it is 
usually because of some other wing of the army, such as the infantry, rather than 
the mounted bowmen.  Granted, Procopius does claim that they have a slight 
advantage over their Persian foes, but in none of the battles that he describes 
does Roman archery play a huge role.  In the Vandal Wars we have yet another 
scenario.  Ultimately, the Romans are successful, particularly against the 
Vandals.32  Again the infantry plays an important role, but here, more so than 
against the Persians, so does the cavalry.  This points towards the importance of 
horses for later Roman success.  Still, the potential of the horse-archers has yet 
to be exploited.  For that we need to turn to the Gothic Wars. 33  If there is any 
single tactical element that consistently contributes to Roman success in the 
Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars it is the competency of the actual 
                                                
29 Procop. Wars  1.1.12-15. 
30 Odysseus, of course, was an accomplished bowman and, significantly, is the only one 
capable of stringing his bow.  When he slaughters the suitors at the end of the Odyssey 
he demonstrates pin-point accuracy. 
31 For contemporary horse-archers see Grosse (1920:  314-315), Delbrück (1990:  346-
347), Ravegnani (1988:  49-50), and Rance (2005:  428, 2007a:  355-357). 
32 The same cannot be said for the Moors, whom the Romans struggle against, 
particularly when they find themselves short of a capable commander. 
33 Procop. Wars 5.3.23. 
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commander, particularly his ability to recognize and utilize the optimal tactical 
arrangement in a given combat situation.  This applies to my discussion of horse-
archers, as we shall now see when I take a closer look at the Gothic Wars.   
The Roman forces first start taking advantage of their prowess with the 
bow during the siege of Rome.  While penned in by Vittigis and the marauding 
Goths the Romans, and their local allies, fire from the walls at their foes to some 
success.  Over the course of the siege from 5.22.4-23.12 Procopius reports a 
number of encounters in which Roman bows take down their Gothic targets.  
Given the Romans’ defensive position on the parapets of Rome’s fortifications, 
horses play no role in the exchanges.  A few chapters later, however, the horse-
archers make their debut, when Belisarius commands Trajan, and two hundred of 
his bodyguards, to head towards the enemy.34  If the enemy turn to attack, they 
are not to engage them with their swords or spears, but their bows alone.35  
Unsurprisingly, the Goths do engage the Roman expeditionary force, and pursue 
them back to Rome’s fortifications where they are met by the defensive weaponry 
at the city’s fortifications.  Procopius alleges that one thousand Goths perished in 
this encounter.36  What is more, a few days later Belisarius sends out yet another 
expedition, this time with three hundred guardsmen under the leadership of 
Mundilas;37 he does this a third time with another three hundred guardsmen after 
that, this time under Oilas.38  All in all, four thousand Goths are alleged to have 
fallen in the three encounters.  Thus, when first deployed the horse-archers are 
an unqualified success against the Goths.  Vittigis is incensed at the Roman 
success and decides to send in his troops to “make a display” in front of the walls 
                                                
34 Procop. Wars 5.27.4. 
35 Procop. Wars 5.27.5.  Note Totila’s comments to his troops at the Battle of Busta 
Gallorum in book 8 (8.32.6-8).  Cf. Rance 2005:  465-469.  
36 Procop. Wars 5.27.11. 
37 Procop. Wars 5.27.11-12. 
38 Procop. Wars 5.27.13. 
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of Rome.39  Unfortunately for the sake of the Goths, their commander Vittigis, 
unlike our narrator Procopius, has failed to grasp the situation, that is the tactical 
advantage that the Romans now enjoy:  “it did not dawn on him [Vittigis] that the 
armies differed as regards their arms and their respective practices in the ways of 
war”.40  Belisarius, however, has, and he orders his troops to encircle the Gothic 
forces, and shoot at them from behind, a move clearly associated with horse 
archery.  The Romans win the encounter, to the relative surprise of the residents 
of Rome.  Quite a bit earlier, at 5.22.2, Belisarius had laughed at the first 
approach of the Goths, and the citizens of Rome had been shocked by what they 
had witnessed; hence their surprise.  It is only now that the Roman general 
discloses his reasons for his seemingly nonchalant approach to combat in a 
passage that has tremendous bearing on the horse-archery tactical advantage; it 
is worth quoting in full:   
And he himself said that while engaging them at the start with a few men 
he perceived what was different between both armies, namely that if he 
made an attack with a force commensurate with theirs, the mass of the 
enemy troops would not hand them a serious defeat because of the 
paucity of their [the Romans’] numbers.  The difference was that nearly all 
the Romans, and their allies, the Huns, were excellent horse-archers, 
while none of the Goths, on the other hand, has practised this skill; their 
horsemen are accustomed to using spears and swords alone, while their 
archers are not mounted, and enter battle under the protection of the 
heavily-armed infantry.  Thus the horsemen, lest the battle is at close-
quarters, are not able to defend themselves against enemies who use the 
bow; and so they can be struck and killed without trouble, and their 
infantry are not powerful enough to make sallies against mounted men.  
Belisarius was convinced that it was because of this that the barbarians 
were defeated by the Romans in these battles.  On the other hand, the 
Goths, who could still vividly remember the unexpected events which had 
transpired, no longer advanced on the fortifications of Rome with a few 
men, and did not pursue the enemy when they were being harassed, 
except so far as to keep them away from their palisaded camps.41 
 
Generalship, again, is a key factor in the Romans’ success, as it has been 
throughout the Wars.  And, had Belisarius not perceived the tactical advantages 
that he held over his opponents, things might have turned out as Vittigis and the 
                                                
39 Procop. Wars 5.27.16. 
40 Procop. Wars 5.27.15. 
41 Procop. Wars 5.27.26-29. 
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Goths had hoped.  But, once Belisarius recognized the advantage, success now 
largely rested in the hands of the troops themselves.42  And, as Procopius 
describes things, the Roman troops were indeed successful, owing to their 
tactical superiority, along with their deployment in operations that maximized their 
potential.  Their success is both physical and psychological, as the Goths’ fear 
suggests.  Thus, once the narrative function of the siege of Rome is factored in, 
that is as the climax of the Wars,43 and we consider the heroic qualities of the 
narrative of the Gothic Wars that I discuss below, it is hard not to conclude that it 
is here that Procopius is providing the evidence he needs for the tactical theory 
propounded in the preface:  indeed, Procopius’ theory would only have made 
sense in the context of a situation with sufficient heroic character to match that of 
the Trojan War and the Iliad.44 
 
Graphic Battle Scenes, and the Single Blow 
One of the most striking features of Procopius’ descriptions of battle in the 
Gothic Wars is the comparatively detailed – at least by the standards of Greek 
historiography – deaths and wounds that permeate the narrative, particularly 
those found in the context of the siege of Rome in 536/537.45  Violence is not 
necessarily out of place in Greek historiography; as D’Huys has demonstrated, 
                                                
42 See below pp. 293-306 for a detailed discussion of Belisarius’ qualities as a general 
appropriate for a Homeric world view. 
43 One might conjecture that the victory at Ravenna marks the peak of Belisarius’ 
success, particularly since it is followed up with Procopius’ ‘Thucydidean eulogy’ of 
Belisarius.  However, the action of the narrative is at its most intense during the siege of 
Rome, for the action tapers off at its conclusion. 
44 Not only do these soldiers, and their success, mark, respectively, the ideals and peak 
of the narrative, they also bring into greater focus the pathetic state that Belisarius and 
the East Romans find themselves in at a later stage in the text, particularly after the 
arrival of Totila.  At 7.12.3, for example, in a letter from Belisarius to Justinian, the general 
says the following:  “For while going round Thrace and Illyria continuously we collected 
soldiers who were altogether few in number, and pitiable, and who had only a few arms 
with them, and who were completely unpractised in battle”.     
45 Interestingly, the later Byzantine historian John Kinnamos later adapted Procopius’ 
descriptions in his discussions of twelfth century combat.  Compare, for example, 
Procopius’ description at 7.4.23-29 and 8.8.25-27 with Kinnamos’ at 4.159-160. 
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violence was described as early as Herodotus.46  There are more than a few 
violent scenes described in the Wars.  The descriptions of battle in the Persian 
Wars are not particularly violent; the same is true for much of the Vandal Wars.  
What the battle scenes discussed thus far have lacked, with few exceptions,47 is 
the gruesome detail that seems to abound in the Gothic Wars.  Indeed, Shaw, 
while summarizing Procopius’ descriptions of violence in the Gothic Wars, makes 
the following startling comments:  “These [descriptions of the many encounters 
outside of the walls of Rome in 537] are extraordinary pieces of historical 
narration, striking because they are not, like most of Procopius’ accounts of 
sieges and set battles, dependent on rhetorical devices and images adopted from 
earlier historians.  Such realism in the description of combat is unusual.”48  Is 
Shaw right to suggest that these images did not come from earlier historians?  
Let us take a closer look.49 
The first of the gruesome death scenes comes from the siege of Rome,50 
and the perpetrator of the deadly strike that Procopius describes is Belisarius: 
When the Goths had come close to the ditch, the general [Belisarius], first 
of all stretched out his bow, then he fired and struck in the neck a certain 
one of the men in armour, who was leading the army.  And, having been 
struck in a vital part of the body, he fell down onto his back, and all of the 
Roman people cried out with an extraordinary sound greater than any 
other, thinking that an excellent omen had happened to them.51 
 
There are a few important features about this scene.  Belisarius’ first strike hits 
the mark; moreover, not only is it on target, but it manages to kill the man struck.  
In addition, Procopius also identifies the part of the body that received the deadly 
blow.  These two features, that is the success with one blow, and the 
                                                
46 D’Huys 1987. 
47 See chapter 4 above pp 214-216. 
48 Shaw 1999:  133.  Lee (2005:  114) endorses the sentiments of Shaw.  Cf. Kaegi 
(1990:  73-74). 
49 See now the comments of Hornblower (2007:  48-49), whom my work supports. 
50 On Procopius and the siege of Rome see Rubin (1957:  441-450), Evans (1972:  70-
72), Beck (1986:  50-51), Adshead (1990:  93-104), and Brodka (2004:  87-93).  For 
historical narrative of the events see Bury (1923:  180-195), Stein (1949:  347-355), 
Evans (1996b:  141-146), and Syvänne (2004:  437-439), who curiously treats them as 
cavalry skirmishes so excluding them from his overview of sieges.  
51 Procop. Wars 5.22.4-5. 
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identification of the wounded body part, are common throughout the skirmishes 
during the siege of Rome in the Gothic Wars.  Despite this frequent usage there 
is considerable variety between the scenes, from the region of the body struck, to 
the source of the blow.  A few lines later we find the following scene:   
At the Salarian gate a tall Gothic man, a great warrior who was wearing a 
breast plate and a helmet on his head, and who was not unknown among 
the nation of the Goths, did not stay in the line with the others, but while 
standing beside a tree fired a number of shots at the battlements.  But, a 
machine, which was on the tower on the left side, struck this man by 
some chance.  The missile passed through the breast plate and hence, 
the body of the man, sinking more than halfway into the tree beside him, 
so binding the man to the spot where it sunk in, and suspending the 
corpse in place.  When the Goths saw this, they became terrified, and 
moved out of missile range while staying in battle order, and they no 
longer harassed those at the wall.52 
 
Here we find bows again hitting their mark, only in this particular instance the bow 
is powered by a machine, rather than an individual soldier.  The victim is struck in 
a part of the body that Procopius identifies, much as he had earlier, and the blow 
is fatal.  The Gothic man who is killed in this instance also happens to be a man 
of some importance, much like the one described above.  These sorts of scenes, 
however, do not only involve Gothic soldiers.  In book six we find more gruesome 
action scenes, only this time those hit are East Roman soldiers, and they manage 
to survive from their wounds:   
In this encounter Koutilas, despite having been struck in the middle of the 
head by a javelin, still kept up the pursuit, all the while with a spear stuck 
in that place.  At the setting of the sun, when it had become a rout, he 
rode into the city along with those others around him with the javelin, 
which was in his head shaking, a spectacle worthy of much repute.  Also 
in this action Arzes, one of Belisarius’ shield-bearers, was struck by a 
certain one of the Gothic archers between his nose and right eye.  The 
point of the arrow went in all the way to the back of his neck; however, it 
could not be seen poking through, though the rest of the arrow came out 
from his face, and shook while the man rode.  The Romans were blown 
away by the incredible sight of this man, in addition to that of Koutilas, 
particularly since they continued riding all the while paying no attention to 
the wounds that they had suffered.53 
 
                                                
52 Procop. Wars 5.23.9-12. 
53 Procop. Wars 6.2.14-18. 
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What first jumps out at the reader in this passage is the fact that the single blows 
are again successful, or at least, they hit their mark; but, they do not finish off 
their victims.  There is, of course, a significant difference between these two men 
and the two men that I discussed above:  they are Roman soldiers.54  Procopius 
has created a marked contrast between the two, though a nuanced one:  
whereas single blows manage to take down Gothic soldiers when fired by Roman 
soldiers, or machines operated by Roman soldiers, the Roman soldiers 
themselves tend to survive the single shots fired from their Gothic counterparts.  
In fact, the passage noted above is not the only such passage where this 
happens, for there are others: 
And at once they all struck him with their spears.  His breast plate 
withstood the bulk of their blows and so he was not in overwhelming pain, 
but one of the Goths struck the youth from behind above the right armpit 
where his body happened to be exposed, and actually very close to his 
shoulder and upper arm; however, it was not a mortal blow, and it did not 
put him in danger of dying.  But, another Goth hit him in front thus piercing 
his left thigh and cutting the muscle, though on an angle.  When Valerian 
and Martin saw what was happening, they came to his aid as fast as they 
could, and having turned back the enemy, both of them grabbed the bridle 
of Bochas’ horse and went to the city.55  
 
Again, there are a number of similarities between the two passages involving 
Roman victims, and they are not unique.  In this case Procopius is more specific 
about the location of the wound, which suggests that he may have some 
knowledge of human anatomy, or perhaps medicine.56  Here too the Roman 
soldier survives; after receiving a number of blows that might otherwise have 
                                                
54 For a limited discussion of the characterization of the armies see below pp 281-292. 
55 Procop. Wars 6.2.22-24. 
56 In fact, after this very episode Procopius includes a lengthy digression on the treatment 
that Bochas received.  If nothing else, Procopius was a very inquisitive historian.  He was 
also, seemingly, very knowledgeable.   Contra Howard-Johnston (2000), I do not think 
that he was an engineer, though he may very well have been a man of science, at least of 
some sort.  The passage in question is found at 6.2.25-36.  See too the battle scene at 
6.5.24-26, where Procopius intervenes in the narrative to postulate why the shaft of a 
missile fell to the ground after a Roman, named Trajan, was struck in the face, even 
though the iron tip was no longer visible.  Procopius says:  “It seems to me that the 
reason is that the iron tip was not fixed with certainty to the shaft.”  The intervention is not 
specifically concerned with medicine, though it is directly related to the injury, and it is in 
many respects a peculiar comment.  It is quite possible that in some sense Procopius is 
alluding to Herodotus, for he too demonstrated an interest in medicine (Thomas 2000:  
29-42).   
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been fatal.  Despite the anatomical detail these descriptions lack blood.57  Horrific 
though their injuries may be, and having a weapon protruding from one’s body 
would be just that, the gory details are restricted to individuals for we do not find 
the heaps of corpses, and pools of blood, which we find in the works of historians 
such as Polybius.58  The exception, an extended passage in which we do find the 
flowing of blood, concerns an individual, and not the battlefield at large; it is 
reminiscent of the single combat involving Andreas in the Battle of Dara:59     
So both horses raced towards each other, and when they were quite 
close, the combatants hurled their spears, and since Artabazes got his 
shot off first, he had the advantage and struck Valaris on the right side of 
his rib cage.  The barbarian, having been struck in a vital spot, was about 
to fall backwards to the earth, but his spear was fixed in place by a rock in 
the ground behind him, and so he could not fall.  But Artabazes pressed 
on and thrust the spear further into the man’s body; for, he did not know 
that his shot had struck home, and in a vital spot no less.  Thus, it 
happened that while Valaris was nearly upright the iron tip of his spear 
became fixed to the breast plate of Artabazes, and moving little by little it 
passed right through his corselet, and sliced through Artabazes’ skin and 
reached all the way to his neck.  By some chance, as the iron tip went 
through him, it cut his wind-pipe, and immediately there was a great 
stream of blood.  Yet, he did not feel any pain, but he himself rode his 
horse back to the Roman army, while Valaris fell there dead.  And 
Artabazes’ bleeding did not stop, and three days later he was taken from 
the world of men…60 
 
This single combat is more detailed than those from the Battle of Dara between 
Andreas and the two Persian soldiers.  Although Procopius does specify the parts 
of the body struck,61 the opponents do not fall from one blow, and instead need to 
be finished off once they have been knocked off their horses.  In the second 
skirmish, between Andreas and the older Persian soldier, both combatants fall off 
their horses, and it is in the ensuing scramble for weapons, aided by Andreas’ 
speed, that the Roman prevails.62  This single combat from the Gothic Wars, 
then, is in keeping with the pattern that prevails throughout this part of the text.  
                                                
57 On blood in Homer see Neal (2006). 
58 See the descriptions which Polybius provides at 15.14.1-2 and 16.35.9-10.  cf. D’Huys 
1987:  224-231. 
59 Procop. Wars 1.13.29ff.   
60 Procop. Wars 7.4.23-29.    
61 Procop. Wars 1.13.31. 
62 Procop. Wars 1.13.37. 
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One blow is enough to finish off the Goth, though in this lone instance it is at the 
expense of the Roman soldier; his death comes days later.  What is unique is the 
description of the flow of blood.  The obvious explanation is that it is the loss of 
blood that killed Artabazes, and as with all graphic battle scenes described in the 
Gothic Wars, Procopius is careful to identify the causes of death, which are, 
invariably, single blows to vital regions of the body.   
This catalogue of anatomically precise battle wounds is unusual in the 
corpus of Greek historiography, a point recently highlighted by Hornblower.63  
Some of the scenes from Diodorus are similar, particularly his description of the 
death of Epaminondas. 64  Appian does refer to body parts while describing the 
horrors of the siege of Carthage during the Second Punic War, but not in the 
context of combat itself. 65  Appian’s near contemporary Arrian does on one 
occasion report the sort of scene we find in Procopius;66 the same is true for 
Ammianus Marcellinus, who admittedly wrote in Latin, but was a Greek.67  Given 
my discussion of hippotoxotai, it should not surprise that the inspiration for the 
gruesome detail is Homer.68  Wounds of that sort abound in Homer, and epic 
poetry in general.69  His near contemporary Corippus describes similar scenes in 
the Latin epic Iohannis.70  Quintus of Smyrna and Nonnos include the same sorts 
of descriptions.71  Over the course of this chapter more examples of Homeric 
influence will surface. 
 
 
                                                
63 Hornblower 2007:  48-49. 
64 At 15.87.1 Diodorus writes:  “But while struggling heroically for the victory, he 
[Epaminondas] received a mortal wound in the chest.  As the spear broke and the iron 
point was left in his body, he fell of a sudden, his strength sapped by the wound” (trans. 
Sherman). 
65 App. Pun. 118. 
66 Arr. Anab. 6.10. 
67 Amm. Marc. 19.1.7. 
68 Strasburger 1972. 
69 Cf. Hom. Il. 11.420-427. 
70 Cf. Corippus Iohannis 5.104-113. 
71 Cf. Quint. Smyrn. 8.310-323; Nonnos Dion. 22.320-330. 
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Single Combat72 
In the chapter focused on the Persian Wars, I looked at, if briefly, the 
single combat involving the bath attendant Andreas, particularly its function as a 
narrative device.  This matter has, however, been touched on before in relation to 
Procopius.  In his insightful cultural history of battle in antiquity, Soldiers and 
Ghosts, Ted Lendon mentions Procopius ever so briefly:  he is noted in the 
epilogue, and, he lists examples of ‘single combat by challenge’, ‘single combat 
in the course of wider combat’, and ‘heroic leadership in general’ from the Wars.73  
The latter I shall save for part three, which is focused on generalship.  Here I 
want to look at those examples of single combat from the Gothic Wars identified 
by Lendon.  Not only is single combat relevant to Lendon’s book, particularly his 
emphasis on this looking to the past that pervaded the Greek and Roman views 
on war, and Homer in particular, but it is relevant to some of the issues discussed 
in this chapter, especially regarding the intellectual connection with the Homeric 
archers from the preface highlighted above. 
The first thing I must do is determine whether those cases identified by 
Lendon really do refer to actual instances of monomachia.74  Lendon identified 
one example of ‘single combat by challenge’, which comes at 7.4.21-30;75 and, 
he identified three examples of ‘single combat in the course of wider combat’ at 
                                                
72 Some of these issues were raised in a paper given by Doug Lee entitled “Heroic 
emulation and warfare in late antiquity”, given at the one-day conference ‘Discourses of 
War in the Roman World from Julius Caesar to Heraclius’, held at the University of 
Warwick on March 8th, 2008.  His paper elaborated on some of the brief comments about 
Procopius made by Ted Lendon in his book Soldiers and Ghosts.  
73 Lendon 2005:  385, n. 32. 
74 Rance (2005:  429) also touches on single combat in Procopius, and composes a 
separate list of single combats (2005:  429, n. 16), though he does not go into much 
detail.  Gat (2005:  290), in his expansive study of the history of war, discusses single 
combat only in passing without making any judgements on whether it is representative of 
primitive warfare or otherwise.  Trombley (2002:  246-247), on the other hand, touches on 
similar issues, though more in the context of the late sixth and early seventh centuries.  
The topic is an interesting one that I hope to come back to and discuss in greater detail in 
the future.  For some comparative material from earlier Greek and Roman history see 
Glück (1964), Harris (1979:  38-39), Oakley (1985), and Van Wees (2004:  133-134). 
75 Lendon 2005:  385, n. 32. 
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5.29.20-21, 6.1.20, and 6.1.23.76  I discussed the first example, at 7.4.21-30, 
above, because of the amount of attention Procopius plays to the wounds 
themselves, and there is no need to go over some of those points here; suffice to 
say, it is a clear-cut example of single combat, and the level of detail hints at a 
Homeric connection.77  What of the others, the cases of ‘single combat in the 
course of wider combat’?  Can we identify them as cases of single combat?  The 
first is at 5.29-20-21 and Procopius says:   
In this struggle the bravery of three Roman men stood out above all the 
others, Athenodoros, an Isaurian man, noteworthy among the spearmen 
of Belisarius, and Theodoriskos and Georgios, spearmen of Martin, born 
Cappadocian.  For having continually gone out in front of the phalanx they 
killed many of the barbarians. 
 
Although this passage provides good evidence of heroic actions, it does not 
necessarily describe single combat.  The first part of the passage, “in this 
struggle [ἐν τούτῶ τῷ πόνῳ]”, makes it clear that these events, about to be 
described, take place in the course of an actual battle.78  Indeed, on closer 
inspection Procopius’ language is quite vague, and it is hard to imagine how 
single combats could actually take place in the midst of the melee, though they 
may have gone out in front to hurl a spear/arrow.  At present, it is best to classify 
them as examples of heroic action.  The second comes at 6.1.20, and here, 
though the events are not detailed, Procopius actually uses the term single 
combat:  “Afterwards not many horsemen on both sides armed themselves as if 
for battle a number of times, and the contests always ended in single combat [ ς μονομαχίαν] with the Romans victorious in all of them.”  The last example, at 
6.1.23, comes only a few lines later, and Procopius describes it in more detail:   
Chorsamantis, a noteworthy fellow among the spearmen of Belisarius, 
born a Massagete, with a few men chased after 70 enemy fighters.  When 
he came well out into the plain, the other Romans rode off back, and so 
Chorsamantis continued to pursue them alone.  But when the Goths 
                                                
76 Lendon 2005:  385, n. 32. 
77 Note, for example, the vivid detail in Homer’s description of the single combat at Il. 
11.420-427. 
78 This point was, of course, noted by Lendon.   
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caught sight of him, they turned their horses around and went after him.  
He went forward into their midst, and having killed one of their best men 
with his spear, he went at the others, who turned again and hurried off in 
flight.  Being ashamed by those in their camp – for they suspected that 
the others had perceived them – they wanted to go against him again.  
But, they suffered this same thing, just like before, with one of their best 
men falling, and turned in flight no less…79 
 
As with the first example, labelling this case single combat is incorrect; rather, it is 
an individual act of bravado, if not rashness.  Still, it is significant for other 
reasons.  Now that I noted the four Lendon examples, let us look at their 
significance. 
In keeping with the Homeric theme, the shame felt by the Goths fleeing 
from Chorsamantis stands out because of its relation to glory.  For the Homeric 
hero, glory and honour, and their opposite, shame, necessitate the recognition of 
others.  The actions of the Goths are shameful less for what they are, than for the 
fact that they were probably recognized by the men; at the same time, 
Chorsamantis achieves glory because he charges into the fray alone, even 
though he had set off in pursuit in the company of others.  Those with him know 
what he is doing, or at least can imagine it.  Thus, when he returns (as he later 
does), his reputation, and so glory, will be all the greater, particularly in relation to 
his fleeing comrades.  The first instance of single combat noted, involving the 
Goth Valaris, takes place, as a proper single combat should, in front of the two 
armies in no-man’s land; the presence of an audience is also significant.  Indeed, 
this need for a witness is all the more striking in the case of the victorious 
Artabazes,80 who, alone of the Romans, was unafraid to accept the Goth’s 
challenge.  His exceptional martial display is even more pronounced when 
Procopius focalizes the soldiers’ reaction to his later death.81  Like the other two 
so-called cases of ‘single combat in the course of wider combat’, this particular 
instance comes from the siege of Rome, the most Homeric part of the Gothic 
                                                
79 Despite the listing at 6.1.23, the passage quoted actually runs from 6.1.21-26. 
80 Victorious yes, though it was a pyrrhic victory. 
81 Procop. Wars 7.4.29. 
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Wars; the fact that they are found in the presence of a description with Homeric 
character is significant.  These four examples highlight the fact that the extent of 
one’s glory, or shame, is very much dependant on how this matches up with 
one’s comrades; this seems to be consistent whether the case is a genuine 
example of single combat or otherwise.   
 
Arete82 and Heroic Displays 
In section three below I shall discuss some examples of heroism 
pertaining to leadership.  Here I want to discuss arete and heroic displays more 
generally, particularly as regards their association with Homeric heroes.  By and 
large, when a battle is treated summarily, Procopius often claims that “a display 
of heroic deeds” is the determining factor.  This is interesting in and of itself; 
however, I shall be focusing on some more detailed cases.   
Arete is a common virtue in the Iliad; the same is true for andreia 
(masculinity), or some cognate; it is also found in Thucydides.83  At the same 
time, scholars have noted Procopius’ emphasis on virtue or arete,84 but the 
                                                
82 Adkins (1997:  706) defines arete in Homer as:  “courage-and-physical-prowess-and-
social-position-and-fame.  It denotes and commends all these qualities together because 
of the general needs of Homeric society that all should be united in certain individuals.  
The man of arete is the agathos, who necessarily possesses a great many goods and 
qualities; and he has time, which in some way denotes and commends his position in 
life.”  These qualities abound in the character of Belisarius, as I note below pp. 302-307. 
83 During the course of the Sicilian debate, and more specifically Nicias’ speech against 
an expedition to Sicily, Nicias says that the Spartans value arete most (Thuc. 6.11.6).  
Considering the context, there can be little doubt that it is the Spartans’ military prowess 
that is being referred to.  This is not surprising given this episode’s Homeric character.  
Diodorus too referred to arete in military contexts.  See, for example, 11.7.2, in which 
Diodorus, while describing the Battle of Thermopylae, says that the battle was a 
remarkable one because of the arete of the barbarians.  In the next line we find that 
despite the Persians’ arete, the Greeks surpassed them in this quality (11.7.2).  cf. 
Mackie (1996) and Allison (1997) on the heroic character of Thucydides’ Sicilian 
expedition. 
84 Kaldellis (2004:  189-204), for example, in chapter 5, which is entitled ‘God and Tyche 
in the Wars’, devotes several pages to the relationship between virtue and tyche in the 
Gothic Wars.  Stewart’s (pers. comm.) insightful work on masculinity in the Wars also 
bears on this matter, though he too overlooks a possible Homeric connection.  I want to 
thank Mike Stewart for sharing his work with me. 
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possible Homeric connection has been overlooked.85  Perhaps we should not be 
surprised.  Given the rest of the discussion in this chapter, this seems to be 
another heroic link.  Before making any such suggestions, however, we must 
discern the preponderance of arete and andreia in the Gothic Wars, two traits 
that I think are related, and so worth discussing in tandem.86 
Arete and masculinity first surface in the historical introduction that opens 
the Gothic Wars.  Over the course of the introduction Procopius’ narrative 
naturally turns to Amalasuntha and Atalaric.  One of the most important 
characteristics for Gothic leaders, at least for Procopius, is their martial, and by 
proxy, their masculine character.87  Thus, it is no surprise to learn that 
Amalasuntha was a good ruler because of her masculine character.88  A little 
later, in the context of her assassination, Procopius comments on her arete.89  At 
the same time, Atalaric presents a bit of a problem, as the leading Goths try and 
seek out, “one who will spur him on in the prime of life to bloom at the same time 
in the arete which is the barbarian custom”.90  Here Procopius openly equates 
arete with the barbarians, and the narrative leaves little doubt that it is recognized 
as a martial quality.  The Goths are being characterized – as they frequently are 
in modern literature91 – as a martial, and heroic, people.  From the beginning, 
                                                
85 See Long (1970), Adkins (1971), and Graziosi and Haubold (2003) for Homeric 
masculinity and the values expressed, such as arete, in the Homeric epics, especially the 
Illiad. 
86 Although the emphasis will of course be on battles, I shall also look at some examples 
of arete and andreia in the surrounding narrative, insofar as they are related to this 
discussion here.   
87 Procopius associates martial prowess with masculinity indirectly in a reference to 
Theodohad:  “But Theodohad was making the least number of preparations for war, being 
also by nature unmanly” (5.9.1).  For more on Procopius’ characterization of the Gothic 
high command see below pp 293-301.  On the connection between martial prowess and 
masculinity in the fourth and fifth centuries, and its later subversion by Christians, see 
Kuefler (2001:  37-49, 105-124) though almost entirely from a Western standpoint, and 
his interpretation is not without its problems. 
88 Procop. Wars 5.2.3. 
89 Procop. Wars 5.4.29. 
90 Procop. Wars 5.2.17. 
91 The modern literature is immense on the character of the Goths.  See, for example, 
Wolfram (1988:  290-306), Heather (1996), Liebeschuetz (1996), Amory (1997), Wolfram 
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then, the Romans find the odds stacked in their opponent’s favour, and so any 
success would be no small achievement.92 
The first time that the Romans are said to possess arete comes during the 
siege of Naples when we learn that some of those assaulting the wall, who were 
killed as a result, possessed arete.93  During that same siege we find Belisarius 
remarking on his troops’ arete in an exhortation designed to assuage their anger 
and so prevent the sacking of the city.94  His troops are not the only ones who 
possess this arete, for Belisarius has this too, or so Stephanus in reference to a 
certain Ascelpiodotus in the course of a speech.95  To this point arete has been 
discussed only in the context of descriptions of military action or people.  When 
the scene shifts to Vittigis, who is not at the siege and has only just become 
leader of the Goths, they, that is the Goths, have not lost their manliness, for in 
an exhortation to his troops he refers to this quality.96  It is also worth noting that 
in that speech Vittigis says that arete is revealed only at the conclusion of one’s 
actions, and not at the beginning.97  This speech comes as Vittigis is preparing to 
enter war, and so again there can be little doubt that arete for Procopius is a 
martial quality.  Indeed, in many respects Procopius is marking out arete as the 
quality by which the opposing sides should be measured, and to a certain extent 
the developing war is shaping up to be a test of this specific quality. 
The siege of Rome is filled with references to arete; moreover, here we 
find that it is more than a word used to describe a warrior:  it is a trait that can 
bring about success in battle.  At 5.16.6, at the end of a skirmish between the 
Romans and the Goths, we find the former successful because of their arete.  In 
                                                                                                                                 
(1997:  51-122), Kulikowski (2002, 2007), Halsall (2003:  20-39), Goffart (2006, especially 
187-229), and Halsall (2007:  118-136, 482-498). 
92 This is, of course, hardly a new observation, though I think that the heroic character 
has been overlooked. 
93 Procop. Wars 5.8.43. 
94 Procop. Wars 5.10.33. 
95 Procop. Wars 5.10.42. 
96 Procop. Wars 5.11.20. 
97 Procop. Wars 5.11.21. 
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a later skirmish some of Belisarius’ spearmen and guardsmen, who manage to 
save his life and so prevent the loss of the Roman cause, make “displays of arrte 
of such a kind that has, I think, not been demonstrated by a human to this day”.98  
As with the previous encounter, the Romans win because of their arete.99  
Immediately following, another bout of fighting breaks out, and yet another 
Roman soldier, a certain Valentinos, makes a display of arete.100  Several lines 
later Vittigis and the Goths finally attempt to match the success of the Romans 
and, “he ordered them to make a display of deeds worthy of arete against the 
enemy”.101  However, this desperate attempt fails, and it is becoming clear that 
the Romans’ arete is superior to that of their foes.  There is another skirmish and 
as the Roman men draw up for battle, Procopius can speak with authority when 
he claims that they had lined up with arete.102  A little later some Romans make a 
further display of arete.103  With Belisarius in firm command it is clear that the 
East Romans have greater arete than the Goths.  And, the arete now applies not 
only to those in the presence of Belisarius, but also to other Roman soldiers in 
the field.  For John, in a speech to his troops at Ariminum, tells them that if they 
have arete their chance to show it is now, on the field of battle;104 we are 
reminded of Vittigis’ pronouncements about arete being demonstrated through 
actions.  The next place in the narrative that we find Belisarius is following the 
siege of Rome at the siege of Auximus.  Here his troops continue to make 
displays of arete, and continue to have success.105  Vittigis is again in a 
precarious position, and so in a letter to the defenders at Auximus he reminds 
                                                
98 Procop. Wars 5.18.12.  By placing their virtue on a pedestal Procopius is also probably 
consciously referring to the Homeric warriors discussed in the preface.   
99 Procop. Wars 5.18.16. 
100 Procop. Wars 5.18.18. 
101 Procop. Wars 5.27.21. 
102 Procop. Wars 5.28.9. 
103 Procop. Wars 5.29.39. 
104 Procop. Wars 6.12.20. 
105 Procop. Wars 6.23.19. 
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them that they were specifically selected because of their arete, and he appeals 
to their masculinity:   
You must bear in mind what falls in your way manfully, and carefully, out 
of necessity, and keep in mind that it was because of your arete that you 
were selected from the lot to garrison Auximus; and, you would be 
tarnishing the reputation which all the Goths have about you, and for 
which you were put forward as a bulwark for Ravenna, and as the 
guarantors of their own security.106 
   
As it turns out, the Romans emerge from these encounters victorious.  It is the 
Romans who have the greater masculinity and arete.   
The references to arete and masculinity begin to trail off with the 
departure of Belisarius at the end of book six and the beginning of book seven.  It 
starts to play a smaller role in the battles that are described, though they too are 
fewer in number.  Indeed, with Belisarius absent, this element is less of a factor in 
the respective battles’ outcomes.  Furthermore, I would stress that the narrative 
as a whole seems to lose its heroic/Homeric quality shortly after the end of the 
first siege of Rome.  Like so much else in the Wars, arete seems to be tied to 
Belisarius, which in turn, points to a link with Homer for his general.   
 
Part II:  Characterization, Numbers, and Rhetoric in the Belisariad  
Numbers and Rhetoric  
In previous chapters I looked at Procopius’ use of numbers, focusing on 
precision, regularity, and selectivity.  As with the Persian Wars and the Vandal 
Wars, these issues are important for understanding the Gothic Wars.  
Nevertheless, here I want to move beyond mere identification of these features, 
and several others, and focus on how they contribute to Procopius’ 
characterizations of the Gothic and Roman armies.  In addition, I shall analyse 
these figures in their broader context, namely, in relation to the figures deployed 
in the Gothic Wars outside of descriptions of battle; by doing this their 
                                                
106 Procop. Wars 6.26.13.  As with my discussion of single combat we find that honour or 
shame ultimately rest in the mind of one’s companions. 
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significance is revealed.  Despite their seeming simplicity, numbers can convey to 
us quite a bit about Procopius’ narrative techniques beyond the type of sources 
he used, or Quellenforschung.  Another significant, and, as we shall see, related 
issue that I shall discuss is identity, namely that of the two primary players in the 
events, the Gothic and Roman armies,107 as well as those of the secondary 
armies mentioned (Franks for example); this too bears on our understanding of 
Procopius’ presentation of battle in the Gothic Wars.   
Above I noted that Procopius uses more precise figures in the Persian 
Wars than in the Vandal Wars.  This matter, as regards the Gothic Wars, has 
been discussed before, notably by Hannestad,108 though also by Thompson,109 
and Cameron.110  There are a number of conclusions drawn by those scholars. 
They have observed a change in Procopius’ presentation in the second half of 
the Gothic Wars, when the numbers become much more precise.  They have 
also suggested that Procopius tended to exaggerate the number of enemy, 
especially Gothic, forces, particularly at the onset of the war; and, that he inflated 
these Gothic numbers for the sake of glorifying Belisarius.111  Are these 
conclusions valid?  Before discussing characterization, I need to discuss them.  
Much ink has been spilled on the inaccuracy of the numbers reported by 
historians throughout antiquity; this is not the place to discuss this any further.  As 
I noted in my introduction, my aim in this thesis is not to discuss the accuracy of 
the data presented by Procopius;112 moreover, accuracy and precision are not 
synonymous, though they are certainly related.  Where a reported figure of 1,000 
                                                
107 I shall treat the characterization of individuals, such as Belisarius, Vittigis, and Totila, 
separately.  As a comparison, for the characterization of the armies in Tacitus’ Histories 
see Ash (1999). 
108 Hannestad 1960. 
109 Thompson 1982:  77-91. 
110 Cameron 1985:  .147-150.  Liebeschuetz (1996:  232) essentially follows Hannestad, 
and, states that “Procopius’ numbers are incomplete and in part certainly unreliable”. 
111 Evans (1972:  143, n. 82) was one of the first to raise doubts about this second 
conclusion.  Cf. Evans 1972:  74. 
112 Cf. appendix 1 below pp. 343-346 for a few comments on rhetoric and reality in the 
Wars.  
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for a troop total may be said to be accurate if there really were, in any historical 
sense, 1,000 troops involved in the situation in question, the expression of “1,000 
troops” is more precise than “no less than 1,000 troops” in that situation, 
regardless of how accurate the 1,000 figure is, because the former is exact, while 
the latter is not.  Moving on to precision in Procopius, in general, just as we saw 
in the Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars, the numbers used for people, whether 
troops or casualties, tend to be round figures.  As with the rest of the Wars, 
numbers for troops are given in multiples of ten.  So, we read phrases like:  
“having selected 300 men from an infantry division”;113 “no less than 1,000 Goths 
fell”;114 “he sent 600 horsemen”;115 “around 2,000 men from the Herulian nation 
followed him”;116 and “no more than 1,000 men following him”.117  We also see 
that Procopius still uses expressions like “about”, “around”, “no more than”, and 
“no less than”, which were discussed in earlier chapters.  Though only a sample, 
these examples are applicable to the rest of the text.  Generally, when numbers 
are reported, they tend to be less than precise, particularly as regards troop 
totals, whether it is for casualties, or units deployed for a particular assignment.  
Indeed, a significant conclusion of Hannestad’s study, which, as noted, was 
followed by later scholars, was that Procopius becomes more precise in the latter 
half of the Gothic Wars.   
Despite the seeming unanimity of this verdict, the precision of the 
numbers that Procopius offers continues to draw attention from scholars.118  The 
only figures that show any real signs of precision, however, are those given by 
Procopius for distances, which tend to come outside of the descriptions of battle.  
                                                
113 Procop. Wars 5.14.1. 
114 Procop. Wars 5.18.14. 
115 Procop. Wars 6.2.9. 
116 Procop. Wars 6.13.18. 
117 Procop. Wars 7.1.27. 
118 Treadgold (2007:  213-226), for example, in his recent overview of early Byzantine 
historiography, discusses this issue in his chapter on Procopius in a section subtitled ‘the 
Achievement of Procopius’. 
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A glance at his use of stades bears this out.119  The precision of the distances 
Procopius uses has been discussed in an interesting article by Feissel, who 
looked at Roman miles, stades, or days’ journey in the Wars, the Buildings, and 
the Secret History. 120  Feissel, in fact, suggests that one of Procopius’ 
requirements regarding distance was to give exact information, in other words, 
precise information.121  At the same time, he did not always meet this condition, in 
large part, or so Feissel, because he was averse to using the mile.122  Much like 
troop numbers, when Procopius reports stades he often seems to round the 
figures to the nearest multiple of ten; at the same time, he also puts them into 
multiples of seven.123  Much as he does with the troops figures, however, 
Procopius resorts to including modifiers before distances such as “no less than”, 
“about”, and “more than”.  Early in book five we find that the length of the River 
Decennovium is 113 stades.124  A little later we read that “Cumae is on the sea, 
128 stades from Naples”.125  With that said, we still get some familiar 
expressions:  “and when he came near to Rome, and no more than 14 stades 
from it”.126  In fact, as we move through the Gothic Wars, we find the figures used 
for distances given increasingly in factors of ten, that is becoming less precise.  
At 6.47 we find:  “the fortress of Tibur, which is 140 stades from Rome”;127 a little 
later we find:  “a certain church of the apostle Paul 14 stades from the walls of 
Rome”.128  At the end of book 7 we find “it extended for 1,000 stades”;129 “as 
many as 60 stades away”;130 and “which is 700 stades from Croton”.131  Still, 
                                                
119 Stades are reported much more often than either days’ journey, or miles in the Gothic 
Wars, as noted by Feissel (2002:  386-388). 
120 Feissel 2002 
121 Feissel 2002:  383. 
122 Feissel 2002:  383, 397-399 
123 Feissel 2002:  393-397. 
124 Procop. Wars 5.11.2. 
125 Procop. Wars 5.14.3. 
126 Procop. Wars 5.17.3. 
127 Procop. Wars 6.4.7. 
128 Procop. Wars 6.4.9. 
129 Procop. Wars 7.28.2. 
130 Procop. Wars 7.28.8. 
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there is a significant degree of precision in the distances that Procopius presents 
us with; as we saw, this seems to be at odds with his figures for troops numbers.   
As things stand, the conclusion of Hannestad is breaking down, at least 
as regards distances.  But what about troop numbers?  Treadgold has recently 
argued in favour of the precision of Procopius’ use of numbers.132  Though he 
recognizes that the quality of the figures used varies,133 he does express 
approval at the quantity of ‘statistics’ used, as well as their general reliability.  As 
regards precision, one of the only places where he finds fault with Procopius is in 
the Secret History.134  In an attempt to solve this problem, I have compiled a near 
complete list (as far as I can tell) of the troop numbers reported by Procopius in 
the Gothic Wars.  The list, which can be found in appendix 3, includes only those 
instances where a figure is given.135 
If we look at the troop numbers from this list alone, we find that there are 
many more figures given for book seven than there are for books five and six.  
This is due, in no small part, to the fact that the siege of Rome, the centrepiece of 
the narrative, starts in book five and continues through book six:  it happens to be 
full of skirmishes filled with indeterminable numbers.  What is more, we get less 
of the fantastical figures in book seven; so, the only two numbers reported in the 
‘myriad’ range come from a speech made by Totila.  Indeed, if we were to equate 
quantity with precision, then we should agree with Hannestad, and others, that 
the last phase is certainly more precise; but, as I have said, precision means 
exactness, and the number of times a figure is reported has no bearing on its 
exactness.  What is probably the best marker of precision is the presence, or 
absence, of expressions such as “about”, “around”, “more than”, “no more than”, 
“less than”, and “no less than”.  A cursory glance suggests that they are fairly 
                                                                                                                                 
131 Procop. Wars 7.28.18. 
132 Treadgold 2007:  210; 218-221. 
133 Treadgold 2007:  218. 
134 Treadgold 2007:  210.  Cf. Procop. SH 18.4. 
135 The list is found in appendix 3 on pp. 349-353 below. 
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evenly distributed throughout books five through seven.  When we tabulate the 
figures that I have collected, however, the results are surprising.  There are 30 
figures from the list that are from book five, 33 from book six, and 52 from book 
seven.  Of those, in book five Procopius uses a relative and imprecise phrase like 
‘around’ 27% of the time; in book six he uses such a phrase 30% of the time; and 
in book seven, 23% of the time.  Based on this criterion, Procopius seems to get 
less precise as he moves towards the centre of the Gothic Wars, before 
becoming more precise as he moves in to book seven, which has a much greater 
total number of figures.  With that said, book seven also has many more pages 
than the previous two books:  184 in the Loeb edition.  As a point of comparison, 
book 5 takes up 141 Loeb pages, and book 6 140 pages.136  If we stick with the 
division into halves that Hannestad originally advocated, and so divide those 
page totals into two sections, the mid point of the Gothic Wars comes at 6.26.  
With this new information in mind, the new tallies are 60 figures for the first half, 
with the use of an imprecise qualifier 28% of the time; and, 55 figures for the 
second half, with the use of an imprecise qualifier 24% of the time.  Suddenly 
Hannestad and the others are vindicated, but only by the slimmest of margins, 
though again it should be pointed out that the siege of Rome, which is the longest 
description, falls in the first half. The conclusions of those previous scholars, 
then, need modification.  What we should really say is that Procopius is slightly 
more precise in the second half of the Gothic Wars, though he also uses a 
slightly fewer figures.  Yet, we can take this discussion a little further. 
One other criterion for measuring precision is the number of adjectives 
used to replace figures; an adjective is certainly vaguer than the use of an actual 
                                                
136 These totals include partial pages (such as the end of a book where the last piece of 
text may only take up a quarter of the page).  The Loeb version was used because it was 
the most convenient at the time that I first typed this.  As a point of contrast, book 5 takes 
up 142 pages in the Teubner, book 6 143 pages, and book 7 185 pages, totals which are 
quite comparable to the Loeb, and so point to its reliability, at least as far as this tally is 
concerned. 
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number.  Thus, let us quickly look at a few examples.  A typical one is found at 
5.7.1, when Procopius says:  “the Goths, who were being led by Asinaris and 
Gripas among others, had come to Dalmatia with a great army [στρατ  πολλ ]”.  
Instances where Procopius describes an army, or division, in this manner in the 
Gothic Wars abound; the same holds true for when he describes the number of 
casualties following an engagement.  So, at 6.23.35 we read:  “the soldiers, while 
looking down on the enemy in the field, went against them on the run, so killing 
some of them [τινάς τε α τ ν] in the first rush”.  Indeed, this is much as we found 
when we looked at the Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars.137   What is important 
for us, however, is their distribution; if we accept the conclusions reached by 
Hannestad and others about the increase in precision in the second half of the 
text, with the low-mark being around the siege of Rome, then we should expect to 
find more general descriptors in the first half of the Gothic Wars.  A close 
examination reveals, however, that this is not the case.  I went through all of 
those instances where Procopius uses adjectives when discussing a troop 
contingent, whether he is referring to its size, or its casualty totals.  As we would 
expect given the respective lengths of books five and six, the totals are roughly 
the same.  The number of places where adjectives are used in book seven is 
greater, ostensibly unsurprising given that the seventh book is longer than the 
previous two.  With that said, book seven is only about 30% longer than book 
five, and about 31% longer than book six, while adjectives are used 65% more 
often in book seven than book five, and 60% more often than book six.  If we do 
for adjectives what we did for numbers, that is, divide the Gothic Wars into 
halves, and then compare the totals, the results are striking, at least if we want to 
accept the theory that there is an increase in precision in the second half:  my 
tentative total for the first half includes 101 cases, while my total for the second 
half contains 102 cases.  At the end of these analyses for numbers and for 
                                                
137 See above pp. 133-137, 196-203. 
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adjectives, then, we should now cast aside any belief that the second half of the 
text is significantly more precise than the first. 
With the first conclusion dispensed with, we need to look closer at the 
second conclusion, namely that Procopius exaggerated the Gothic forces, to test 
whether it is as plausible as it at first seems.  There are many more figures given 
for Roman troops than there are for Gothic ones.  This should not surprise as 
Procopius had no qualms about focusing on the Roman side of the war.  This fact 
is also reflected in the greater variety of troop types given for the Roman forces, 
but more on this, and other matters of characterization, in a moment.138  In the list 
that I have compiled above Procopius refers to Gothic forces 33 times.139  Of 
those 33 figures, only three (which are repeated) seem to be wild exaggerations, 
and of these, two are variations on each other.  The two related figures are totals 
given for the Gothic forces at Rome, which are first quoted at 150,000, but later 
200,000.140  The other figure is for the casualties after a skirmish in the early 
stages of the siege of Rome, listed as 30,000.141  Both sets seem to be out of 
order, the former especially when we consider the scholarly consensus as 
regards the size of campaigning armies in the sixth century.142  If we ignore the 
size of the number of troops killed and instead focus on the proportion of troops 
killed from the total, the figure is a bit more believable:  one fifth of the Gothic 
forces perished in that one encounter.  Thus, does Procopius really want us to 
accept these gross figures, or is there something that we are missing?  The 
                                                
138 See Müller (1912) and Grosse (1920:  272-296) on how the divisions of the Roman 
army are categorized by Procopius, and more recently Ravegnani (1988:  29-39) and 
Rance (2005: 444-447). 
139 My list, of course, also includes some civilian totals, though this does not affect my 
argument. 
140 150,000 – Procop. Wars 5.16.11, 5.24.2; 200,000 – Procop. Wars 7.4.12, 7.21.4. 
141 Procop. Wars 5.23.26. 
142 Treadgold (2007:  220) speculates that the figure of 200,000 might be appropriate for 
the size of the total Ostrogothic population.  As regards the size of late Roman 
expeditionary forces see Rance (2005:  447-449).  Cf. Treadgold 1995:  59-64; Whitby 
1995:  73-75; Whitby 2000a:  292-293; Syvänne 2004:  79-91; and Elton 2007a:  284-
286. 
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solution becomes manifest when we turn to a topic that I have not yet discussed, 
namely cultural perception.143 
In a provocative, though not unproblematic, study on “the numbers ‘found’ 
in Thucydides…and their explication”,144 Morpeth focuses on two contexts that 
are of particular relevance here, and that are worth quoting in full:   
(ii) cultural perceptions and reckonings of abnormally or exceptionally 
large forces – with specific reference to massed formations, expeditions, 
or expeditionary forces of barbarians or outsiders ad Hellenes…(iii) the 
dramatic impact and literary power of the deployment of the term, 
μυριάδες in Thucydides’ work and, for that matter, Herodotus’ Histories 
[sic]145 
  
The perception of large forces, and any totals for that matter, by both the sixth 
century audience, and the characters in the text itself, and, the dramatic effect of 
using such large numbers, are two issues worth considering when we find such 
figures in Procopius.  In fact, if we begin with the perception of the characters 
themselves, the validity of this approach is made apparent.  At 5.7.28-29, in the 
early stages of Belisarius’ invasion of Italy, Procopius describes the following:  
“men happened to be there whom Gripas [a Gothic commander] had sent as 
spies.  And when they caught sight of the ships and camp of Konstantianos, it 
seemed to them that the sea and the whole land were full of soldiers; they went 
back to Gripas, figuring that Konstantianos was bringing no less than tens of 
thousands of men [μυριάδας ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλιγας]”.146  This report is a gross 
exaggeration, for even though Procopius does not tell us the exact number of 
troops Konstantianos had at his disposal,147 a few lines later he does note that 
Konstantianos dispatched 500 men to seize the pass near Salones and deemed 
it sufficient.  These events take place before Vittigis assumes control of the 
                                                
143 Cf. the comments of Halsall (2003:  144). 
144 Morpeth 2006:  64.  Morpeth’s (2006) book raises some interesting issues though his 
language and argumentation are often difficult to follow. 
145 Morpeth 2006:  67 
146 On a similar note, see Procop. Wars 8.16.8-9, where the Persian force is exaggerated 
in an attempt to frighten King Gubazes.  Cf. Treadgold 2007:  220. 
147 Procop. Wars 5.7.28:  “with his whole force” [τ  παντ  στόλ ]. 
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Gothic forces.  Theodohad is still in charge, and the fear among the Goths is 
palpable, and growing, thanks to his ineffectual leadership.148  This vague report 
of myriads of soldiers for the enemy, ‘the other’ (here the Romans), then, is a 
great way for Procopius to heighten the tension (i.e., dramatic effect).  
Furthermore, it advances the narrative by increasing the collective fear of the 
Goths, here manifested by Gripas, and by highlighting the failure in leadership 
that would eventually lead to Theodohad’s replacement by Vittigis.149  With this in 
mind, let us look at the other presentations of myriads. 
The first use of myriad, and, in regard to a specific number at that, comes 
when Procopius tells us the size of the Gothic force that Vittigis leads to Rome, 
namely “cavalry and infantry numbering no less than 150,000”.150  A few chapters 
earlier we learned that Vittigis had “gathered all the Goths from all over”,151 and 
although Procopius had not yet (nor does he ever) give the total Gothic 
population, this statement acts as a qualifier, implanting in the mind of the reader 
the idea that we are to expect a significant force at the king’s disposal (all the 
Goths, and myriads of them); unsurprisingly, 150,000 is exactly that, and more.152  
This fantastic Gothic total is also all the more remarkable when we bear in mind 
that Belisarius has only 5,000 men to defend Rome.153 Indeed, this is one of the 
main reasons why Procopius is alleged to have exaggerated the Gothic numbers:  
to flatter Belisarius.  I discuss some of the epic characteristics of the siege of 
                                                
148 Procop. Wars 5.7.11. 
149 Indeed, throughout the Gothic Wars we get a procession of different Gothic leaders, 
with each successive one, setting aside Theoderic that is, more effective, and more 
positively presented, than the former (Theodohad to Vittigis to Totila). 
150 Procop. Wars 5.16.11. 
151 Procop. Wars 5.11.28. 
152 This total is used at only one further point in the text at 5.24.2 when it is directly 
contrasted with the Roman total (5,000 versus 150,000).  Significantly, however, the 
context is a letter written by Belisarius to Justinian in which he pleas for more troops.  It is 
not hard to imagine that Justinian, or any other emperor for that matter, would be more 
willing to send extra troops with the knowledge that his army was up against an incredible 
host.  Indeed, in Justinian’s, as well as Belisarius’, eyes, the figure of 150,000 may have 
been more plausible (as we shall soon see) than one that we might feel is more 
applicable, such as 50,000, the total postulated by Treadgold (2007:  220). 
153 Procop. Wars 5.22.17. 
 279 
Rome, such as the graphic wounds, and the importance of arete above,154 and so 
using an exaggerated figure like this in this context is perhaps not surprising:  this 
is certainly the most logical place for Procopius to do it.  A number this size, even 
if inaccurate, conveys to the reader the scale of the encounter, particularly when 
contrasted with the size of the Roman force; the amount of detail used, and the 
length of the narrative of the siege itself, both strengthen this impression.155  
When the Gothic forces at the siege of Rome are referred to again, this comes 
much later in the text, and the totals are focalized through Totila, in both cases by 
means of speeches.156  In the second of the two instances Totila contrasts the 
now numerically inferior Gothic forces with their Roman opposites, and so 
emphasizes the peril in which they find themselves, much as Belisarius did in his 
letter to Justinian.  The position of the two groups has reversed, and, one might 
suggest, a Gothic victory would be almost as remarkable an achievement as 
Belisarius’ at Rome.  Indeed, to highlight the difference, both between the 
Romans and Goths, but also between the Goths then and the Goths now, Totila 
exaggerates further giving a figure of 200,000, rather than the 150,000 reported 
by Procopius under Vittigis.  Plus, when Totila refers to the size of the Roman 
forces he also exaggerates claiming that it was made up of 7,000 men.157  In this 
latter situation, when Totila is in charge and the Goths have been reduced to 
5,000 men, the Romans now outnumber their foes:  at one point, following 
Totila’s accession, the Romans number 12,000;158 at another, in the same 
speech in which Totila claims that 200,000 Goths were defeated by 7,000 
Greeks, he says that his small force has defeated a Roman counterpart 
                                                
154 See pp. 255-268. 
155 Cf. Morpeth 2006:  70. 
156 Procop. Wars 7.21.4:  “earlier we had collected 200,000 of the most warlike 
soldiers…we were defeated at the hands of 7,000 Greek men”. 
157 The figures from the speech are found at 7.21.4.  There is an earlier reference to the 
size of the Gothic force, and it is again in a speech given by Totila (7.4.12), only here, he 
lists the 200,000, and says that the Gothic army was reduced to 5,000. 
158 Procop. Wars 7.3.4. 
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numbering “more than 20,000 men”.159  Scale figures here too, just as it did with 
the 150,000 Goths at Rome.  The reversal in fortunes between the two groups, 
Goths and Romans, is significant, as is the victory here of the Goths over the 
Romans following Belisarius’ departure.  It is the Romans that are the extreme 
‘other’ with numbers in the myriad range.  Figures reported in the myriad range, 
then, seem to play an important part in the development of the narrative, both for 
what they indicate about the scale of the respective endeavour, and, as I have 
started to show, what they reveal about the respective armies involved, and their 
position in the text.  There are two further points:  in many instances it is the 
difference in size between two forces that stands out; they are often presented in 
some discourse (letter, speech), and so, for those on the receiving end of the 
communication the scale of the number involved is clearly important in conveying 
the size of the challenge (in Belisarius’ case), or the scale of the reversal (in 
Totila’s case).     
There are a few other examples of number inflation in the myriad range.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the issues of discourse and perception, and scale, 
resurface.  At 6.20.21 we learn that “in Picenum it is said that among the Roman 
farmers no less than 50,000 people died from diseases”; at 6.21.39 we read that 
the number killed at Milan numbered “no less than 300,000”.  Of those examples, 
the former pertains to discourse and perception, the latter to scale.160  The first 
troop contingent concerns the number of soldiers that the Franks had gathered 
for their army, which is 100,000.161  It is quite possible that this figure is an 
exaggeration,162 though it is certainly much lower than the second example.  It 
concerns the number of German forces (that is Frankish), only here the total is 
                                                
159 Procop. Wars 7.21.5. 
160 The same can probably be said about the former case, the 50,000 who perished from 
disease in Picenum. 
161 Procop. Wars 6.23.5.  On Procopius’ and Agathias’ characterization of the military 
capabilities of the Franks see Bachrach (1970).  Cf. Halsall 2003:  40-70, 2007:  399-405. 
162 On the size of Western Medieval armies see Halsall (2003:  119-133).  On a similar 
note, see Goffart (1980:  231-234) on Vandal Africa. 
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500,000, a fivefold increase.  This figure is reported midway through book six,163 
and, quite significantly, the information is conveyed to Vittigis by Frankish envoys.  
Thus, we have the same scenario that we did for Belisarius and Justinian, and 
Totila and the Goths.  It is unlikely that Procopius’ audience, or the character, and 
historical personage, of Vittigis would have known the size of the Frankish army, 
and given the perilous situation (the Goths were on the ropes at this point), it 
seems quite plausible in the context of the narrative that the envoys would have 
used such an incredible figure.164  Yet again, some variation on myriad is used to 
convey the scale of the situation, and, it hinges on perception,165 is presented 
through some sort of discourse, and involves an ‘other’.   
There also seem to be a number of references to concerns about the size 
of respective forces, particularly in relation to one’s own force.  Much seems to 
hang on the perception of the size of the opponent’s force, and this is evident 
from the beginning.  We find a situation where it is reported that “they [the 
wounded Goths] maintained that Belisarius would be present with an army of a 
size beyond reckoning”.166  Indeed, one of the most common adjectives used by 
Procopius when describing the size of an army is something along the lines of 
‘worthy of note’; so we find phrases like ‘stratian axiologotaten’, ‘axiomachon’, 
‘ouk axiologon’.  To a certain degree, we should not be surprised to find such 
references, on occasion, to armies of this sort, for one of Procopius’ expressed 
aims was to prove to his audience that his story was of the greatest war ever 
known, and certainly such a story would include armies described in this manner.   
                                                
163 Procop. Wars 6.28.10. 
164 On military intelligence in late antiquity see Lee (1993).  For the earlier Roman period 
see Austin and Rankov (1995). 
165 We get a good example of the role of perception in the presentation of the size of the 
enemy forces in a speech that Belisarius makes to his commanders before his move to 
Ravenna:  “Thus let each one of you remember that Vittigis has many myriads of Goths in 
Ravenna” (6.18.19). 
166 Procop. Wars 6.28.10. 
 282 
Ignoring, for a moment, the variety of figures and adjectives employed, it 
is worth noting that Procopius often refers to the importance of numbers in battle, 
whether small or large.167  And, it seems to pick up as the narrative progresses.  I 
have not highlighted all the places where he notes it, but generals seem to be 
constantly referring to the size of their army in relation to their foe.  In some ways 
this seems to be reminiscent of both ancient and modern discussions of the 
importance of numbers in late Roman, or East Roman, armies, which often found 
themselves at a numerical disadvantage.168  This sort of information found its way 
into tactical manuals, of which the most relevant for my purposes is the 
Strategikon of Maurice.  With that said, it seems that in the Gothic Wars the 
regularity of this problem, the discrepancy in numbers, seems to be balanced 
between Roman and Gothic forces.  So, it might simply be that Procopius is 
trying to draw our attention to the numbers used because of their significance in 
his narrative:  the more fantastic the numbers involved, and the differences 
between them, the more spectacular the story.  One final point about the number 
discrepancy, at least as regards the Romans:  as I have noted, one issue that 
Procopius is keen to emphasize is the tactical superiority of certain segments of 
the Roman army, especially the mounted archers.  I stressed that this point was 
first highlighted in the preface, and then argued for, by Procopius, primarily in the 
Gothic Wars.  One obvious way to strengthen his argument was to not only 
present Roman forces, using mounted archers, fighting successfully against their 
Gothic opponents, but also to present them as victorious against opposition that 
was numerically superior.  We have, then, another case of intratextuality in the 
                                                
167 Conceivably, this could be more significant than it at first seems to be.  Where an army 
lacks the numbers needed to match their foes, they must resort to other means if they 
want to be successful.   
168 See, for example the comments of Maurice (Strat. 8.2.8.21-22, 8.2.38) and Nikephoros 
Phocas (On Skirmishing 6).  Cf. Kaegi 1983; Kaegi 1990:  64-66; Treadgold 1995:  206-
219; Whittow 1996:  175-193; Haldon 1999:  67-106. 
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narrative, despite the seeming unimportance of the numbers aside from the 
perspective of reconstructing the war. 
 
Characterization and Rhetoric  
Besides marking out the scale of the encounter, these uses of myriad 
highlight the relative barbarity of the force in question.  A key feature of Classical 
Greek, especially Athenian, identity was the polarity between Greeks and 
barbarians.169  In some respects, much of what they were based on was who they 
were not:  barbarians, and more specifically, Persians.170  This point became 
particularly marked following the success of the united Greek force at holding off 
the invasion of Xerxes, described in detail by Herodotus.  Over a thousand years 
later the circumstances have changed, but, the dichotomy still exists, with the 
Romans now occupying one end of the polarity, barbarians the other.  On a 
related note, in the chapters on the Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars above I 
commented on the usual presence of two principal commanders in battle, one for 
each side.  This pattern holds for the Gothic Wars,171 and it has a bearing on the 
following discussion.  These grandiose figures, the myriads, are usually reserved 
for the most barbaric of forces in the Gothic Wars, a practice consistent with 
earlier Greek historical writing and reinforced through Procopius’ diction, 
especially through his various uses of the word ‘barbarian’.172  Furthermore, not 
only does the use of the word ‘barbarian’ have a bearing on the use of ‘myriad’, 
                                                
169 See Champion (2004:  30-63) and Kaldellis (2007a:  14-30). 
170 This was, of course, not felt universally; moreover, the barbarian need not be Persian, 
as they could just as easily be a Macedonian.  The key distinction was non-Greek.  It was 
largely contingent on the context; despite Alexander’s claims in the fourth century BC, 
mainland Greeks were arguably just as likely to view the Macedonians as barbarian as 
the Persians whose land he was invading.  The few times that the Persians are 
mentioned in the Gothic Wars, they are called either Persians (6.13.17), or Medes (5.5.3), 
and never barbarians, a possible indication of how Procopius viewed the status of 
Rome’s main eastern rival. 
171 Indeed, in her dissertation Kouroumali (2005:  219-224) commented on the presence 
of pairs of figures in the Gothic Wars. 
172 Herodotus (7.184), Thucydides (2.98), and Arrian (2.8.5-8), for example, all adopt the 
same practice at some point or other in their respective historical works. 
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but, these terms collectively are also connected to Procopius’ characterization of 
the principal generals, and to his conception of generalship.173  
One of the earliest figures reported for the Goths is the grossly 
exaggerated 150,000 troops alleged to have been present at the siege of Rome.  
When Procopius opens the Gothic Wars he begins with his introductory history of 
Italy, and to a lesser degree, its Gothic rulers.  They are explicitly called 
barbarians, and put in apposition to the Romans.174  Indeed, even Theoderic, who 
is generally characterized favourably, is called a Goth, and said to have 
maintained this distinction when he assumed control of Italy:  “and he did not 
claim the right to take on the manner of the emperor of the Romans, or the name, 
but was even called rex throughout his life (for thus the barbarians are used to 
calling their leaders”.175  Italy has come to be ruled by barbarian Goths; in modern 
eyes, they have many of the features that we associate with barbarian, Gothic, 
and Germanic peoples, and notably for our purposes, the values associated with 
their reputed warrior aristocracies.  Amalasuntha is urged by Gothic nobles to 
allow her son be raised with the arete that is the barbarian custom.176  In their 
eyes, this is what is expected, particularly in light of the values of Theoderic, and 
his subsequent success. 177  However, at the same time, we are presented with a 
dichotomy, and a potentially divisive one, within the Goths themselves:  the 
                                                
173 Only a few books in to the Gothic Wars Procopius stresses the importance of 
commanders:  “the Romans withdrew to their base, since they were altogether left without 
a commander” (5.7.9). 
174 Procop. Wars 5.1.4.  Procopius goes into more detail about the origins of the Goths 
early in the Vandal Wars.  We read:  “While Honorius was holding power over the West, 
barbarians took his land; I shall talk about these people, and in what manner they did 
this…There were many Gothic nations earlier just as there are now, and the greatest and 
most noteworthy of all the Goths are the Vandals, Visigoths, and Gepids” (3.2.1-3.2.2).  
He also notes the brutality of the barbarians/Goths at 3.2.9-13. 
175 Procop. Wars 5.1.26.  As an aside, at this early stage in the text Procopius is also 
making a distinction between Romans, such as himself, and Italians, the inhabitants of 
Italy, Goths aside, at the end of the fifth century and start of the sixth.  A little later he 
does this between the Goths and their Italian subjects (5.6.19).   
176 Procop. Wars 5.2.17. 
177 Cf. Procop. Wars 5.2.15. 
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‘civilizing’ tendencies of their leaders such as Amalasuntha,178 and the ‘traditional’ 
tendencies of the later ruler Totila.179  There is another important point about the 
term “barbarian” that Procopius raises early on, and it pertains to its fluidity.  
Although the Goths are generally barbarians, the degree to which they exhibit 
barbarian tendencies varies with time and actions; moreover, barbarians are not 
necessarily Goths in the context of the Gothic Wars, for Roman soldiers too can 
be barbarians.  For example, when Procopius gives us his catalogue of Roman 
forces at 5.5.1ff., he notes that the commander Mundus “was born a barbarian, 
though he was especially loyal to the affairs of the emperor and brave in war”.180  
A little later, in the context of a conversation with Stephanus during the siege of 
Naples, Belisarius says:  “especially while in command of Romans who are 
accompanying me…but especially as there are a great number of barbarians in 
my encampment”.181  From the introduction we can see that the Goths can be 
barbarians, and, that barbarian is a fluid term, and one that is not fixed to any 
particular person or group; this conception of the word is developed, and further 
explicated, over the course of the Gothic Wars.   
The fluidity of the term barbarian becomes particularly marked when the 
Goths, often termed barbarians, are placed along side other peoples, such as 
those who make up a part of their army; furthermore, this bears out the similarity 
                                                
178 Not only is Procopius presenting us with this dichotomy among the Gothic leadership, 
but also between men and women.  Indeed, he is presenting a very Iliadic conception of 
war, where the women are generally averse to fighting, manifested here in Amalasuntha’s 
educational plans for her son (Procop. Wars 5.9.1).  This marked difference between the 
martial qualities and roles of men and women is consistent with what we know about so-
called barbarians and ancient martial societies, including Greece and Rome.  In keeping 
with Homer’s and Herodotus’ allusions to the prominent role that women have had as the 
causes of major wars in their respective eras, Procopius does so too, by having 
Amalasuntha contact Justinian and persuade him to attack Italy.  On the role of women in 
warfare in various ancient and early medieval societies see Halsall (2003:  32-36), Van 
Wees (2004:  37-40), Gat (2005:  77-86), Hornblower (2007:  42-47), Lee (2007a:  141-
146) and Southern (2007:  144-145). 
179 This is a point to which we shall return later, particularly when we come to Totila. 
180 Procop. Wars 5.5.2. 
181 Procop. Wars 5.9.27. 
 286 
in meaning of the term ‘Goth’ with the composite term ‘Roman’.182  At 5.16.9 we 
find Vittigis ordering Asinarius and Uligisalus “to collect an army from the 
barbarians of the land of Suevi there, and then to go straightaway to Dalmatia 
and Salones”.183  In this reckoning, “Goth”, at least as regards the army, is more 
of a collective term, much as “Roman” is.  On a similar note, at 5.29.20, 
Procopius gives us this interesting phrase:   
In this struggle three men from the Romans were conspicuous among all 
the others, Athenodoros, an Isaurian man, and one of good repute among 
the spearmen of Belisarius, and, Theodoriskos and Georgios, spearmen 
of Martinos, born Cappadocian.  For, they were always going out in front 
of the phalanx and killing many of the barbarians with their spears.184 
                    
What these two passages suggest is that in some respects, Goth and Roman are 
both collective, and inclusive, terms.  Indeed, one might even go so far as to 
suggest these two words are, in some sense, cognates, or at the very least, on 
the same side of parallel polarities, one Roman/barbarian, the other 
Goth/barbarian.  A good example of the relativity of the terms barbarian and Goth 
come much later in a speech made by a certain Paul, who is discussing both the 
Germans (Franks) and the Goths.  In it, he calls Goths “Goths”, but the Germans 
“barbarians”, thus making a strong distinction between the two.185  Another quite 
striking example comes when Procopius describes the incident in the hole at 
                                                
182 In his provocative new book Kaldellis (2007a) questions the designation of the 
Byzantine Empire as a multicultural commonwealth, preferring the term nation state, 
where distinctions, such as Cilicia are more akin to terms like “mid-westerner” for an 
American.  At least as regards Procopius – and more generally the sixth century, a period 
Kaldellis passes over – the language is ambiguous; as such, I think that the case can still 
be made that he presents an East Roman Empire, rather than nation state.  Cf. Herrin 
2007:  242-251. 
183 Cf. Procop. Wars 5.16.12:  “Thus Asinarius, having come to Suevia, collected an army 
of barbarians; on the other hand Uligisalus alone led the Goths to Liburnia”.  The Gothic 
army was in fact quite heterogeneous, as Procopius’ text suggests (6.11.1).  Among 
modern scholars, there are differing views of the heterogeneity of the Gothic army, with 
some seeing it as polyethnic, others as only so when the situation necessitated it, and 
others as generally only composed of ethnic Goths.  See Wolfram (1988:  300-302), 
Heather (1996:  242-248, 327-328), Amory (1997 passim, especially 277-313), Geary 
(1999:  110-123), Kulikowski (2002), Syvänne (2004:  372), Goffart (2006:  187-229), 
Kouroumali (2005:  164-175), and Halsall (2007:  328-338).    
184 Procop. Wars 5.29.20-21.  I discuss some other issues arising from this passage 
above p. 262. 
185 Procop. Wars 6.21.6.  The Germans number in the hundreds of myriads at this point, 
while the Goths do not. 
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6.1.11-20.  Here we find two soldiers, one Goth, the other Roman, who both, on 
different occasions, fall down the same hole such that they end up trapped 
together, with the Roman soldier ultimately dependent on the good faith of the 
Gothic soldier and his comrades.  The Gothic soldier is called just that, with one 
exception;186 this episode stresses the similarity of the two forces, and again, the 
fluidity of their respective group names. Indeed, there is even one example in 
which a Roman could be a Goth:  “Thus they sent an embassy to Rome, the third 
man [from the embassy] was an esteemed Roman man among the Goths, who, 
having come before Belisarius, said the following”.187  We find Procopius making 
a similar connection between Goth and Roman at 7.2.1ff., which suggests, as I 
have noted, that the term Goth often refers to a group, and not any specific 
nation:   
There was a certain Erarichos in the army of Goths, a Rogos by birth, a 
man invested with great power among these barbarians.  These Rogoi 
are a Gothic nation, though in the past they were autonomous.  In the 
beginning they, along with these other nations, had allied with Theoderic, 
and this separate nation came to the Goths and acted entirely with them 
against the enemy.188 
 
This passage has striking similarities to the aforementioned passage at 5.29.20; 
in fact, the two passages read as mirror images of each other.  In the Roman 
                                                
186 Procop. Wars 6.1.13. 
187 Procop. Wars 6.6.3.  This exchange is one of the more interesting ones from the 
Gothic Wars, at least as regards identity.  The envoys are constantly making a distinction 
between Goths (that is who they are) and Romans (the invaders); barbarians are 
mentioned, but as a distinct third group, when the envoys address Belisarius:  “But you, 
being men such as this, did not lay claim to Italy while it was suffering at the hands of 
Odoacer and the barbarians” (6.6.21).  At the end of this discussion we get a series of 
quick replies from both sides – the only instance, to my recollection, of a dialogue 
involving direct discourse among characters in the Wars – in which Procopius, the 
narrator, when referring to who is speaking calls the Goths barbarians (for example, 
6.6.27), but Belisarius, as a speaker, calls the Goths by their name (6.6.28).  Throughout, 
when Procopius uses a word for embassy or ambassadors, he uses Goth or Goths.   
In some cases the choice of word, particularly as regards the usage of the word 
barbarian, seems to hinge on the status of the person, or persons, in question:  “For he 
[John] was daring and especially self-sufficient amongst this group, untiring in dangerous 
situations, and in his way of life he had a certain austerity and continuing ability to endure 
hardship that was in no way inferior to that of any barbarian or soldier” (6.10.10).  One 
might even suggest that here barbarian is being used in the same sense as Goth is by 
Joshua the Stylite, that is, as a type of soldier, and presumably, a non-Roman soldier. 
188 Procop. Wars 7.2.1-2.  On the Rogoi (Rugians) see Goffart (2006:  110-114). 
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version the Cappadocian and Isaurian soldiers have the same position in the 
army as the Rogos soldier here in the Gothic army.  The similarity between the 
two forces is stressed much later in the Gothic Wars when Totila is king.  In a 
speech at 7.25.4-24 to his disgruntled soldiers, many of the points noted by Totila 
evoke points made at other times by Belisarius in similar situations of his own.189  
By the time of the great reversal,190 the Goths have taken the Roman position in 
the narrative almost effortlessly, a transformation which underscores the similarity 
between the terms ‘Goth’ and ‘Roman’.  
While bearing in mind the fluidity of the term barbarian, we should also 
bear in mind that neither it, nor the term Goth, have any moral dimension.  For 
Procopius, Goth is not a pejorative term, nor, necessarily, is barbarian.  In noting 
Justinian’s decision to send the Romans to war in Italy Procopius says:  “he 
[Justinian] ordered Belisarius to go to Italy as quickly as possible, and, to treat the 
Goths as if they are enemies”.191  Before the siege of Naples, Belisarius alludes 
to the fact that the Gothic soldiers could move between both groups, Goths and 
Romans:  “We give to these Goths present a choice:  either to array themselves 
with the rest of us under the great emperor, or, to go home altogether without 
suffering wrong”.192  The Goths were in the wrong not because they were Goths, 
but because, at least as regards the political stage, they were foes.193  Indeed, 
some of the principal Roman commanders are themselves Goths, such as 
Bessus.194  We also read of one of Belisarius’ spearmen, a certain Chorsamantis, 
who suffers a major injury and is thus prevented from contributing in battle; 
                                                
189 Indeed, the whole reason for the speech itself, namely the questions surrounding the 
leadership of the Goths after some minor setbacks, is reminiscent of similar speeches 
made by Belisarius to both his fellow soldiers, and the people of Rome. 
190 Procop. Wars 7.25.14. 
191 Procop. Wars 5.7.26. 
192 Procop. Wars 5.8.16. 
193 Cf. Procop. Wars 5.8.27, where Belisarius calls their leadership “barbarian tyranny”, 
where barbarian is the type of tyranny, and so not the negative part of the title.  In a 
different context “Roman tyranny” would essentially mean the same thing, only those in 
control would be different.  Again, no morality is implied.  
194 Procop. Wars 5.16.2. 
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Procopius tells us that his barbarian background leads to inevitable dismay 
because of his inability to fight.195  This reading of Procopius’ understanding of 
barbarians is a bit more nuanced than, and in stark contrast to, that of 
Cameron.196  A similar point was made recently by Kaldellis, in regard to the 
views of Eratosthenes of Cyrene, and to a lesser degree, Strabo:  “that good and 
bad people are distributed among different ethnic or cultural groups”.197  With that 
said, as regards both terms, barbarian and Goth, it is barbarian that has more 
negative connotations than Goth.  Having described the massacre at Milan, 
Procopius says the following:  “The barbarians did not treat them [the Roman 
soldiers] with disgrace, and held them under guard with Mundilas; on the other 
hand, they razed the city to the ground and killed all the men from youth upwards, 
which totalled no less than 300,000”.198  Here the actions of the Goths are 
certainly atrocious; in addition, it is probably no coincidence that they are called 
barbarians and not Goths.  But, Procopius is not making any moral judgements 
here about the Goths necessarily.  By saying barbarians the word Goth is 
absolved of specifically negative connotations.  He does note that the Roman 
soldiers were treated well,199 and a few lines later he calls them Goths again.200  
In the subsequent chapter he calls the Goths barbarians and the term loses its 
moral designation:  “And among these [suggestions] this point was considered, 
namely that the emperor of the Romans had never before been strong enough to 
wage war against the barbarians in the west, except when treaties were 
established with Persia.  For at that time they had destroyed the Vandals and the 
                                                
195 Procop. Wars 6.1.21. 
196 Cameron 1985:  239-240. 
197 Kaldellis 2007a:  25. 
198 Procop. Wars 6.21.39. 
199 This is an interesting, and perhaps significant point, for we rarely, if ever, read of 
soldiers treating any enemy soldier poorly at the conclusion of a battle, or after taking a 
city – that is excluding, of course, the actual act of killing each other – in the Gothic Wars. 
200 Procop. Wars 6.21.42. 
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Moors, and at present, were battling the Goths”.201  When Totila starts to feature 
in the narrative, the likelihood of a negative connotation for ‘Goth’ is even more 
improbable.  For, we read statements such as:  “When Totila captured Naples, he 
made a display of humanity to those captured that conspicuously fits neither an 
enemy nor barbarian man”,202 and, “While Totila was doing these things, the 
commanders of the Roman army, along with the soldiers, were plundering the 
property of their subjects”.203  Indeed, in the latter example, it is the Romans who 
are behaving like brigands.204   
The connection between barbarity and myriad is borne out when the 
Franks enter the stage.  Indeed, in the excursus on their background, they are 
painted as even more barbaric than the Goths, a further indication of the relativity 
of the term barbarian.205  At this stage of the narrative, the size of the Frankish 
force willing to enter the fray is listed at 100,000,206 a figure which now vastly 
outnumbers the constantly shrinking Gothic army, despite the earlier assumption 
of Belisarius, who believes that the Goths still numbered in the 10s of 1000s.207 
This figure of 100,000 grows fivefold when it becomes a matter of perception, and 
a tool of rhetoric, and not simply a figure reported in the text.208  The 
ambassadors from the Frankish kingdom make a concerted effort to turn the 
Goths to their side; they even appeal to the similarity in ethnicity, relatively 
speaking, between the two peoples.209  The use of the figure 500,000 is 
significant in its context for two reasons:  they, that is, the ambassadors, tell the 
                                                
201 Procop. Wars 6.22.15. 
202 Procop. Wars 7.8.1.  Unlike the previous example, Procopius alludes to a negative 
definition of barbarian. 
203 Procop. Wars 7.9.1. 
204 Incidentally, what we see here is another case where the outcome (here behaviour) 
depends heavily on the leadership of the respective commander, particularly with respect 
to the treatment of civilians.  For a more detailed discussion of this topic see Pazdernik 
(1997, 2000). 
205 Procop. Wars 6.25.9-11. 
206 Procop. Wars 6.25.2. 
207 Procop. Wars 6.18.19. 
208 Procop. Wars 6.28.10. 
209 Procop. Wars 6.28.14. 
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Goths that their numerically superior force would crush the Romans; 
simultaneously, they are implying that they would, and could, do the same to the 
Goths.210  Here, then, myriad is used to convey fear (dramatic effect), as the 
exaggeration of the size of their army in this speech is meant to intimidate.  
Indeed, they even mark themselves as “the most warlike of men”, another means 
of heightening the tension through increasing the Gothic fear.211  The envoys call 
both nations, Franks and Goths, barbarians:  “In short, the nation of the Romans 
has become mistrustful to the barbarians, since by nature it is an enemy”.  But, 
the use of such a large number puts the Franks much further on the relative scale 
of barbarity than the Goths; after all, the Frankish appeal to a collective barbarity 
is denied by the Goths, who end up siding with the Romans.  The Goths now are 
relatively few, and as such, their barbarity lessened.212  This point is reinforced 
when Totila is given command of the Gothic forces, for the use of the term 
‘barbarian’ drops dramatically; when Totila himself is mentioned, the use of 
‘barbarian’ is even rarer.  The size of Gothic forces by this stage is much smaller 
than it was before Rome when Vittigis was in charge.  Totila even marks out this 
drop in size – in other words, the contrast between the earlier myriads strong 
Gothic force to the current, ‘Romanesque’ size – in a couple of speeches.  In the 
first of the two speeches, at 7.4.12, Totila notes the decrease, “going from 
200,000 men to 5,000…”; in the second, incidentally at 7.21.4, he compares the 
difference in size between the Goths at Rome, and the Romans “earlier we had 
collected 200,000 of the most warlike soldiers…we were defeated at the hands of 
7,000 Greek men”.  Significantly, in that second speech, after noting their defeat 
by the Romans, he also gives the current size of the Roman army, which is two 
myriads strong, and contrasts it with the pitiable Gothic force currently at their 
                                                
210 They even explicitly say this, noting that they would lose if they allied themselves with 
the Romans against the Franks. 
211 Procop. Wars 6.22.13:  ξὺν τοῖς πάντων πολεμιωτάτοις. 
212 The crowning of Totila also seems to usher in a period of increased emphasis on their 
‘Gothicness’, rather than their ‘barbarity’.  
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disposal:  “But now, we happen to have been reduced to a few unarmed and 
pitiable men, without any experience at all, and so are unable to defeat more than 
20,000 men from the enemy”.213  In this speech of Totila not only do we see that 
the Gothic number is much smaller than it was before, but it has moved out of the 
myriad range – their barbarity is thus lessened214 – while the Romans have 
moved into it, an important reversal that coincides with the rise of Totila, and the 
fall of Belisarius.215 
Besides its changing relationship with the term myriad, the use of 
‘barbarian’ can be either a matter of arbitrary choice,216 or, contingent on the 
focalizer in a specific context.   When the Roman envoys come before 
Theodohad regarding the brewing conflict between the Romans and Goths, they 
refer to him as “ruler of the Goths” in direct speech, when they themselves are 
the focalizer;217 but, when the speech concludes, and Procopius becomes the 
narrator-focalizer, he refers to the “leaders of the barbarians”.218 To a certain 
degree this works for who gets called Roman as well.  At 5.18.40, when a certain 
Vacis, one of Vittigis’ commanders, is speaking, albeit indirectly, to the citizens of 
Rome, he calls the Roman soldiers Greeks,219 and marks out their faithlessness 
                                                
213 Procop. Wars 7.21.5. 
214 Indeed, in the lines surrounding this speech Procopius uses the words Goths, and not 
barbarians, to identify Totila’s forces. 
215 Belisarius’ failed attempts to secure bases from which to operate in Italy against the 
Goths on his return reads like the Athenians’ similar largely unsuccessful attempts to 
secure bases in southern Italy and Sicily in book 6 of Thucydides’ Histories; both 
characters, Belisarius on the one hand, the Athenian expeditionary force on the other, 
failed in their objectives and returned home in shame. Cf. Procop. Wars 7.19.8:  “For they 
did not hold any other strongholds in this land, but everyone everywhere was hostile to 
them”; Thuc. 6.44.2:  “the sailed along Italy, and none of the cities would receive them”. 
216 A scene that illustrates well Procopius’ arbitrary usages of the terms barbarian and 
Goth comes during his description of the fighting in the lines from 5.29.24ff.  This is also 
the case later during the siege at 6.2.19ff., when focalization also plays no part in the 
distinction between barbarian and Goth. 
217 Procop. Wars 5.7.17. 
218 Procop. Wars 5.7.22. 
219 The reference to the Roman soldiers as Greeks is also appropriate because the 
citizens of the city of Rome would likely have seen themselves as Romans, and the 
‘Byzantines’ as Greeks, at least the well-educated found amongst them.  The usage was 
also derogatory.  In actuality, many of the Roman soldiers would have spoken a host of 
different languages.  Latin was the language of command.  Cf. Procop. Wars 5.29.11, 
where Vittigis calls the Roman soldiers Greeks in the course of a speech. 
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for abandoning the Goths.  When the focus shifts back to the Romans, and more 
specifically, Belisarius, the Goths are now called barbarians.220  There are a 
series of skirmishes a few books later and Procopius wavers back and forth 
between Goth and barbarian, here largely depending on who is the focalizer, 
Vittigis in the former instance, Belisarius in the latter.221  This continues for the 
next several books in the manner of the following excerpt:  “On account of this, 
Belisarius contended stoutly that the barbarians had been defeated.  On the 
other hand, the Goths, bearing in mind the unexpected event that had 
happened to them, did not go forward…”;222 there is a similar construction a 
couple of chapters over.223  The phrase, “on the other hand” (de), marks the 
transition in focalizer from Belisarius to the Goths.  Indeed, when the mood suits 
him, Procopius is quite willing to use the term Goth, particularly when they are the 
focalizers.  When Procopius, the narrator, wants us, the readers, to feel sympathy 
for the plight of the Goths, he unsurprisingly uses Goth.  This is the case when 
Trajan perceives the opportunity presented to him during an engagement at 
6.5.21ff., and charges at his foes.  Procopius flips from barbarians224 to Goth225 
as he describes the incredible slaughter of the out-generalled 
(καταστρατηγηθέντες), and terrified (δείσαντες), Goths.  When Totila enters the 
scene, the importance of focalizers is even more marked:  “But, since they had 
been defeated at the hands of the barbarians and still held them in great fear, 
they in no way wanted to follow Demetrios against Totila and the Goths”.226  In 
this sentence “the barbarians” and “the Goths” refer to the same thing.  
Focalization is an important factor in the differentiation in use between ‘barbarian’ 
and ‘Goth’. 
                                                
220 Procop. Wars 5.19.1. 
221 Procop. Wars 5.22.1ff. 
222 Procop. Wars 5.27.29. 
223 Procop. Wars 5.29.24. 
224 Procop. Wars 6.5.20. 
225 Procop. Wars 6.5.22-23. 
226 Procop. Wars 7.6.19. 
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Part III:  Generalship in the ‘Belisariad’ 
As with the Persian Wars and Vandal Wars, generalship remains a central 
aspect of Procopius’ understanding of battle in the Gothic Wars; there is no need 
to go over the same issues that I have in the previous two chapters.  Here, in this 
third section of the chapter, I shall focus on three other interesting aspects of 
Procopius’ portrayal of generalship:  examples of ‘heroic leadership in general’, 
as identified by Lendon; the Achilles/Odysseus dichotomy, much stressed by 
Wheeler; and the characterization of Belisarius as both a Roman general and a 
Homeric hero. 
 
Leading From the Front – Heroic Leadership 
Lendon noted ‘heroic leadership in general’ in one of his brief discussions 
of Procopius, and listed several examples from the text.227  Of those from the 
Gothic Wars, the first comes at 5.7.5, and involves Mundus, the Illyrian general.  
The commander learns that his son, Maurikios, has perished, and as a result, 
“with a great fury at what had happened, he immediately went after the enemy in 
disorder.”228  Not surprisingly, the failure to tame his emotions leads to Mundus’ 
death.229  Heroic leadership this very well may be, for Mundus’ actions lead to the 
death of a number of enemy combatants; but, Procopius poignantly calls the 
battle a “Cadmean victory”.  We should probably see this as quiet censure of 
Mundus’ rashness.  Indeed, not only does Procopius seem to be speaking out 
against undue rashness and battle in general; but also against the general 
                                                
227 Lendon 2005:  385 , n. 32. 
228 According to Ammianus Marcellinus (Amm. Marc. 19.1.7), the Chionitae general 
Grumbates is also motivated to such actions when his son is killed during the opening 
stages of the siege of Amida in 359. 
229 In the context of the Persian Wars I noted in the requisite chapter above that failure to 
control one’s emotions usually leads to trouble, whether defeat, or death.  For Xenophon, 
such a failing is something that a commander should avoid.  Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.1.42, Cyr. 
3.3.19; Wheeler 1991:  145. 
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himself risking too much.  For the next time that heroic leadership is discussed,230 
it nearly brings about the end of the entire Roman enterprise in Italy. Belisarius, in 
a sequence that runs from 5.18.4 onwards, charges into battle and is nearly 
killed; he is only saved by the actions of his guards and spearmen.231  Procopius 
makes it clear on two occasions, though indirectly, that this was a foolish action 
on the part of Belisarius.232  To be sure, the folly in leading from the front, and, 
the dangers inherent in being ruled by emotion, are themes stressed throughout 
the examples picked out by Lendon. 
In the next passage, at 6.2.21, Procopius describes another incident of 
impetuosity.  Bochas is commanded by Belisarius to go to the Plain of Nero.  He 
ends up engaging the Goths and in the melee, is surrounded and attacked by 
twelve Goths.233  His armour saves his life, though he still suffers some significant 
wounds.234  This skirmish turns out in the Romans’ favour, but not before the 
arrival of reinforcements.235  Procopius – the narrator – assumes in these 
situations that such rash actions will lead to serious injury, if not death itself, as 
his comment in the next example indicates.  There, a certain Aquilinos, a 
guardsman of Belisarius, charges into the middle of the enemy camp and 
engages his foes.236  Procopius notes:  “When many of the enemy surrounded 
him and fired missiles, his horse was struck and fell; on the other hand, he 
                                                
230 The third example that Lendon lists comes at 5.18.10-14.  This is mistaken, for there is 
no mention of any specific commanders in this section, or for any individuals for that 
matter, but rather vague references to “displays of arete”.  If anything, what this passage 
does do is support Lendon’s claims that competition fuelled much of the brave actions of 
soldiers in Greek and Roman battle.   
231 Procop. Wars 5.18.11-13.  I discuss this episode in greater detail below p. 297, in the 
context of my examination of the differences between the Achilles ethos vs. the Odysseus 
ethos, and their manifestation in the persons of Belisarius and Totila. 
232 Procop. Wars 5.18.5; 5.18.15.  Procopius’ comments concerning how this ‘heroic 
leadership’ of Belisarius nearly brought the invasion to an end, frame the episode itself, 
thereby stressing its importance, and the general’s folly. 
233 For a discussion of the gore in this passage see above p. 258. 
234 Procop. Wars 6.2.24. 
235 Procop. Wars 6.2.24. 
236 Procop. Wars 6.5.18. 
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himself, paradoxically, fled through the midst of the enemy.”237  This minor event, 
which Procopius has highlighted, does not further the aims of the Romans in this 
battle; this underscores its probable didactic aim.  That is, avoid overly rash 
behaviour because of the detrimental effect it is likely to have on the actor 
himself, and/or his army.  In the next case, involving Mundilas and Longinos, the 
latter does manage to be the cause of the Gothic flight, though he himself falls in 
the encounter.238  The penultimate case comes in book seven and involves the 
Roman commander Isaac, who, upon learning of Belisarius’ success, decides to 
seek out some glory of his own.239  As with the previous case this sortie initially 
brings results, for we learn that he manages to take the entranced enemy 
encampment, which is under the supervision of Ruderichos, “a man brave in 
war”.240  However, after perceiving the paltriness of the Roman force, the Goths 
reverse their decision and come back and re-take their base, killing many and 
capturing Isaac in the process.241  The last case comes towards the end of the 
Gothic Wars.  Not far from Ravenna a certain Verus engages the Goths, and in 
the course of the battle, “he loses many of his followers and he himself dies”.242  
Yet again we have a case of ‘heroic leadership’ bringing death.  The balance of 
the evidence suggests that Procopius was not a proponent of this tactic.  The 
very fact that he identifies these passages, which, in the context of the Gothic 
Wars as a whole, make up a small portion of the narrative, suggests that he 
wanted to highlight them.  This was Procopius the narrator, taking up his didactic 
role, proclaiming that acts of folly are wont to lead to undesirable circumstances; 
he seems to be advocating an approach to generalship that stresses more care 
and sensibility.  In other words, less of the Achilles or Alexander model of 
                                                
237 Procop. Wars 6.5.19. 
238 Procop. Wars 6.10.20. 
239 Procop. Wars 7.19.23-24. 
240 Procop. Wars 7.19.25. 
241 Procop. Wars 7.19.29. 
242 Procop. Wars 7.37.28. 
 297 
generalship, and more of the Odysseus model of generalship.  It is to that 
dichotomy that we now turn.  
 
The Achilles Ethos243 vs. the Odysseus Ethos 
Above, I looked at the fluidity of the term barbarian, the connection 
between myriads and barbarian, and, the fluidity of the concept, particularly in 
terms of the Roman/barbarian polarity.  This discussion of generalship rests on 
another polarity besides the aforementioned Roman/barbarian one; it is one 
which Procopius emphasizes throughout the Gothic Wars, which further 
highlights the respective characterizations of the Roman and Gothic forces, and 
which, in some sense, takes us back to the Homeric context.  This is the polarity 
between commanders who adopt the Achilles ethos, and those who adopt the 
Odysseus ethos;244 by and large, the various Gothic commanders, such as Totila, 
and to a lesser degree Vittigis, adopt the former, while Belisarius goes with the 
latter.   
The Achilles ethos, or ideal, relates to those commanders who prefer the 
traditional warrior ideal,245 while the Odysseus ethos, or ideal, relates to those 
who prefer “intelligence, cleverness, and trickery instead of brute force and open 
confrontation.”246  Indeed, over the course of the Gothic Wars, where the duel of 
generals is played out just as it was in the Persian Wars and Vandal Wars, the 
                                                
243 Michael Whitby (pers. comm.) has asked whether a distinction between Ajax and 
Odysseus, rather than Achilles and Odysseus, might be more appropriate, given that 
Ajax, at least as characterized by tragedians such as Sophocles, was much more 
straight-laced, that is, less prone to slippery behaviour (such as abandoning his army), 
than Achilles.  
244 The model, as far as I know first proposed by Wheeler (Wheeler 1988a:  xiii-xiv; 
Wheeler 1991; Krentz and Wheeler 1994:  vi-vii; Wheeler 2007:  213-223), is a simple but 
convenient means of describing the divergent streams of generalship prescribed here in 
the Gothic Wars. The ‘Achilles ethos’ is the same as the ‘western way of war’ which is 
championed by Keegan (1993) and Hanson (2000).  Despite their strong assertions, 
however, western forces have long used stratagems and have often sought to avoid 
pitched battle.  Cf. Kaegi 1990:  64-65; Brizzi 2004:  15-41.   
245 Leadership of this type has been given different names by other scholars.  Keegan 
(1987:  13-91), for example, characterizes Alexander’s bold leadership style as heroic. 
246 Wheeler 1991:  137.  Odysseus is often given the epithet πολύμητις.  Cf. Hom. Il. 
10.148. 
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success of the Goths is largely contingent on the ability of the respective 
commanders to follow the precepts pertaining to the Achilles model rather than 
the Odysseus model; Belisarius, on the other hand, sticks to the Odysseus model 
with remarkable consistency, and, when he does not, it often leads to trouble.  
The first time that such a distinction is brought to our attention comes at 5.18.4, 
when Procopius suggests that the general, and more specifically, the Roman 
general, usually does not lead from the front, fighting amongst his men.  Indeed, 
in the next line he says:  “and as a result of this the affairs of the Romans 
happened to fall into a great danger, since the outcome of the war lay entirely on 
his shoulders”.247  This line is not mere flattery, for the same sort of actions on the 
part of Alexander at the River Granicus in 334 BC nearly cost the Macedonians 
their war of conquest, even before it really had a chance to begin.248  This was 
also a reality for the Persians and their shahs, 249 whether Achaemenid or 
Sasanid, and Alexander made Darius the focus of his attacks with his 
Companions at Issus and Gaugamela. 250  In this first instance where Belisarius 
departs from his usual practice, the Romans nearly run into trouble.  The scene 
itself is reminiscent of the aforementioned episode with Alexander, for when the 
Goths perceive who Belisarius is, they start directing their attention at him;251 like 
                                                
247 Procop. Wars 5.18.5.  cf. Procop. Wars 5.18.13:  “Thus the whole battle was focused 
on the body of one man”; 5.18.15:  “But by some chance it happened to Belisarius on that 
day that he was neither wounded nor struck, although the battle took place around him 
alone”. 
248 Arr. Anab. 1.15.6-8. cf. Curt. 8.1.20; Diod. 17.20.5-7; Plut. Al.16.8-11; Bosworth 1988:  
42-43. 
249 Cf. Heckel 2008:  178, n. 38. 
250 Indeed, Heckel (2008:  61-65) has made the quite plausible case that the reason for 
Darius’ flight after Issus was not cowardice, but to prevent his own capture, and what that 
would have meant to the Persian war effort as a whole.  Leading from the front was not a 
practice adopted by Sasanian kings, as we saw with the Persian Wars; though often 
present at battles, and especially sieges, they were not involved in the fighting 
themselves. On the Achaemenid kings see Xenophon (Anab 1.8.22) and Arrian (Anab. 
2.8.11).  On the Sasanid kings of late antiquity see Whitby (1994). 
251 Procop. Wars 5.18.8ff. 
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Alexander,252 Belisarius is saved by the bravery of one of his men, in this case, 
one of his bodyguards.253   
Belisarius maintains this Odyssean, even Hellenistic, model of 
generalship during one of the first scenes of frantic action during the siege of 
Rome.  At 5.23.14ff we find him directing his soldiers in the defence of the city, 
and Procopius intersperses in this episode a considerable amount of technical 
detail, a point in keeping with a cerebral general which is what Belisarius is meant 
to be.254  He also recognizes the importance that keeping up this approach is to 
the success of the Roman cause, as noted in a speech he gives to his restless 
troops, who do not share his comprehension of the situation:   
I have not found any softness in you, men and fellow-soldiers, and I am 
not so terrified of the power of the enemy that I have shrunk from an 
engagement with them, but, when we were prevailing in the war thanks to 
sudden attacks, matters stood well; and, I thought that we must continue 
with the cause of our good fortune…for I know that the factor most likely 
to turn the scale of war is the frame of mind of the lot fighting, and it is this 
great eagerness that is wont to bring about success.  Thus, a few men 
lined up with arete can defeat a large number of our foes, as each one of 
you know well; and, you learned this not by what you have heard, but by 
getting battle experience daily.  Thus, do not put the former glory of my 
generalship to shame, nor the hope that rises from this eagerness of 
yours.255 
 
Ignoring the other unmistakable Homeric overtones in this speech, such as the 
role of arete in success in battle, the desire for glory, and with that, the avoidance 
of shame, we see that Belisarius is quite aware of the limitations of his army, and 
so is willing to use the means at his disposal to overcome the enemy.  Here that 
                                                
252 In Alexander’s case it was Cleitus who saved his king.  Cf. Arr. Anab. 1.15.8. 
253 Procop. Wars 5.18.12.  This encounter between the Goths and the Romans is 
interesting for reasons besides its presentation of the Achilles/Odysseus dichotomy.  On 
the one hand, the battle is almost brought to a disastrous conclusion for the Romans 
when Belisarius charges into the fray and is nearly killed; on the other hand, the battle 
ultimately turns out in the Romans’ favour thanks to the bravery of a certain Valentinos, 
the groom of a Philotios (5.18.18).  Thus, the battle is fairly symmetrical.  Also, as with the 
battle of Dara, and Andreas the bath attendant, a significant part of a battle is affected by 
a relatively unknown figure.  See chapter three above pp 156-157. 
254 Although one might argue that Belisarius does not have the opportunity to ‘fight from 
the front’ during the course of a siege, it must be noted that at no point in this scene does 
he himself attempt to engage the would-be attackers, through the use of missiles for 
example, from the city’s battlements.  On emperors fighting from the front during sieges in 
the Principate see Levithan 2008. 
255 Procop. Wars 5.28.6-9. 
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means limiting his attacks to small-scale raids and ambushes, which, ideally, are 
carried out unexpectedly.  Along with the recognition of the best sort of tactics to 
use, comes the importance of an awareness of the quality of one’s troops, and 
how and when to use them effectively: 
So, with things thus, he [Belisarius] wanted to have a cavalry battle alone 
on that day; moreover, the majority of the other infantry were not in a 
position to remain in their established spot, and having seized horses 
from the enemy, they had become not unpractised in riding, and were, for 
all intents and purposes, horsemen.  On the other hand, the infantry being 
few, and, not able to make a phalanx worthy of note, nor bold enough to 
battle against the barbarians, but always wont to turn to flight at the first 
rush, he thought that they were not secure enough as regards the danger 
to deploy them by the walls there, but that they should stay quite close to 
the moat and in line, so that, if their attackers happened to turn their 
cavalry to flight, the infantry would receive those fleeing and together, 
since they were unwearied, make a stand against their foes.256 
 
Like the former example, this description, in which Belisarius is the focalizer – 
and thanks to Procopius, we are provided with unique insight into his thoughts – 
we are presented with a general who uses his mind before his emotions.  The 
Belisarius characterized here is not rash, but shrewd and sensible, a man who is 
aware of the condition of his army, and with the requisite information carefully 
gathered and in his hands, able to analyse the data and so, potentially, carry out 
an action likely to result in a desirable outcome, i.e., a victory.   
Totila, the Gothic king who best fits the mould of a traditional Gothic king 
with the appropriate martial, Achillean, values, is noticeably different from his 
predecessors.  Vittigis, the first of the two Gothic kings described in detail 
comparable to Belisarius, is characterized as a leader who does have a few of 
the qualities of an Achilles.257  As regards Theodohad, his predecessor, he is 
even less of an Achilllean general than Vittigis, and as Procopius’ narrative points 
out, he does not last terribly long.  Totila, on the other hand, is most assuredly 
Achillean, is the Gothic commander who stays truest to their traditional martial 
values, and as a result, has the greatest amount of success against the Romans 
                                                
256 Procop. Wars 5.28.21-22. 
257 Procop. Wars 5.11.15, 5.11.17. 
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over the course of the war.258  Getting back to Vittigis, he is characterized 
indirectly in his first speech, for one of the first points that he emphasizes is 
planning, something more in keeping with the cerebral generalship represented 
by Odysseus, than the warrior of Achilles.259  Rather significantly, not long after 
Totila’s introduction in the text, we find him acting in a very Achilles-like manner:  
he ties a rope around the neck of the Neapolitan Governor Demetrios and drags 
him to the wall of his city.260  Indeed, in a subsequent speech to the people of 
Naples he calls his Roman foes not Romans, or even Greeks, as Vittigis had, but 
“opposites” (τοῖς ἐναντίοις);261 where Belisarius was Odysseus at Rome, Totila, 
here at Naples, is Achilles.  Indeed, this likeness is even more apt when 
Procopius turns to tactical matters:  “For he would rather decide matters against 
them [the Romans] on a plain than to fight it out through some cunning devices 
[τέχναις τισὶ] or sly tricks [σοφίσμασι]”.262  Totila repeats this point several 
chapters later in a passage which further reinforces Belisarius’ characterization 
as an Odysseus-like general, and himself as Achilles-like: “On the other hand, the 
enemy shut themselves inside these walls and decided that in no way would they 
come down to the plain and draw up in battle against us, but through sly tricks 
and continually delaying day by day, they frustrated the Goths and became 
masters of our property unexpectedly”.263   Totila’s claims are not mere rhetoric, 
for Procopius as narrator reinforces the point by describing Belisarius’ actions 
only three chapters later:  “And since he [Belisarius] in no way had a force which 
was a match against the enemy, so that he could settle matters in a battle in the 
plain against them, he first contrived the following”.264  This line, as it is, is not an 
                                                
258 In this discussion when I refer to traditional Gothic martial values I mean as understood 
by Procopius.   
259 Procop. Wars 5.11.12ff. 
260 Procop. Wars 7.7.8-10. 
261 Procop. Wars 7.7.12. 
262 Procop. Wars 7.8.11. 
263 Procop. Wars 7.16.22. 
264 Procop. Wars 7.19.2 
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outright condemnation of the techniques adapted by Belisarius; we saw earlier 
that one of the best the features of an Odysseus-like commander was his ability 
to understand the military situation, the limitations of his men, and then act 
accordingly.  On the first glance, Procopius seems to be reinforcing this.  
Nevertheless, it is when Procopius returns to the narrative and describes the 
outcome that we learn that Belisarius, at least at this juncture, does not have a 
good grasp of the situation, or a sufficient means of counteracting his limitations.  
We get some foreshadowing of trouble for Belisarius and company at 7.19.8 
before the battle between the two sets (Gothic and Roman) of towers; a defeat in 
this engagement is further suggested at 7.19.22, several lines later.  Procopius 
has not turned on Belisarius, nor is he necessarily haranguing against the 
Odysseus approach to generalship.265  He has simply pointed out that he is no 
longer in command of the situation as he once was; that place is now occupied 
by Totila, who also has a different approach to warfare.  Totila, the king, is 
employing tactics based on his Achilles-like approach to generalship, and when 
at his peak, which occurs a quarter to a third of the way into the Gothic Wars, so 
too are the Goths; meanwhile Belisarius is at his lowest – so too the Romans – 
as Procopius, the narrator, makes clear.266 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
265 At 7.26.19 Procopius criticizes Totila for acting without reason, sensibility, and 
foresight, traits more commonly associated with the Odysseus ethos:  “With great fury, 
and, without thinking ahead, Totila enjoyed the stupidity resulting from his anger”. 
266 Procop. Wars 7.13.14-19.  Cf. Procop. Wars 7.22.7ff.   
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Belisarius:  hero and general267 
So far, I have pointed out the remarkable points of contact between 
Procopius’ description of combat in the Gothic Wars, and the descriptions found 
in epic poetry, and Homer’s Iliad in particular.  At this point one might wonder 
whether this parallel is appropriate, particularly when we consider that the world 
of Odysseus – to borrow the title to Finley’s enlightening essay – was a world of 
heroes, something sixth century Byzantium was not, at least so it seems.268  In 
this section I shall discuss one last aspect that should put us in a better position 
to address the Gothic Wars’ Homeric character269:  the presentation of Belisarius, 
and Procopius’ conscious likening of him to a Homeric hero.   
In this section, perhaps more than elsewhere in this chapter, I am going to 
stray from the field of battle and instead focus on an event that is some remove 
from the Italian theatre, but is, nevertheless, closely linked to what has transpired:  
Procopius’ famous eulogy of Belisarius at the start of book seven.270  The general 
had left Italy and returned to Constantinople with matters somewhat unsettled.  
After getting a mixed welcome from Justinian, Belisarius received a much more 
positive reply from the public:  “Belisarius, however, was on the lips of all, and he 
was credited with two victories, something that no man had managed to pull off 
                                                
267 As noted by Clarke (2004:  78-79), ‘hero’ is problematic as a word in English because 
of its multiple meanings.  I am going to use the word in the way that I think Procopius 
meant it.  Although hero for Homer may, strictly speaking, only be a reference to a certain 
race of men (as in Hesiod’s five stages of the Human race; Clarke 2004:  79), they 
certainly have a collective set of characteristics.  Procopius undoubtedly recognizes that 
his heroes are not part of that race (and I do not see any reason why Procopius would not 
have been familiar with this ancient notion of the five stages).  I believe that in order to 
emphasize the martial excellence of his characters, he describes them in terms of 
Homeric heroes.  They possess the qualities of Homeric heroes without actually being 
Homeric heroes.  
268 Finley 1978:  21. 
269 On Homer in Byzantium see Browning (1975). 
270 Procopius includes a couple of details about Belisarius’ physical appearance in his 
eulogy for the Roman military hero.  When Malalas (5.12-27) describes the Trojan War he 
includes the physical traits of many of the heroes of the Trojan War.  It is probably just a 
coincidence, but it is an interesting one nonetheless.  Scholars have conjectured that 
Procopius compares Belisarius here to Pericles through allusions to Thucydides’ funeral 
oration for the Athenian general.  On Procopius’ eulogy see Cresci (1986:  351-356) and 
Kaldellis (2004a:  197).  For Thucydides’ (2.65.6-8) eulogy of Pericles see Connor (1984:  
60-64). 
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before; he brought two kings captive to Byzantium, and paradoxically made the 
nations of Gizeric, and of Theoderic, as well as their property, Roman spoils; and 
there had never been more notable men from among the barbarians”.271  
Belisarius’ fame rests with the people, the “all” in the passage, and this is 
important, for it brings up a Homeric point of contact concerning heroism; in 
reference to a discussion of ‘continuing fame after death’ Clarke says the 
following about martial excellence in reference to the Lycians and Sarpedon in 
the Iliad:272  “martial excellence is part of a reciprocal contract:  the noblemen are 
honoured by their people because they achieve fame (kleos…) and thus glorify 
the Lycian people as a whole, and this in turn encourages the warriors to 
continue their display of prowess and maintain their good name.”273 As with the 
Homeric heroes, Belisarius’ fame rests with his people, and is based on success 
in battle.274  Indeed, the first thing emphasized is invariably one of the most 
important, and here it is Belisarius’ military victories, particularly those in Africa 
and Italy.  It is probably also significant that in his eulogy Procopius praises 
Belisarius for his wealth, and the size and quality of his personal force, among 
other things.  By juxtaposing his description of the crowds’ reaction to his 
presence with lines concerned with matters such as these, Procopius is 
characterizing the general as a great military hero, a point reinforced by the 
focalization of the Constantinopolitan public’s thoughts about his triumph; 
moreover, it is as a martial hero in the vein of his Homeric predecessors.  Some 
of this was borne out by my discussion above of barbarians, Goths, and Romans:  
the Goths and Romans are characterized in a remarkably similar way and are 
                                                
271 Procop. Wars 7.1.4.   
272 Clarke (2004:  77) quotes the passage, 12.315-328, at length. 
273 Clarke 2004:  77-78.  There are innumerable cases in the Wars where combatants are 
said to have made “displays of valour”; kleos too is often mentioned.  See above pp. 264-
268. 
274 Duty aside – and as regards duty we think of Hector – one wonders if Belisarius 
agreed to the campaign in Italy immediately following the African campaign because of 
the reception he received, which would again be in keeping with Homer’s world. 
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composed of men with similar backgrounds;275 in many cases they also share the 
same qualities and virtues.  The great Roman hero Belisarius is also a king of 
sorts,276 like Odysseus over Ithaca.  Both men are under the supreme command 
of another:  with Odysseus it is Agamemnon, with Belisarius Justinian.  What is 
more, like the Homeric hero Achilles, who commands a select group of soldiers in 
the Myrmidons, Belisarius commands buccellarii, who some modern scholars 
have suggested were something of an elite regiment.277  Though we have not yet 
reached Procopius’ statement of Belisarius’ virtues in the Thucydidean eulogy, it 
is already clear that the Homeric echoes are quite stark. 
In his description of Belisarius’ virtues, Procopius places particular 
emphasis on those pertaining to his military career:  with few exceptions the 
eulogy is concerned with Belisarius’ military exploits.  It opens at 7.1.8 with his 
talents as a commander, and finishes at 7.1.21 with a reference to the siege of 
Rome.  At the beginning Procopius says the following:   
The love of him as a commander among the soldiers and rustics was 
incredible, because he was the fondest of all men at giving gifts to the 
soldiers; for whether they had performed well in battle or been wounded, 
he emboldened them with piles of cash, and, he rewarded those who 
acted gloriously with armlets and torques, which they could have as 
prizes; on the other hand a soldier who had lost his horse or bow or 
anything else was immediately provided with a replacement by 
Belisarius.278   
 
Procopius wraps up the military focused eulogy with the following extended 
description that is worth quoting in full:   
                                                
275 In the words of Finley (1978:  38):  “the Trojans are as Greek and as heroic in deeds 
and values as their opponents in every respect.”   
276 Belisarius was, of course, offered the crown for Italy by the Goths only he rejected it.  
Whether Procopius had Homer in mind when he described this episode is another matter.  
Regardless, Procopius still gives the credit for the conquests (Africa and Italy) to 
Belisarius. 
277 On buccellarii in sixth century Egypt, and the Byzantine Empire in general, see Sarris 
(2006:  162-175).  On their status as elite soldiers, see Rance (2007a:  356, 365).  Cf. 
Kaegi 1981:  50-51; Whitby 1995:  72-73, especially 73, n. 41. 
278 Procop. Wars 7.1.8.  Not only are some of these features Homeric in quality, one also 
detects some echoes of Alexander, particularly in regard to Belisarius’ attention to the 
wounds and battle performance of his soldiers.  Cf. Arr. Anab. 1.16.4-5, 2.7.7, 2.12.1, 
2.23.4, 4.18.7, 7.10.3-4, Lendon 2005:  128.  
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In addition to all these other qualities he was especially shrewd, and if 
ever he found himself in dire straits, he would think of the best and most 
suitable solution.  When embroiled in the dangers of war he was 
courageous, steadfast, calculating, and exceptionally daring; and he 
would always attack when the risk was minimal, and he would delay if 
necessary, according to the exigencies of the situation.  Apart from these 
things, when he found himself in a terrible predicament, he remained 
hopeful and understanding, even when things were unsettled; and when 
things went exceptionally well, he was neither full of himself nor stuffy.   
Thus, as long as he was in command of the Roman army in Libya 
and Italy, he continued to be victorious, and always acquired whatever 
was close at hand.  But when he went back to Byzantium after he was 
summoned, his arete was still recognized to a greater extent than it had 
ever been before.  For he surpassed all in arete, authority, and in the size 
of his estate; and he was exalted more than any previous general 
because of the number of bodyguards and spearmen he had; and 
naturally he became formidable to all commanders and soldiers.  For, I 
think that no one would dare to disobey his orders, and none of his men 
would refuse to do what he commanded, and so dishonour his arete while 
fearing his power.  For he furnished 7,000 horsemen from his own 
household; none of them were worthless, and each of them, in fact, would 
stand at the front of the battle-line, and they were deemed worthy of 
challenging the best of the enemy’s troops.  The Roman elders, when 
they were being besieged by the Goths, watched what was transpiring in 
the many battles of the war, and cried out in great wonder that one man’s 
household was bringing down the power of Theoderic.279  
 
There are many important points here, some of which we have already 
discussed.  Towards the end Procopius returns to Belisarius’ wealth and gives us 
the size of his personal retinue.  Belisarius is very much a warlord with his own 
personal army.  That army is not composed of rabble, but those who would stand 
at the front of the battle-line and challenge their foes; perhaps we are to 
understand that Procopius here means single combat.  Again, this seems quite 
Homeric. 280  There are other qualities worth mentioning, such as Belisarius’ 
mental capacities.  When reading the first lines of the passage we are 
immediately reminded of Odysseus, who was also shrewd, quick-thinking, and 
resourceful on the field of battle; although Odysseus is better known for these 
qualities in the Odyssey, there are places in the Iliad where he displays these 
                                                
279 Procop. Wars 7.1.13-21. 
280 See, for example, Hom. Il. 12.315-328, where Sarpedon urges Glaucus to prove his 
worth on the field of battle, which involves standing at the front.  Cf. Van Wees 1988:  2; 
Wheeler 2007:  192-197. 
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attributes.281  Belisarius is a number of other things of course, some of which are 
unsurprising.  Belisarius is daring, but also prudent.  Given the discussion above, 
we should not be surprised that Belisarius is remarkable for his arete. 282  There 
are some other qualities that are a bit surprising, and at first glance seemingly out 
of step with Procopius’ characterization of the general in battle to this point; not 
only is Belisarius a great warrior and leader, but he is also a leader who is feared 
by his subordinates.  When we consider that Procopius refers to two incidents 
alone in the Wars where there are any moments where Belisarius might be 
considered frightening, this seems to be out of place.283  This ascription, however, 
is not atypical for the Homeric hero, particularly the Odysseus of the Iliad.  The 
Iliadic heroes are capable of remarkable anger.  One of the key themes of the 
poem itself is the wrath of Achilles.  Odysseus is also capable of remarkable fury, 
as when he massacres the suitors in the Odyssey, or when he lashes out at 
Thersites.  Indeed, Odysseus’ outburst with Thersites seems most like the rage, 
and the subsequent fear that it inspires, referred to here in the Wars.  For, much 
like Thersites, Belisarius’ men are of a lower status than their commander, and 
find themselves subject to his authority and arete.  The consequences of 
                                                
281 See Hom. Il. 10.248-579. 
282 Here there can be little doubt that the meaning of arete envisaged by Procopius here 
is very much like that described by Adkins (1997:  706).  Cf. above pp. 264-268. 
283 See Procop. Wars 3.12.8-22; 6.8.1-18.  Procopius does comment on the soldiers’ 
views of Belisarius in the presence of Antonina in the Secret History (2.18-37).  Despite 
the seeming differences between the Secret History and the Wars there are in fact a 
number of correspondences, as noted by Cameron (1985:  49-66).  The Secret History, 
much like book 8, supplements the first 7 books of the Wars.  Indeed, the respective 
figures of Belisarius in the two works are not mutually exclusive.  In both works Belisarius 
comes across as a tragic figure, with the principal difference being that this comes across 
through his actions in the Wars, and through Procopius’ comments in the Secret History.  
Procopius, of course, also focuses more on Belisarius’ actions on the field of battle in the 
Wars, whereas in the Secret History it is his relationship with his wife.  For example, 
Procopius (SH 5.3-7) elaborates on Belisarius’ tremendous retinue and estate by claiming 
that Belisarius developed a lust for money over the course of the Gothic Wars.  We also 
find a passage in which Belisarius seems to be acting very much in accord with what 
might best be called a Homeric code of honour:  “as soon as he [Belisarius] got inside the 
walls of the city, he would immediately seize his arms and, as is fitting for any virile man, 
was minded to act nobly against his wife and those who had wronged him” (Procop. SH 
4.40). 
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disobeying can be severe.284  On balance, then, Belisarius is very much the 
Homeric hero, not without his faults; his martial excellence can bring him to the 
dizzying heights of success, but, this means that he is also prone to the miseries 
that accompany heroism.   
 
Chapter Overview 
Whereas in the previous two chapters I examined how Procopius focused 
on the unity within the respective sections, the Persian Wars and the Vandal 
Wars, in the Gothic Wars – even more so than in the Vandal Wars – Procopius 
emphasizes the unity of all first seven books of the Wars by returning to the 
horse-archers from the preface.  We also find a change in quality, for much of the 
Gothic Wars is given a Homeric character, and this is especially evident in 
Procopius’ extended description of the Siege of Rome.  Numbers are used to 
characterize barbarians, and the greater the number, the greater the barbarity of 
the respective peoples.  Tactics largely reigned supreme in the Persian Wars, 
with morale making a spirited rise in the Vandal Wars; in the Gothic Wars, on the 
other hand, both theoretical conceptions of combat are presented, this time 
through the ‘Achilles ethos’ versus ‘Odysseus ethos’ dichotomy, which are 
embodied by Totila and Belisarius respectively.  Bearing the results of the past 
three chapters in mind, I now turn to book 8.
                                                
284 Of course, the fact remains that Procopius does not really convey this side of 
Belisarius in the Wars, though in general he does not shy away from portraying his lesser 
qualities. 
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Chapter 6:  Book VIII 
 
 
I now come to Book 8, the final instalment of the Wars, which was 
published some years after the first seven.1  Where the previous books are 
organized by theatre, this last book covers those which he felt necessitated an 
update.  Indeed, in Dewing’s words:  “the eighth book was added later as a 
supplement to bring the history up to about the date of 554, being a general 
account of events in different parts of the empire.”2  When we turn to those 
sections focused on the east, in some sense it reads very much like the Persian 
Wars; when we turn to Italy, the Gothic Wars.  On the one hand, Procopius has 
managed to keep the style of the earlier books in their relevant spot; on the other 
hand, there are parts of the Persian narrative that evoke the most heroic of 
clashes in the Gothic Wars.  Yet, for all the similarities and continuity with the rest 
of the Wars, there is much in book 8 that is new.  For one thing, there are many 
more narratorial interventions, some of which are attempts to bring unity between 
the first seven books and this eighth book; many of them refer to earlier 
passages.  Also, even though Procopius himself is absent from the action as a 
participant, he compensates by giving more explicit comments about the events, 
though even here he does not stray too far from the themes propounded in the 
earlier books.3  In this sense, book 8 has a style similar to that found in the Secret 
History.4  Geography and ancient texts are two further notable differences; there 
are many more geographical excurses, and, Procopius makes more explicit 
                                                
1 Procop. Wars 8.1.1-2. 
2 Dewing 1914:  ix.   
3 Some of his intrusions come across as reactions to any criticisms his first seven books 
might have received.  A particularly striking example comes at 8.6.9-10.  Indeed, 
Procopius seems especially bent on stressing his authority:  he is the best man possible 
to describe these events, and some of his readers may have forgotten this. 
4 What is more, both works essentially perform the same function, which is, to fill in the 
gaps that have been left with the conclusion of the first seven.  Though circumstantial, 
these similarities between book 8 and the Secret History would seem to support Evans’ 
(1996a:  312) date for book 8, and Croke’s (2005b) for the Secret History, assuming, that 
is, that they were written around the same time (557/558). 
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references to ancient literature than he ever had before, even going so far as to 
quote some texts verbatim.5  Indeed, in some ways this book is the most 
Herodotean part of the Wars; given his combative attitude, at least as regards the 
numerous stories, many of which are mythological and which he sees fit to refute, 
it might also be the most Polybian.   Bearing all of this in mind, and given its 
unique character, in a departure from chapters 3, 4, and 5, I shall treat battle 
issues sequentially as they arise in the text, rather than thematically as I have 
previously.  Those battles and sieges that I shall discuss include the River Hippis, 
Petra, Archaeopolis, Senogallia, Busta Gallorum, and Mons Lactarius. 
 
River Hippis 
In Procopius’ description of the battle of the River Hippis, which took place 
in 550 in Persarmenia, we find the penchant that was so pervasive in the Gothic 
Wars.6  Here events are largely focalized through one Artabanes, as a result of 
which the Persarmenian comes across as the doer of some remarkable feats, 
principally the slaying of 120 men.7  This detail hails from Artabanes’ past and it 
stresses his martial qualities, so preparing the audience to expect a further 
display of remarkable deeds.  Prior to Artabanes’ introduction the battle had 
produced little of substance, being little more than a series of charges and 
counter-charges.8  As the narrative advances, there are two episodes in this 
battle that suggest a blending of elements from the Persian Wars and the Gothic 
Wars.  The first is a single combat involving the aforementioned Artabanes in 
which he manages to scare off his Persian opponents, a scene more reminiscent 
                                                
5 See my discussion above pp. 34-46 in chapter one. 
6 Procop. Wars 8.8.21ff.  Cf. Rubin (1957:  508), Greatrex and Lieu (2002:  118), Syvänne 
2004:  469-470. 
7 Procop. Wars 8.8.23, though he does note that he was accompanied by his followers 
(ξὺν τοῖς ἑπομένοις).   
8 Procop. Wars 8.8.20. 
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of the episode involving Andreas at Dara rather than the skirmishes outside of 
Rome:   
In this battle Artabanes brought two of the Roman soldiers with him into 
the middle, where some of the enemy men had also come.  Artabanes 
hurried against them, and one of the Persians, a man especially fit, with a 
valorous spirit and a powerful body, he killed immediately with his spear, 
having thrown him from his horse and dashed him to the earth.  But a 
certain one of the barbarians standing beside the man who had fallen 
struck Artabanes with his sword, hitting not at the vital spot but on the side 
of his head.  Another of Artabanes’ followers, a Goth by birth, engaged 
this man while he was holding his hand at the head of Artabanes, and 
having hit him on his left side, he [the barbarian] died.  And the thousand 
were frightened by what had happened and fell back to the rear…9 
 
Although Procopius does note the general part of the body that the respective 
participants struck, he neither goes into more precise anatomical detail about the 
blows, nor mentions any protruding implements, prominent features of the Gothic 
Wars incidents.  And, like the single combat with Andreas, this victory gives the 
Romans a significant psychological advantage heading into the central part of the 
battle.  The second episode comes several lines later, and here Procopius 
focuses on the trouble that befalls the Persian commander Chorianes: 
In this battle Chorianes, the commander of the Persians, happened to be 
hit.  However, by whom this man was struck, was not clear; for by some 
chance the arrow came out of a crowd and fastened itself straight into this 
throat, so killing him; and by the death of one man the scale of battle 
turned and victory came to the Romans.10 
 
In this scene we have the anatomical detail that was somewhat lacking from the 
previous case, with Procopius identifying the body part pierced by the arrow; at 
the same time, we have single shot success.  What is more, by the time we reach 
the end of the description we learn that the battle was very much a contest of 
bravado, a feature common to the Gothic Wars.  Most of the focus is on the 
actions of, or surrounding, a few select individuals; one might call this the “face of 
                                                
9 Procop. Wars 8.8.25-27. 
10 Procop. Wars 8.8.34-35.  This is a recurring theme in the Wars, especially in book 8, 
that is the reversal and the concomitant change in momentum it gives to both sides. 
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battle” approach to narrative.11  This focus on individual action and bravery was 
more a feature of the Gothic Wars than the Persian Wars, where Procopius was 
concerned with tactics, rather than individualism on the field of battle.  As a whole 
the battle reads as a series of vignettes, as events are focalized through different 
individuals;12 it is these acts that lead to the Roman victory, not greater tactical 
awareness or superior generalship.13  The only section that is concerned with 
tactical matters comes following the single combat of Artabanes and the arrival of 
Gubazes and Dagisthaios.  Philegagos and John perceive that their cavalry is no 
match for their opponents, and are worried about the Lazi,14 so they dismount 
and form a phalanx,15 to counter their charge, a perfectly reasonable approach 
given the increasing dominance of heavy cavalry in sixth century combat.16  The 
only other feature that harkens back to the Persian Wars is the presence of 
Gubazes’ pre-battle exhortation,17 although there is no matching speech from his 
Persian counterpart.18  In this first battle, then, we see a meshing of styles, 
though, on balance, this ‘composite’ description of battle is more evocative of the 
Gothic Wars than the Persian Wars.  
 
 
                                                
11 Indeed, the focus on individuals is reminiscent of Ammianus’ approach during, notably, 
the siege of Amida.  See Kagan (2006:  23-51) for Ammianus and the “face of battle”, and 
see my comments in the introduction above p. 15.   
12 Following the death of Chorianes Procopius turns to a certain Alan who performed feats 
of bravery (8.8.37), and his death at the hands of John (8.8.38). 
13 Procop. Wars 8.8.38. 
14 In a possible intratextual allusion, here we are perhaps reminded of the performance of 
the Isaurians and Lycaones at Callinicum.  Procopius highlights a possible problem with 
the Lazi earlier, so bringing to attention any potential role they might have, at 8.8.3.  As 
regards Callinicum, see Procop. Wars 1.18.38-40.   
15 Similar actions are taken at the Battle of Mons Lactarius and the Battle of Busta 
Gallorum, both, incidentally, described in book 8.  See Rance (2005:  459-462) and below 
pp. 328-329.  
16 On infantry versus heavy cavalry in ancient combat see Arrian’s Ektaxis, and Rance 
2004, 2007a:  348-359, 363-371; Syvänne 2004:  185-189; and Wheeler 1979, 2004a, 
2004b. 
17 Procop. Wars 8.8.7-13. 
18 It must be said that the comparative lack of pre-battle speeches in the Gothic Wars is in 
large part due to the nature of the combat described, i.e., sieges. 
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Petra 
The first siege narrative follows shortly after the battle at Archaeopolis in 
the text and takes place at Petra.19  As a siege description it is unique in the 
Wars.  Where the Persian Wars descriptions were wont to focus on the divine, 
and the Gothic Wars descriptions on valour and negotiation, this one, or at least 
its first phase, is very much concerned with intelligence, innovation, and 
technology.20  Diplomacy opens the description, and while these negotiations are 
taking place between the Romans and Persians in regard to the ongoing peace 
negotiations,21 the former undertake a siege of this Caucasian city.  Many of the 
opening lines are concerned with technical aspects, particularly the engineering 
works employed by both sides, and are replete with authorial interventions;22 we 
are reminded of the detail regarding architecture found in the Buildings.  This first 
phase of the description reads very much like a battle of wits.  Where the siege of 
Rome was won with brawn, valour, and for Belisarius alone, brains, at this point, 
from the perspective of the victors, the siege of Petra is to be won with brains and 
valour.  There is an ethnographic digression – a prevalent feature of book 8 – 
concerning the Sabiri.23  This ethnographic interlude that precedes Procopius’ 
focus on their siege-work innovation draws our attention to the fact that this is a 
notable feat, not only because such a device had never before been devised by 
anyone, despite the frequency of sieges in ancient combat,24 but also because it 
was done by barbarians.  What is perhaps most striking about the Sabiri is that 
Procopius actually highlights their ingenuity, and credits them with inventing a 
machine to allow the Romans to overcome the elevation of the Sasanid defensive 
                                                
19 On the siege see Stein (1949:  505-508), Rubin (1957:  510-511), Greatrex and Lieu 
(2002:  118-119), and Syvänne (2004:  496). 
20 The descriptions of the siege-works and machinery at Petra surpasses any that 
Procopius has provided earlier, and perhaps here more than anywhere else most closely 
matches those found in Ammianus.   
21 On the Endless Peace, and its portrayal by Procopius, see Greatrex (1998:  213-221). 
22 Procop. Wars 8.11.11-18. 
23 Procop. Wars 8.11.22-26. 
24 Procop. Wars 8.11.27. 
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works, a feat the Romans were not able to achieve themselves, with our narrator 
all the while remaining cognizant of the fact that they are barbarians.25  
Procopius’ description of the ram is again striking for its technical detail; there is 
little doubt that this siege is the best evidence we have for the supposition that 
Procopius might have been an engineer.26  The first 30 lines or so of the narrative 
are a scientific tour de force, and given Procopius’, and to a lesser degree, his 
contemporaries’ reputations as conservatives, somewhat surprising.27  Given 
Procopius’ explicit stress on the breadth of his reading in book 8, one wonders 
whether this focus is reflective of his perusal of earlier Hellenistic siege manuals, 
such as that of Aeneas Tacticus.28  Nevertheless, the technical detail more or 
less prevails only in this opening phase before the fighting gets underway; then it 
is the valour of the participants that is conspicuous. 
When the siege moves into its second phase, heroism, which had been 
mentioned earlier, replaces intellectualism.  Indeed, amidst the early stages, 
while technological know-how is very much stressed by Procopius, we find 
Roman soldiers singled out for their valour (ἀριστίνδην) participating in the 
assault.29  It is when the fighting gets underway, however, that heroism 
dominates, and, it is Bessas who first makes such a display, which is highlighted 
in a phrase reminiscent of Procopius’ comments at Dara,30 namely that it is a 
display such as has never been seen.31  With that said, Procopius’ seemingly 
positive comments are in fact couched with criticism, for the narrative that follows, 
                                                
25 Procop. Wars 8.11.28, 32. 
26 On this point, and Procopius’ career in general, see Howard-Johnston (2000) and 
chapter 1 above pp. 54-56. 
27 On Procopius and sixth century conservatism see Cameron (1985:  46). 
28 For Hellenistic technological innovation, and how it pertains to warfare, see Shipley 
(2000:  334-341), Chaniotis (2005:  97-99), Bugh (2006:  280-288), Keyser and Irby-
Massie (2006:  259-261), and de Souza (2007:  451-454). 
29 Procop. Wars 8.11.32.  Cf. Procop. Wars 8.11.35:  “the most warlike men” (in regard to 
the Persians). 
30 Of course, Procopius puts his comparable statements from Dara following the battle 
itself, adopting an inductive approach (Procop. Wars 1.14.54)   For Dara see above pp. 
131-133. 
31 Procop. Wars 8.11.41.   
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at least in its initial phases, undermines this claim.  The outnumbered defenders 
are having some success in holding off their assailants, which is at first 
unremarkable given the tactical advantages those defending a city usually had.32  
But, during the attempted mounting of the walls, Bessas himself falls to the 
ground.33  As we would expect, this attracts the attention of the Persians who now 
direct their fire at the general; fortunately for him, as with Belisarius at Rome, his 
bodyguards rush to his defence and, being fully armed, use their shields to create 
a protective barrier to ward off the missile attacks.34  The scene described is quite 
frantic, with other Romans coming to their commander’s aid by directing their 
attacks at the Persian bowmen at the walls.35  Procopius describes the actions of 
the guardsmen as follows: 
They defended themselves from the missile fire with all their strength.  
And there was a clashing of arms from the continual falling and snapping 
of the arrows on the shields and the rest of the armour, which became 
great, and each man was sustaining himself with a shout, heavy 
breathing, and hard work.36 
 
Indeed, to this point in the action, and with the notable exception of the invention 
of the Sabiri, the only matter that might be considered of note is the exceptional 
efforts of the guardsmen.37  Yet, their efforts do enable their aged commander to 
rise to his feet,38 if slowly and sluggishly, and immediately come up with a plan to 
turn the battle in the Romans’ favour.39  When Bessas attempts to climb another 
                                                
32 On this matter see Lenski (2007:  225). 
33 Procop. Wars 8.11.44. 
34 Procop. Wars 8.11.45.  On Belisarius at Rome see above pp. 293-295. 
35 Procop. Wars 8.11.46.  Some of the details here, such as the heavy breathing, are not 
found elsewhere in the Wars, and are features of the “face of battle” approach. 
36 Procop. Wars 8.11.46-47.   
37 If this is indeed the case, then we are left to wonder at the customary effectiveness of 
guardsmen of this sort in most battles; nevertheless, their behaviour is not unique for we 
have seen examples of this sort earlier in the Wars at 6.5.18-19. 
38 This depiction of an aged commander attempting to carry out brave deeds is not unique 
in the ancient annals of combat.  A notable example comes from Agathias who describes 
the aged Belisarius’ attempts to save Constantinople against the Huns in 559 (Agathias 
5.18.11ff.).  One might wonder whether Agathias was responding to, and expanding 
upon, the subtle criticism that Procopius seems to be hurling at Bessas here by portraying 
Belisarius so favourably in his own description.   
39 Procop. Wars 8.11.48.  At this point we might wonder whether the notable feat is the 
sluggishness of the commander, or his ability to come up with a suitable plan.  As regards 
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ladder, his actions terrify the Persians and at first it seems that we have reached 
a turning point in the battle; yet, nothing comes of it, and Bessas denies the initial 
offer set forth by the Persians.  Indeed, we do not even know whether Bessas 
was successful in his climbing.40  The entry of the city itself is effected through the 
bravery of a certain Armenian named John, who leads a select number of fellow 
Armenians to a weakened part of the defences, and in this struggle slays a 
defender with a spear.41  With an entrance now found, fire becomes a focus, a 
fact which brings to mind the stock features of the Iliupersis, and looks forward to 
the climactic moments of the battle itself.42  We also get a uniquely gruesome 
scene, which might allude to Polybius,43 for Procopius describes the charred 
bodies of the defenders consumed in the spreading fire.44  Unsurprisingly, given 
the heroism that dominates this second phase of the siege,45 Procopius brings his 
discussion to a close by returning to the aforementioned John, the Armenian, 
who falls in the course of the fighting.46 
The fighting lingers at the acropolis of Petra, and, in this final phase, 
diplomacy, generalship, and heroism are the primary factors.  It opens with a 
                                                                                                                                 
the former, Procopius describes a pathetic, and comical, scene in which Bessas orders 
his bodyguards to drag him by the feet not far from the wall (is this an allusion to Troy?).  
What is remarkable is that he does not do this using his own strength, but needs the 
assistance of his spearmen.  On the other hand, the contrast between his feebleness and 
the merit of his plan (intelligence) is perhaps meant to draw attention to his intellectual 
qualities.  Thus, his weakness and cleverness may be connected, and so would be very 
much in keeping with the narrative as a whole, considering Procopius’ emphasis on 
brains over brawn.  With that said, in anticlimactic fashion, Bessas then proceeds to climb 
yet another ladder in an attempt to scale the walls, a display of heroism and dogged 
determinism rather than cleverness.  Robert Graves’ overall portrayal of Bessas in his 
Count Belisarius picks up well Procopius’ characterization of the general as found in book 
8. 
40 Procop. Wars 8.11.53.  One could – and perhaps with reason – lodge charges of 
inconsistency at Procopius in this siege, though this may very well be the point if he was 
criticizing the Romans’ efforts.   
41 Procop. Wars 8.11.57.   
42 Procop. Wars 8.11.59-62.  On the importance of fire in the description of the sacking, or 
at least taking, of cities, see Paul (1982:  147) and Rossi (2004:  24-30). 
43 For the Polybian comparandum see above pp. 259, n. 58.  cf. Polyb. 15.14.1-2.  
44 Procop. Wars 8.11.61-62. 
45 Were it not for a general absence of the usual stress on generalship, we could, in 
keeping with my discussion in chapter 5 (above pp. 296-301), call the first phase the 
Odyssean phase, and the second the Achillean.   
46 Procop. Wars 8.11.64. 
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peace proposal from the Romans, which the Persians reject – rather significantly 
considering the emphasis of phase 2 – in the belief that they will get heroic 
deaths fighting till the last.47  Bessas decides to press on with negotiations, and 
sends an unnamed Roman soldier to the wall to persuade the Persians to yield, 
in a scene that may suggest that the two armies were similarly composed, much 
like the Gothic and Roman armies in Italy.48  This last diplomatic gesture, 
however, fails, and fire becomes the focus as Bessas orders his men to burn the 
acropolis.49 Like their compatriots earlier, they too are burned to death.50  While 
alluding to the heroic deaths of the defenders, Procopius the narrator intrudes to 
tell us about the strategic importance of Lazica, thereby emphasizing the 
standard of Bessas’ achievement.51  To wrap up the siege, Procopius includes 
some technical detail – here about aqueducts – for the first time since the first 
phase of the description, so giving the narrative something of a ring structure.52  
With the siege concluded, Procopius now puts Bessas up for comparison with 
Belisarius: 
And the emperor applauded him especially for the arete he displayed and 
for his prudence, because he brought down the whole of the wall.  Thus, 
Bessas was admired again, both for what had happened, and for the 
arête that he had shown, among all men.53    
 
In the narrative that follows, this summary of Bessas’ background reads very 
much like an overview of the trials and tribulations suffered by Belisarius over the 
course of the text.  After some early success we find that the public had high 
hopes for Bessas, though he stumbled at Rome.54  It is striking that it is only now 
                                                
47 Procop. Wars 8.12.2. 
48 See Procopius’ later comments concerning the composition of the Persian army:  Wars 
8.13.4-7.  On the Procopius and the composition of the Persian army see Börm (2007:  
159-163).  Cf. Rubin (1995), and Dignas & Winter (2007:  63-67).   
49 Procop. Wars 8.12.15. 
50 Procop. Wars 8.12. 16. 
51 Procop. Wars 8.12.17-18. 
52 Procop. Wars 8.12.21-27. 
53 Procop. Wars 8.12.29-30. 
54 Procop. Wars 8.12.32.  Procopius’ comments about Bessas raises interesting questions 
about the importance of warfare and victory among the Constantinopolitan public, a point 
already discussed in part by McCormick (1986:  64-68,124-129).  In this passage the 
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at the conclusion that Procopius explicitly draws our attention to the importance 
of generalship; all we had earlier were hints, such as the comment about the 
importance of the events juxtaposed with his notes about Bessas.  Procopius is 
sure to let us know of the significance of this victory; he thinks that it is worth 
comparing with some of the earlier successes of Belisarius.  Yet, his concluding 
statements about the role of Fortune and God in battle mean that Belisarius 
comes off much the better general.55  For all Procopius’ comments about 
technological innovation and heroism over the course of this siege, it is only at 
the end that we learn what was for our narrator the true cause of the Roman 
victory, God, an explanation very much in keeping with the first seven books of 
the Wars, particularly the Persian Wars.  What we have with the siege of Petra is 
a description that includes elements previously unseen in Procopian battles, 
while also some of those that we have come to expect. 
 
Archaeopolis  
The next major battle that Procopius describes is the Battle of 
Archaeopolis,56 and he leads us in epic and rhetorical fashion into this description 
by providing us with a truncated catalogue of the Persian forces, and some of 
their tactical abilities, as well as a discussion of their strategic objectives.57  When 
he turns to the Romans at 8.13.8, he does the same, giving both their troop total, 
                                                                                                                                 
populace seems to be not only very interested in military events, but also very well 
informed.  Indeed, the importance of success seems to extend beyond the presence of 
generals, primarily those of Illyrian background, in the capital (Croke 2001:  90).  
Belisarius’ triumph that followed his success in Africa, coupled with, among others, 
Tiberius II’s during the reign Justin II suggest that for all its civilian character, the warrior 
ethos still persisted in the sixth century East Roman Empire. 
55 Procop. Wars 8.12.34-35. 
56 For a summary of the battle see Rubin (1957:  511-513), Braund (1994:  302-305), 
Greatrex and Lieu (2002:  119-121), and Syvänne (2004:  470). 
57 Procop. Wars 8.13.1-7.  Some of the concerns raised here evoke those of Roman 
commanders, principally Belisarius (as at Callinicum), earlier in the text, about the loyalty 
of the allied troops (8.13.7).  This also brings to mind the introduction to the Persian 
Wars, in which Procopius recalls the war between the Ephthalite Huns and the Persians 
late in the fifth century; it seems that a great deal of animosity still existed between the 
two nations.  Cf. Dignas and Winter 2007:  97-98; Börm 2007:  206-210. 
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and the objectives and roles of select commanders and their units.  Among those 
listed is Bessas, whom Procopius had only just highlighted for his role in the 
Siege of Petra.  Here Procopius is scathing, painting Bessas as the cause of the 
Romans’ misfortunes in a prolepsis in which he intrudes in the narrative,58 all the 
while pointing to Justinian’s role in this strategic blunder.59  Indeed, in the 
narrative leading up to the battle itself, Procopius is concerned with strategic 
issues:  while technology was very much the focus of Petra, strategy is shaping 
up to be the focus of Archaeopolis.  This discussion of strategic issues is not 
merely a case of Procopius making a display of the breadth of his knowledge, but 
rather it fits into the broader context of the narrative itself, specifically the 
historian’s treatment and analysis of the war;60 Procopius’ brief comments on the 
geography of Rhodopolis continue this trend.61  Our narrator then provides us 
with some insight into Mermeroz’s strategic thinking, before describing the 
commander’s mocking of the Romans at Archaeopolis,62 in a scene that is a 
reversal of the situation at Amida in the Persian Wars.63  Mermeroz’s behaviour, 
and even misguided arrogance, alludes to trouble to come; although the Romans 
there give him a confident response, the commanders at the river Phasis become 
                                                
58 Procop. Wars 8.13.11-13.  Procopius’ comments here lend credence to my view that 
Procopius may have been among those residents of Constantinople he recently referred 
to who had questioned Justinian’s allocation of the Persian command to Bessas.   
59 Procop. Wars 8.13.14.  Procopius says that Justinian has only an indirect role in the 
failure, noting:  “For the emperor Justinian was accustomed to forgiving the majority of 
those commanders who had failed”.  This could also be read as veiled criticism of 
Belisarius, as someone who had failed. 
60 Procopius and strategy is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Nevertheless, there are a 
couple of points that deserve mentioning.  First, Procopius demonstrates a good 
knowledge of strategic, and related to that, logistical issues in this passage, which betrays 
his experience in the army.  Second, whether or not his knowledge of Lazian geography 
is correct – on which see Börm (2007:  210-213) – he not only recognizes the importance 
of control of major access points, particularly in mountainous regions which are difficult to 
traverse, such as this, but he also connects topographic details to wider strategic 
concerns, something he also does in the Buildings.  Cf. Kaegi’s (1990:  76) sceptical 
comments about Procopius’ knowledge of strategy, and Braund’s (1994:  287-311) and 
Greatrex’s (1998:  139-148) discussions of the war in Lazica. 
61 Procop. Wars 8.13.21-22. 
62 “Having come as close as possible to the fortifications at Archaeopolis he greeted the 
Romans there with derision, and acting like a certain hot-headed youth implied that he 
would come back to them as soon as he could” (8.13.25). 
63 On the earlier Amida episode see above p. 129. 
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terrified, thinking their numbers too few to face the Persians, and they withdraw.64  
This is a regular Procopian – and, one might add, battle in general – feature, 
namely, fear leading to flight during, or before the start of, a battle.  Procopius’ 
allusion to trouble through Mermeroz’s hot-headedness comes to fruition when 
the Persian commander discovers the Roman camp is empty:  “Having burned 
the palisade of the Romans and seething with fury he immediately turned back 
and led the army to Archaeopolis”.65  Although the account had initially focused 
on strategy, the emphasis has now, as with the siege of Petra, become 
something else with emotional issues the focus.  Besides the merging of narrative 
features from different parts of the Wars, what we are seeing in book 8 is a 
tendency to break down battle descriptions into different phases, with different 
features, such as technology or strategy, occupying the lion’s share of one scene 
before dropping out in the next as Procopius shifts his focus.66 
At the start of chapter 14 Procopius maintains this geography/strategy link 
with a brief description of Archaeopolis.67  The narrative that follows keeps the 
pattern employed at Petra with a description of the diverse siege machinery, 
albeit in much less detail, which he justifies by referring to his earlier comments;68 
a digression on the origins on one of the barbarian groups involved, here the 
Dolomites;69 before starting into the fighting itself, while describing Mermeroz 
ordering his army, dispatching units hither and fro.70  With the Persian side clearly 
having the momentum, and the psychological level of the Romans at a low ebb, 
we get a curious interlude by Procopius before the battle’s first speech:  “then 
                                                
64 Procop. Wars 8.13.28. 
65 Procop. Wars 8.13.30.  This racing to battle with rage is a feature usually associated 
with Roman commanders in the Persian Wars, and so this episode here marks an 
unusual departure for Procopius.  Indeed, the Persians in this Archaeopolis episode are 
characterized much more fully than the Romans.  That point aside, this description does 
have many of the hallmarks of the battles from the Persian Wars.   
66 Admittedly, strategy, at least at the grand tactical level, returns to the fray following the 
speech by Odonachos and Babas.   
67 Procop. Wars 8.14.1-3. 
68 Procop. Wars 8.14.3-5. 
69 Procop. Wars 8.14.5-9. 
70 Procop. Wars 8.14.10-11. 
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Odonachos and Babas, either to display their arête or wanting to make trial of the 
soldiers, or perhaps some divine force moved them, left a small number of the 
soldiers alone, and ordered them to defend themselves from the battlements 
against those attacking the walls, and having gathered the majority of them made 
some brief exhortation and spoke as follows”.71  Procopius is clearly puzzled by 
the decision to leave such few men to defend the walls; what is most puzzling for 
his audience, however, is the fact that he neither interjects with criticism, nor lets 
us know what they should have done, as he is wont to do, but only identifies the 
incident.  Yet, that is not the only curious feature, for the speech itself contains 
some interesting points about the best means of defending a city in the case of a 
siege.  Here are the pertinent points covered in the text:  1 – avoiding the enemy 
does not provide an opportunity for displays of martial prowess;72 2 – one’s 
bravery is determined by chance;73 3 – victory comes with valour;74 4 – 
attempting to hold out against an attacker by defending from the city walls 
ultimately will not bring success;75 5 – success in pitched battle is the only way to 
ensure success;76 6 – and the Romans are furnished with divine assistance.77  
Much of what Odonachos and Babas advocate is in keeping with the views of 
many of the common soldiery earlier in the Wars; quite often, when outnumbered 
by the enemy, even if only marginally, Belisarius would favour asymmetrical 
combat, and usually to the dismay of his troops.78  Here the difference in troop 
                                                
71 Procop. Wars 8.14.14. 
72 Procop. Wars 8.14.17. 
73 Procop. Wars 8.14.17. 
74 Procop. Wars 8.14.18. 
75 Procop. Wars 8.14.19. 
76 Procop. Wars 8.14.20. 
77 Procop. Wars 8.14.20.  Procopius literally says “help from above” [τὴν ἄνωθεν 
ἐπικουρίαν].  
78 See, for example, Procop. Wars 1.18.8-15.  On early asymmetrical combat see Gat 
(2005:  114-132). 
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numbers is quite significant;79 yet in another reversal of situations as with 
Mermeroz and his fury, here, in point 5, it is the Roman commanders imploring 
their soldiers to charge their foes, despite the troop disparity.  Some of the points, 
such as 1 and 2, seem to allude to the siege of Rome when many of the heroic 
displays were made by Roman defenders from the city’s walls, and then, success 
was often by chance.  Though again, as with the general point about pitched 
battle, it is somewhat the reverse of the earlier Procopian situation, in this case 
the siege of Rome.  Indeed, point 4 could be interpreted as a direct challenge to 
the tactics taken up by Belisarius in a similar scenario at Rome, and suggests to 
a large extent that heroism, and what defines it, was very much in the eyes of the 
beholder.  The third point also seems to hark back to the Gothic Wars, though it 
could just as easily apply to a number of earlier Procopian battles.  Point 6, divine 
assistance, is also familiar.  All in all, the proposed charge by Odonachos and 
Babas seems desperate and foolhardy; given their situation, but, they clearly 
perceived it as the only viable option, and if nothing else, it would prove their 
heroism.  With these words then, the fighting truly begins. 
Fire dominates the next phase of the siege, coupled with treachery, 
elephants, and an analepsis.  As with many an ancient siege, this one at 
Archaeopolis nearly came undone for the Romans as a result of the duplicitous 
actions of a certain Lazian.80  This fellow had made an arrangement with 
Mermeroz to burn the places where the provisions were kept, with two possible 
outcomes envisioned, the first being that, with fire raging the Romans would 
abandon their attack and return to put out the flames so leaving the Persians free 
to scale the walls,81 the second being that they would be so preoccupied with 
                                                
79 We are not told the number of Persian soldiers, though we know there were at least 
4,000 Hunnic allies; on the other hand, we know that there were 3,000 Romans (Procop. 
Wars 8.13.8) defending the city.    
80 Procop. Wars  8.14.23.  On the relationship of the Lazi with the Romans see Braund 
(1994:  268-314). 
81 Procop. Wars 8.14.25. 
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fighting off the Persians that they would ignore the fire and so in a short time be 
forced to surrender.82  As it turns out, Mermeroz has a reasonable grasp of the 
situation, though he seems to have muddled things as the Romans do turn to 
dowse the flames, but it is only a portion of the total force; the rest stay to repulse 
the Persians.83  Much like a number of the battles described in earlier parts of the 
Wars, the outcome of the battle is largely contingent on the ability of the 
respective commanders to perceive the situation accurately and then respond 
accordingly; at this point, Mermeroz seems to be failing, despite his attempts to 
do otherwise.  Another recurring feature from past battles is the effectiveness of 
the unexpected attack.  Though Odonachos’ and Babas’ proposed charge 
seems, ostensibly, to a be an ill-fated tactic given their numerical inferiority, the 
result of their desperate foray is exactly as the two commanders would have 
hoped, so demonstrating their superior grasp of the tactical situation.  What is 
significant about this description, particularly in relation to other such scenarios in 
the text, is that events are usually focalized through the Roman commanders, 
whereas here, things have largely, though not entirely, been focalized through the 
Persian commander:   
Having attacked them suddenly and unexpectedly they terrified them and 
killed many, and they neither defended themselves nor dared to raise 
their hands against them.  For the Persians, not at all expecting that they, 
being few, would go out against them, were standing apart from each 
other and were arranged in disorder so that they could storm the walls.  
Those who were carrying the battering-rams on their shoulders were 
without their shields and unprepared for battle, as you would expect, while 
the others holding strung bows in their hands were in no way able to 
defend themselves against the enemy pressing upon them who were 
themselves standing close together.84  
 
This passage is followed by a couple of colourful incidents involving elephants,85 
the second of which is an analepsis to the siege of Edessa.  Interestingly, 
                                                
82 Procop. Wars 8.14.25. 
83 Procop. Wars 8.14.28. 
84 Procop. Wars 8.14.30-31. 
85 Generally, Procopius seems much more interested in elephants in book 8 than he was 
in books 1 and 2; whether this is a reflection of the situation is hard to say, though it is 
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Agathias, Procopius’ continuator, decides to replicate, expand upon, and conflate 
these elephant episodes in his own History.86  To some degree these episodes 
are not very Procopius-like, for as we have seen, he tends to shy away from 
these sorts of anecdotes.  Nevertheless, Procopius had flagged the importance of 
elephants in the opening lines of the siege, and here they serve to emphasize the 
role of fortune in the Romans’ victory, which also reinforces Odonachos’ and 
Babas’ point about God’s role.   
                                                                                                                                 
likely that Procopius decided to compensate for his more restricted access to information 
by putting greater emphasis on remarkable things, here the elephants.  Earlier he had 
discussed siege equipment. 
86 Agathias concentrates his focus on one lone elephant, while Procopius describes two 
separate elephants.  With that said, both scenes hail from a prolonged description of a 
siege in Lazica, both incidents do not mark any significant point in the narrative in and of 
themselves, though they do follow an important stage, and both come in the context of a 
charge on the part of one side.  Agathias’ description runs as follows:  “…he struck the 
elephant that was bearing down on him ferociously with his spear and drove home the 
point, so that it was left dangling.  The elephant found the blow unbearable [ὁ δὲ 
πρός τε τὴν πληγὴν] and since it was brandishing the spear before its eye it was 
horrified and so leapt backwards, and, whirling round [κραδαινομένου 
ἐκταραττόμενος ὑπεξήγετο ] his trunk like an uncoiling spring, struck many of the 
Persians and sent them headlong, now stretching it out as long as it could go, and 
emitting a harsh and wild noise [τραχύν τινα καὶ ἄγριον ἦχον ἀφίει ].  Suddenly he 
shook off those seated on his back [τοὺς ὕπερθεν ἑστῶτας ἀποσεισάμενος ], and 
having hurled them to the earth, he trampled them to death.  Then he struck fear into the 
whole mob of Persians, the horses reared up [ αναχαιτίζων] when he approached 
them, and cut through and shredded whatever he came across with his tusks.  The scene 
was filled with lamentation and confusion” (Hist. 3.27.1-3).  I have highlighted those 
particular parts that are most evocative of Procopius.  The Procopian passages in 
question are:  “Then it happened that one of the elephants because it was struck 
[πληγέντα ], as some say, or because it suddenly became much distressed [ἢ ἀπὸ 
ταὐτομάτου ξυνταραχθέντα ], wheeled round [περιστρέφεσθαί ] in disorder and 
reared up, throwing off those mounted on its back [καὶ ἀναχαιτ ίζειν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν 
ἐπιβάτας ῥίπτειν ] and broke up the line of the others” (Wars 8.14.32); “one of the 
elephants, mounted by a great crowd of the most warlike men among the Persians, came 
quite close to the fortifications such that it was likely that, in a short while, it would 
overpower those defending themselves from on top of the tower there, since a great 
number of missiles were falling from above, and take the city.  For it seemed that it was 
some sort of machine, even a helepolis.  But the Romans, having hung a young pig from 
the tower, escaped this danger.  For, as is to be expected while it was suspended there, 
the porker let loose some cry, and having been grieved by this [κραυγμὸν γὰρ 
τινα...ἠφὶει ,  ὃνπερ ὁ ἐλέφας ἀχθόμενος ἀνεχαίτ ιζε] the elephant reared up and 
started to step back little by little and withdrew to the rear [κατἀ βραχὺ 
ἀναποδίζων ὀπίσω ἐχώρει ]” (Wars 8.14.35-37).  Although Agathias’ episode is much 
more detailed, as we would expect given the later historian’s proclivities and even though 
in some of those cases different words have been used, as we can see, there are, 
unsurprisingly, more than a few points of contact between the two respective texts. 
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With the battle turning in the Romans’ favour, Procopius returns to the 
Persian and allied focalization in a scene that comes across as a retelling of the 
final moments of the Battle of Callinicum in the Persian Wars, only this time, and 
not for the first time in this siege narrative, the situation has reversed.87  Although 
it does not have the detail that we found in the fast-paced retreat described, 
again, in the Battle of Callinicum, there are again a number of similarities.  The 
casualties weigh heavily in the Romans’ favour with apparently several Persians 
killed.  The panic among the fleeing Dolomites, the capture of the standards, and 
the death of the horses, also point towards Callinicum.88  Following the retreat the 
siege comes to a close.  In summation, with Archaeopolis we get again a number 
of distinct phases, with strategy dominating the first two.  The importance of a 
correct grasp of the situation, along with the closing scenes that come with the 
Persian defeat, all evoke the Persian Wars, a point intended by Procopius which 
is made clear by his analepsis to the siege of Edessa.  Where the description of 
Petra had at first been told in a manner reminiscent of the Persian Wars, with 
Archaeopolis this happens at the end.  Another prominent feature of this siege is 
the number of instances where the events are presented reversed, that is as 
mirror images of those found in earlier, comparable, situations.  
 
Senogallia 
The next battle described by Procopius is the Battle of Senogallia, which 
is unusual for the fact that it is a naval encounter, and the only substantial one in 
the whole of the Wars; it is something of an interlude in the midst of another 
                                                
87 In the Battle of Callinicum it had been the Roman recruits from Anatolia that were the 
cause of much of the trouble to Belisarius and the Roman cause.  As here, Procopius had 
identified this group earlier in the description, a telltale sign that they would have an 
important role in the narrative to follow.   
88 See my discussion in chapter three above pp. 151-156. 
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battle, namely the siege of Ancon;89 and, despite its naval character, it is 
described in the manner of a land battle,90 a point which Procopius later justifies.  
As with many of the substantial land battle descriptions this one opens with a 
catalogue of forces, here ships, only it is a truncated one.91  We learn, for 
example, the names of a few of the Gothic commanders, namely Skipuar, Gibal, 
and Gundulf,92 as well as the number of ships at their disposal, which is 47;93 on 
the Roman side there are 50 ships,94 and the two commanders are John and 
Valerian.95  The battle itself is hastily arranged, as the Romans try to catch the 
Goths off-guard, seeing as they are short of provisions.96  When the two sides 
come close to each other, as in the manner of a land-based battle, they decide to 
pause, arrange their forces, and implausibly, speak to the gathered troops on all 
of the ships.97  The speech given by the two Roman generals is very 
Thucydidean, and evokes some points from the debate in book 6 about the 
Sicilian expedition.98  The response from the Gothic commanders brings to mind 
                                                
89 The battle of Cape Bon is a much shorter description, on which see above p. 217.  For 
an overview of the Battle of Senogallia (Sena Gallia) see Rubin (1957:  518-519) and 
Syvänne (2004:  508-509). 
90 One of the points noted by Adrian Goldsworthy in his closing comments at the 
conference “Discourses of War in the Roman World from Julius Caesar to Heraclius” 
March 8 at the University of Warwick was that Homer does not describe naval warfare; 
therefore, studying combat at sea has the best potential for studying battle in historians 
from a perspective shorn of literary obfuscation.  Yet, there are always complications, as 
here Procopius claims that the battle resembled a land battle.   
91 It was not just the epic poets who prescribed (for their part indirectly) catalogues before 
battle, as the rhetoricians did too. 
92 Procop. Wars 8.23.1. 
93 Procop. Wars 8.23.2. 
94 Procop. Wars 8.23.8. 
95 Procop. Wars 8.23.14. 
96 Procop. Wars 8.23.3. 
97 Procop. Wars 8.23.13.  Indeed, Procopius’ detail about the speech of John and 
Valerian to all of the gathered men in their ships is one of the most implausible details 
from any of his battle descriptions.  This might suggest that Procopius’ audience, as well 
as Procopius himself, had only a limited knowledge of what was involved in a naval battle.   
98 In Thucydides’ debate about the expedition Nicias notes that the Athenians should 
bring along as many supplies as possible, given the likelihood of coming across hostile 
peoples (6.24), while John and Valerian note that war is largely contingent on food 
(8.23.15-18).  John and Valerian also note that much of Italy from Dryus to Ravenna is 
hostile to them, much as Nicias does Sicily and southern Italy.  These points are not often 
made by Procopius’ speakers, and so it stands out here as something un-Procopian, at 
least in the context of battle, and Thucydides is the most obvious parallel, though here the 
Romans won, while the Athenians ultimately lost.   
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some of the points made earlier in the Gothic Wars by other Gothic commanders; 
this suggests to me that Procopius constructed this speech based on what he felt 
was appropriate given what he knew had transpired earlier.99  Procopius then 
qualifies his reasons for giving this sea battle the feel of a land battle by saying:  
“since it resembled a battle on land”.100  His subsequent discussion reinforces this 
claim; he describes the volleying of arrows, and on occasion, skirmishes involving 
swords and spears.101  Once this stage ends, however, the battle assumes a 
more maritime character.  As with land battle, the Gothic ships run into trouble 
when they are disorderly, and this in turn is the result of a lack of experience.  
Procopius also puts great weight on the importance of the arrangements of the 
ships themselves, particularly as regards the intervals of the ships.  He is quick to 
point out the contrast between the two, which is largely dependant on skill, 
something which the Romans have in abundance.  When this is perceived by the 
Romans, they start charging their opponents.102  The confusion of the Gothic 
ships, and the efforts of the Romans to exacerbate the situation, ultimately bring 
about the formers’ demise.103  In the rout that follows, we find many of the stock 
features of a Procopian battle, such as the role of fortune, the lack of awareness 
of the situation which precipitates the flight, the abandonment of any thoughts of 
a heroic last stand in the retreat, and finally the fact that some were saved by 
some chance or other, while the others were killed or captured.  Despite the 
possibility of being a wholly new type of battle description given the naval 
component, in the end Procopius falls back upon a host of the stock elements 
from his grammar of battle.   
 
                                                
99 They charge the Romans with cowardice and call them Greeks (8.23.25), they highlight 
the folly of rashness (8.23.26), and the commanders’ appeasl to their valour (8.23.26-28). 
100 Procop. Wars 8.23.29. 
101 Procop. Wars 8.23.30. 
102 Procop. Wars 8.23.31. 
103 Procop. Wars 8.23.34. 
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Busta Gallorum 
The second last battle of the Wars,104 and one which has received some 
scholarly attention lately, is the Battle of Busta Gallorum.105  As with the earlier 
battles described, this one is broken down into phases, the first of which contains 
vague allusions to Herodotus and Homer.  After describing the marching of the 
respective sides, Narses’ Romans and Totila’s Goths, to the site of the battle, 
Procopius inserts a reference to an earlier Republican battle, one in which the 
general Camillus is said to have triumphed over the Gauls; this comment 
foreshadows Roman victory here over 900 years later.106  Dewing is certainly 
right to point out that Procopius muddled his details.107  But, insofar as Procopius 
believed what he read was true, this allusion serves its purpose as a literary 
device (foreshadowing victory).108  Moving on, there is a diplomatic exchange 
between Narses and Totila, with the former urging the latter to surrender.  Totila 
turns down Narses’ offer, and the two decide to settle things in pitched battle, and 
interestingly enough, at a preset time,109 something that we have not come 
                                                
104 This second last battle is organized along similar lines to the battle of Dara.  The same 
is true for Mons Lactuarius and the Ephthalite/Persian battle.  The two last battles in the 
Wars, then, mirror the first two, most likely a conscious attempt of Procopius to bring unity 
to his text. 
105 Philip Rance (2005) has recently discussed the battle in some detail.  His main 
concern was finding out what Procopius’ narrative tells us about sixth century warfare, 
and where Procopius leads us astray.  Much of this article builds on Rance’s earlier work 
on battle, particularly concerning what Maurice has to say about tactics and deployment.  
Despite Rance’s detailed discussion, however, he does not cover the sorts of material 
that I have thus far in the Wars and as a result, there is still much that can be said.  A full 
scholarly bibliography on the battle is provided by Rance (2005:  425-426, n. 4).  Cf. 
Rubin (1957:  523-525). 
106 Procop. Wars 8.29.4.   
107 Dewing (1928:  353, n. 2; Loeb edition and translation of Procopius).  The fact is that 
we know very little about this period, with most of the sources, such as Diodorus and Livy, 
basing their accounts on much earlier, and lost works.  Camillus does not seem to have 
been in Rome during its sack in 390 BC, but he may have had some role in the 
subsequent Roman recovery following their departure in the 380’s.  Indeed, even the 
question of who Procopius might be referring to when he says “they say” (8.29.4) is 
unclear, based on what he says about Camillus.  Was he reporting a rumour, or tradition, 
still popular in Italy at that time, or, in keeping with much of the rest of book 8, was he 
referring to some text that he had read which described the account and that is no longer 
extant?  Cf. Plutarch’s Life of Camillus; and Drummond 1996a.      
108 There is no hint that Procopius made any conscious error here; thus, he is not playing 
any tricks on his audience. 
109 Procop. Wars 8.29.8. 
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across in Procopian battles.110  Despite deciding to fight eight days later, Narses 
prepares to engage the Goths the very next day, suspecting treachery.111  As it 
turns out, his suspicions are correct, and after the two armies have lined up, 
Procopius digresses to discuss a nearby hill, and its tactical function,112 an issue 
– geography and grand tactics – that is in keeping with book 8 thus far, as we 
have seen.113  There are other interesting features; the first phase of the battle 
itself alludes to the Battle of Thermopylae.  Procopius notes that there is only one 
path that leads behind the hill;114 having noted the 50-man Roman force sent to 
hold the hill, he notes that they arranged their phalanx as best they could given 
the limited space.115  While arrayed in the densely packed formation the fifty men 
manage to hold their position and ward off a series of attacks from the Gothic 
cavalry.116  These charges are quite vivid with Procopius alternating his 
focalization in rapid succession between the Romans, the Goths, and the Gothic 
horses, while also appealing to his readers’ senses, particularly sight and sound, 
from the quick charge of the cavalry,117 and thrusting of the spears118  (in 
                                                
110 This suggests that there may have been a ritualistic dimension to sixth century combat, 
a point worth further examination.  The fact that this issue is not described in any of the 
earlier battle narratives does not mean that it was not discussed.  Dara is instructive in 
this regard, for Procopius tells us about the arrangement of the two lines, then gives us 
the exhortations of the two commanders, followed by the battle itself (which started with a 
series of single combats).  In other words, there is no suggestion in his description that 
one side surprised the other, save for the later arrival of Persian reinforcements.   
There is another interesting element of this feature, namely the inclusion of a mini-
dialogue in direct discourse between the respective envoys.  With the exception of the 
case at the end of the Gothic Wars (6.6.21ff.), and the speeches (which I think are 
something else entirely) found throughout the Wars, dialogues are largely absent, though 
there are a number of episodes in which we know discussion took place, such as the 
three-way conversation between Frankish, Gothic, and Roman envoys at 6.28.10.  In 
those instances, however, the discussion is usually related by Procopius the narrator in 
indirect discourse. 
111 Procop. Wars 8.29.9. 
112 Procop. Wars 8.29.11-13.  Thucydides also devotes considerable attention to the role 
of the hill, Epipolae, at Syracuse, in book 6 (6.96ff.) of his Histories. 
113 Procopius’ subsequent comments about the spring also follow this book 8 pattern 
(8.29.15). 
114 Procop. Wars 8.29.11. 
115 Procop. Wars 8.29.15. 
116 Procop. Wars 8.29.16-21. 
117 Procop. Wars 8.29.18. 
118 Procop. Wars 8.29.18. 
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language evocative of the Classical Greek phalanx, particularly the othismos),119 
to the shouting of the men120 and crashing of the shields.121  This is followed by a 
minor analepsis, as Procopius singles out the bravery of two of the Roman 
combatants, namely a certain Paulos, and a certain Ansilas;122 here we are 
reminded of the individual bravery of Homeric warriors.  In this episode Procopius 
says that the two men jumped in front of the phalanx, threw down their swords, 
and started shooting arrows at their foes, “making an especially notable display of 
arête beyond all others”.123  What is notable for us is the fact that it is their skill at 
archery that attracts Procopius’ attention:  this evokes his Homeric archer/Roman 
archer dichotomy from the preface, and the comments and descriptions scattered 
throughout the Gothic Wars, which emphasize the ability and effectiveness of the 
Roman bow against the Goths; it thereby contributes to the text’s overall unity, 
while also reflecting Procopius’ attempt to keep his description of this battle 
somewhat consistent with those of earlier Romano-Gothic battles.  Procopius’ 
description of this episode implies that the principal reason that the Romans were 
able to hold off the charges of the Goths was the single-handed efforts of Paulos, 
and his ability to use whatever weapons he could find, including his body; 124 this 
last bit of the scene is focalized through him.  As a result of his heroic actions, 
Narses rewards him by making him one of his personal guards.125  This brings to 
an end this first, literary allusion infused, phase of the battle. 
                                                
119 Rance 2005:  442; cf. Hanson (2000:  171-184) and Goldsworthy (1997) on the Greek 
othismos, and more recently Van Wees (2004:  188-191), Rawlings (2007:  52-58, 90-93), 
and Wheeler (2007:  209-211). 
120 Procop. Wars 8.29.18. 
121 Procop. Wars 8.29.18-19. 
122 Procop. Wars 8.29.22.  Cf. Rance 2005:  452. 
123 Procop. Wars 8.29.22.  Unlike Teucer in the Iliad, of course, these archers do not 
couch behind someone else’s shield for protection, in marked contrast to the Homeric 
archers, and another probable reference to Procopius’ archery discussion in the preface. 
124 Procop. Wars 8.29.26-27. 
125 Procop. Wars 8.29.28.  Procopius’ description suggests that Narses was on hand 
paying attention to the actions of his soldiers, or at least was well-informed about them.  
Belisarius similarly rewarded soldiers for their bravery in battle (see above pp. 304-305) 
just as Alexander the Great had hundreds of years earlier.  Indeed, this seems to be a 
fairly common leadership practice in antiquity, and would have been an effective way to 
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The second phase opens with two ominous exhortations, one given by 
Narses, the other by Totila, which serve as indirect means of characterization, 
and as narrative devices, on the one hand, highlighting some of the important 
points about battle stressed earlier in the Wars, and, on the other, pointing 
towards Busta Gallorum’s probable outcome.  These two speeches complement 
each other, as Procopian speeches are wont to do, while also bringing out the 
different character of the two generals and their forces.  Indeed, where the 
respective speeches in the Battle of Dara, for example, not only interacted with 
each other, but also the surrounding text, Procopius constructed these two 
exhortations in such a way that they are perhaps more concerned with 
characterization than other narrative details per se.126  Narses’ opening lines 
betray a lot of confidence on the part of the Romans in their success, a fact born 
out by his suggestion that this particular exhortation is not, strictly speaking, 
                                                                                                                                 
promote loyalty and bravery on the field of battle.  On the other hand, this scene also 
brings to mind this juxtaposition between prosaic unit order and individual bravery that 
has most often been discussed in the context of the earlier imperial army.  As we saw, the 
scene opened with Procopius’ careful description of the closely-packed arrangement of 
the Romans, a formation for which success is based on good discipline.  The fact that 
they held off successive Gothic cavalry charges shows that they did possess this 
discipline; indeed, in the attacks of heavy cavalry this is the best formation to employ, a 
point well known in antiquity, and made especially clear by Arrian in his Ektaxis (on which 
see Wheeler 1979).  Thus, in this battle we also have this manifest juxtaposition between 
discipline and individual bravery. Yet, this does not mean that Procopius’ account is 
contradictory, or that this battle marks an exception to the rule.  As regards the individual 
attacks by Paulos and Asinas, if we are to believe Procopius’ description then it seems 
that the practice had differed little in the ensuing 300 years or so (from the Principate), 
thus possibly offering more proof that the charges of laxity often given to the late Roman 
army need to reconsidered.  Much of the earlier imperial army’s success rested on the 
ability of the commanders to use disciplined and complex tactical formations when 
necessary, while not sacrificing the virtus of the individual soldiers, a balance not easy to 
strike (a point born out recently by Phang 2008).  Indeed, this juxtaposition between laxity 
(at least on its surface) and discipline has become an object of much interest in recent 
years in Roman military studies, though it has, for the most part, bypassed analyses of 
the late Roman army.  See, for example, Lendon (2005:  163-315), Southern (2007:  145-
149), and Phang (2008) for the earlier imperial army, and, Jones (1964:  668-679), 
Southern and Dixon (1996:  170-174), Rance (2007a:  371-378), and Whately (2008) for 
the later army.   
126 I would speculate that it is perhaps more evident here than elsewhere that Procopius 
aimed to construct these speeches in such a way that reflected the characters of the two 
generals, and the two armies, at this particular juncture in the narrative.  In other words, 
he felt that these are the sorts of things that these two generals were likely to say given 
what had happened.  I suggested as much for the Gothic commanders at Senogallia. 
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necessary.127  He notes that they outmatch their opponents as regards arête, 
numbers, and equipment, and that all they really need is to get God on their 
side.128  In fact, he goes so far as to suggest that the Goths would not have 
arrayed themselves against the Romans if they had considered the situation 
carefully.129  Narses then claims that the Goths possess many of those qualities 
which, in Procopius’ evaluation, tend to bring defeat to any side.  These are 
irrational boldness, reckless madness, the inability to look ahead, and a failure to 
propitiate God.130  All these factors together, then, should not necessarily convey 
a sense of foreboding if the opposing general, here Totila, is able to respond to 
and refute these charges.  Totila, however, does not deny these allegations.  To 
begin with, from the onset he characterizes his exhortation as the final one.131  
Totila notes that they have been stripped of all of their power, and that they have 
failed to get what they need, both points which refer to their inferior numbers and 
equipment as proclaimed by Narses.132  He also spends most of his time doing 
whatever he can to embolden his men, who in his own eyes are suffering from a 
severe lack of courage,133 a point made by Narses.  Indeed, side by side, these 
two speeches point towards a Roman victory, and, quite probably, an end to the 
war in Italy.134 
With the speeches concluded the next phase of the battle begins; here 
Procopius examines the generalship of the two sides.  Where the first phase had 
brought out some intertextual relationships, this phase brings out some 
intratextual relationships.  We also see some of the points stressed in the 
speeches reflected in the narrative.  The deployment of the armies is noted, with 
                                                
127 Procop. Wars 8.30.1. 
128 Procop. Wars 8.30.1-2.  Maurice (Strat. pref. 45) also stresses the importance of God 
when heading into battle.   
129 Procop. Wars 8.30.3.   
130 Procop. Wars 8.30.4. 
131 Procop. Wars 8.30.7. 
132 Procop. Wars 8.30.9. 
133 Procop. Wars 8.30.10-16. 
134 Of these two points, it is the latter that turns out not to be the case.   
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detail evinced of the sort not seen in a pitched battle since Procopius’ description 
of Dara, at least as regards the Roman army.  It also includes some narratorial 
comments about the tactical functions of specific parts of the Roman army’s 
formations.  Procopius is sparing in his description of the Goths’ forces, and is 
more concerned with identifying Totila’s continuing efforts to embolden his men 
by riding up and down the line giving words of encouragement.135  This latter 
point reflects Totila’s concerns with the lack of bravery of his men.136  Narses 
does the same thing, though he also holds up torques and golden bridles,137 a 
reflection of the relative prosperity of the two sides, and their psychological state.  
There follows a scene again reminiscent of Dara.  A certain Gothic soldier named 
Kokkas, who had originally been a Roman soldier, rides out and challenges any 
of the Romans to single combat.138  The challenge is accepted by one of Narses’ 
spearmen, a certain Anzalas,139 who like Andreas at Dara, is an Armenian.  
Anzalas is successful, to the applause of his comrades.  As at Dara a more 
senior Gothic soldier decides to follow Kokkas, only here it is the most senior of 
them all, Totila; on the other hand he decides not to engage with a Roman 
soldier, but rather to make a display of his skill on a horse.  Indeed, this 
manoeuvre is in part a delaying tactic in the hope that reinforcements will soon 
come to the Goths’ aid.140  Significantly, the series of single combats at Dara is 
soon followed by the arrival of reinforcements, even though the number of Goths 
                                                
135 Procop. Wars 8.31.8. 
136 As is usually the case, Procopius’ speeches do have some bearing on the text that 
follows, as here.   
137 Procop. Wars 8.31.9.  We are also reminded here of the reward given to Paulos for his 
bravery in the opening skirmish. 
138 Procop. Wars 8.31.11. 
139 See Rance’s (2005:  452, n. 107) comments about the possible need to conflate the 
characters of Ansilas and Anzalas, though I would be more willing to attribute this to 
coincidence rather than conflation.  Presumably, a number of those men who served as 
Narses’ spearmen got that position because of their personal bravery.  Also, Andreas’ 
bravery suggests that, at least in the eyes of Procopius, Armenians were particularly 
noteworthy for his trait.  Thomson’s, Howard-Johnston’s, and Greenwood’s (1999:  xiii-
xiv) and Walker’s (2006:  158-160; 158, n. 158) comments on Sebeos and sixth and 
seventh century Armenia are illustrative in this regard.   
140 Procop. Wars 8.31.17. 
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meant to arrive here at Busta Gallorum is much less than that of the Persians.  
Indeed, to no small degree, the Romans’ opponent here is inferior to that at Dara, 
thus making the eventual victory of Narses much less significant than that of 
Belisarius.  As with Bessas earlier, Procopius has put these two generals up for 
comparison by highlighting the relative similarities of the two battles, Busta 
Gallorum and Dara.  Narses proves himself to be quite well prepared for the 
battle as Totila’s attempt to outwit and surprise him fails miserably.141  There 
follows a re-arrangement of the Roman forces to counter the increased strength 
of the Goths.142  We also get Procopius’ famous statement that Totila had told his 
men to use only their spears and not their bows or any other weapon;143 this 
baffling decision and subsequent action, as Procopius himself readily admits,144 is 
in stark contrast to that of the Romans whose choice of weapon hinged on the 
needs of the situation.145  When the Goths do charge, they do so with the 
recklessness that Narses had earlier credited them with.146  Conversely, the 
Romans themselves have the arête that Narses said that they have.147  As the 
battle rages the Goths start to give way and soon turn into headlong flight.  We 
even get an allusion to God’s role in the victory.148  In the rout the Romans 
slaughter their opponents without mercy, who are themselves shamed by their 
flight, which again gets back to their low psychological levels originally reported 
by Narses, and suggested by Totila’s own actions.  In the end what we are left 
                                                
141 Procop. Wars 8.31.21; 8.32.3. 
142 Procop. Wars 8.32.5-6. 
143 Procop. Wars 8.32.7-8.  Totila might in part have hoped that the Goths would be able 
to defeat the Romans using their own strengths, the spear and the horse, in the process 
matching the heroism of Paulos and Ansilas who also decided to use only one weapon 
initially (the bow), presumably their best.  He may also have been consciously trying to 
play up the Goths martial character.  See Rance (2005:  465-469) for an historical, rather 
than historiographical, discussion of Totila’s decision. 
144 Procop. Wars 8.32.7. 
145 Procop. Wars 8.32.7.  What this difference between Narses’ and Totila’s motives here 
amounts to is an exaggeration of the tactical differences of the Romans and Goths noted 
by Procopius in the Gothic Wars (see above pp. 249-255), brought upon, in part, by the 
low psychological level of the Goths’ themselves.   
146 Procop. Wars 8.32.8. 
147 Procop. Wars 8.32.12. 
148 Procop. Wars 8.32.15. 
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with is a battle in which the winning general, Narses, did greatly outmatch his 
opponent, but in an engagement between sides that were never evenly matched.  
This description amounts not so much to unabashed praise of Narses’ tactical 
brilliance so much as to the advantages that the Romans had when they 
eventually had the resources to match their ambitions.149 
 
Mons Lactarius 
The last battle recorded in the Wars is the Battle of Mons Lactarius, and 
this brief description brings the text to a close.150  In some ways this engagement 
makes a fitting concluding battle to the text, for it incorporates features of a 
pitched battle, a siege, and perhaps best of all, centres on the heroism, and 
ultimately the failure of, a general.151  As with many book 8 battles, it opens with a 
description of the local geography.152  The Goths attempt to fortify their position 
across the River Drakon with towers and ballista put in place.153  At the onset of 
this battle the river serves as a barrier, so preventing the two sides from coming 
to blows, though the presence of the bridge does at least permit a series of single 
combats.154  A bit later, after a successful operation, the Romans seize some 
Gothic ships and put up towers of their own on their side of the river.155  The first 
stage lasts for a couple of months, before the Goths are forced to retreat to Mons 
                                                
149 It is no coincidence that Procopius’ brief eulogy of Totila (Wars 8.32.28-30) evokes the 
one he gave earlier about Belisarius, for which see above pp. 302-306.  As with 
Belisarius, and many of the battles and commanders in the Wars, we get another 
example of the great reversal (peripeteia), a theme Procopius stresses throughout.  The 
reader of the Wars is surely meant to draw parallels between Dara and Busta Gallorum, 
and so Belisarius and Narses.  As with Bessas earlier in book 8, Belisarius comes across 
much the superior general, a point which questions Procopius’ alleged loss of faith in the 
strategos. 
150 On the battle see Rubin (1957:  526-527) and Syvänne (2004:  472).  This battle 
parallels the Ephthalite/Persian battle at the start of the Wars.  
151 It should also be noted that in the first battle described in the Wars, between the 
Ephthalites and the Sasanid Iranians (on which see above pp. 126-127.), the main 
characters were also non-Romans, much as Teias is here. 
152 Procop. Wars 8.35.1-8. 
153 Procop. Wars 8.35.9. 
154 Procop. Wars 8.35.17-18. 
155 Procop. Wars 8.35.13-14. 
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Lactarius.  Eventually they run out of provisions and decide to make one last 
desperate charge against the Romans, in the hopes of catching them off guard 
by its suddenness, a tactic that is often successful in Procopian battles.156  A bit 
alarmingly at first for the Romans, they do not arrange themselves as they 
normally would for a battle, and they in fact seem quite disordered, though 
perhaps significantly, Procopius does not actually use such a word.157  On the 
other hand, the Goths decide to dismount and fight on foot, a move which does 
not allow them to take advantage of a jumbled phalanx, but does enable their 
commander Teias to make displays of heroism.  Indeed, much of the narrative is 
centred on the heroic exploits of this last Gothic commander of the Wars:  “Here I 
shall write about a battle that was worthy of much repute, and, the arête of a man 
who I think is no more inferior than that of any one of the heroes of legend, 
particularly that display [of arete] which Teias made in this engagement.”158  In 
this last battle, Procopius says that the Goths now had the courage which they so 
lacked at Busta Gallorum; when the fighting starts, Teias, the current Gothic 
general, is immediately emphasized.   
As with some earlier battles, Teias, the primary character in this episode, 
stands out from the lot and soon draws the fire of the Romans.159  Here too we 
see Procopius’ continuously stressed belief in the importance of the general in 
the outcome of a battle:  “When the Romans saw him, thinking that if he himself 
should fall, the battle would instantly fall apart for them, all of those who lay claim 
to arête stood against him”.160  This central phase of the battle is almost entirely 
focalized through Teias.  In the narrative which follows the Gothic commander 
draws the attention of all of the Roman attackers; at the time the impression 
given is that he is the only Goth charging their opponents.  Indeed, the sole 
                                                
156 Procop. Wars 8.35.17. 
157 Procop. Wars 8.35.18. 
158 Procop. Wars 8.35.20. 
159 Procop. Wars 8.35.23. 
160 Procop. Wars 8.35.23. 
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purpose of Teias’ guardsmen seems to be to give him fresh shields once the 
others have been filled with spears.161  In fact, we learn little about what else is 
transpiring in this battle until:   
And he [the guard] was standing beside him with the shield, and Teias 
immediately exchanged the one weighed down with spears for this one.  
But, at the same time, his chest happened to be bare in this brief moment, 
and by chance, having been struck by a javelin, he then fell down and 
died from this direct hit.162 
 
Teias’ death, in a manner we would expect given Procopius’ battles from the 
Gothic Wars, is followed by a rather gruesome scene, with some Roman soldiers 
holding his head aloft as a trophy in an attempt to embolden their comrades, and 
demoralize the Goths.163  But, events transpire other than expected, as Procopius 
notes, for the Goths fight on.164  In the remainder of the battle the action is 
described summarily, with events focalized through the respective sides as a 
whole.  With the exception of Procopius’ possible use of a Sophoclean word,165 
the fighting is unremarkable, insofar as Procopian descriptions are concerned.  
The battle itself comes across as something of a stalemate, until the Goths 
apparently perceive – finally is the sense Procopius conveys – that God is 
against them.166  With that the Wars comes to a close, the final battle, 
significantly much like the first one, ultimately hinging on the death of a 
commander. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Book 8 ends just like the Iliad ends, that is, with the death of the enemy 
leader.  Despite attempts to maintain consistency with the rest of the Wars, that 
                                                
161 Procop. Wars 8.35.24-26. 
162 Procop. Wars 8.35.29.   
163 Procop. Wars 8.35.30. 
164 Procop. Wars 8.35.31. 
165 The word, found at 8.35.32, is “ ἀπηγριωμένοι“, which means “become wild/savage”.  
Significantly, Procopius uses the word to describe both sides, by some accounts a fitting 
way to describe the armies involved in the last battle of his history of war under Justinian.   
166 Procop. Wars 8.35.33. 
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is, by describing battles in particular theatres in a manner consistent with how 
they were described in the requisite part of the Wars – battles in the East as they 
had been in the Persian Wars – the techniques employed in the Gothic Wars are 
much more prominent.  On the other hand, where Procopius opened the Wars 
with a comparison between contemporary and Homeric archers, he ends the 
Wars with matters unfinished, much as they had been at the end of the Iliad.  In 
the Iliad we have the heroic, if pathetic, death of Hector; in the Wars Teias.  From 
this perspective, then, and despite the uniquely literary character of this final 
book, Procopius still endeavours to highlight the unity of his text. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Procopius is an historian who needs to be taken seriously as a writer as well 
as a source of information.  As we have just seen, there is tremendous variety in his 
descriptions of battle:  they are far from formulaic.  Procopius deliberately varied his 
descriptions of battle to draw on a range of influences and to convey particular 
messages to explain military success.  It is also clear that when reading the Wars we 
must be cognizant of the late antique context. 
In the descriptions of battle Procopius engages with elements from the 
rhetorical handbooks, historiographical theorists, and military treatises.  In some 
places he seems to be responding to many of the criticisms raised by the rhetorical 
and historiographical theorists.  Thucydides’ descriptions, as we saw, are often 
considered quite complicated, and one could argue that in response to this 
Procopius has generally gone for relative simplicity.  Rhetorical and historiographical 
theorists also stressed the importance of putting events in a scene in their proper 
place, and as we have seen, Procopius is careful and deliberate in his arrangement 
and in the choice of events he describes:  he sticks to the promises he made in the 
preface.  This is partially evident in his decision to arrange the Wars by theatres, 
perhaps following Appian, which, for the most part, alleviated the problem of jumping 
around to describe concurrent events happening in different places.1  I noted that 
many Greek historians were particularly concerned with the tactical conception of 
battle, with Polybius being the extreme example of this tendency.  Procopius favours 
tactical explanations too, at least in the Persian Wars, though as the text progresses, 
particularly as we move into the Vandal Wars and Gothic Wars, morale, psychology, 
                                                
1 On the other hand, this may have been necessitated by the nature of the chronology of the 
events described. 
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and stratagems become increasingly important.  This emphasis on morale and 
psychology in some sense reflects the Roman conception of combat, which is 
perhaps to be expected given that Procopius and his fellow citizens of the Greek 
East saw themselves as Romans.   
Much has been made of Procopius’ relationships with classical Greek 
historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides, and rightly so, though points of 
contact with Homer have generally been overlooked.  These same historiographical 
predecessors often engaged with Homer, whether it was in their prefaces or through 
the descriptions of particular episodes; as such, Procopius’ engagement with “the 
poet” should not surprise.  What should, and does, however, is the explicitness of 
this engagement; moreover, when he does so it is in the most fitting section and 
theatre.  Procopius’ choice to emphasize the Homeric character of Italy and the 
Italian war was deliberate.  In Roman mythology, of course, some of the 
descendants of the defeated Trojans moved to Italy and founded the nation of the 
Romans.  Like the Trojans and Achaeans before them, the Ostrogoth and East 
Roman armies are similarly composed, with heroic leaders and personal retinues.  
As in the Iliad, the war limps along without a clear-cut end in sight.  Both wars also 
begin as the result of a woman, and both texts, the Wars and the Iliad end with the 
death of a leader and the war unresolved.  Whether considering rhetoric, military 
theory, or Homer, it is clear that there were a variety of different literary traditions 
which influenced Procopius. 
Procopius’ blurring of the tactics/morale dichotomy is unsurprising given the 
changes in the tactical and strategic situation of the East Roman Empire.  This 
mixing of tactics and morale was also evident in the descriptions of some of his 
contemporaries such as Agathias and Jordanes.  The main difference between these 
contemporaries and Procopius is that with Procopius there is much more depth, 
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variety, and artistry in his battles.  Besides this trait, another feature which Procopius 
had in common with his fellow sixth-century historians was the nature of some of the 
explanations he gave.  Although I focused on battles and sieges alone, we saw that 
Procopius was no mere reporter, but an historian who sought to explain why the 
battles he described turned out in the ways that they did.  Not only does he provide a 
wide variety of descriptions, but their character, and explanations, vary depending 
upon the context.  In some cases he explains the outcomes in terms of generalship, 
some tactics, and in other battles Procopius has recourse to give divine 
explanations.  This latter point is evident throughout, though most so in the Persian 
Wars and the Vandal Wars.  Again, like the attention to both tactics and morale, 
Procopius shared this with his contemporaries.  The Roman world in the sixth 
century was largely Christianized, and these sorts of explanations support claims 
that Procopius himself was a Christian.  His Byzantine successors would adopt these 
practices, though not from Procopius of course.  Indeed, while accepting that middle 
Byzantine historians may have developed from chronicles than from Procopius’ 
immediate successors such as Agathias and Theophylact Simocatta, there were 
other features of his text besides Christian explanations that anticipate the 
tendencies of later historians, such as his focus on the events of the reign of a single 
emperor.  On the other hand, as I alluded to above with the discussion of influences, 
he is still in many ways very classical.  In this sense he is the embodiment of the late 
antique author and historian, straddling as he does two worlds, the ancient and the 
medieval (here Byzantine).   
Bearing in mind Procopius’ varied influences and the commonalities with his 
contemporaries, it is worth asking who Procopius’ intended audience was.2  A 
number of different answers have been put forth.  Some have postulated something 
                                                
2 Cf. Jeffreys 2006. 
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of a literary elite,3 some closet Platonist philosophers (at least in part),4 some the 
generals and civilian elite,5 while others a more general group of elite.6  As we saw, 
the costs involved with a sixth century education were significant, particularly to 
reach the level to read and write in the language that Procopius did.  Thus, on one 
level we could say that Procopius’ audience included the wealthy elite.  These 
wealthy elites would have had a similar education, and so Procopius’ choice to write 
in a style similar to that of the standard texts like Herodotus and Thucydides was 
largely contingent on his desire to set events in a language, framework, and with 
systems of meaning which his audience could understand.  Furthermore, the fact 
that his text was successful suggests that it had a relatively large audience.  Might 
some of them been from the officer class?  This is a more difficult proposition to 
confirm.  If Latin was still widely spoken and since many of the generals were of 
Balkan origin, then they may not have been able to read the Wars.  What can we say 
about his audience’s tastes?  Well, war was evidently still popular, perhaps even 
more so than it had been in earlier periods, and I would suggest that the interests of 
the elite, at least partially, leaned towards military matters.  Justinian was keen to 
promote success in war, more so than most emperors before him had for quite some 
time.7  It is no surprise then that a military career was a viable option for the elite, as 
volume three of the Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, which admittedly is 
not without its problems, suggests.8  There seems to have been an interpenetration 
                                                
3 Rapp 2005. 
4 Kaldellis 2004. 
5 Rance 2005. 
6 Brodka 2007. 
7 McCormick 1986:  67 
8 I went through volume 3 of the Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire and identified 
those persons who dated to the sixth century. There are 953 total entries (in reality probably 
fewer individuals existed than total entries, and I should note that this list contains 3 of the 6 
emperors who ruled in the sixth century) in Martindale (1992).  Roughly 1/3 of the total are 
elite soldiers (301). Of this group of officers, 53 are of the grade spectabilis, with the rest 
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of secular and military hierarchies.  Indeed, there are signs that the military was 
playing an increasingly important role in public and private life in the sixth century.  
This issue, and related topics on military matters, have not been given the attention 
that they deserve.  Aspects of the army in society, the army in politics, and the army 
and culture merit serious study.  War and culture is something for which there is a 
wealth of material in late antiquity, with the age of Justinian particularly well served.  
In this thesis I have only looked at one text, and rather cursorily at the Graeco-
Roman tradition, so ignoring texts written in Syriac, Armenian, and Coptic.  What is 
more, given my emphasis on literary issues, this sort of analysis could, and should, 
be extended to the late sixth and seventh centuries, with other genres, such as 
poetry, incorporated.  There is also, of course, much more to be done on Procopius 
himself.  A more detailed study of his knowledge of warfare is needed, and unlike 
this thesis, more attention ought to be paid to the reality, and less the rhetoric, 
though the relationship between the two certainly should not be overlooked.   
In the end, it is clear just how important an historian Procopius is.  He 
deserves a wider modern audience, and one that not only has a passing interest in 
the sex and intrigue of the Secret History.  Procopius is one of antiquity’s most 
important historians, and the fact that he is such a crucial source for the age of 
Justinian should be applauded and not bemoaned.  When careful attention is paid to 
his style, intellectual milieu, rhetoric, and intratextual context, an examination of 
something often considered as uninspired and banal as the description of a battle or 
siege can be tremendously insightful and rewarding.
                                                                                                                                      
illustris, that is, more than 8/10.  As regards the civilians, 81 are of the spectabilis grade (total 
civilians 653), with the rest illustris (572), that is, a little less than 9/10.  The low number of 
those of spectabilis grade is probably due to the fact that over the course of late antiquity the 
title gradually lost its lustre (Jones 1964:  529).  Overall, more than 2/5 (248/572) of those of 
the grade illustris are soldiers. 
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Appendix 1:  Battle in Antiquity – Rhetoric and Reality 
 
My focus over the course of this thesis has been on the rhetoric employed by 
Procopius to describe battles in the Wars and I have consciously avoided discussing 
its relationship with reality.  Now that I have elucidated his narrative practices I want 
to make some comments about the correlation between that rhetoric and reality.1   
Historians have a host of material available to them to use when attempting 
to reconstruct an ancient battle, and/or the tactics, conditions, and experience found 
in one.2  The material evidence has been used with some profit.  Dura-Europos has 
provided valuable evidence for siege warfare in the third century, particularly the 
remains of Roman soldiers and an ancient mine.3  On the other hand, an 
archaeological study of the battlefield of Dara has enabled Lillington-Martin to 
postulate a new theory on the location, and to a lesser degree certain elements of 
the course, of the Battle of Dara described by Procopius, which I looked at in chapter 
three above.4  What, to this point, archaeology has not been able to do is provide 
chronological markers, as the evidence uncovered cannot be dated with the certainty 
needed to reconstruct events; like the literature, the material evidence is not shorn of 
bias.  Another possibility is the use of comparative evidence from contemporary 
models,5 whether how to describe a battle and its experience using modern 
                                                
1 Cf. Lynn’s (2003:  xix-xxii) discussion of the relationship between discourse and reality, as 
he conceives it, in his history of battle and culture, and Ravegnani’s (2004:  144-174) 
discussion of the theory and practice of warfare in the sixth century, using military manuals 
and the historical and poetic literature. 
2 The classic account of this matter is Whatley (1964), which has now been superseded by 
Whitby (2007a).  Cf. Sabin 2007:  3-15. 
3 Lee 2007a:  130-133. 
4 Lillington-Martin 2007.   
5 War-gaming has also been used to reconstruct ancient battles, as have re-enactment 
societies.  Cf. Sabin 2007. 
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theoretical approaches, such as the “face of battle”,6 or through the use of 
comparative anthropological material to explain the nature of warfare.7  A cultural 
approach to battle, which has had a major influence on this thesis, has also become 
popular of late, particularly with regard to battle.8  The foundation for many of these 
approaches, however, is the ancient literature itself.   
When attempting to reconstruct, and analyse, the practice of ancient battle 
and warfare, whether regarding the experience of the combatants, the generals, the 
course and chronology of a particular battle, or the tactics used by an ancient army, it 
is the literature that provides the most detail.  Two principal and related issues are 
their usefulness and applicability.  Asclepiodotus provides a wealth of information on 
the workings of the phalanx, including a host of technical terms; on the other hand, 
as far as we know, the man was an armchair theoretician and so we do not know 
whether his description was fanciful or otherwise.  Livy gives a very detailed account 
of the Second Punic War, yet it took place nearly two hundred years before him, and 
he himself had seen little military action.  Polybius, on whom much of Livy’s account 
is based, was closest to the events concerned by perhaps a generation at best; 
moreover, he himself saw action in the middle of the second century (BC).  If we 
have more than one account, as we do for the Siege of Amida in 503, then we can 
compare the respective descriptions and extrapolate a core of historical data.  When 
we have only one source for a particular battle, as we do for much of what Procopius 
describes, the situation is a bit more complex.  This brings us back to the relationship 
                                                
6 Keegan (1976), of course, is the inspiration for the “face of battle” approaches.  As regards 
ancient history he has been followed, in varying degrees, by Goldsworthy (1996), Lee (1996), 
Hanson (2000), Sabin (2000), Daly (2002), and Lenski (2007).  This approach has, however, 
drawn fire, particularly from Wheeler (1998, 2001), largely because of the perceived 
limitations which the evidence provides, and its interpretation, as well as by, more recently, 
Kagan (2006:  7-22), who questions its utility for analysing the varying aspects of battle. 
7 Van Wees 1994, 1997, 2004:  153-165.  cf. James 2002:  28-29; Trombley 2002.  
8 Keegan 1993; Lendon 1999, 2005; Lynn 2003; Brizzi 2004; Phang 2008. 
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between Procopius’ rhetoric and reality.  The fact that we can check Procopius’ 
account against those of other contemporary sources points towards his veracity for 
those where he is the only source.  Plus, in keeping with the Greek historiographical 
tradition, one of his expressed aims was to stick to the truth, and there is little reason 
to question his statements on such matters.9  I have attempted to show that 
Procopius went to considerable lengths to shape his descriptions, from varying the 
chronological order, to focusing, often exclusively, on generalship and heroism.  In 
chapter 6 on book 8, the most literary book of the Wars, I even suggested that the 
battles of Busta Gallorum and Mons Lactarius were modelled on the 
Ephthalite/Persian battle and Dara from book 1.  So, does this mean that Procopius 
has wilfully lied to his audience, and that we cannot get past his rhetoric of combat to 
uncover any reality?   No, for as I noted in regard to the Siege of Amida, we can 
check the authenticity of certain events.  Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, Pseudo-
Zachariah, and Procopius all mention the use of mines to destabilize Kavad’s 
mound.10  On the other hand, both Pseudo-Zachariah and Pseudo-Joshua highlight 
the death of the bishop during the siege, while Procopius omits it.  Based on what we 
know from other elements of this siege, however, we should attribute Procopius’ 
silence on these matters to a difference in emphasis.11  Furthermore, as I have tried 
to show, at least on the field of battle, Procopius presents a balanced picture of those 
individuals he knew best,12 particularly Belisarius, though he does, at times, magnify 
his exploits.13  That does not, however, mean that they are wrong.14  As regards the 
                                                
9 Procop. Wars 1.1.4. 
10 Zach. Hist. eccl. 7.3 (153); Ps.-Joshua Stylites 50; Procop. Wars 1.7.14.  cf. Greatrex 1998:  
85-86.  
11 Debié 2004. 
12 Procop. Wars 1.1.5. 
13 Procopius, in his much maligned description of the Battle of Callinicum, actually includes 
explicit criticism of the general, a point which Evagrius (4.13) picked up on.  Belisarius is 
described in heroic terms in the Gothic Wars, though his failings during his second expedition 
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reconstruction of tactics and combat it is again a question of selectivity rather than 
deception; he focuses on archery because of contemporary questions surrounding 
their effectiveness which he strives to address.  In sum, the mass of rhetoric 
deployed by Procopius does not negate the presence of the identifiable reality found 
in the Wars, it merely shapes it.  
                                                                                                                                      
to Italy draw censure.  On the other hand, in book 8 Procopius includes tacit criticism of 
Bessas and Narses, so suggesting that his opinion of the general was fairly consistent 
throughout the Wars. 
14 Cf. Lynn 2003:  xx. 
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Appendix 2:  Procopius, Belisarius, and Roman Defeat at the 
Battle of Callinicum 
 
 
Different accounts of Belisarius’ role in this battle are given by two 
contemporaries, namely Pseudo-Zachariah and Malalas.1  According to Pseudo-
Zachariah, the reason for Belisarius’ unwillingness to engage the Persians at 
Callinicum had been his piety, and his respect for the Persian commander’s wishes 
that the two sides not fight during the Easter fast.  The pious Belisarius consents but 
as in Procopius’ account he is rebuked by his unholy troops.  The two engage, the 
Persians win, and Belisarius manages to escape.  Pseudo-Zachariah’s account does 
not cast any blame on Belisarius for the outcome, and instead stresses that he had 
been willing to honour the fast.  If anything, it is the Roman soldiers who are to 
blame.   
Malalas’ account is fairly hostile towards Belisarius.  Interestingly enough, 
however, we find some of the same concerns raised repeatedly by Procopius in the 
Persian Wars:  there was discord among the various Roman forces leading up to the 
Battle of Callinicum.  In Malalas’ account Belisarius seems to let his anger get the 
better of him and so he enters the fray perhaps still a little infuriated with Sunicas.  
There is no mention of the unwillingness of any of the soldiers to fight beforehand.  
Once the battle begins and it starts to go in the Persians’ favour Belisarius takes his 
standard and flees.  As a result of the Roman defeat a commission is launched and 
Belisarius is found guilty of cowardice and dismissed from his command.  Needless 
to say, much like Greatrex, I am not so sure that Malalas’ official record of events is 
                                                
1 Zach. Hist. eccl. 9.4; Malalas 18.60. 
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necessarily the one to be preferred.2  Although it is one of Malalas’ longest 
descriptions of battle he has certainly left out a considerable amount of detail.   
Both Malalas and Procopius, unlike Pseudo-Zachariah, find some reason to 
censure Belisarius’ actions, explicitly in the case of Malalas, implicitly in the case of 
Procopius.  Thus, if we accept that in the historical battle Belisarius was in some way 
responsible for the outcome, what is then significant is how the respective authors 
construct their narratives to emphasize their different interpretations of the battle.  
Pseudo-Zachariah’s and Procopius’ accounts both suggest an initial unwillingness on 
Belisarius’ part to engage his foes; thus there is no reason to deny that this actually 
happened.  All three authors state at some point that Belisarius turned and withdrew 
from battle; but, the significant difference is that only Procopius adds some detail in 
between the shift in momentum following the Persians’ breaking of Arethas’ line.  
Pseudo-Zachariah and Malalas omit the struggle that preceded Belisarius’ 
withdrawal.   
In the end the Battle of Callinicum shows us just how suitable battles are for 
analyses of narrative techniques employed by writers of diverse backgrounds and 
working in different genres.  The incredible complexity of a battle forces any would-
be writer to be selective:  it is impossible to record all events which occur over the 
course of a battle.3  
                                                
2 Greatrex 1998:  194-195). 
3 See above pp. 99-106 for a discussion of Malalas’ military narratives and Kagan (2006:  1-
22) for the problems inherent in narrating battles with reference to their complexity.      
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Appendix 3:  Numbers Used in the Gothic Wars 
 
The following complete list includes those troop numbers used by Procopius in the 
Gothic Wars, which I use in section II, chapter 5, to discuss numbers and 
characterization.1 
 
5.5.2 Roman forces 4,000 soldiers from 
the foederati, around 
3,000 from the 
Isaurians 
Troops deployed at 
start of war 
5.5.4 Roman forces 200 allied Huns, 300 
Moors 
Troops deployed 
5.6.2 Gothic forces 3,000 Gothic warlike 
men 
Part of possible 
treaty 
5.7.34 Roman forces 500 men from the 
army 
Troops deployed 
5.10.1 Roman forces Selecting around 400 
men  
Troops deployed 
5.10.3 Roman forces The 400 men Troops deployed 
5.10.8 Roman forces 200 of the men 
around him 
Troops deployed 
5.10.37 Gothic forces No less than 800 
Goths were captured 
P.O.W. 
5.11.26 Gothic forces No less than 4,000 
men  
Troops deployed 
5.12.51 Gothic forces Around 2,000 
soldiers 
Troops deployed 
5.14.1 Roman forces 300 men from an 
infantry division  
Troops deployed 
5.16.11 Gothic forces Cavalry and infantry 
numbering no less 
than 150,000 
Troops deployed 
5.17.17 Gothic forces 22 deserters came to 
them, barbarian by 
nation, but Roman 
soldiers 
Roman deserters 
5.17.17 Roman forces 1,000 horsemen Troops deployed 
5.18.14 Gothic forces no less than 1,000 
Goths 
Casualties  
5.22.17 Roman forces amounted to about 
5,000 
Troops deployed 
5.23.26 Gothic forces 30,000 of the Goths Casualties 
5.24.2 Roman forces, 
Gothic forces 
although the army 
has been reduced to 
5,000 men.  But the 
enemy, having 
Troops deployed 
                                                
1 See chapter 5 above p. 269ff.  This list is meant to be a complete record of the troop 
numbers used by Procopius, though it is entirely possible that I may have missed some 
cases unintentionally. 
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gathered 150,000 
men 
5. 26.19 Roman forces 1,600 military 
horsemen 
Troops deployed 
5.27.6 Roman forces with the 200 men Troops deployed 
5.27.11 Gothic forces no less than 1,000 
Goths 
Casualties 
5.27.11 Roman forces with 300 guardsmen Troops deployed 
5.27.13 Roman forces with 300 horsemen Troops deployed 
5.27.16 Gothic forces 500 horsemen Troops deployed 
5.27.18 Roman forces selected 1,000 men Troops deployed 
5.27.22 Roman forces 1,500 troops Troops deployed 
5.29.44 Roman forces hacked to pieces, fell 
there, along with 42 
infantrymen 
Casualties 
6.2.9 Roman forces 600 horsemen Troops deployed 
6.3.7 
 
Gothic forces no less than around 
7,000 men 
Troops deployed 
6.4.6 Roman forces With 1,000 men Troops deployed 
6.4.7 Roman forces with around 500 men Troops deployed 
6.4.19 Roman forces no less than 500 
soldiers 
Troops deployed 
6.5.1 Roman forces with around 3,000 
Isaurians…and 800 
horsemen…and with 
them 1,000 other 
soldiers from a 
division of horsemen 
Troops deployed 
6.5.2 Roman forces with 300 horsemen 
arrived…they were 
mixed with 500 men 
who had been 
collected 
Troops deployed 
6.7.3 Roman forces with 100 horsemen Troops deployed 
6.10.1 Roman forces with 2,000 horsemen Troops deployed 
6.11.1 Gothic forces 1,000 men…and 
such a number 
Troops deployed 
6.11.2 Gothic forces 500 men in the 
garrison of…he left 
behind 4,000 
Goths…2,000 men in 
the city of 
Troops deployed 
6.11.3 Gothic forces no less than 500 
men 
Troops deployed 
6.11.4 Roman forces with 1,000 horsemen Troops deployed 
6.11.22 Roman forces with the 400 Troops deployed 
6.12.26 Roman forces 1,000 Isaurians and 
Thracians 
Troops deployed 
6.12.40 Roman forces with around 300 men Troops deployed 
6.13.17 Roman forces 5,000 soldiers 
followed with him 
Troops deployed 
6.13.18 Roman forces around 2,000 men 
from the Herulian 
nation 
Troops deployed 
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6.16.18 Roman forces there with 1,000 men Troops deployed 
6.18.6 Roman forces Heruls and 
spearmen and his 
guards…along with 
those with…and the 
followers of…he 
asserted were no 
less than 10,000 
men 
Troops deployed 
6.20.21 General Populace no less than 50,000 
people 
Casualties 
6.21.39 General Populace totalling no less 
than 300,000 
Casualties 
6.23.2 Roman forces along with 500 foot-
soldiers from a 
division 
Troops deployed 
6.23.5 Roman forces with 11,000 men Troops deployed 
6.25.2 Frankish forces 100,000 men Troops deployed 
6.27.16 Roman forces 7 Armenian men who 
were deployed 
Troops deployed 
6.28.10 German/Frankish 
forces 
our army of no less 
than 500,000 warlike 
men 
Troops deployed 
6.28.31 Gothic forces 4,000 Ligurians and 
men from the 
fortresses in the Alps 
Troops deployed 
7.1.27 Gothic forces no more than 1,000 
men following him 
Troops deployed 
7.3.4 Roman forces army of Romans 
numbering 12,000 
was gathered 
Troops deployed 
7.4.12 Gothic forces, 
Roman forces 
for going from 
200,000 men to 
5,000…the number 
that you happened to 
live with was no 
more than 1,000 
Troops deployed 
7.4.19 Gothic forces 300 of his followers Troops deployed 
7.10.3 Roman forces having collected 
4,000 men 
Troops deployed 
7.10.11 Roman forces 170 Casualties 
7.11.19 Roman forces 3 of his 
spearmen…with 
1,000 men 
Troops deployed 
7.11.28 Gothic forces 2,000 men Troops deployed 
7.11.30 Gothic forces 200 of them Casualties 
7.15.3 Roman forces with 500 men Troops deployed 
7.18.29 Gothic forces they were 300 Troops deployed 
7.19.19 Gothic forces all of the Goths, who 
numbered around 
200 
Casualties 
7.19.25 Roman forces 100 horsemen Troops deployed 
7.20.19 
 
General Populace 500 men Men remaining 
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7.20.23 General Populace, 
Roman forces 
26 of the soldiers 
died, as well as 60 
members of the 
public 
Casualties 
7.21.4 Gothic forces, 
Roman forces 
earlier we had 
collected 200,000 of 
the most warlike 
soldiers…we were 
defeated at the 
hands of 7,000 
Greek men 
Troops deployed 
7.21.5 Roman forces more than 20,000 
men from the enemy 
Troops deployed 
7.22.3 Roman forces 300 Antae Troops deployed 
7.22.21 Roman forces the 300 Antae Troops deployed 
7.23.7 Roman forces he came with an 
army…with the 15 
soldiers 
Troops deployed 
7.23.8 Roman forces 1,000 of the soldiers Troops deployed 
7.23.18 Gothic forces a garrison that 
numbered no less 
than 400 men 
Troops deployed 
7.26.6 Gothic forces the army…and these 
same 400 barbarians   
Troops deployed 
7.26.10 Gothic forces no less than 70 
Roman soldiers 
Roman deserters 
7.26.16 Roman forces with those under him 
numbered 1,000 
Troops deployed 
7.27.3 Roman forces 300 Heruls…with 
800 Armenians…and 
guards who 
numbered no more 
than 1,000 
Troops deployed 
7.27.9 Roman forces more than 200 Casualties 
7.27.15 Roman forces 300 of his followers Troops deployed 
7.27.16 Roman forces gathered 900 
valorous men, 700 
horsemen, 200 foot-
soldiers 
Troops deployed 
7.28.10 Gothic forces more than 200 Casualties 
7.28.13 Gothic forces 3,000 horsemen 
from his entire 
expeditionary force 
Troops deployed 
7.29.3 Roman forces? commanders of the 
Illyrians having an 
army of 15,000 
Troops deployed 
7.30.1 Roman forces no less than 2,000 
foot-soldiers 
Troops deployed 
7.30.6 Roman forces army of the Romans 
was 300 Illyrian 
horsemen…100 foot-
soldiers 
Troops deployed 
7.30.18 Roman forces 2,000 horsemen 
from the 
expeditionary force 
Troops deployed 
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7.30.23 Roman forces 80 men from the 
army of Romans 
Troops deployed 
7.34.40 Roman forces (sent 
to Lombards) 
more than 10,000 
horsemen 
Troops deployed 
7.34.42 Roman forces 1,500 allied Heruls 
followed them 
Troops deployed 
7.34.43 Roman forces Heruls amounted to 
3,000 
Troops deployed 
7.35.21-22 Gothic forces the followers and 
some volunteers 
from the 
Gepids…having an 
army of no less than 
6,000 with him 
Troops deployed 
7.36.1 Roman forces select 3,000 valorous 
men 
Troops deployed 
7.36.17 Roman forces with 400 horsemen Troops deployed 
7.36.28 Roman forces being 300 in number Troops deployed 
7.38.1 Slavic forces an army of Sklaveni 
numbering no more 
than 3,000 
Troops deployed 
7.38.18 General Populace all 15,000 men Casualties 
7.39.20 Lombard forces (sent 
to Romans) 
1,000 heavily-armed 
men 
Troops deployed 
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